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The Cancer Centre That Never Was - The organisation of Danish cancer research 
1949-1992 
This thesis analyses the demise of a remarkably resilient idea relating to the establishment of a 
public-private comprehensive cancer centre in Denmark. Plans to establish the cancer centre 
were made for more than four decades without ever amounting to an actual centre 
establishment. After 43 years, the cancer research community finally deemed the idea fruitless 
and no further plans were made. 
But why did it take so long to abandon an idea that had at no point in its existence proved its 
worth or rationale? And why were better alternatives not explored although they presented 
themselves along the way?  
This thesis employs a theoretical framework inspired by economist Douglass C. North and 
sociologist Pierre Bourdieu to answer these questions and determine whether or not the history 
of the cancer centre that never was can be seen as a case of path dependence. In doing so, the 
thesis focuses on three main questions: 
1) Why was the goal of building a public-private comprehensive cancer centre never 
reached? 
2) Why did 43 years pass before the idea of the centre was abandoned? 
3) And is it possible to answer these questions by merely seeing the matter as a succession 
of historical events, or should it be seen in the perspective of path dependence? 
By using North’s concepts of formal and informal institutions, the thesis shows that the failure 
to establish a centre is closely linked to unfavourable institutional matrices at different times in 
history.  
The thesis also shows how the idea of the centre was promoted for different reasons by various 
groups of actors in the case-story, and that the idea was most vigorously promoted in times of 
economic recession as a tool to secure either better funding for individual cancer research 
groups or for the anti-cancer cause in general. At every point in history, at least one group of 
involved actors did not have their needs met by the institutional matrix and used the idea of a 
cancer centre as a way of expanding the matrix to their own advantage – thereby prolonging the 
lifespan of the idea. 
The history of the Cancer Centre That Never Was may, on the surface, seem irrational because it 
never paid off in the form of an actual cancer centre. However, by employing the concepts of 
North (institutions, path dependence) and Bourdieu’s theory on social fields and actor behavior 
it seems that the path paid off in different ways and on different levels than through the 
establishment of an actual centre.  
The involved public and private actors in the cancer research community had other reasons for 
supporting a cancer centre than what was formally presented as the primary objective: the 
scientific coordination of cancer research in Copenhagen. Reasons that reflected a power 
struggle between individual researchers, public and private research organisations and the 
Danish Government on issues relating to the financing Danish cancer research. 
The thesis concludes that path dependence did most likely occur in the story of the Cancer 
Centre That Never Was. 

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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
 
I followed an ostensibly lame turkey over a  
considerable part of the United States one 
morning, because I believed in her and could not 
think she would deceive a mere boy, and one who 
was trusting her and considering her honest. I had 
the single-barrelled shotgun, but my idea was to 
catch her alive. I often got within rushing distance 
of her, and then made my rush; but always, just as 
I made my final plunge and put my hand down 
where her back had been, it wasn't there; it was 
only two or three inches from there and I brushed 
the tail-feathers as I landed on my stomach – a 
very close call, but still not quite close enough; 
that is, not close enough for success, but just close 
enough to convince me that I could do it next 
time.1 
 
(Mark Twain: “Hunting the Deceitful Turkey”) 
 
 
1.1 Setting the scene: Case study, problem and hypothesis 
In 1949, the Danish Minister of Education inaugurated Denmark’s first ever cancer research 
centre The Fibiger Laboratory in Copenhagen2. The laboratory was not only the first cancer 
research facility of its kind in Denmark; it was also the result of an unprecedented collaboration 
between the Danish State and a private interest group (in this case the Danish Cancer Society) 
on establishing and operating any type of research unit with the strategic purpose of solving 
societal challenges at hand3. The Fibigiger Laboratory addressed the challenge of the cancer 
scourge, and the State’s involvement in the lab signalled a new state approach to problemsolving 
– namely research. The laboratory was initially supposed to come to include clinical activities as 
well as research in order to bridge the gap between bench and bedside as seen in the 
comprehensive cancer centres in the US. This would effectively have made cancer research the 
first research field to be institutionally and financially supported by the Danish State who did 
not at the time have a history of funding basic research or even research-based approaches to 
disease management. Instead, cancer research ended up being one of the last research fields to 
                                                 
1 Twain, M. (1957). "Hunting The Deceitful Turkey". The Complete Short Stories of Mark Twain. C. Neider. New 
York, Doubleday & Company, Inc.. 
2 Kieler, J. (1989). The Fibiger Institute 1949-1989. Copenhagen, The Danish Cancer Society, p. 5. 
3 Rud, E. (1953). Landsforeningen til Kræftens Bekæmpelse 1928-1953. København, Egmont H. Petersen Kgl. 
Hof-bogtrykkeri, p. 101.  
 
The Cancer Centre That Never Was 
 
 5 
enjoy such thorough state prioritising as shifting policies, economic conditions and coincidental 
circumstances prevented the plans of a public-private comprehensive cancer centre to be 
realised. However the idea of such a centre was kept alive by changing groups of public and 
private stakeholders for more than four decades of on and off planning, even though real 
progress were never made, alternatives presented themselves along the way and though the 
scientific and societal value of the centre itself was even questioned by statistic evidence.  
Despite numerous failed attempts to establish a centre in Denmark and despite the lack of  
rational basis for continuously promoting it, the idea of the centre was not abandoned for a 
period of 43 years and alternatives were never fully explored. This fact raises two crucial 
questions: 
1. Why was the goal of building a public-private comprehensive cancer centre never 
reached? 
 Why did 43 years pass before the idea of the centre was abandoned?
This thesis describes and analyses a case of “non-institutionalisation” – the history of the cancer 
centre that never was. In following the demise of the idea of a centre, rather than the success of 
one, the thesis distinguishes itself from historical and socio-historical works on the actual 
creation of cancer centres4. However, the fact that no other organisational concept or tool was 
really explored as an alternative to the comprehensive cancer centre also opens a new vista for 
this thesis compared with other works on cancer organisations: Is it fruitful to answer the two 
                                                 
4 Examples of historical accounts of cancer centres that were established are:  
On the interwar establishment of a network of cancer treatment centres in France as part of the French 
Government’s effort to protect the public against what the country’s anti-cancer associations had portrayed as the 
“scourge of cancer”, see: Pinell, P. (2002). The Fight against Cancer: France 1890-1940. London, Routledge, 
Pinell, P. (1991). "Cancer Policy and the Health System in France: "Big Medicine" Challenges the Conception and 
Organization of Medical Practice." Social History of Science 4(1): 75-101.  
  On the establishment of the American National Cancer Institute (the NCI), see: Erdey (1995). Armor of Patience: 
The National Cancer Institute and The Development of Medical Research Policy In the United States, Case 
Western Univesity. Here Erdey describes how the NCI was established in 1937 as the result of the federal 
government’s and President Roosevelt’s Public Law 75-244 which also committed federal government resources to 
the conquest of cancer through the NCI’s grant-in-aid program which became a historical turning point marking the 
entry and expansion of the government into the field of medical research on a chronic disease.  
  On the creation of a centralised Canadian cancer program and its institutional settings, see: Hayter, C. R. (1997). 
"Medicalizing Malignancy: The Uneasy Origins of Ontario's Cancer Program, 1929-1934." Canadian Bulletin of 
Medical History 14: 195-213. Hayter describes how the Canadian Government’s effort to centralise cancer 
treatment in Ontario (1929-1934) was affected by how different fractions of the medical community perceived  the 
plans in relation to their own professional domains.  
  On the establishment of the British cancer research institution The Imperial Cancer Research Fund, see: Austoker, 
J. (1988). A History of the Imperial Cancer Research Fund 1902-1986. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Austoker 
describes the establishment in 1902 of  the UK’s first and private cancer research institution, its research program, 
and its relationship and conflicts with fractions of the British medical community. 
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main questions by merely seeing the history of the cancer centre that never was as a succession 
of historical events; or should it be seen in the perspective of path dependence?  





The concept of path dependence is originally known from a body of economic literature dealing 
with the evolution of technology. The idea that small historical events can cause one technology 
to persist rather than more efficient alternatives was introduced by such writers as W. Brian 
Arthur and Paul David5. David specifically describes why the “QWERTY” keyboard 
arrangement has become universal. The QWERTY system refers to the way the alphabet is 
arranged on key in typewriters today. The system was originally developed in the late 19th 
century by an American inventor. It was to be used in a mechanical typewriter as an alternative 
to a more straightforward alphabetic arrangement, as the pace of skilled typists and certain 
combinations of letters in the English language would sometimes jam the sluggish machine.  
In our digital era, the sluggishness of machines is no longer an issue, and yet the QWERTY 
arrangement still prevails worldwide. Curiously, the QWERTY arrangement is fundamentally 
universal – but locally configurated – for all languages although it only addresses a specific 
problem for the English language. So why did the QWERTY system win in spite of more recent 
(and superior) alternatives that were developed specifically for modern technology in the form 
of computers? David and other path dependence writers propose that it has to do with the 
imperfection of markets, as will be elaborated on in the following. 
When developing new technology one cannot always predict its innovative potential 
downstream. Although some technologies can be assessed as superior to their immediate 
competitors at a given moment in history and therefore gain a monopolistic position, such 
assessment is not always possible if the technologies perform equally well at the onset, and if 
the long term effects and applicability of each technology are unpredictable. So why does one 
prevail in the face of others in these situations? One answer could be that some technologies 
                                                 
5 Arthur, W. B. (1988). "Self-Reinforcing Mechanisms in Economics". The Economy as an Evolving Complex 
System. P. W. Anderson, K. J. arrow and D. Pines. Reading, MA, Addison-Wesley 
Arthur, W. B. (1989). "Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Events." Economic 
Journal 99: 116-31 
David, P. (1985). "Clio and the Economics of QWERTY." American Economic Review 75: 322-37 
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have better luck gaining adherence than other and even superior technologies6 e.g. the 
persistence of the rather odd arrangement of letters on the typewriter keyboard or the survival of 
the gas engine over steam engine motors. And this is where the concept of path dependence 
enters the scene: The consequence that small events and chance circumstances can bring forth 
solutions that locks one in on a particular path7. Following the above, the concept of path 
dependence in technological evolution implies that competition takes place between 
organisations embodying the technologies and making decisions to maximise their profit and 
opportunities in a competitive market, rather than taking place directly between the technologies 
per se.  
In this perspective, path dependence is contingent with whatever shapes the organisations’ 
decisions: Increasing monetary and/or societal returns in a broader sense. An essential part of 
the organisations’ pursuit of such returns is engaging themselves in exchanges – transactions – 
in a competitive market characterised by scarcity8. When different individuals trade, they can 
deliver what they have agreed to (cooperation) or they can defect without paying their dues and 
thereby attempt to maximize their own wealth9. A defection would thus benefit the individual 
defector, but obviously not the other part of the trade – or the economy in general – as the act of 
trading would be conceived as too risky and the gains from trade would not be realized. Formal 
rules/constraints for trading are needed and so is and means of enforcement so that defection is 
punished and not seen as an attractive method for optimizing ones wealth or for gaining 
increasing ones personal gains.  
According to economist and Nobel Laureate Douglass C. North, these assumptions are at the 
very core of neo-classical economic theory as it presupposes rational behaviour and sufficiently 
informed choices from the individual traders, when they enter ever efficient markets that will 
correct their choices through enforcement or lack of profit optimization, if they do not trade 
correctly or wisely10: 
 
                                                 
6 As put forward by Arthur in:  Arthur, W. B. (1988). "Self-Reinforcing Mechanisms in Economics". The Economy 
as an Evolving Complex System. P. W. Anderson, K. J. arrow and D. Pines. Reading, MA, Addison-Wesley 
7 North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change And Economic Performance. New York, Cambridge 
University Press, p. 93-96. 
8 Ibid., p. 11. 
9 For more on the theoretical problem of cooperation vs. defection, see: Ibid., p. 13-16. 
10 Ibid., p. 11. 
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If political and economic markets were efficient (i.e., there were zero transaction costs), then the 
choices made would always be efficient. That is the actors would always possess true models or if 
they initially possessed incorrect models the information feedback would correct them. But that 
version of the rational actor model has simply led us astray. The actors frequently must act on 
incomplete information and process the information that they do receive through mental constructs 
that can result in persistently inefficient paths.11 
According to North, the neo-classical economic theory has been a major contribution to 
knowledge, and its idea of perfect and efficient markets (in which the rational actor always has 
sufficient information to optimize wealth through costless transactions) does work relatively 
well in analysing markets in developed countries. It does not, however, succeed in explaining all 
types of markets and organisations e.g. medieval markets, the Champagne fairs or the 
continuous poor economic performance of third world countries12. What the theory is missing is 
an understanding of the nature of human coordination and cooperation13.  In other words, it does 
not account for the informal constraints that guide the actors’ choices when trading in an 
imperfect market with high transaction costs because of incomplete information about the other 
bargaining parties and the potentially unstable circumstances of the trade. North calls these 
constraints “institutions”: 
Institutions include any form of constraints that human beings devise to shape human interaction. 
Are institutions formal or informal? They can be either, and I am interested both in formal 
constraints – such as rules that human beings devise – and informal constraints – such as 
conventions and codes of behaviour (...). Institutional constraints include both what individuals are 
prohibited from doing and, sometimes, under what conditions some individuals are permitted to 
undertake certain activities. As defined here, they therefore are the framework within which human 
interaction takes place. They are perfectly analogous to the rules of the game in a competitive team 
sport. That is, they consist of formal written rules as well as typically unwritten codes of conduct 
that underlie and supplement formal rules, such as not deliberately injuring a key player on the 
opposing team. And as this analogy would imply, the rules and informal codes are sometimes 
violated and punishment is enacted. Therefore, an essential part of the functioning of institutions is 
the costliness of ascertaining violations and the severity of punishment.”14 
                                                 
11 Ibid., p. 8. 
12 Ibid., p. 11. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid., p. 4.  
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Institutions, both formal and informal thus define the “game” and how it is to be played. The 
objective of anyone playing this game – be that individuals or organisations – is to win by 
employing strategy, skills and sometimes fair or foul means15.  
North defines organisations as “groups of individuals bound by some common purpose to 
achieve objectives”16, such as e.g. political parties, educational bodies, economic bodies (e.g. 
firms) and social bodies (churches, clubs etc.). The institutional framework strongly affects 
which organisations emerge and how they thrive and evolve over time, inasmuch as 
organisations are created and develop as the result of the opportunities for wealth maximization 
the institutions allow for. Nevertheless, the organisations do in turn influence how institutions 
evolve as the organisations seek to maintain, expand or overthrow the existing institutions in 
order to gain, protect or increase their wealth17.  
According to North, institutional change is a complicated process and the changes may happen 
through a change in rules, in informal constraints, in relative prices (such as taste and 
preferences18) and in the types and success of enforcement of the rules. However, the 
organisations’ complex web of contracts with each other makes institutional change typically 
incremental – and path dependent: 
1) because large-scale change would affect too many existing organisations that might 
therefore oppose the change; 
2) because revolution only occurs when competing organisations end up in a grid-lock 
situation that hinders any gains from trade in being made; 
3) and because the incremental institutional changes will be broadly consistent with the 
existing institutional matrix and be governed by the know-how of the organisations and 
therefore make path dependence possible and likely19. 
Institutions typically change incrementally rather than in discontinuous fashion. How and why they 
change incrementally and why even discontinuous changes (such as revolution and conquest) are 
never completely discontinuous is a result of the imbeddedness of informal constraints in societies. 
Although formal rules may change overnight as the result of political or juridical decisions, 
informal constraints embodied in customs, traditions, and codes of conduct are much more 
                                                 
15 Ibid., p. 5. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid., p. 84. 
19 North, D. C. (2005). Understanding The Process Of Economic Change. Princeton, Princeton University Press, p. 
62. 
 
The Cancer Centre That Never Was 
 
 10 
impervious to deliberate policies. These cultural constraints not only connect the past with the 
present and the future, but provide us with a key to explaining the path of historical change20. 
By criticising the idea of the zero-cost transaction and by emphasizing the importance of 
informal institutions in the dynamics of imperfect markets with costly transactions, North thus 
takes the path dependence concept a bit further than Arthur’s and David’s respective works on 
technological evolution. According to North, two forces shape the path of institutional change: 
Increasing returns and imperfect markets characterised by significant transaction costs. And 
whereas Arthur deals with the former, neither he nor David deals with the latter21. However, the 
existence of imperfect markets and insufficiently informed choices lend explanation to why 
some economies or individual organisations continue to perform poorly or continue to “get it 
wrong” so to speak. In the zero-transaction-cost model the long-run path will always be 
successful as the system rewards with increasing returns and corrects erroneous strategies with 
loss of return. Therefore divergent paths or persistent poor performance would not logically 
occur. 
But if the markets are incomplete, the information feedback is fragmentary at best, and transaction 
costs are significant, then the subjective models of actors modified both by very imperfect feedback 
and by ideology will shape the path. Then, not only can both divergent paths and persistently poor 
performance prevail, the historically derived perceptions of the actors shape the choices that they 
make. In a dynamic world characterized by institutional increasing returns, the imperfect and 
fumbling efforts of the actors reflect the difficulties of deciphering a complex environment with the 






North’s analytical and conceptual framework suggests that institutions typically change 
incrementally and according to the beliefs, knowledge and skills of organisations, and that this is 
the reason why path dependence occurs. North also shows that divergent paths can exist, and 
shifts from one path to another are possible when institutional change creates new opportunities 
for organisations to maximise their wealth by terminating one path and following another. This 
is a powerful analytical tool for historical writers, as illustrated in Kurt Jacobsen’s historical 
                                                 
20 North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change And Economic Performance. New York, Cambridge 
University Press, p. 6. 
21 Ibid., p. 95. 
22 Ibid., pp. 95-96. 
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analysis of the development of Danish telecom in which he describes how the almost 100 year 
long process of nationalizing the telephone companies was path dependent23.  
Jacobsen describes how the nationalization was constantly postponed as an arrangement of 
several private companies was successful in providing the telephone services and that the cost of 
altering this arrangement was too high, until a change in relative prices (new technology) and 
taste (neo-liberalism) rearranged the institutional matrix24.  
North’s analytical and conceptual framework also takes into account the fallibility of humans in 
the face of ubiquitous uncertainty, and therefore also allows historians to describe the history of 
those who continuously seems to “get it wrong” by sticking to a path that never leads them to 
obtain their objectives: 
We tend to get it wrong when the accumulated experiences and beliefs derived from the past do not 
provide a correct guide to future decision making. There are two reasons. The set of mental models, 
categories, and classifications of the neural networks that have evolved in our belief system through 
which the new evidence gets filtered have no existing patterns that can correctly assess the new 
evidence. And in cases where conflicting beliefs have evolved, the dominant organizations (and 
their entrepreneurs) may view the necessary changes as a threat to their survival. To the degree that 
the entrepreneurs of such organizations control decision making they can thwart the necessary 
changes. The first of these factors stems from our not correctly comprehending what is happening 
to us; the second, from an inability to make the necessary institutional adjustments25.  
For this reason, North’s analytical and conceptual framework – and in particular his concept of 
path dependence – is the theoretical base of this thesis which analyses the history of the cancer 
centre that never was. That is, the history of a persistent, fruitless and sometimes even irrational 
pursuit of the idea of a public-private comprehensive cancer centre as the central organisational 
tool to strengthen Danish cancer research, epidemiology and treatment.  
North’s conceptual work on path dependence was created to explain phenomena within the 
fields of economics. How can it be used in historical analysis also? North’s uses his concept of 
                                                 
23 Jacobsen, K. (2005). "Institutional change and path dependence in Danish telecom development." Paper 
presented at the conference "Cross-Connections: Communications, Society and change", Science Museum London, 
11-13 November 2005.: 1-16.  
Jacobsen, K. (2004). Jydsk Telefon - "Verdens bedste telefonselskab". København, Post og Tele Museum 
24 Jacobsen, K. (2005). "Institutional change and path dependence in Danish telecom development." Paper 
presented at the conference "Cross-Connections: Communications, Society and change", Science Museum London, 
11-13 November 2005.: 1-16., p. 4.  
25 North, D. C. (2005). Understanding The Process Of Economic Change. Princeton, Princeton University Press, p. 
117. 
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path dependence to explain economic performance, but it can be used as an operational 
analytical tool in other disciplines as well. Different takes on the concept of path dependence 
have already spread to a wide range of disciplines (such as studies of organisations, welfare 
models, medicine and philosophy) but has not yet gained ground in the study of history26. A few 
historians have adopted the concept, but they use it in very different manners.  
One example of historians with different takes on the concept of path dependence is the 
respective works of Harald Rinde and Kurt Jacobsen (see above) on the nationalization of 
Scandinavian telecom systems which in Norway and Denmark tended to go in different 
directions than the rest of Europe that leaned from an early onset, towards a more hegemonious 
state held organisational setup27. Both historians set out to describe how the Norwegian and 
Danish system evolved from a multitude of private telecom companies toward different models 
of state monopoly or a mixture of state and private services. Likewise both historians introduce 
the concept of path dependence in their efforts to explain the respective national developments; 
but they do not use the concept in the same way.  
Rinde seems to argue that the differences in how the two countries developed their telecom 
systems were due to contingent and situation-specific local conditions that shaped the path to be 
followed (thereby ensuring continuance), and his concept of path dependence owes to Paul 
David (previously mentioned in this thesis for his work on the QWERTY key arrangement).  
Kurt Jacobsen, on the other hand, adopts Douglass C. North’s take on the concept of path 
dependence. The difference has been discussed in the above, as North takes the concept a bit 
further than David inasmuch as his theoretical framework enables him to analyse and explain 
the two forces shaping the path of institutional change; increasing returns and imperfect markets 
with significant transaction costs. With his theoretical framework, North delivers explanations to 
the events and institutions that shape the path, and his critique of the notion of zero-cost-
transactions lends a nuanced explanation to why some actors/economies make insufficiently 
informed choices in imperfect markets and therefore continues to “get it wrong”. This is not part 
of David’s conceptual framework which is why Rinde’s David-inspired tale of Norwegian path 
                                                 
26 Jacobsen, K. (2005). "Institutional change and path dependence in Danish telecom development." Paper 
presented at the conference "Cross-Connections: Communications, Society and change", Science Museum London, 
11-13 November 2005.: 1-16., p. 2.  
27 Ibid. 
Jacobsen, K. (2004). Jydsk Telefon - "Verdens bedste telefonselskab". København, Post og Tele Museum. 
Rinde, H. (2004). Kontingens og Kontinuitet: framveksten av stiavhengige organisasjonsmønstre i Skandinavisk 
telefoni, Unipub Forlag. 
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dependence rests on – in a North perspective – unexamined contingent conditions that function 
as catalysts for a path dependent progressive development; and this endangers the analysis of 
appearing like a tale of straight forward causal relation between highlighted events like 
dominoes tipping over and moving the next in line. In other words; it is in danger of lacking 
sufficient explanation to the path’s onset and choices made on the way – what shaped the path in 
the first place and what made the following process path dependent?  
In contrast to the QWERTY case, both Rinde’s and Jacobsen’s telecom cases are not focused 
specifically on technological development. The stories are about the growth and organisation of 
systems and about complex actors in complex structures. Perhaps this is why Kurt Jacobsen, 
unlike Rinde, fully adopts North’s analytical approach to path dependence and adapts this tool to 
his historical study as he explores the development of Danish telecom – not as an inevitable 
result of historical progress from initial contingent conditions, but as the result of actors making 
deliberate choices between alternative solutions under the influence of complex institutional 
matrices28.   
The difference between the two approaches would no doubt become even clearer if the case 
study were a story of continuously “getting it wrong” despite the presence of better alternatives. 
In such a case, the explanatory powers of North’s focus on imperfect markets and insufficiently 
informed choices would become evident, and the concept of path dependence would really 
distinguish itself from what historians could otherwise be tempted to refer to as crude 
determinism.   
For naturally, the idea that a specific “path” can influence and shape historical developments – 
that the development can be subject to “dependence” in whatever form – does not go down well 
with many historians who sees history as the complexity and unpredictability of any given 
situation29. Any talk of path dependence in history is therefore in danger of being perceived as a 
subscription to the theory of determinism in which a historical development can be portrayed as 
an inevitable and foreordained account. However, this is not what North’s concept of path 
dependence is about:  
                                                 
28 Jacobsen, K. (2005). "Institutional change and path dependence in Danish telecom development." Paper 
presented at the conference "Cross-Connections: Communications, Society and change", Science Museum London, 
11-13 November 2005.: 1-16., pp. 2-4. 
29 Ibid., p. 2.  
For more on history and path dependence see: Hirsch, P. m. and J. J. Gillespie (2001). "Unpacking Path 
Dependence: Differential Valuations accorded History Across Disciplines". Path Dependence and Creation. R. 
Garud and P. Karnøe. Mahwa, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. : 69-90, p. 70.  
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At every step along the way [of a given historical case, eds.] there were choices – political and 
economic – that provides real alternatives. Path dependence is a way to narrow down conceptually 
the choice set and link decision making through time. It is not a story of inevitability in which the 
past neatly predicts the future30. 
A historical development can only be said to display path dependence if, at any point in time, 
there were real alternatives to the chosen path, making it more than just a straight forward causal 
relation. And this is the case with the subject of this thesis. The thesis adopts North’s and 
Jacobsen’s take on path dependence to explain its central problem, hypothesis and case study. 
At all times, the organisations and entrepreneurs of the Danish cancer community could have 
explored other means to strengthen Danish cancer research and treatment than the organisational 
idea of the public-private comprehensive cancer centre. There were even pressing reasons to do 
so.  Nevertheless, a period of 43 years passed until this idea was abandoned.  
In summation, North therefore does not advocate determinism. He clearly states that path 
dependence means that history matters and that “we cannot understand today’s choices (and 
define them in the modelling of economic performance) without tracing the incremental 
evolution of institutions”31. With his concept of path dependence, North integrates historicity in 
his conceptual framework for economic analysis, and this is why it can provide historians with a 
tool that offers path dependence perspectives beyond those of traditional historical criticism. 
And it is why North’s use and definition of path dependence differentiates itself from the bulks 
of very diverse literature on the concept. In his own words: 
How human societies attempt to shape their future leads us to deal directly with a fundamental 
aspect of the process of change – its historical nature. We cannot understand where we are going 
without an understanding of where we have been. How the past connects with the present and the 
future is the subject of path dependence – a term which is used, misused, and abused. It could mean 
nothing more than that choices in the present are constrained by the heritage of institutions 
accumulated from the past. But if that were all there was to path dependence then we could 
undertake radical change when we observed that the institutions were performing badly. A step 
toward a more comprehensive understanding of the term is to recognize that the institutions that 
have accumulated give rise to organizations whose survival depends on the perpetuation of those 
                                                 
30 North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change And Economic Performance. New York, Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 98-99. 
31 Ibid., p. 100. 
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institutions and which hence will devote resources to preventing any alteration that threatens their 
survival32. 
The notion that organisations devote resources to preventing institutional change that will 
threaten their survival – while others will fight for the kind of change that will give them the 
opportunity to improve their position and maximize their wealth – seen together with the 
historicity of the concept of path dependence makes it an operational tool to analyse and answer 
the two main questions of this thesis: Why was the goal of building a public-private 
comprehensive cancer centre never reached, and why did 43 years pass before the idea of the 
centre was abandoned?An attempt to answer these questions by looking at the history of the 
cancer centre that never was as merely a succession of historical events would result in a 
description of a bunch of organisations making several irrational choices, while a path 
dependence perspective seems to offer an explanation to the seemingly irrational long-term 
development.  It is central to this thesis to use North’s concepts as a theoretical scaffold and to 
find out, if in fact, path dependence occurred in the story of this thesis. 
  
It is part of this thesis’ objective to demonstrate whether or not the concept of path dependence 
can be used as an analytical approach to the case; an approach that may turn out to be fruitless. 
However, it seems likely that path dependence have occurred as the efforts to establish a cancer 
centre continued for so long without results. Based on this, I have chosen to use the theoretical 
scaffold and the structuring measures seen in the writings of North and Jacobsen to analyse, 
manage and structure the sources and the case study. In the aforementioned article on path 
dependence and the nationalisation of Danish telephone companies, Jacobsen uses North’s 
theory of the path-shaping interdependent relationship of institutions and organisations to divide 
the phenomenon of path dependence into several phases such as, 
 
1)  “path creation”,  
2) “path destruction”, 
3)  “path termination” 33.  
 
                                                 
32 North, D. C. (2005). Understanding The Process Of Economic Change. Princeton, Princeton University Press, p. 
51-52. 
33 Jacobsen, K. (2005). "Institutional change and path dependence in Danish telecom development." Paper 
presented at the conference "Cross-Connections: Communications, Society and change", Science Museum London, 
11-13 November 2005.: 1-16., p.3. 
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Although North never uses these terms himself, they are very effective structural aids in 
illustrating the chronological process of the potential occurrence of path dependence, and this 
thesis will be structured accordingly. However, whereas Jacobsen describes the creation of a 
path that is eventually terminated for a clearly defined and better alternative, this is not the case 
in this thesis. A path is created which is why the chosen phase-structure of this thesis can be 
used to illustrate the occurrence or non-occurrence of path dependence. But unlike Jacobsen’s 
case, this path is not terminated for some obvious alternative. On the contrary, it seems that the 
path is not so much terminated as it dissolves beneath the actors’ feet along the way from 1949-
1992, and this thesis aims to describe this process, and to find out whether or not it can be 
ascribed to path dependence.  
 
The thesis will push the analysis further than what has already been done in the historical works 
of Jacobsen and the economical theory of North by adding a sociological element. Whereas 
Jacobsen and North deal with the interaction of organisations and institutions in a traditional 
commercial market context, this thesis will employ sociological concepts and tools to 
understand the choices and behavior of these organisations (and the individual actors they 
consist of) in an entirely different and predominantly non-commercial setting – the Danish 
cancer community – which the following chapters will show was shaped in great part by 
different organisations, individuals and sets of institutions than commercial organisations.  
 
Even though the case study of this thesis takes place in a community of public organisations 
(such as medical faculties and hospitals) and a private cancer charity instead of in a setting of 
competing private companies striving to maximise their profits on the global market, the 
concept of institutions and path dependence still applies. North seeks to explain economic 
performance and development over time, but he does not explain these processes by referring to 
the interplay of e.g. economic conjunctures as if they were to be seen on a par with forces of 
nature in natural science. Nor does he (in his later works) advocate that the object of economic 
research can be explored under the same epistemological paradigm as natural science. His focus 
on historicity and path dependence symbiosis between institutions and organisations places him 
well within the realms of social sciences – an in particular organisation theory – as he insists that 
the defining structures of his theory – institutions – are created by organisations.  
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It is therefore not a stretch to use North’s concepts to explain the ambitions and actions of 
individuals as well as organisations in the case study of this thesis. Much like economies or “the 
market”, any social system is guided by rules and sets of institutions and in order to thrive, any 
actor has to know the rules of the game. Institutions – be it formal law, traditions of a 
professional society, or even family – exist because they reduce uncertainty and the cost of 
making decisions34. However, as North has pointed out, if the accumulated knowledge or 
information about a trade is insufficient, wrong decisions can be made. It seems that in the non-
commercial setting of this case study, the actors/organisations are not as much punished 
financially by their seemingly incorrect decisions as they are by negative feedback in a broader 
sociological and societal sense. In consequence thereof, they are probably even more prone to 
continuously “get it wrong” as North would have put it.  
 
Because of the historicity of North’s concepts of path dependence and institutional change, they 
are suitable to analyse processes over time. However, whereas North describes processes of 
institutional change and path dependence, he does not describe in any detail the social 
mechanisms between organisations and individuals that change the informal institutions or the 
conditions under which incremental change is most likely to occur. To use his own sports 
metaphor, he describes the rules of the game but not how it is played in practice or for that 
matter the arena it is played in. For this reason, this thesis combines North’c concepts with the 
analytical tools of sociologist Pierre Bourdieu for a deeper analysis of stakeholder behaviour in 
the case study. As will be evident in the following section, Bourdieu takes on a more ahistorical 
and social constructionist epistemology than North and he focuses more on what defines the 
arena and its rules than its historical development. The combination of North and Bourdieu 
yields a socio-historical approach to the study of the complex web of multiple organisations and 
individuals that make out the story of the cancer centre that never was.  
 
In the case study, we follow heterogenous groupings of actors. It is not merely a matter of 
government bodies versus a cancer research community. The cancer research community is a 
very diverse collection of organisations and individuals with very different terms of existence 
and agendas. As such, the community cannot be described as an “organisation” in the sense of a 
group of people with a shared goal, even though they all aim to fight cancer. A classical 
                                                 
34 Rolfstam, M. (2009). "Public procurement as an innovation policy tool: the role of institutions." Science and 
Public Policy 36(5): 349-360, p. 352. 
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organisational theory approach would be very misleading, as the community should rather be 
seen as a field of actors with shifting alliances. To illustrate this point, a short introduction to the 
heterogeneity of the cancer community is needed to set the scene for at further argumentation 
for the choice of a North-Bourdieu approach rather than – perhaps – more classical alternatives.  
About the Danish cancer research community. Cancer research is being done in various forms 
and to various extents at the Danish universities, hospitals, special state “sector institutes” and 
private research institutes.  Generally speaking, Danish universities were state-funded 
organisations with independent legal status up until 200335. In the late 20th century, the 
universities received their core funding through the State Budget, but the basic and applied 
research done there was also supported by grants-in-aid from State research councils and from 
different private companies and foundations. Cancer research was conducted at the faculties of 
science, medicine and agriculture, although not as an independent scientific discipline on a par 
with e.g. organic chemistry or plant physiology.   
Today, most Danish hospitals count (cancer) research amongst their activities, but this has not 
always been the case as treatment rather than research was prioritised until the second half of 
the 20th century.  The structure, financing and origin of the Danish hospital system will be 
elaborated on in the following chapters, but for now it will suffice to say that in Denmark there 
has traditionally  been a local authority responsibility for building and running hospitals which 
dates back to a royal decree of 1806. Consequently, the country’s hospitals have had different 
types of ownerships but can in the 20th century generally be described as a three-tier 
governmental system consisting of: central state ownership (only one hospital, Rigshospitalet), 
                                                 
35 Up until the late 19th century, the oldest Danish University, Copenhagen University (est. 1479) , had the  status of 
being an independent and self-financing foundation with its own funds and capital. An arrangement with the Danish 
state ensured the university private property (former church owned estates) in return for educating civil 
servants/government officers. The university was financed out of the profits of these estates/properties, and was 
only controlled by the King (and later on the Ministry of Church and Education) on the issue of its teaching 
responsibilities. However, in the late 19th century, the university economy was increasingly weakened, and the 
outlook for survival without state subsidies was not good. In effect, the university received state funding for its 
continued operation, but due to legal condition in the Danish constitution, the university’s official status was not 
officially changed although it was commonly referred to as a state institute. Interestingly, the Danish constitution 
did not allow for a state-takeover of the legally independent university’s property rights, and therefore any newly 
established university building belonged to the university and not the state. The state, on the other hand, did not see 
it as a state responsibility to finance such new constructions, and the purchase and construction of university estate 
remained a non-state issue until as late as after World War II. So, in essence, the historically conditioned beginning 
of the country’s first university as estate-owner had long term effects on the status of the universities in Denmark 
which in the 20th century was financed through a multi tier system of allocations through the state budget, grants in 
aid from the states research councils, private foundations and companies and post World War II through state 
purchase and construction of buildings. For more on the above, see:  
Oxenløwe, R. H. (2006). "Bygninger, politik og penge". Lys over landet 1850-1920, Dansk Naturvidenskabs 
Historie bd. 3. P. C. Kjærsgaard. Århus, Aarhus Universitetsforlag: 61-95.  
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county ownership, and municipal ownership – all with each tier governed by a popularly elected 
body36.  Some hospitals are required to do research due to its close organisational links with the 
local university medical faculty, while research at other and for example municipally owned and 
operated hospitals is a completely voluntary activity done in the physician’s spare time outside 
working hours37.  A small portion of the Danish cancer research is done at Statens Serum Institut 
which is the State’s special lab and centre for the control of infectious diseases, referring 
directly to several of the governments ministries such as the Ministries of the Interior and 
Health. 
However, the only organisation devoted entirely to cancer research is on private hands, the 
Danish Cancer Society, which both owns and operates several research institutes and supports 
cancer research at the publicly operated research facilities. Cancer research, as most Danish 
health care research, is heavily dependent on such private funding38.  
In summation, all the institutes, organisations or foundations that conduct cancer research - and 
therefore make up what one could call the Danish cancer field – are very diverse. It is not a 
homogenous field inasmuch as the actors and organisations have different terms of existence 
(funding, ownership, teaching/administration/research-ratio) and different professional 
backgrounds, social capital and organisational purposes, as will be elaborated on below. In order 
to understand this field with its heterogeneous organisations and the actors, North’s conceptual 
focus on symbiosis between organisations and institutions in path dependence needs to be 
accompanied by a complementary sociological approach to explain the creation and anatomy of 
the institutions/field in question. An approach more finely tuned to analyse the behaviour of 
organisations and individuals than North’s. The concepts and analytical tools of Pierre Bourdieu 
meet this requirement, as will be described below.  
	
and their takes on the “rules of the game”
Combining North and Bourdieu in a theoretical frame for this thesis requires some further 
elaboration on their similarities, differences and use in the context of the case study. At first, 
North’s take on institutional change will be described, followed by an introduction to Pierre 
                                                 
36 Haave, P. (2006). "The Hospital Sector - a four county comparison of organisational and political development". 
The Nordic Model of Welfare. N. F. Christiansen, K. Petersen, N. Edling and P. Haave. Copenhagen, Museum 
Tusculanum Press: 215-242, p. 218-19. 
37 Larsen, P. O. (2003). Forskningens Verden - Prydhave, Nyttehave, Vildnis, Aarhus Universitetsforlag, p. 76. 
38 Ibid., p. 77.  While the Danish medical industry has since taken a strong  interest in cancer research, this was not 
the case from 1949-1992.  Originally a private light therapy clinic, the Finsen Institute, conducted clinical cancer 
research. In the 1980’s, however the Finsen Institute was organizationally fused with the state owned university 
hospital, Rigshospitalet, and the cancer  research groups thus became state-funded.   
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Bourdieu and the case relevant parts of his conceptual work. Last, the epistemological 
differences and similarities between the two theoreticists will be analysed in order to describe 
the potential and limits to their complementarity and their use in this thesis. 
To North, formal and informal institutions make out “the rules of the game” when different 
organisations and individuals trades. He argues that organisations will strive to either maintain 
or change the institutional matrix to ensure the best possible frames for their survival and 
maximisation of wealth. Sometimes, this will result in conflicts between organisations which 
have different aims and which are affected differently by the existing institutions.  
 
Stability derives from the fact that there are a large number of specific constraints that 
affect a particular choice, such as those described in the sale of a residential property. 
Significant changes in this institutional framework involve a host of changes in a variety 
of constraints, not only legal constraints but norms of behaviour as well. Although the 
institutional constraints may not be ideal or efficient for one set of individuals involved in 
a particular exchange and therefore those parties would like to restructure the institutions, 
the same set of institutions for other sets of choices may still reflect as efficient a bargain 
as is possible. Moreover it is the bargaining strength of the individuals and organizations 
that counts. Hence, only when it is in the interest of those with sufficient strength to alter 
the formal rules will there be major changes in the formal institutional framework.  
At the same time, the complex of informal and formal constraints makes possible 
continual incremental changes at particular margins. These small changes in both formal 
rules and informal constraints will gradually alter the institutional framework over time, 
so that it evolves into a different set of choices than it began with.39 
 
The concept of continual incremental change of institutions at particular margins can help 
explain the behaviour of the actors in the case study: their changing choices and attitudes 
towards the idea of a cancer centre at different times and under different conditions. In other 
words, the concept can help describe how a change of heart is closely correlated with how much 
the existing institutional matrix works against or for an organisation at any given time. But 
North does not, however, sufficiently explain the social mechanisms by which a group or 
organisation in a community can manage to instate, change or preserve favourable institutions 
when others fail at doing so. He briefly touches the topic in the following – but never in depth.  
Organizations with sufficient bargaining strength will use the polity to achieve objectives 
when the payoff from maximizing in that direction exceeds the payoff from investing 
within the existing constraints. But the incremental change in the overall institutional 
framework is more comprehensive than what happens when economic organizations 
devote resources to changing political rules directly to increase their profitability. 
                                                 
39 North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change And Economic Performance. New York, Cambridge 
University Press, p. 68.  
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Organizations will also encourage the society to invest in the kinds of skills and 
knowledge that indirectly contribute to their profitability40. 
Continual incremental change means that the exchanging organisations gain new opportunities 
to recontract and potentially capture any gains from trade, however in gridlock crisis situations 
none of the involved parties are likely to have the strength to win by themselves and they 
therefore form coalitions and make deals with other interest groups – be that specific 
organisations or the goodwill of society in general41. If the organisations fail to set “a winning 
team” or lack a framework to settle disputes, the gridlock remains and the gains from trade 
cannot be realised which is eventually harmful for both the weakest and the strongest party. In 
these situations, North speaks of revolutions, where entrepreneurs may try to reach their goals 
and break the deadlock by employing severe means. In some markets, this means strikes, 
conflicts and protests etc. In the case of the cancer centre that never was, it was negative media 
campaigns as will be described in a later chapter.  
While North’s conceptual and analytical apparatus will serve as the overall framework of this 
thesis, something “more” is needed to clarify what is going on in such condensed situations 
where conflicts, interests, choices, path dependence and institutional change interact; that is, 
operational tools for an even more extensive sociological analysis of these situations than what 
North offers. To this end the theories of French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, who describes how 
a cultural entity (or field) such as e.g. cancer research can be dominated by its practitioners’ 
struggles to improve their position in an ever changing hierarchy, are both relevant and 
complementary to North’s conceptual framework. Complementary in the sense that they 
describe in detail the sociological mechanisms which according to Bourdieu dictate who and 
what “sets the rules” in the social game of transactions as described by North. 
Bourdieu and the social field 
According to Bourdieu, a field emerges where different individuals or groups compete for 
symbolic or material resources. The field is a meshwork of objective “structures” that through a 
process of internalisation – the actors’ “habitus” e.g. gender, upbringing, education – guide the 
actor in his or her everyday decisions and choice of strategies. The different actors do not have 
the same authority, resources or standing in the field, and they thus engage in a constant struggle 
to move further up in the hierarchy, or in other words, to have “symbolic capital”42. Actors with 
                                                 
40 Ibid., p. 79. 
41 Ibid., p. 90. 
42 Bourdieu, P. (1977). Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 177.  
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this specific type of capital have the power to define which resources are legitimate and 
powerful in a field. The question of how much power an actor can achieve depends on the 
amount and form of resources or “capital” that she or he possesses43.  
Besides “symbolic capital”, Bourdieu operates with three other general forms of capital: 
economic, social, and cultural. The first form springs from the actor’s property, financial 
situation or skills. The second has to do with the actor’s ability to network or establish 
meaningful relationships with other human beings and his social or scientific authority44. The 
third form most often has to do with the actor’s level of education. Actors are ascribed certain 
quanta of different and interchangeable types of capital, and they strive to impose their form of 
capital as the predominant form, thereby gaining “symbolic capital” and power. As a result, the 
field becomes a dynamic arena of constant power struggles, where the actors try to undermine 
each other’s form of capital and thereby create new hierarchies. The field is thus never a steady-
state rigid construction. It is as dynamic as the conflicts that polarise it. In other words, “a field 
is a space in which powers struggle – not only to manifest the meaning of it – but also to 
restructure it. It thus constantly changes its nature. The causal connections of a field in any 
given moment (…) emerge from conflicts and competition and not from a structurally immanent 
logic of development.”45  
According to Bourdieu, the driving force of a social field is the economic practice and strategies 
of the actors to improve their situation in the field which would cease to exist the moment any 
one dominant group or person has eliminated all opposition. Even the rules the actors play by 
are constantly being questioned and changed by the actors themselves. The social field is 
consequently not a designed system with an intended purpose, nor is it to be seen as a well-
greased machine that functions effortlessly through an almost mechanical logic46. 
Bourdieu’s actors employ strategies to satisfy their personal interests (e.g. visibility and 
authority) in the field. For the researchers presented in this case study it could mean a strategy to 
secure better funding of their research activities, to establish their professional status and 
standing etc.: 
                                                 
43 Bourdieu, P. and L. J. D. Wacquant (2004). Refleksiv Sociologi. København, Hans Reitzels Forlag, p. 86-87, 89. 
44 Bourdieu, P. (1979). "The specificity of the scientific field and the social conditions of the progress of reason." 
Soc. sci. inform. 14(6): 19-47, p. 25.  
45 Bourdieu, P. and L. J. D. Wacquant (2004). Refleksiv Sociologi. København, Hans Reitzels Forlag p. 85. (My 
translation). 
46 Ibid. p. 251. 
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In the struggle in which every agent must engage in order to force recognition of the value 
of his products and his own authority as a legitimate producer, what is at stake is in fact 
the power to impose the definition of science (i.e. the delimitation of the field of the 
problems, methods and theories that may be regarded as scientific) best suited to his 
specific interests, i.e. the definition most likely to enable him to occupy the dominant 
position in full legitimacy, by attributing the highest position in the hierarchy of scientific 
values to the scientific capacities which he personally or institutionally possesses (e.g. by 
being highly trained in mathematics, having studied at a particular educational institution, 
being a member of a particular scientific institution, etc.).47 
 
The market for scientific goods has its own laws, and they have nothing to do with ethics. 
And, if we are to avoid creating a place in the science of science, under various 
“scientific” names, for what agents sometimes call the “values” or the “traditions” of the 
“scientific community”, we need to be able to recognise as such the strategies which, in 
universes in which people tend to have an interest in being disinterested, tend to disguise 
strategies.48 
Bourdieu defines the strategies of his actors as plans for either conservation or subversion of the 
power-balance motivated by their interests and including means to be employed to satisfy these 
interests.49 The interests, again, depend strongly on the actor’s position in the field (such as 
scientific authority) and the power it gives them over the field.  
Bourdieu also presents a special concept of professional logics. In chapter 2 of his “Homo 
Academicus” 50, Bourdieu argues that different professional groups are guided by different 
logics – that is the overall norms and goals that unify and identify the group from others. These 
logics refer to Bourdieu’s theory that we usually act according to a meshwork of objective 
structures in our fields which through a process of internalisation (our habitus) guide our 
everyday choices and preferences. But in contrast to Bourdieu’s term “habitus”, the notion of 
professional logics does not seem to depend on the actors’ sexuality, gender, and race, but 
primarily on their education, age, professional position, and institutional affiliation. Sometimes 
these logics prevent the professional groups from seeing eye to eye on essential matters such as 
e.g. the content and management of a cancer centre which is at the heart of this thesis. 
                                                 
47 Bourdieu, P. (1979). "The specificity of the scientific field and the social conditions of the progress of reason." 
Soc. sci. inform. 14(6): 19-47, p. 23.  
48 Ibid., p. 26.  
49 Ibid., p. 29.  
50 Here Bourdieu describes the relation between two systems of differences, on the one hand the type of discipline 
(law and medicine versus natural and human sciences) or of research (clinical versus basic research) with their 
different norms, goals and interest, and on the other hand a series of social properties such as income, political 
persuasion, and addresses between different professional groups at the different faculties of a French university. 
This type of extremely time-consuming research is not the aim in this work on the history of the never-existing 
cancer-centre. See: Bourdieu, P. (1996). Homo Academicus. stockholm, Det Lilla Förlaget, throughout chapter 2.  
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Bourdieu has developed a set of concepts (field, habitus, capital) to help explain the complex 
and dynamic mechanisms by which we all act in the social world – for example in our families, 
our communities and the clubs and associations we join. His notion of professional logics lends 
explanatory power to our behaviour in professional milieus such as our work places. But 
Bourdieu also offers a concept to explain what North does not: why some groups and 
individuals have the power to define “the rules of the game” while others do not. This concept is 
called “doxa”.  
Practical action may be describes by analogy with the orthé doxa of Plato in Meno, as “the 
right opinion”: the coincidence between dispositions and positions, between “sense of 
game” and the game, explains that the agent does “what he or she has to do” without 
posing it explicitly as a goal, below the level of calculation and even consciousness, 
beneath discourse and representation.51 
To Bourdieu, the concept of doxa is a collective sense of habitus in a field. It is what assigns 
symbolic and dominant status to specific forms of capital over others. Doxa is deep founded and 
unconscious beliefs and values that are taken as self-evident truths by all agents/actors in a given 
field. It guides the actors’ actions and thoughts and tends to favour a social arrangement in the 
field, through which dominant groups remain at power as their position is considered natural and 
perhaps even beneficial for all. According to Schwarts (1997), this means that Bourdieu is 
taking a cue from Marxian materialism inasmuch as his concept of doxa becomes a historical 
construct that produces and reproduces the dominant group and the dominated group in the 
social world, although Bourdieu opposed and analysis of society based solely on economic 
classes or ideologies52. Doxa is what makes individuals learn what the specific social conditions 
make possible for them: their place in a social field as defined through language, values, 
education, methods of classifications and everyday life activities. From this, habitus is the 
lasting dispositions for thoughts, preferences and actions an individual develops in response to 
objective conditions (family structure, wealth/poverty, network,  health etc.) it meets.  
Habitus and its collective form doxa thus play important roles in the process of social 
reproduction, as they instruct actors in striving only for what is relatively accessible to them. 
That is why revolution is so relatively rare even in class struggles53. According to Bourdieu, 
even crisis and situations in which doxa may not seem self-evident to all do not necessarily 
                                                 
51 Bourdieu, P. and L. J. D. Wacquant (1992). An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology. Chicago, Chicago University 
Press, p. 128. 
52 Schwartz, D. (1997). Culture and Power: the Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu. Chicago, University of Chicago 
Press. 
53 Bourdieu, P. (1977). Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 170. 
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result in a redistribution of power or a change in the social arrangement of a field as “crisis is a 
necessary condition for a questioning of doxa but not in itself a sufficient condition for the 
production of critical discourse”54. However, power struggles within the the social groups 
conditioned to have power (through wealth, education etc.) is constant, as doxa/habitus makes 
the power and wealth well within reach of these actors.  Also, as Bourdieu views habitus as a 
dynamic concept able to change over time through reactions to the the context, conditions and 
field the agents/actors encounter and engage in, his theory can be used to explain how people 
can resist dominance in one field and express complicity in another55. Context and environment 
are determining factors on an agent’s habitus, which is why the constant interplay of agency and 
structures make agents experience power differently and react differently depending on which 
field they are in: public, private or intimate arenas of power.  
In summation, Bourdieu’s focus on dispositions is an internalisation of the objective conditions 
met in the social turned into subjective patterns of thought and action. As a consequence, the 
field exists only as far as there are individuals acting in it through their habitus and doxa; but at 
the same time a habitus is a transformation of the seemingly objective structures of the field into 
dispositions guiding the individuals’ actions. Field and habitus/doxa are thus interrelated and the 
condition for each others existence. By being part of a field, an actor integrates into their habitus 
a set of rules allowing them to affect the field. As such it is a circular relationship in which 
habitus defines the structure of the field, while the field affects the transition from habitus to 
action.  
Epistemological and ontological similarities and differences between Bourdieu and North 
With the interrelationships between field and habitus, Bourdieu tries to bridge the objective-
subjective antinomy of the social sciences, where different schools of thought have debated 
whether  human behaviour is best explained through objective and overarching social laws 
(structures) or through subjective processes, where the individual mind creates and reacts to a 
perceived social reality (social phenomenologists). Bourdieu seeks a middleground conceptually 
by creating a subtle interplay between his concepts of field and habitus thorugh the dispositions 
of the individual.  To Bourdieu, the social world is objective only in the sense that social 
scientists can realise it, and it is in effect thus a symbolic and subjective world of relations rather 
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55 Moncrieffe, J. (2006). "The Power of Stigma: Encounters with "Street Children" and "Restavecs" in Haiti." IDS 
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than one of objective substances56. In this respect, Bourdieu’s basic ontological assumptions 
about the social world are of an anti-realist, subjective nature: the point of view creates the 
(social) object. He does, however, assign limits to the creative freedom of the 
constructors/actors in their design of the world (the construct), as it is restricted by the doxa, 
habitus and social conditions of society. And this is where Bourdieu’s ontological view gets 
more nuances: The world is a relational hyper-reality in which social constructions appear real 
and independent of us. Although social objects are subjectively created they turn “objective” 
through their relations with other people’s social constructs – the world is thus a world of 
relations.  
Bourdieu’s attempts to overcome the binary objectivism-subjectivism structure in his theory 
make his ontological assumptions about the world a bit diffuse. While he stresses, that the world 
is constructed through the theoretical frames of social scientists influencing percieved social 
reality through the lense of their theory of choice57, his concept of habitus is a hydbrid structure 
of subjectivity and objectivity reflects a recognition of a perceived objectivity of social 
structures with real impact on our every day lives. Similarly, Bourdieu sets out to create a 
practical epistemology for the study of the interplay of agency and structures in the social world. 
So even though Bourdieu is generally a subjectivist rooted in the belief that the social world is a 
social construct, he assigns some objective status to the phenomena subjectively created by one 
individual, when they interact with those created by other individuals. The interaction of those 
phenomena defines and demarcates the social world and can be studied by social researchers. 
So how does this correlate with the theoretical works of Douglass C. North, a theoreticist from 
the academic field of economics which Bourdieu describes as a discipline traditionally practised 
without concern for social relations through a (crude) focus on the laws of interested calculation, 
competition, or explotation? When writing about the interplay of social rules and archaic “good 
faith” economy, it seems Bourdieu indirectly asks for a sociological element of explanation in 
neoclassical economy: 
In reducing the economy to its objective reality, economism annihilates the specificity located 
precisely in the socially maintained discrepancy between the misrecognized or, one might say, 
socially repressed, objective truth of economic activity, and the social representation of production 
and exchange. It is no accident that the vocabulary of the archaic economy should be entirely 
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composed of double-sided notions that are condemned to disintegrate in the course of history of the 
economy, since, owing to their duality, the social relations they designate represents unstable 
structures which are condemned to split in two as soon as there is a weakening of the social 
mechanisms aimed at maintaining them58. 
This plays well into the theoretical works of North (his later works) and his concepts of path 
dependence and institionalised economy that mark a theoretical break from neo-classical 
economy thinking. The economist North is rooted in a more realist assumption about the 
ontological status of the objects of his research and he adopts a more objectivist epistemological 
stance than Bourdieu. But the lines are far from clear cut. In his later works, North is leaving 
behind his early epistemological demands of Popperian theory falsification and taking a small 
step towards a more subjective epistemology. As is described above, North does not liken 
economical core conceps such as market mechanisms with innate, determing structures on a par 
with natural constants. To him, economic transactions are not flawless machinery inevitably 
correcting human action. On the contrary, North states that trades are made by humans; that 
when trading we cannot always gain sufficient information about the trade and the other trader; 
and that we are thus in danger of making incorrect decisions that will not necessarily be 
corrected by market forces for historic and behavioral reasons better described by sociology than 
traditional economics – path dependence.  
So even though they may come from each their ontological stance and disciplinary positions 
North’s concepts of institutions and path dependence and Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus, fields, 
power, forms of capital and professional logics reflect a very similar view of the social world as 
a dynamic changing place of constructs. A world that is affecting and being affected by 
individual and organisational strive for survival, improvement of social/economic/political 
bargaining power, and the constraints these actors impose on themselves. From each their side 
of the subjective-objective antinomy continuum, they both try to balance the explanatory power 
of overall structures versus individual agency in their respective fields of research. North’s 
formal and informal institutions are quite compatible with Bourdieu’s collective concepts of 
habitus, doxa and capital inasmuch as they all describe the often intangible processes 
reproducing social structures in a field – defining both the rules of the game and the game itself.  
North will be used as the overall conceptual and analytical framework of this thesis while 
Bourdieu offers an even finer tuned set of tools to explain the actors’ behaviour in the 
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condensed situations of the thesis case story that may reveal the occurrence of path dependence. 
Together, their concepts can help identify if in fact path dependence has occurred in the case 
study – and why.  
Also the thesis adopts a North-Bourdieuan model for its institutional analysis because it lends 
differentiated tools to address the different levels – or layers – of the development it addresses 
and the interaction between them. That is, a multilevel analysis for a multilevel problem. And 
what does this mean? It means that the puzzle of the cancer centre that never was involves 
various exogenous and endogenous factors corresponding to formal and informal constraints 
created by different levels actors or phenomena (eg. global, state, organisational and individual 
levels).  
An attempt to explain the story of this thesis from any one of these levels alone would be too 
simplistic. For example, you cannot explain the demise of a cancer centre by referring to a 
global level financial crisis alone, even though it did influence the economic performance of all 
the planning parties and the institutional setting on all other levels. This is not the same as to say 
that all levels or factors should be given equal importance in the matter. Indeed, a challenge for 
the institutional analyst must be to identify the appropriate focus in the the puzzle he wishes to 
address and to balance the complex factors against each other to avoid over-simplifying or over-
complicating the matter59.  
For institutional analysis comes with a part-wholeness problem inasmuch as institutions may 
consist of other institutions and/or be part of yet others again. For this reason the present thesis 
will attempt to focus on the organisational level (e.g. the Danish Cancer Society, the university, 
the hospitals, and the subdepartments of all of these) in order to maintain some focal point for 
the reader, but it will go down or up one or several levels to lend detailed explanatory power to 
the dealings on this level when needed. For a sole focus on the organisational level would both 
be too simplistic but also somewhat impossible to uphold faithfully, as organisations themselves 
are made of stakeholders that over time shift organisationl affiliations or go solo with different 
agendas and informal institutions. For instance, within both North’s and Bourdieu’s analytical 
frames, it is important to identify the organisations that are for and those that are against 
maintaining the existing institutional framework.  
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In this thesis, a range of entrepreneurs and organisations do at some point in history try to either 
change or maintain the institutional matrix using the idea of the cancer centre as both the means 
and/or the end to do so.  However, the groupings change along the way and they are very 
heterogeneous to the point that they might seem as nothing more than clusters of people who 
coincidently acted in the same way on the issue of the establishment of cancer centres. By using 
Bourdieu and his concept of habitus and the notion professional logic, and by looking at the 
pertinent properties that made the actors of this case study inclined to act in certain ways 
regarding the planning for the cancer centre, one could no doubt yield a much more nuanced 
division of the actors and organisations into numerous groupings – e.g. basic scientists vs. 
clinicians vs. research administrators –  but the mere amount of emerging groupings and sub 
groupings60 would blur rather than clarify the analysis of why the cancer centre never came into 
existence.  So instead of using Bourdieu’s concepts to create archetypical groupings based on 
professional logic, they will be used to explain, from a sociological perspective, why 
organisations and individual entrepreneurs chose to expand or maintain the institutional matrix 
with regards to the planning for the cancer centre. In other words, Bourdieu’s sociologically 
rooted tools complement North’s economic framework in describing and analysing these 
dynamic groupings in the cancer community61 where the case study takes place.  
	
		
Other theoretical frames have been suggested for this thesis along the way including a series of 
different organisation theory approaches and also game theory. As shown in the above, this 
thesis does not deal with one single organisation – or even the interaction of a limited number of 
                                                 
60 These groupings would be opposed to each other – and therefore be distinct from each other – on some issues and 
overlap on others, on issues such as  research management, the role of basic sciences in cancer research, the 
appropriateness of business strategies in a private cancer charity, and the cancer charity’s need for asset 
management and PR. For this reason, such fluctuating groups would not be very operational, and this thesis will 
focus on the abovementioned two which may be heterogeneous but within North’s conceptual framework and the 
path dependence perspective, they serve the purpose of explaining the story of the cancer centre that never was as 
something more than just a succession of historical events.  
61Here I use ”cancer community” as a term denominating a broad group consisting of the different researchers, 
physicians, institutions, professional societies and charities that worked on cancer research, treatment, control (such 
as public education), political lobbying, and fundraising for cancer projects. In other words, both the grant receivers 
in the public and private cancer laboratories and the funding authorities such as the Danish Cancer Society. In this 
respect, my use  of the term parallels that of James T. Patterson, who uses terms such as “alliances against cancer” 
and “the cancer establishment”. Patterson, J. T. (1987). The Dread Disease: Cancer and Modern American Culture. 
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, p. 82, p. 266 & p. 286. However, Bourdieu would not have approved of this 
use of the word “community” as it gives a false sense of unity. It is more pragmatic to use this term instead of 
always having to write “researchers, physicians, societies, charities, and administrators affiliated with the cancer 
research field”, though. Aside from this pragmatic reservation, I do agree with Bourdieu. When Bourdieu himself at 
one point does use the term “scientific community”, he adds that it would be better to call it” a club open only to 
native and adopted members of the Ivy League.”Bourdieu, P. (1979). "The specificity of the scientific field and the 
social conditions of the progress of reason." Soc. sci. inform. 14(6): 19-47, p. 38.  
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organisations with clearly defined membership, values, strategies and interests. The case study 
describes a multitude of organisations with interchangeable memberships, individuals 
counteracting their organisational affiliation, individuals acting without apparent organisational 
affiliation etc. The study’s gallery of actors is therefore too complex to lend itself to a classical 
analysis of individual organisations and their place in a well defined politico-economical 
ecosystem. The members of the organisations do not necessarily act as a collective 
organisational body. They typically act as individuals representing both organisational and 
individual interests: e.g. a public cancer researcher who also serves as a member of the 
Scientific Council of the private Danish Cancer Society. For this reason, the case study cannot 
rest on organisation level analysis alone.  
 
Niels Åkerstrøm Andersen’s works on partnerships between organisations has been specifically 
suggested as a possible alternative to the thesis’ current theoretical framework. With regards to 
topic, Åkerstrøm Andersen’s work would seem a good fit for the case study of this thesis, as it 
centers on several organisations’ attempts to co-create a cancer centre. Åkerstrøm Andersen 
describes the benefits and the fallpits of partnerships between different organisations (public, 
private, NGO’s) in their pursuit for shared goals such as symbiotic co-existence, co-creation, 
solution to societal challenges and so forth. He describes how classical contract-mediated 
collaborations like licitations and traditional Public-Private-Partnering pose serious risks for 
reduction of the innovative potential and benefit of the partnerships, as the contract can lead to a 
passive client-supplier relationship where power distribution is uneven62. A fruitfull partnership, 
on the contrary, must be more equal and address possible shared goals and strategies in an open 
and mutually beneficial manner. The partnership becomes an alternative in society to 
“outsorcing, an alternative to sectoral break-ups, an alternative to state, market and civil society 
respectively, and also a mediator between these”63.   
 
In this respect, Åkerstrøm Andersen bases his approach to partnerships on sociologist Niklas 
Luhman’s view on interactive systems.  In his body of work, Luhmann describes society as a 
system of independent (and atopoietic) subsystems such as e.g. family, law, economy, politics or 
even commercial organisations, which closes themselves commincatively from their 
surroundings through the use of historically differentiated interaction-modes and communication 
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– codes64. To Luhmann, social systems built these differences in the actors/subsystem 
commincations on how they see the world and which are the basis of the decisions they make. In 
particular, Luhmann points to his concept of reflexive communication to describe an 
organisation’s ability to reflect upon its own world perception in contrast to others and 
formulate survival strategies and decisions based on this65. In fact, decisions are the central 
element of any organisation66. 
To Luhmann, decisions er not to be seen as choices that are transformed into action. They are 
open scenarious for the future that are turned into fixed scenarios for the future through 
communication in concert with social expectations. More often than not, it will only be possible 
to know that a decision has been made in hindsight, when one can meaningfully link a given 
action and its premises to a prior communication effort67. 
  
Åkerstrøm Andersen’s use of Luhmann serves the purpose of presenting partnerships as 
“machines of possibilities” not accessable by the partners by themselves. Through a viable and 
effortless partnership, organisations can open the door to new opportunities for business 
development, cost-efficient operation, new innovative services/products etc. Naturally, the good 
partnership needs a lot of preparation and translation so that two different subsystems can 
interact without problems. And according to Åkerstrøm Andersen, a tool for this would be 
Luhmann’s take on communication. In this respect,  
partnerships are seen as constructions with special legitimacy due to their communication ability 
to carry out opposing expectations from the partners. As such, the concept of partnership could 
have been used to point to faulty communication as the reason why the proposed partnership 
surrounding the establishment of a Danish cancer research centre was never successful. 
 
But though Åkerstrøm Andersen and Luhmann can identify right and wrong ways to go about 
the communicative actions needed to fuse interests and create partnerships between 
organisations with different value and goals, they cannot account for the surprisingly long time 
span of 43 years that passed before the particular partnership for a cancer centre was deemed 
unfavourable. And this is the reason why North’s concept of path dependence has been chosen 
                                                 
64 Luhmann, N. (1999). Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft, Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Wissenschaft, p. 72, 190.  
65 Luhmann, N. (2013). Indføring i systemteorien, Unge Pædagoger. 
66 Luhmann, N. (2006). Orgaisation und Entscheidung. Wiesbalder, VS Verlag für Socialwissenschaften, p. 46, 63. 
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to uncover possible rationality in a seemingly irrational historical development. As described 
above, the choice of Bourdieu as the complementary theoretical addition owes to North’s and 
Bourdieu’s common view on individuals, organisations and their attempt to bridge the gap 
between overall structures and individual agency as the main explanatory factor in human 
behaviour. Bourdieu’s conceptual interrelationship between field and habitus makes for a more 
practical study of individual behaviour than e.g. Luhmann’s more abstract focus on 
communication. While Luhmann illustrates important challenges regarding the manner 
information and messages from organisations are communicated and received by other 
organisations, Bourdieu’s conceptual frame can account for the “blind spots” organisations have 
about each other’s motivation, and for the powerstruggle that sometimes leads to alliances and 
sometimes to irreconcilable conflicts and defection from contracts or informal deals.  
 
Game theory has also been suggested as a matrix to explain actor behaviour (such as defection) 
in the case study. Originally developed by mathematicians John Nash and John Von Neumann 
as a mathematical model to explain game strategy, game theory has since been introduced in 
social sciences to explain the interaction people have with each other. As such, human 
behaviour is likened with a game with winners, losers, rewards and punishments. Game theory 
describes different types of interactions/games and the strategies which the players will logically 
employ in the games under different conditions (e.g. zero-sum-games, Prisoner’s Dilemma). 
Game theorists investigate strategic interaction between two or more actors – individuals, 
corporate or other. They deal with four types of interdependencies/rules: 1) that rewards of each 
depend on the choices of all players, 2) that the rewards of each depend on the rewards of all 
through e.g. envy, altruism and solidarity, 3) that the choice/action of each depends on the 
choices of allthrough strategic reasoning and finally, 4) that the desire to play of each depends 
on the actions of all through individual preferences and plans being social in their origin68. 
Game theory cannot deal in details with the latter – the social origins of actor preferences – and 
this makes the North-Bourdieu frame preferable in the present thesis. In addition, game theory 
implies further a series of assumptions that are not compatible with the thesis case study: 
 
1) The payoffs are known by all players and fixed. 
2) The number of players is fixed and they are known by all. 
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3) All players behave rationally. 
4) The rules of the game are common knowledge. 
 
According to critics, this means that when used in social studies, game theory makes largely 
unrealistic assumptions about the players: complete, shared and valid knowledge about the game 
to be played69.  Such an assumption is in direct opposition to North’s path dependence concept 
and argument that actors make mistakes because they will sometimes make transactions based 
on incomplete information about the trade itself and about the other traders. If game theory was 
to be used on the case study of this thesis – the 43 years of fruitless planning for a cancer centre 
in the face of better alternatives – it would render the development irrational and inexplicable. 
This is why North and Bourdieu have been preferred for this thesis. 
1.3 The semantics of the thesis: talking about “cancer research” 
A series of terms and concepts will be used consistently throughout the thesis such as “cancer”, 
“cancer research” and “cancer centre”. These terms are semantically loaded and an introduction 
to their use and meaning in this thesis is therefore needed. In order to do so, a historic context 
will be presented in the following. 
In Denmark, as in most other countries, cancer research as a general research area has not been 
established as a discipline at the universities on a par with e.g. physiology inasmuch as there is 
not a department dedicated for “cancer research” specifically. The medical profession has 
traditionally been arranged in specialist areas, with each their individually designed education 
packages, professional societies, journals, status and place at the hospitals and at the medical 
faculties and in some cases at special private practices as well70. In Denmark, though, oncology 
was not accepted by the medical community as a specialty until as late as 200471. The field of 
oncology stemmed from a strong radiological tradition in Denmark, but with the introduction of 
chemotherapy in the 1960’s, the field grew more complex and diverse and was practiced as an 
interest-activity within many different well-established specialities such as general medicine, 
radiology and so forth. So, cancer research and even oncology was not a separate scientific 
discipline or medical speciality in Denmark in the space of time covered by this thesis. In fact, 
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the only institutes entirely dedicated to cancer research have historically been on private hands; 
the research units of the Danish Cancer Society.  
However, this does not mean that cancer research was not done at the universities or at other 
State-owned research institutes such as hospitals and veterinarian schools. Here a broad 
spectrum of research activities commonly known as cancer research was performed at different 
laboratories and in different contexts. Cancer research – be that clinical, basic, or 
epidemiological – addresses so many different aspect of the biology, treatment and/or aetiology 
of cancer diseases that the practitioners of cancer research in all its forms practically are not 
working within the same cognitive framework or employing the same well-defined methods or 
instruments72. The vague terms “oncology” and “cancer research” are thus common 
denominators for a wide array of clinical, basic, and epidemiological research activities with a 
strong or even a marginal relevance to the cancer problem, conducted at institutes that most 
often are not devoted entirely to the study of cancer. The fact that the term “cancer research” 
does not do justice to the heterogenic field it designates is not surprising, as the umbrella-like 
word “cancer” is not quite suitable either. As James T. Patterson notes, the word “cancer” seems 
to indicate that one is talking about a single, easily defined disease, although scientists have 
enumerated over 200 different varieties of cancer with each its own natural history73. Still, this 
diversity of illnesses has one thing in common. They are caused by cells that are dividing 
uncontrollably and can be capable of invading other parts of the body, causing malfunction and 
destruction of vital body organs74. Perhaps this is why many of the doctors, scientists and 
laymen presented in the case of this thesis tend to describe the various diseases and the 
heterogenic research done to understand them with the words “cancer” and “cancer research”. 
Like Patterson, this thesis does the same although it too holds the more accurate medical 
distinctions and disciplinary affiliations in great respect75.  
While laymen typically use the general words for convenience or in lack of a more precise 
professional terminology, the reason why the professionals use them is more interesting. It is 
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73 Patterson, J. T. (1987). The Dread Disease: Cancer and Modern American Culture. Cambridge, Harvard 
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Period 1946-1971. Bethesda, Division for Cancer Control and Rehabilitation, National Cancer Institute, vol. 1, p. 
74.  
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University Press, p. 5 (or x) of the preface. 
 
The Cancer Centre That Never Was 
 
 35 
possible that they, too, use the terms for convenience even in official reports that are not 
targeted at lay readers, but it is also possible that the physicians and scientists working on 
different aspects of cancer – equally simplistically termed “cancer researchers” although their 
educational backgrounds, research projects and disciplinary affiliations vary greatly to the extent 
that they can no longer be said to study the same disease or aspect of it – are using the general 
term to form a common front and legitimise their research field to their peers and the funding 
organs in order to build institutes/organisations; be that university departments or cancer 
centres76.  
It will be evident that the actors of the story of the cancer centre that never was also had very 
different notions or definitions of what in fact the proposed cancer centre was – or should be – 
in terms of what types of cancer research and clinical activities should be included and how the 
centre should be managed, and this impeded the efforts to establish it. Based on the literature on 
cancer research, it seems that the term “cancer centre” has many different meanings for different 
people in different national settings. 
The umbrella-like nature of the concepts “cancer”, “cancer research”, “cancer centre” and 
“oncology” and the lack of cancer departments/scientific disciplines and separate medical 
specialities at the Danish universities and hospital bears witness to the difficulties one would 
encounter, if one set out to build a cancer centre. It would require a combination of the 
institutional matrices of a wide range of actors from different medical and science worlds. And 
in particular, the physical establishment of a cancer centre – a structural entity in the medical 
and scientific world – could be seen as an attempt to bypass the Danish medical community’s 
traditional speciality system which is respected by the medical world. Consensus on the content 
of such a centre would be very difficult to find amongst the possible inhabitants of the centre, 
but even if this were possible, the centre would in itself signal a professional demarcation to 
other scientific disciplines and professional specialities that might be perceived by those as a 
threat.  
In summation, Patterson notes the vagueness of the term “cancer”, and consequently “cancer 
research”, but he decides to talk about the attitudes toward “cancer” in this singular anyway. 
Likewise, this thesis will sometimes use the unspecified term “cancer centre” because this is 
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how the actors of the study refer to the centres in question, although they differ in type and 
content, as this is a central point of the story. It would seem that the actors use simplistic and 
unspecified terms such as “cancer research” and “cancer centre” to signal a unified front against 
cancer – especially in times with poor public funding of the research institutes from which the 
actors come.    
1.4 What has already been done, and what is to be done: related literature on 
theory and topic 
This historical thesis benefits from, contributes to, and distinguishes itself from a wide selection 
of theoretical literature and topically related case studies using this theory. Much of this 
literature has served as inspiration to this thesis, while some of it could not be used despite 
related topics and area of use but has helped demarcate the thesis from the existing body of 
literature. This has to be accounted for which is the purpose of the following sections.  
There are no historical works on Danish cancer research in the timespan of the case study. Aside 
from a short paragraph in a 1994 exam paper from Copenhagen Business School, “Kræftens 
Bekæmpelse – en humanitær organisation i modvind” (“The Cancer Society – a humanitarian 
organisation in headwind”) by Søren Lecker and Andreas Kjær, no specific works have been 
published that  address the plans to establish a cancer centre in Copenhagen77. There are, 
however, thorough works on the history of the Danish health care sector which have been used 
much in this thesis to describe the development and organisation of e.g. the Danish hospital 
system, the funding of health services and medical research, political discussions on the growing 
costs for the health care system, statistical data etc.: Kurt Jacobsen and Klaus Larsen (2007): 
“Ve og velfærd”, and to a lesser extent Signild Vallgärda (1992) “Sygehuse og Sygehuspolitik i 
Danmark”.  
With respect to the central institutional analysis of this thesis, there has been much literature to 
choose from. As the “notion of institutions itself is not yet a coherent concept, at least not across 
the various users of the term”78 the institutional analysist faces the risk of having to juggle 
incompatible theoretical works in order to “cover the ground”, so to speak. To avoid this pitfall, 
the present thesis draws on on two main theorists in combination – Douglass C. North and 
Pierre Bourdieu for reasons describes in section 1.2. In addition, the thesis has found inspiration 
                                                 
77 Lecker, S. and A. Kjær (1994). Kræftens Bekæmpelse - en organisation i modvind. Institut for Organisation og 
Arbejdssociologi, Copenhagen Business School: 116. 
78 Nelson, R. R. and B. N. Sampat "Making sense of institutions as a factor shaping economic performance." 
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organisation 44: 31-54, p. 32. 
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on the use of North’s concept of path dependence in Kurt Jacobsen’s historical portrayals of the 
development of the Danish telecom system in two different writings:  Kurt Jacobsen (2005) 
“Institutional change and path dependence in Danish telecom development” (paper presented at 
the Cross-Connection Conference at Science Museum London, November 2005) and Kurt 
Jacobsen (2004) “Jydsk Telefon – verdens bedste telefonselskab”. 
Although none has touched on the topic of path dependence in the organisation of cancer 
research, several international studies on how cancer research and/or treatment has been 
organised in other countries have served as some inspiration as well. Because of both topical 
and methodological differences between these works and the present thesis, they have only been 
used sparsely, and any reference to them will therefore be relatively crude as it will be 
comparisons to e.g. successful establishments rather than failed ones, or to different countries at 
different periods of time (e.g. France in the interwar years, in the UK at the turn of the 19th 
century, and in the US after the National Cancer Act 1971). Nevertheless, this thesis pertains (in 
part) to the discussions of the plans to establish a scientific and clinical centre (or institute as 
some prefer)79  – a cancer centre – which was to be an important element of organising80 Danish 
cancer research in 1949-1992. As such, the thesis touches upon the well-known theoretical field 
in the history of science and medicine – institutionalisation81 – which deserves special 
mentioning in the following. 
Factors that drive the emergence of new centres and define an institutionalised research area 
have been subject to very extensive literature ranging from histories of specific institutes to 
histories of the process of institutionalisation which describes how research fields are 
established – be that in the form of departments, centres, disciplines, professional societies, 
journals etc. Especially the literature on specific institutes or centres is very comprehensive, as 
such histories are popular with both professional historians of science and researchers writing 
jubilee publications of their own departments, universities etc. Amongst the histories of specific 
                                                 
79 I define a scientific institute as an organisational unit with an independent administration and economy: e.g. a 
university department or a private research laboratory. Nielsen, H., K. H. Nielsen, et al. (2006). "Videnproduktion 
som komplekst socialt system". Viden uden grænser 1920-1970. H. Nielsen and K. H. Nielsen. Aarhus, Aarhus 
Universitetsforlag, p. 502. 
80 Following Kohler’s introduction to his Partners In Science: Foundations and Natural Scientists 1900-1945 
(1991),  I define this form of organisation as anything that has to do with structuring the scientific world – e.g. the 
formation of scientific disciplines, the building of research institutions, research management, social networking, 
communication systems, and political fiscal negotiations etc. 
81 In this section, the word institutionalization refers to the process by which new scientific disciplines, 
organizations, journals etc. emerge, and should not be confused with North’s concept of “institutes” which is 
described in the above. The concept has a very different meaning than North’s, as it is used by different authors 
(Kohler, Lenoir and Lundgren) in a completely different context and discipline.  
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cancer establishments are historian Joan Austoker’s A History of the Imperial Cancer Research 
Fund 1902-1986 (1988), Triolo’s and Shimkin’s “The American Cancer Society and Cancer 
Research – Origins and Organization: 1913-1943” (1969), and sociologist Patrice Pinell’s The 
Fight Against Cancer: France 1890-1940 (2002). Topically, these works are classics within the 
history of cancer; with each their theoretical take on the concept of institutionalisation.  
The issue of what creates a scientific discipline has been subject to a wealth of national and 
international literature, as scientific disciplines82 and the associated institutes are not entirely 
uniform entities, and the factors and circumstances connected with their emergence can vary 
from discipline to discipline and from country to country, as will be elaborated on below. Some 
of the many historians who have worked on this process within the academia are Robert Kohler, 
Timothy Lenoir, and Anders Lundgren83. They have described the special circumstances 
connected with what they call “institutionalisation”84 – the process of forming scientific 
disciplines. Such circumstances range from the personal power of individuals to influence the 
decision making at the department or centre housing the upcoming discipline, to more general 
political and financial factors such as the organisational structures at the institute, the amount 
and state of similar and already existing disciplines/institutes, and the 
government’s/parliament’s attitude towards the role of science in society85. The works of 
                                                 
82Following Nielsen et. al,  I define a scientific discipline as an institutionalised research area with a specific 
cognitive content, use of specific instruments, and more or less well-defined methods agreed upon by its 
practitioners, see Nielsen, H., K. H. Nielsen, et al. (2006). "Videnproduktion som komplekst socialt system". Viden 
uden grænser 1920-1970. H. Nielsen and K. H. Nielsen. Aarhus, Aarhus Universitetsforlag, p. 502.  
83 Lundgren, A. (1999). "Naturvetenskapelig institutionalisering". Vetenskapsbärerne: naturvetenskapen i det 
svenska samhället 1880-1950. S. Widmalm. Hedemora, Gidlunds Forlag; Kohler, R. (1982). From medical 
chemistry to biochemistry, Cambridge University Press, Kohler, R. (1991). Partners in Science  
- Foundations and Natural Scientists 1900-1945. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press;Lenoir, T. (1997). 
Instituting Science: The Cultural Production of Scientific Disciplines. Stanford, Stanford University Press.    
84 Again, the term applied by Kohler, Lundgren and Lenoir is not to be confused with North’s concept of 
“institutes”. 
85 Anders Lundgren describes the formation of biochemistry as a new discipline at the Swedish universities as a 
process of “inner” institutionalisation through which researchers started to work on a neglected sub-area within an 
already well-established discipline. When the new sub-area grew so big and successful that its practitioners wished 
to distinguish their field from its “mother” discipline, it experienced a process of “outer” institutionalisation during 
which it eventually received a separate name, budget, and student clientele at the Swedish faculties (Lundgren 
(1999), p.130). In other words, Lundgren perceives  institutionalisation as a process where new disciplines “bud” of 
other disciplines from which they have got their methods and cognitive frames. Lenoir takes things a little further as 
he argues that the expanding sub-area of a discipline cannot expect to be institutionalised as an autonomous 
discipline based on a successful research program alone. According to Lenoir, the final or “outer” 
institutionalisation depends on a series of factors besides a viable and successful research program and a loyal 
clientele of researchers; it also depends on e.g. favourable power relationships at the institute in question, the 
political goodwill in general, and the ability of the new discipline to be indispensable at the institute by delivering 
research services to its other disciplines (Lenoir (1997), pp. 58-61).  
Robert Kohler thinks along these lines and stresses the importance of the political and diplomatic footwork which 
the researchers have to do in order to institutionalise their research area or to build scientific institutes. Kohler 
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Lenoir, Kohler, and Lundgren have served as inspiration for many historians of science, and 
some of the factors that these authors highlight as important in their work – such as political 
goodwill, a loyal clientele, and favourable local power-relations – are relevant to this thesis as 
well. However, it is important to note that while their works describe the factors needed for 
successful institutionalisation, this thesis focuses on the demise of a strangely persistent 
idea/path or perhaps the situation when institutionalisation never happens – one could call it 
non-institutionalisation – and for this reason the present thesis cannot adopt the full theoretical 
framework produced by these authors.  
Although there is no theoretical literature on non-institutionalisation per se, several writers have 
employed a socio-historical approach to identifying the factors explaining the delayed 
emergence of new professions, disciplines or welfare policies. One of these writers is historian 
Lindsay Granshaw. In her work, she describes how the medical specialists of the 19th century 
Britain employed strategies to improve their positions in the medical profession86. General 
practitioners tended to regard the self-proclaimed medical specialists as nothing more than 
quacks and thus assigned them a very low position in the professional hierarchy of the medical 
field. However, by World War I, the specialists were among the leaders of the profession, and 
Granshaw claims that part of the explanation for this change is to be found in the fact that the 
19th century specialists had a hard time finding positions at the general hospitals and therefore 
established their own specialist hospitals as a route to power, prestige and wealth, as the 
specialists did not have a hard time finding paying patients. In other words, the specialists 
employed a strategy of building an institute and stepped into fame and fortune by means of 
bricks and mortar87. Inasmuch as she deals with a professional group’s employment of strategies 
                                                                                                                                                            
compares the scientific disciplines with geographical nations which establish and defend their borders through 
dynamic interaction with each other. Only, the borders established and defended by researchers are not 
geographical, they are cognitive and institutional, and the researchers are fighting to create disciplines and institutes 
that will accommodate their personal work: “Disciplines are political institutions that demarcate areas of academic 
territory, allocate the privileges and responsibilities of expertise, and structure claims or resources. They are the 
infrastructure of science (…).” and “If disciplines are to the political economy of science what nations are to 
political economy of production and commerce, then it is no surprise that their domestic affairs may be profoundly 
influenced by a diverse traffic in ideas and problems with neighbouring disciplines” (Kohler (1982), p. 1&7).  
Kohler and Lenoir in particular make an important point about the social, diplomatic and political work and power 
struggles that are often involved in the process. In the words of Lenoir: “But absolutely crucial to understanding 
the dynamics of discipline formation and institution building is realizing that no field, no matter how autonomous it 
appears, is completely closed to external factors. Indeed “external” factors provide crucial leverage points in the 
dynamics of the field”. (Lenoir (1997), p. 17). 
86 Granshaw, L. (1989). "Fame and fortune by means of bricks and mortar: the medical profession and specialist 
hospitals in Britain 1800-1948." The Hospital in History. L. Granshaw and R. Porter. New York, Routledge: 199-
220, pp. 199-220. 
87 Ibid., p. 199.  
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to secure their position in a field, her work seems inspired by Bourdieu’s abovementioned 
theories.  
Other historical works, by sociologist Patrice Pinell, are also inspired by Bourdieu and explore 
the historical conditions that can slow down or prevent the process of institutionalisation. Pinell 
provides a socio-historical analysis of the first French developments in the fight against cancer 
in the interwar years. In particular, Pinell describes the process that got the French State 
involved in the fight against cancer. According to Pinell, the process can be explained by the 
strategies and interests of several groups as well as historically specific conditions that paved the 
way for the French anti-cancer efforts. In essence, Pinell argues that World War I and the efforts 
of first French anti-cancer organisation to set up an image of cancer as a scourge resulted in the 
State producing an anti-cancer policy after World War I88. Before World War I, cancer had not 
been considered the most serious health threat in society by the State which was committed to 
the fight against the great infectious diseases of the time89. However, as the mortality rates due 
to this type of diseases decreased and when the country’s anti-cancer organisations managed to 
depict cancer as a greater peril inflicting not only those living in poverty but all layers of 
society, threatening rich and poor alike and being a universal disease found in man, animal, and 
plants, the situation changed.  
According to Pinell, this universal trait interested the researchers and the combination of the 
disease’s image as a scourge, its vistas of new exciting research lines, and the special French 
wartime mobilisation of medical experts in cross-disciplinary teams and temporary teaching 
institutes persuaded the French government to formulate an anti-cancer policy in the form of a 
network of cross-disciplinary treatment and training centres or ”healing factories”90 modelled 
after the wartime mobilisation of medicine91. The idea was to decentralise treatment by placing 
specialist centres providing standardised treatment around the country in order to protect the 
French people against the cancer peril, but not all cities wanting to host such a centre were given 
one despite the local demands for it, and this resulted in the establishment of unofficial centres 
outside the government program.  
Pinell thus sets out to show how the interpenetration of the strategies of the different groups of 
actors diverted the project of setting up a network of anti-cancer treatment centres from its initial 
                                                 
88 Pinell, P. (2002). The Fight against Cancer: France 1890-1940. London, Routledge, p. 183, p. 191.  
89 Ibid., p. 182. 
90 Ibid. p. 191.  
91 Ibid. p. 75.  
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objective and resulted in both “an uncontrolled development of care institutions and in a 
disparity in their equipment potentialities”92. In order to identify the causes of the 
abovementioned development, Pinell has found it necessary to identify the groups involved in 
the case and the questions they asked themselves about it, to define their interests, and to show 
the relationships which they had with each other and their areas of agreement and conflict93. In 
doing so, Pinell’s case study also illustrates Lenoir’s notion that successful institutionalisation 
depends in part on political goodwill. But according to Pinell, the interests of the various agents, 
groups and institutes, their alliances and oppositions, their strategies, and the interpenetration of 
their strategies are neither similar, nor in principle transferable from one country to another94. 
And this makes the national study of the particular Danish efforts to establish a cancer centre 
justified. And as will be evident in the following chapters, the plans for a Danish centre did not 
receive the same amount of political goodwill as the French centres did. 
 A long list of other writers have dealt with institutionalisation within the cancer community in 
different countries, and these works have served as inspiration to the present thesis. Although 
none of them mirrors this thesis in both topic and methodological approach, they need 
mentioning here:  
 Caroline C.S. Murphy has written specifically on the establishment of cancer hospitals in 
Britain and on how the discovery of e.g. Radium, X-rays, better surgical methods, and a 
bourgeoning philanthropic interest in experimental cancer research made the 
management of these hospitals give up their initial plans of establishing hospices for the 
terminally ill cancer patients, and instead establish research laboratories in order to better 
attract funding – thereby creating forerunners of the 20th century’s cancer centres in 
Britain95. Murphy’s work has thus serves as inspiration on how the nature of a cancer 
centre changes in history in accord with the progression of cancer research and/or 
treatment.  
                                                 
92 Pinell, P. (1991). "Cancer Policy and the Health System in France: "Big Medicine" Challenges the Conception 
and Organization of Medical Practice." Social History of Science 4(1): 75-101, p. 75.  
93 Pinell, P. (2002). The Fight against Cancer: France 1890-1940. London, Routledge, p. xv-xvi.  
94 Ibid. 
95 Murphy, C. C. S. (1989). "From Friedenheim to Hospice: A century of cancer hospitals". The Hospital in History. 
L. Granshaw and R. Porter. New York, Routledge: 221-241  
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 David Cantor’s work on the MRC’s support for experimental radiology during the inter-
war years in Britain has been an inspiration as well96. In this work, Cantor describes the 
Medical Research Committee/Council’s (MRC) attempts to popularise radium therapy 
and experimental radiology in the interwar years, and he describes how specialised 
cancer centres were planned to make medical practitioners, clinical scientists, and 
laboratory scientists collaborate and how the MRC employed different strategies to fend 
off medical practitioners’ control of the medical research field. 
 Charles R. Hayter has written an interesting article and a book on the establishment of 
Ontario’s cancer program 1929-3497. Here, he deals with the question of how the 
organisation of Canadian cancer treatment became a struggle between two groups of 
physicians who saw the government’s efforts of centralisation either as a benefit for or a 
threat to their professional work and status, and as such the present thesis parallels his 
work.  
 Joan Austoker’s historical work on British basic cancer research and its largest cancer 
research organisation, A History of the Imperial Cancer Research Fund 1902-1986, 
illustrates many similarities and differences in the way cancer research was organised 
and financed in Denmark and Britain, and it is a historical work on “positive” 
institutionalisation of a cancer establishment. Also, it describes the disagreement on the 
role of basic science in cancer research between the Imperial Cancer Research Fund and 
the college of surgeons, under the aegis of which the Fund was, and how this 
discrepancy between professional groups affected the development of the Fund’s 
research program.  
 Richard E. Rettig’s Cancer Crusade and Erdey’s Armor of Patience: The National 
Cancer Institute and The Development of Medical Research Policy In the United States 
describe the earliest anti-cancer efforts and organisations, and the establishment of the 
National Cancer Institution in 1937. They also analyse the privately initiated lobbyism 
that led to the emergence of the National Cancer Program in the US in 1971 and the 
                                                 
96 Cantor, D. (1989). "The MRC's Support for Experimental Radiology during Inter-war Years". Historical 
Perspectives on the Role of the MRC: Essays in the History of the Medical Research Councilof the United  
Kingdomand Its Predecessor, the Medical Research Committee, 1913-1953. J. Austoker and L. Bryder. Oxford, 
Oxford University Press: 181-204. 
97 Hayter, C. R. (1997). "Medicalizing Malignancy: The Uneasy Origins of Ontario's Cancer Program, 1929-1934." 
Canadian Bulletin of Medical History 14: 195-213. 
   Hayter, C. R. (2005). An Element of Hope: Radium and the Response to Cancer in Canada. Montreal, McGill-
Queen's University Press. 
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enduring expansion of the federal government into the field of medical research on 
cancer.  
1.5 The case study in short: structure and central actors 
All of these studies have contributed to a more nuanced understanding of the international 
developments within the cancer field, and they have helped place the Danish developments and 
problems in the cancer field in an international context. But even though the present thesis on 
the cancer centre that never was parallels these works topically inasmuch as they deal with 
developments within cancer communities, it is important to point out that these works described 
institutes that were actually established, and this thesis will describe why a cancer centre was 
never built. And it will use a path dependence perspective to explore an otherwise irrational 
development. This has not been done in the abovementioned histories or in any other history of 
cancer centres.  
It is the working hypothesis that the concept of path dependence is relevant to the case study of 
this thesis, but in the end it will have to be tested. Is it possible to use such a perspective to 
explain a historical development? In order explore whether or not the story of the cancer centre 
that never was can in fact be characterised as a matter of path dependence, the thesis will focus 
on four key events that are crucial to the understanding of the story as a matter of path 
dependence: 
1. Path creation. 
2. Path re-actualisation/lock-in. 
3. Path perpetuation. 
4. Path dissolution. 
Path creation: The establishment of the  Fibiger Laboratory in 1949 
In 1949, the Danish Minister of Education Hartvig Frisch inaugurated Denmark’s first ever 
cancer research laboratory, The Fibiger Laboratory, as a joint venture between the Danish 
government and the private cancer charity The Danish Cancer Society. The new laboratory was 
established on the initiative of the cancer charity which up until this point had been the main 
source of financial support for cancer treatment as well as cancer research which at the time was 
not an autonomous research discipline at the Danish universities, and therefore was not 
supported through the State Budget.  
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The private Cancer Society had not, however, at any point had unlimited financial means to 
support an appropriate physical structuring of the rather randomly organised cancer research 
activities in the country. Activities which the Cancer Society believed to be an essential part of 
the fight against cancer. For a long time, the private Cancer Society had therefore wished to 
organise the field in the best possible manner in order to strengthen it, and had continuously 
been lobbying to engage the State in the cause. Four years prior to the inauguration of the 
Fibiger Laboratory, a Danish pathologist from the University of Copenhagen had presented his 
vision of the most optimal organisation of Danish cancer research and treatment to the Danish 
Cancer Society and the Danish politicians.  Professor Julius Engelbreth-Holm had then just 
returned from a stay at the large and private cancer institutes in the US, where he was inspired 
by the way the American anti-cancer efforts were often organised in large and centralised cancer 
hospitals with affiliated research laboratories, and he hoped that a similar venture in Denmark 
could help improve the quality and distribution of the Danish cancer services98 by recognizing 
the importance of cancer research to continuously improved cancer treatment99. Research had 
not traditionally been at the core of these services. He thus imported the early American concept 
of the wide-ranging “cancer centre”100 – uniting research and treatment under the same roof to 
bridge the gap between bench and bedside – and proposed that it be financed through public and 
private funds and placed on the premises of a university hospital and under academic 
management.  
The Cancer Society supported the idea of a public-private comprehensive centre, and following 
extensive negotiations with the State, an unprecedented partnership was established between the 
cancer charity and the State when the Fibiger Laboratory emerged as a joint venture in 1949.  
The laboratory was situated within the University of Copenhagen and established for State 
funding while the costs of running the laboratory were to be shared fifty-fifty by the Cancer 
Society and the State. At the inauguration, the Minister of Education stated that this type of 
                                                 
98 Here I define cancer services as the cancer treatments offered to cancer patients.  
99 Engelbreth-Holm, J. (1946) "Kræftforskningen i Fremtiden" Berlingske Aftenavis København 11.01.1946  
100 On the nature of early American cancer centres, see:  
Cantor, D. (1993). "Cancer". Companion Encyclepedia of the History of Medicine. W. F. Bynum and R. Porter. 
London, Routledge: 537-61 & Cantor, D. (2007). "Introduction: Cancer Control and Prevention in the Twentieth 
Century." Bulletin of the History of Medicine 81: 1-38. Cantor gives an overview of the first cancer establishments. 
Shingleton, W. W. (1989). "Cancer Centers- Origins and Purpose." Archives of Surgery 124: 43-45, who discusses 
the origin and definition of  “cancer centres” in many countries including the US.   
Vaeth, J. M. (1975). "The network concept in the cancer center." The American Journal of Roentgenology  
Radium Therapy and Nuclear Medicine 123(1): 3-6, who discusses the concept of cancer centres (and the 
collaboration therein) as part of the National Cancer Program of 1971.    
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unprecedented arrangement would henceforth be a good way to get the State to contribute to the 
advancement of science. So even though the laboratory was not – as of yet – placed in close 
connection with a cancer clinic (as a comprehensive cancer centre was supposed to be), and 
even though the State would eventually go back on its word to finance half of the running costs 
of the Laboratory, the State formally sanctioned the idea of a public-private comprehensive 
cancer centre that day.  
By engaging itself for the first time ever in the establishment and operation of a public-private 
(cancer) centre, the State created the formal institutions101 (and the specific interdependent 
relationship between those institutions and organizations) that shaped the path that dictated the 
direction for the next 40 years’ discussion of the organisation of cancer research. The idea, 
however, proved very difficult to put into practice for a variety of reasons that will be identified 
throughout the following chapters of this thesis. Nevertheless, the idea of a Danish cancer centre 
proved remarkably persistent, and cancer researchers and administrators at the country’s 
different research institutes, hospitals, cancer fighting organisations and funding bodies chased 
the idea for several decades in the hope that it could be the ideal organisational tool to 
strengthen their field. In some instances this was done without stopping to question the merits of 
the idea itself even in the face of alternatives already proving their merits. 
 
Path re-actualisation and lock-in: The writing and publishing of the Kjeldgaard Report in 1979-
84  
From 1979-1981, a subcommittee of the Danish Natural Science Research Council and the 
Danish Medical Research Council analysed the state of Danish cancer research in order to make 
recommendations to the Danish Government on ways to strengthen the field102. Of course, such 
a commission implied that the existing state of Danish cancer research (and treatment) was not 
necessarily optimal, that the existing organisational tools were not necessarily effective, and that 
new ones had to be explored. Even so, when the subcommittee presented its recommendations 
to the Government in 1981, it proposed regression rather than innovation by revisiting the idea 
of establishing a comprehensive cancer centre. An idea, that had not been possible to effectuate 
before and which was interestingly enough not even supported by the statistical material of the 
                                                 
101 The political decision to support a cancer centre that would otherwise not have been established for the scarce 
private funds available.  
102 Forskningsråd, U. f. b. c. n. a. S. n. (1981). Cancerforskning i Danmark, SNF. 
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conducted analysis103. So while the idea seemed to mirror the authors’ personal preferences 
rather than actual statistical evidence, it was strongly accentuated throughout the 1980’s in the 
form of plans for a centre in the Rockefeller research milieu in Copenhagen. 

The report’s recommendation of using the well-known idea of a public-private comprehensive 
cancer centre as the tool to strengthen Danish cancer research was not the result of increasing 
returns or positive feedback. It was rather the result of informal institutions which influenced the 
organisations to make choices that in turn perpetuated the path. The centre became a tool to 
change formal institutions towards making cancer research a priority of the State (which it was 
not) in times of financial recession and governmental policy of non-growth of public 
expenditures.  
 
Path Perpetuation: The Rockefeller centre and the growth of the Danish Cancer Society 1984-
1987 
While the government approved the planning of a cancer centre in the Rockefeller building it 
did so on the condition that the establishment would not require additional state-funding. 
Despite the fact that the “centre” thus no longer seemed able to bring about the coveted state 
financial prioritizing of the cancer research field, the planning for a public-private centre carried 
on.  
 
But in the midst of the planning for a cancer centre, one of the strongest proponents of the idea 
had a change of heart. The private Danish Cancer Society enjoyed a massive economic growth 
due to skillfull management and economic strategies that allowed the cancer charity to utilize 
the institutional matrix to its own advantage giving it moral and financial leverage and power in 
the cancer community. In order to pursue further growth or just maintain status quo, the Society 
was faced with the necessity to defect from the plans to build a public-private cancer centre as 
proposed in the Rockefeller plans. And it had to do so without suffering damaging PR in the 
public eye (third party enforcement) as it was heavily dependent on voluntary contributions 
from the public. So although the Society decided that a centre in its current form was in fact a 
threat to the organisation’s strategic goals, the cancer charity deliberately perpetuated the idea of 
it (with a markedly different and inferior content) by serving the informal institutions with a new 
                                                 
103 Henningsen, I. (1982). "Flere spørgsmål end svar." Naturkampen: 20-23, p. 23. 
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centre plan so that the organisation would not suffer from the decreasing income and negative 
societal feedback that would result from pulling out of the centre plans altogether. The charity 
proposed that a different type of centre be established (The Finsen Centre) on terms that were in 
accordance with the organisation’s growth strategy which remained undisclosed to the other 
negotiation partners.  
 
Path dissolution: The fall of the Finsen centre plans 1987-1992 
The idea was finally abandoned in 1992 when a large number of the country’s cancer 
researchers and clinicians voiced their doubts about its validity from a cost/benefit perspective.
In the wake of the abandoned Rockefeller plans, the Danish Cancer Society offered to establish 
a cancer research centre, if the state would sell the soon to be vacant Finsen hospital premises to 
the charity. A centre could be established there, although it would no longer entail a contact 
between bench research and patient care. The Society’s ambition of continuing its investment 
strategy, which utilized the institutional matrix to secure continued growth in income and 
serving of the anti-cancer cause in times of economic instability, depended heavily on a 
purchase of the state-owned Finsen campus at which the Society already owned one building. 
 
An attempt to secure the lot at a cheaper price by using moral arguments to force the State to sell 
via an exemption clause that allowed for special sales term for bidders with “worthy causes” at 
first sight seemed to secure the Society a better price, but proved to be a costly affair that linked 
the sale with a moral responsibility of establishing a privately financed cancer centre under great 
public influence.And the linkage would make the Society vulnerable to moral scrutiny by any 
critics appealing to the public as moral third party enforcers in the non-contractual matter of 
establishing a cancer centre. In this way, a change of taste and preferences (informal 
institutions) undermined the power of the Society in the cancer community and this was utilized 
by a small group of critics seeking influence on the private cancer charity’s practices.  The 
debates and criticism focused on the form (management and financing) of the centre – because 
these were the means to secure influence – rather than on what was originally the primary 
objective: a scientific program coordinating the Copenhagen cancer research.  
 
At a grand debate meeting for cancer researchers and -clinicians held in January 1992, the 
matter of content was finally discussed, and a majority of cancer researchers and clinicians 
found the Finsen plan to be too different and scientifically inferior, compared with the original 
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plans from the Kjeldgaard Report and the Rockfeller Centre, to be able to meet the objective of 
strengthening cancer research in Copenhagen, the nature of which had changed gradually along 
with new scientific progress in cancer research. The meeting revealed that the more than 40 year 
old idea of a comprehensive public-private cancer centre might no longer fit the needs of the 
Danish cancer research groups in the 1990’s. A change in relative prices (the new oncogene 
paradigm), taste and preferences (due to improved current housing facilities for the researchers 
and clinicians) changed the institutional matrix. The path dissolved. 
1.6 Sources 
This thesis is mainly based on primary written, unpublished sources. Most of them have been 
found in the extensive archives of the Danish Cancer Society. The minutes from meetings held 
withim this organisation’s three main organs – the Head Board, the Executive Committee and 
the Scientific Council – contain elaborate discussions of the society’s scientific objectives, 
policy, regulations, structure, construction plans, and financial situation. In addition, the annual 
reports of the organisation have contributed much information as well. Reports on the plans to 
establish a comprehensive cancer centre and personal correspondence have been collected from 
several of the central actors of my case study.  
While there were many sources to be found about the Society and its involvement in the failed 
centre plans, the same cannot be said about the State’s research councils. It has proved very 
difficult to form a general view of the archives of these public organs.  Due to a move of the 
secretariat, no administrative personnel were certain about the location of the necessary 
material, and they could thus not grant access. However, head clerk Bente Møller noted that 
there was nothing of interest to this thesis in the archives anyway.  There would be no principal 
discussions in the archives of the establishment of a cancer centre that never came into 
existence. Even the annals of these public organs reveal nothing of remote relevance to this 
thesis. The only written material on the research councils’ involvement in cancer research is to 
be found in the published reports Cancerforskning i Danmark (1981) from the State’s scientific 
research council, Sundhed og sygdom: en strategiplan fra Statens Lægevidenskabelige 
Forskningsråd (1988) from the State’s medical research council and the unpublished 
Redegørelse til Undervisningsministeriet vedrørende en samordning af den basale onkologiske 
forskning i hovedstadsområdet (1984) from the collaborating institutes involved in the planning 
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of the cancer centres104. Apart from these reports and several newspaper articles, it has not been 
possible to find any further material about the government’s and its research councils’ role and 
commitment in the case. This is very unfortunate, but nothing indicates that a vast amount of 
important documents has been missed, though. According to Bente Møller and several former 
members of the State’s research councils there simply is nothing more to find, because the 
centre plans were never put into practice and therefore were not further processed or 
documented. However, adequate material about the failed centre plans has been found in other 
archives and through newspaper articles from the database Infomedia.dk105. Also, this thesis has 
drawn from a transcribed recording of a meeting which debated one of the failed Danish cancer 
centres at which more than 250 cancer researchers were present and allowed to present their 
opinion on the centre plans. As a condensate of the meetings discussions, this has been a very 
useful tool as it reflects how the researchers regarded the cancer centre at the time and not how 
they see it in retrospect, as is the case with interviews done many years after the actual historical 
events in question. 
                                                 
104 The translated titles of these reports are: “Cancer Research in Denmark”, “Health and Disease: Strategies of the 
Medical Research Council”, and “Report to the Ministry of Education on the Coordination of Basic Cancer 
Research in the Copenhagen Area”.  
105 The newspaper articles retrieved through this database and the database bibliotek.dk often come without page-
numbers, and this is the reason why some of the newspaper articles used as references in the following chapters do 
not have a specified page numbers. However, all articles can be easily found in the databases using the data on 
authors, titles, newspaper, and/or date specified in each case. The articles has been retrieved through several 
searches with different keywords alone or in combination (e.g. “cancer centre”, “The Cancer Society”, “Finsen”, 
“Rockefeller”, “cancer research”) in the period from 1940-2005, in order to check if the searches resulted in the 
same or separate groups of articles until no new articles would appear in the searches.  
 




Archives Location Status 
The Danish Cancer Society  The Danish Cancer Society, 
Copenhagen 
Researched 
The State Research Council 
Archives 
The Danish Research Agency, 
Copenhagen 
No admission due to lack of 
relevant material 
Private archives - Ole Bang Private property, Copenhagen Researched 
Private archives – Keld Danø Private property Researched 
Private archives – Jes 
Forchhammer 
Private property, Bagsværd Researched 
Private archives- Niels Ole 
Kjeldgaard 
Private property, Aarhus Researched 
Infomedia Online newspaper database Researched 
 
In addition to this, a lot of secondary sources have been used in the form of books and articles 
about e.g. the early history of some of the organisations mentioned in this thesis. In a few cases, 
these sources are written by non-historians – e.g. physicians writing a short history of their 
organisation without always finding primary sources to document their arguments – and they 
have thus primarily been used for factual information on organisations. In two instances, actors 
of the cancer field have published their personal recollections of their work in the Cancer 
Society, and another has published his account of the events in a revised history of one of the 
Danish cancer research institutes106. Although these sources are eyewitness accounts of the 
period of time involved in this thesis, they were written several years after this period and tend 
to be argumentative and will not be given equal status as the correspondence and proceedings 
found in the archives. As such, they are still useful to this study, but will be treated the same 
way as conducted interviews, see below.  
The social sciences have been quick to embrace the use of interviews/oral documents in their 
studies. The same cannot be said about the history of science and traditional archival science 
                                                 
106 Bang, O. (2004). En personlig beretning om Kræftens Bekæmpelse 1981-1994, Narayana Press (personal 
recollections of his employment in the Cancer Society), Amdrup, E. (1998). Som jeg så det - en kirurgs tilbageblik. 
Danmark, Gyldendal (personal recollections of his carrier as a physician and his administrative work at the Cancer 
Society), and Kieler, J. (1989). The Fibiger Institute 1949-1989. Copenhagen, The Danish Cancer Society (his 
jubilee publication at the Fibiger Institute 50th anniversary). 
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which seem more reluctant to accept the use of interviews as legitimate historiographical tools. 
The reasons for this are manifold.  Above all, traditional positivist historiography does not 
attribute the same status to interviews as to written documents which are considered more 
reliable and “authentic”107. Interviews are produced with the sole purpose of informing posterity 
of a series of events, and some historians thus consider them too subjective – mere opinions – 
that cannot form the basis of sound history writing. The interviewees may have personal 
agendas and good reasons for altering a chain of events and give false information to make 
themselves or others look better or worse. Also, as interviews are often conducted a long time 
after the historical events in question, their “reliability is at the mercy of memory”108. Older 
interviewees in particular tend to have difficulties remembering dates and the chronological 
order of specific events.  
Indeed, interviews are seldom accurate accounts of wie es eigentlich gewesen. But one could say 
the same about most other historical sources. A historian of science would have to exert the 
same critical assessment of his or her sources, whether written or oral. The fact that something is 
written and found in an archive does not necessarily give it more authority and authenticity than 
an oral document. The producer of a written document can be just as partial and subjective as 
the interviewee. Nevertheless, some written documents are produced closer to the events in 
question than oral interviews conducted several years later. In this way, they are more authentic 
than the personal account of the interviewee who tends to forget details with time. Still, this 
thesis uses oral documents as historical sources (although secondary), as they offer advantages 
that supplement the archival materials very well. The written documents do not always reveal 
what is written between the lines, whereas interviews (and especially the ones on videotape) 
manifest the emotions and intentions of the interviewees109.  
The interviews can provide new knowledge about decision-making processes that are not 
necessarily found in written documents from official archives. Also, the interview poses an 
advantage to the historian inasmuch as he can ask whomever he wants to ask about whatever he 
wants to know. He is not tied down by the often accidental findings in archives. This means that 
interviews and other kinds of oral documents, as historiographical tools, can lend voice to 
                                                 
107 Wallot, J.-P. and N. Fortier (2002). "Archival science and oral sources". The Oral History Reader. R. Perks and 
A. Thompson. London, Routledge: 365-379, p. 365.  
108 Ibid., p. 367. 
109 Ibid., p. 373. 
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people who are not often heard in history110. People in the periphery often provide (more) 
interesting accounts of an event than the prominent actors who have accounted for their actions 
many times before111. Last, but certainly not least, the interviewees can lead you to new archival 
materials that you would not otherwise have retrieved112.  
As mentioned above, this thesis has used a transcribed recording of a meeting that debates one 
of the failed attempts to establish a Danish cancer centre at which more than 250 cancer 
researchers were present and allowed to present their opinion on the centre plans. This has been 
a very useful tool as it reflects how the researchers regarded the cancer centre at the time and not 
how they see it in retrospect, as is the case with interviews done many years after the actual 
historical events in question. Perhaps this advantage over the post-event interview was realised 
too late, as a number of cancer researchers and administrators affiliated with the Danish cancer 
research field (1981-1998) were also interviewed, but many of the interviews have not been 
used113. However, the interviewees’ perceptions of the cancer centre concept and its value as an 
organisational tool differed remarkably from the written sources and meeting transcripts of the 
time. So, although a number of people have been interviewed for the thesis, the interviews have 
only been used as documentation if their “present” opinions were important. In addition to being 
produced later in time than the meeting transcripts, the oral interviews also address a different 
“audience”. That is, while most written and oral documents from the period in question 
comment on an ongoing debate and while their authors address either the public, their 
colleagues or both; the persons interviewed address a historian who is about to describe a past 
part of their lives. The two situations and types of audiences may result in different accounts of 
the events.  
                                                 
110 Thompson, P. Ibid.: "The voice of the past". R. Perks and A. Thompson: 21-28, p. 24.  
111 Chadarevian, S. d. (1997). "Using Interviews to Write the History of Science". The Historiography of 
Contemporary Science and Technology. T. Söderqvist. Amsterdam, Harwood Acacademic Publishers: 51-71, p. 52 
& 64. 
112 Thompson, P. (2002). "The voice of the past". The Oral History Reader. R. Perks and A. Thompson. London, 
Routledge: 21-28, p. 24. 
113 I chose the interviewees by examining archival material such as meeting minutes, annual reports, and personal 
correspondence for the actors of most relevance. These printed sources have given an outline of the field and its 
contenders, and they have thus provided me with a provisional list of actors that could be interesting to interview 
for the project. During each interview, I asked the interviewee for suggestions for other potential interviewees. This 
circular process left me with a list of names who agreed to an interview (see Appendix B).  
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1.7 The structure of the thesis 
The thesis contains five main chapters (chapters 2-6) in chronological order. Chapters 2-6 each 
include a brief summary and a gallery of the chapter’s key persons and their summarised 
actions. These galleries serve as the reader’s “guide books” only.   
Chapter 2 deals with the period from 1945-1973 during which the dream of a cancer centre was 
introduced to the Danish cancer community and the first failed efforts to put the dream into 
practice appeared. Path creation. 
Chapter 3 deals with the period from 1979-1984 during which two of the government’s research 
councils issued a report on the state of Danish cancer research and revived the idea of a wide-
ranging – or comprehensive – national cancer centre in order to solve the coordination problems 
of Danish cancer research. Path re-actualisation. 
Chapter 4 deals with the period from 1984-1987 where several public and private negotiation 
parties from the cancer community planned for a comprehensive cancer centre in the 
Rockefeller building. The chapter describes the planning process, its failure and the reasons 
therefore. Path perpetuation. 
Chapter 5 deals with the period from 1987– 1992 during which the negotiation parties were in 
conflict with each other trying to reach agreement on the form of new and privately financed 
and controlled centre presented as the alternative for collapsed Rockefeller plans. The chapter 
will describe and analyse the planning process and subsequent dismissal of the centre plans. 
Path dissolution.  
Chapter 6 briefly deals with the period following the collapse of the Finsen plans in order to 
illustrate whether or not the cancer centre dream was continued, replaced by logical alternatives 
or laid to rest.   
Chapter 7: Conclusions and answers to the main thesis questions posed in chapter 1.  
Attached to this thesis are six appendices which are meant as a help to the reader: 
Appendix A: A list of abbreviations used in the thesis. 
Appendix B: A list of persons interviewed for this thesis. 
Appendix C: 1) A list of the members of the central organs of the Cancer Society  
                     2) A list of the members of NSRC and the MRC 1981-1998. 
Appendix D: A brief description of the key institutions central to this thesis.  
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Appendices E and F: Maps of the location of key institutes/organisations 
1.8 Language  
The present thesis has been written in English, although this is not the author’s first language, 
because the use of the English language increases the range of potential readers. However, the 
main part of the archival materials and articles used for this project are in Danish. All quotations 
from them have been translated into English by the author of this thesis. 
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From the onset, the organisation and financial support of Danish cancer treatment and research 
were primarily on private hands. But in the 1940’s, the prominent Danish cancer researcher Dr. 
Julius Engelbreth-Holm proposed a way for the State to lead the war on cancer through 
establishing and operating a wide-ranging cancer centre like the ones he had seen in the US. He 
strongly believed that such a thing was the ideal organisational tool to coordinate the Danish 
anti-cancer efforts. In 1949, the Danish Government made an unprecedented decision to co-
finance the establishment of a private-public version of the cancer centre proposed by 
Engelbreth-Holm, and with it the institutional matrix to promote one of the most persistent ideas 
in the Danish cancer research community: The value of a comprehensive cancer centre.  
 
2.1 Organising the anti-cancer cause: The international scene 
While archaeology suggests that cancer in all the forms this disease takes has always been with 
us, organised attempts to control the disease and the construction of hospitals for the treatment 
of it are far more recent phenomena114. In other words, the anti-cancer cause – defined as the 
organised fight against cancer through research, treatment, prevention, public education, 
creation of institutional structures for these activities, fundraising and lobbying – took on form 
only late in history compared with the disease it worked against. By the mid-19th century, 
French and Italian researchers had independently collected the first pieces of cancer statistics in 
the world and reached the same conclusion: cancer was generally more widespread than 
expected, and due to cancers of the breast and uterus, cancer death rates were rising among 
women in particular115. This increased the public focus on the disease, and it was not unusual for 
prominent lay persons to appeal to different authorities through newspapers and demand that 
something be done to stop the enemy within. But what could be done? Surgery had proved to be 
the only known treatment, and even that was not all too successful. During the 19th century, this 
increasing focus on cancer and cancer treatment motivated the development of a variety of 
                                                 
114 Murphy, C. C. S. (1989). "From Friedenheim to Hospice: A century of cancer hospitals". The Hospital in 
History. L. Granshaw and R. Porter. New York, Routledge: 221-241, p. 221.  
115 On early cancer statistics and cancer epidemiology in the US, see: Patterson, J. T. (1987). The Dread Disease: 
Cancer and Modern American Culture. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, p. 78-79.  
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public and private specialist cancer hospitals in France, the UK and the US116. In contrast to 
other specialist hospitals, these hospitals did not primarily promote themselves as entrepreneurs 
of scientific medicine. According to historian Caroline Murphy, the cancer hospitals were also 
established with the purpose of creating hospices or “Friedenheims” where incurable cancer 
patients – who were denied treatment at the large general hospitals in order to “massage” the 
hospital statistics – could go and die in peace and relative comfort117. The cancer hospitals 
offering different treatment modalities and palliative care depended on a steady clientele and 
philanthropic support, and clinical laboratory research was only given some priority there in the 
hope that the discovery of a cure for cancer would someday make the Friedenheims obsolete118. 
In the 19th century some British cancer hospitals were set up by medical practitioners with 
ambitions of making money on cancer treatment, and the medical profession therefore regarded 
them as “quack emporia”119 as the medical cures for cancer offered at most of these places were 
considered to be the result of quackery and not a valuable contribution to scientific medicine120.   
But in spite of this, the practice of cancer treatment was strongly affected by major innovations 
at the end of the 19th century: the professionals’ belief in the positive effects of cancer surgery 
such as radical mastectomy and hysterectomy  increased, and at the same time the methods of 
physiological research repeatedly proved effective in the control of infectious diseases121. This 
                                                 
116 Cantor, D. (1993). "Cancer". Companion Encyclepedia of the History of Medicine. W. F. Bynum and R. Porter. 
London, Routledge: 537-61, p. 547. 
  For more on the development of cancer hospitals in UK: see, Murphy, C. C. S. (1989). "From Friedenheim to 
Hospice: A century of cancer hospitals". The Hospital in History. L. Granshaw and R. Porter. New York, 
Routledge: 221-241, who shows how the progress of cancer treatment modalities transformed the hospitals’ cancer 
units from being hospices for the incurable patients to being hospitals with laboratories and offering research based 
treatment.   
117 Murphy, C. C. S. (1989). "From Friedenheim to Hospice: A century of cancer hospitals". The Hospital in 
History. L. Granshaw and R. Porter. New York, Routledge: 221-241, p. 222.  As Murphy points out, the 
histological nature of the variety of growths diagnosed as cancers in the past is now a matter of speculation, but she 
states that it is a fact that “cancer” patients were regularly admitted to the surgical wards of general hospitals. 
However, if they were considered to have inoperable cancers, they were denied access.  
According to Patrice Pinell, “inoperable” or “incurable” cancer was diagnosed in cases of relapse after treatment or 
in cases of ulcerated cancer. Pinell, P. (2002). The Fight against Cancer: France 1890-1940. London, Routledge, p. 
9.  
118 Murphy, C. C. S. (1989). "From Friedenheim to Hospice: A century of cancer hospitals". The Hospital in 
History. L. Granshaw and R. Porter. New York, Routledge: 221-241 p. 221.  
119 Cantor, D. (1993). "Cancer". Companion Encyclepedia of the History of Medicine. W. F. Bynum and R. Porter. 
London, Routledge: 537-61, p. 547.  
This was also the case for the medical profession’s attitude towards many other specialists and specialist hospitals 
in Britain. see: Granshaw, L. (1989). "Fame and fortune by means of bricks and mortar: the medical profession and 
specialist hospitals in Britain 1800-1948." The Hospital in History. L. Granshaw and R. Porter. New York, 
Routledge: 199-220, p. 200.  
120 Murphy, C. C. S. (1989). "From Friedenheim to Hospice: A century of cancer hospitals". The Hospital in 
History. L. Granshaw and R. Porter. New York, Routledge: 221-241 p. 225.  
121 Pinell, P. (2002). The Fight against Cancer: France 1890-1940. London, Routledge, p. 20.  
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gave rise to a bourgeoning public and philanthropic interest in a laboratory based search for the 
cause(s) of cancer and the discoveries of the effects of X-rays (discovered in 1895), radioactivity 
(1896) and radium (1898) on biological tissue gave new hope to both the public and the cancer 
investigators that more effective means of treatment were on the way122. In effect, the 
investment in Friedenheims for the incurable cancer patients seemed more and more 
inappropriate, and cancer hospitals concluded that research was more likely to attract support 
than palliative care and consequently dropped their plans for more Friedenheims and opened 
research laboratories instead123. According to Murphy (1989), the hospitals that adopted this 
scientific approach to cancer diseases tended to be the ones that survived into the 20th century124. 
In this way, the new discoveries shaped the cancer hospitals.  
In the terminology of Douglass C. North, a change in relative prices in the form of new 
technological possibilities can result in a new institutional equilibrium in favour of change, as 
seen in Kurt Jacobsen’s work on the development of a Danish telecom system where an initial 
plan to nationalise private telephone companies was postponed for almost a century until a 
change in relative prices such as the technology of automation, cable TV, digitalisation fibre 
optics and also a change in tastes and preference in the form of neo-liberalism made a 
nationalisation of the telecom services the most appealing solution to all parties in the 1990s125. 
Likewise, the medical breakthroughs of the late 19th century created new opportunities for 
treatment and thus new medical, private and political incitements to prioritise the construction of 
actual treatment facilities rather than just having Friedenheims for terminal patients. In other 
words, the new medical knowledge and technology brought about hope and possibilities that 
changed the institutional matrix in favour of a multifaceted anti-cancer cause that exceeded 
                                                 
122 The use of X-rays in the treatment of cancer followed in 1896, only a year after their discovery, when Dr. 
Despignes of Lyon attempted to treat a patient with malignant stomach tumour. The patient died soon after, and 
side effects of X-rays were quickly discovered by those who operated the machinery used for emission of X-rays. 
The effects ranged from simple hair removal of the body parts exposed to the rays to third degree burns or even 
tissue necrosis. However, the technique was soon improved by Swedish radiologists who managed to obtain good 
results from applying the technique to the treatment of cancroid cancer of the skin in 1899. By 1902, the American 
Dr. Coley  reported to the American Surgical Association that  radiotherapy produced a clear action on neoplasms 
even when the cancers were deep. Ibid. p. 20-23. According to Pinell, the use of Radium in cancer treatment was 
promoted by Pierre and Marie Curie and Henri Becquerel who suggested to French doctors that the substance might 
be useful in this respect, and a new field of radium treatment of cancer appeared in 1901, Pinell, P. (2002). The 
Fight against Cancer: France 1890-1940. London, Routledge p. 25 &34.   
123 Murphy, C. C. S. (1989). "From Friedenheim to Hospice: A century of cancer hospitals". The Hospital in 
History. L. Granshaw and R. Porter. New York, Routledge: 221-241, p. 227-228. 
124 Ibid. p. 228.  
125 Jacobsen, K. (2005). "Institutional change and path dependence in Danish telecom development." Paper 
presented at the conference "Cross-Connections: Communications, Society and change", Science Museum London, 
11-13 November 2005.: 1-16., p. 4.  
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traditional surgery and changed the nature of the cancer fighting organisations/hospitals. But 
what was cancer research at these places? 
The progress of physiological research and the development of bacteriology in the 1870s 
heralded a new era of scientific and laboratory-based approaches to medical problems. The 
young discipline of bacteriology was based on the “germ” theories of German physician Robert 
Koch and French chemist Louis Pasteur who defined disease as something being caused by 
different types of invading “germs”126. Apart from being a powerful tool for categorising 
different diseases according to the germs that caused them, bacteriology also paved the way for 
the prevention of diseases through vaccination – which is immunisation by means of injecting a 
suspension of specific and weakened micro-organisms 127. As a consequence, both researchers 
and interested laymen started to wonder whether or not cancer, too, was caused by microscopic 
organisms, and if a cancer vaccine would be feasible? However, far from all researchers were 
convinced that the cause was in fact a micro-organism, and the hope of finding the cause and 
subsequently the cure for cancer led the investigators to produce a wealth of hypotheses on the 
aetiology of cancer.  
These generally belonged to one of two groups: The group of theories that attributed the 
development of cancerous growth to endogenous factors, and the group of theories attributing 
the cancerous development to exogenous factors128. Vivid discussions took place between the 
advocates of the different viewpoints, and there were debates as to whether cancer had one or 
even multiple causes. The theories were manifold and proposed by investigators of different 
disciplinary affiliations. Cancer research at the turn of the century was thus not shaped by any 
one theory on the subject. The field developed from interplay of different and often competing 
theories, as new experimental data either supported or discarded them129. In general, those who 
subscribed to the hypotheses of an endogenous cause of cancer agreed that tumours developed 
due to some sort of internal biological irregularity turning normal cells cancerous –  that is, 
cancer could be hereditary or a result of some sort of isolated biological breakdown.  
                                                 
126 Porter, R. (2003). Medicinens Historie. København, Rosinante Paperbacks, p. 428. 
127 For more on Pasteur and the development of the concept of disease causation, see Carter, K. C. (1991). "The 
Development of Pasteur's concept of disease causation and the emergence of specific causes in nineteenth-century 
medicine." Bulletin of the History of Medicine: 528-48. 
128 Helvoort, T. v. (1999). "A Century of Research into the Cause of Cancer: Is the New Oncogene Paradigm 
Revolutionary?" History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences: 293-330, p. 293-330.  
129 Ibid. 
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The advocates of an exogenous cause, on the other hand, claimed that the aetiology of cancer 
was in fact environmental and could be induced by an external agent of chemical, parasitical or 
physical nature. Since 1775, it had been well known that there was an unusually high incidence 
of a specific type of cancer among chimney sweeps, and as more reports on the correlation of 
certain types of cancers and particular occupations increased in number throughout the 19th 
century, more people subscribed to the theory that cancer could be caused by factors outside the 
body such as coal tar, tobacco, mine dust or even strong exposure to sunlight, which was 
believed to be the cause of skin cancer among fishermen130. Although such theories of chemical 
and physical carcinogenesis received backing from many investigators, the most widespread 
exogenous theory of cancer focused on biological agents instead131.   
It is not within the scope of this dissertation to describe the international development of early 
experimental cancer research in all its forms. However, it is important to note that the growing 
scientific and philanthropic interest in the laboratory-based approaches to cancer gave 
momentum to a wave of professionalization of cancer research as a scientific field in the form of 
                                                 
130 Varmus, H. and R. A. Weinberg (1993). Genes and the Biology of Cancer. New York, Scientific American 
Library, p. 45-46.  
131 Among the most famous Danish propagators of exogenous theories were the physician-veterinarian team of 
Vilhelm Ellermann and Oluf Bang, whose work on chicken leucosis in 1908 suggested that at least some types of 
cancer were caused by a virus, see Ellerman and Bang (1908). "Experimentel Leukæmi hos Høns I." Oversigt over 
Det Kgl. Danske Videnskabernes Selskabs Forhandlinger. And in 1913, J. A.G. Fibiger claimed to have stumbled 
across a phenomenon which he believed could be used to induce cancer experimentally, see Nielsen, H. and K. 
Nielsen (2001). Nabo til Nobel - Historien om tretten danske Nobelpriser. Gylling, Aarhus university Press, p. 382.  
For this, Fibiger was awarded the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine in 1926 as the first cancer researcher in 
history. However, no one has ever managed to reproduce the results of his experiments and they have since been 
the subject of much scrutiny.  The most famous Danish proponent of an endogenous cause of cancer was the 
veterinarian C. O. Jensen. Inspired by the German investigator, Arthur Hanau, Jensen carried out a series of 
experiments between 1901 and 1903, where he studied spontaneous alveolar carcinomas in white mice, (see Jensen, 
C. O. (1903). "Eksperimentelle undersøgelser over kræft hos mus." Hospitalstidende 11: 581, p. 581). He 
demonstrated that a piece of this type of tumour could be transplanted from cancer-struck rodents into healthy ones, 
in which the piece would subsequently grow into a new tumour of the same histological type, (see Thomsen, O. 
(1935). "Mindeord over C.O. Jensen." Oversigt over Det Kgl. Danske Videnskabernes Selskabs Virksomhed 1934-
1935, p. 109-111). Jensen succeeded in propagating a spontaneous alveolar carcinoma through 19 generations of 
white mice, and thus established a rodent tumour line, through which he and other researchers could study the 
properties of the original tumour over longer periods of time now that the tumour was no longer dying with the 
host, (see Triolo, V. A. (1964). "Nineteenth Century Foundations of Cancer Research: Origins of Experimental 
Research." Cancer Research 24: 4-27, p. 10). Jensen’s experiments with tumour propagation demonstrated beyond 
any doubt that the cancerous growth in his new rodent-host was caused by the transfer of intact cancer cells and not 
by some infective microbe. More importantly, he produced an experimental tool – the tumour line – that opened up 
new vistas in the study of cancerous cells, and many European laboratories sent for samples of Jensen’s 
transplantable tumour line in order to investigate the metabolism, growth mechanisms, and morphology of the 
cancer cells. His discoveries have even been described as being “the starting point for most of the experimental 
mouse tumour research in Europe and the United States”, (see Thomsen, O. (1935). "Mindeord over C.O. Jensen." 
Oversigt over Det Kgl. Danske Videnskabernes Selskabs Virksomhed 1934-1935, p. 110). Later in the 20th century, 
many of the discrepancies between different theories on aetiology of cancer were considered to be due to the fact 
that the cancer researchers had not been working on the same type of cancer and due to multi-causality. 
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specialist research labs, specialist journals, international cancer congresses (1906-1913), and 
cancer organisations132. That is, the change in relative prices in the form of new treatment 
modalities and research-based breakthroughs in the aetiology of diseases and the change in taste 
and preferences (the public interest and contributions to the war on cancer brought about by the 
aforementioned medical breakthroughs) changed the institutional matrix for the anti-cancer 
cause/the cancer field.  
According to Douglass C. North, such change gives rise to new organisations utilising the new 
opportunities created by this change, and this was certainly the case here. In the first two 
decades of the 20th century, a number of professional societies and lay organisations were set up 
with the purpose of fighting cancer by raising funds for the support of cancer research – e.g. The 
Imperial Cancer Research Fund of 1902 in Britain133 - and for the so-called cancer control134 in 
the form of organisations such as The American Association for Cancer Research (1907), The 
American Society for the Control of Cancer (1913)135, Deutches Komitee für Krebsforshung 
                                                 
132 Cantor, D. (1993). "Cancer". Companion Encyclepedia of the History of Medicine. W. F. Bynum and R. Porter. 
London, Routledge: 537-61 p. 548.   
133 For more on the creation of the ICRF and other British cancer organisations: see Austoker, J. (1988). A History 
of the Imperial Cancer Research Fund 1902-1986. Oxford, Oxford University Press. The Imperial Cancer Research 
Fund stands out from the rest of the mentioned organisations in as much as it focused primarily on cancer research 
rather than on cancer control (see below).  
134 According to historian David Cantor, cancer control had many different meanings in different countries and 
points of history. However, I adopt Cantor’s general definition of cancer control as the scientific and medical 
efforts to control cancer mortalities and incidences, to control cancer diseases as biological entities, and the efforts 
to control the human activities and structures that work against these goals by hindering or delaying the cancer 
patients from consulting their doctor and detecting the disease at an early onset. That is, e.g. by educating the public 
on which danger signs to be aware of in their bodies, and by instructing them to consult their doctor, if the signs 
should occur. Cantor, D. (2007). "Introduction: Cancer Control and Prevention in the Twentieth Century." Bulletin 
of the History of Medicine 81: 1-38, p. 4. Historically, the definition has been discussed and changed with regards 
to the role of experimental cancer research in cancer control. For example,  there has been some discussion in the 
US in 1946-1957 of whether experimental cancer research is to be considered a part of cancer control or not, as 
cancer research proved to be a competitor to cancer control for appropriations,  Breslow, L., D. Wilner, et al. 
(1977). A History of Cancer Control in the United States, with Emphasis on the Period 1946-1971. Bethesda, 
Division for Cancer Control and Rehabilitation, National Cancer Institute, vol 1, p. 1 and vol 2 p. 578-579.  
According to Breslow et. al, (1977), recognised cancer control activities include: prevention, screening and 
detection, diagnosis and pre-treatment, evaluation, treatment, rehabilitation, public and professional education, and 
continuing care, and in a later article on cancer control from 1988, Dr. Lester Breslow from the Division of Cancer 
Control at the Jonsson Comprehensive Cancer Centre (US), and Dr. William G. Cumberland from UCLA, 
(California) continued this exclusion of experimental cancer research from the definition of cancer control by 
stating  that “understanding biologic mechanisms can be useful but is not essential for important progress in disease 
control. Experience with cholera, scurvy, and several other diseases – including lung cancer – has shown that 
disease prevention is feasible even without knowing the precise biologic or chemical agents that are responsible or 
the bodily mechanisms involved. Hence, research aimed directly at cancer prevention and promoting use of 
available knowledge for cancer prevention is highly desirable in the present state of cancer control”, Breslow, L. 
and W. G. Cumberland (1988). "Progress and Objectives in Cancer Control." JAMA 259: 1690-1694, p. 1694. 
135 For more on the American cancer organisations and the American anti-cancer cause in general, see:  
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(1900), and the French L’Association Francaise pour l’étude du Cancer (1908). A common trait 
for most of the new cancer organisations was that they believed that there was a better chance of 
treating cancer effectively, if it was diagnosed at an early point of its development. For this 
reason, many of the organisations believed that it was important to educate the public on which 
cancer warning signs to be aware of in their own bodies and to get them to seek medical help as 
soon as possible so that they could be referred to treatment facilities that mastered surgery 
and/or the new radiotherapy. In this way, both public education on cancer and cancer treatment 
were part of an organised attempt to control the disease – cancer control. Many countries 
developed cancer policies and programs in cancer control with these shared goals, but they often 
disagreed on how to reach them. There were national differences in the way the countries 
perceived of e.g. the role of public education in cancer control, what form of treatment was most 
appropriate for particular cancers, and how cancer treatment should be given to cancer patients – 
and by whom?136  
                                                                                                                                                            
Triolo, V. A. and M. B. Shimkin (1969). "The American Cancer Society and Cancer Research - Origins and 
Organization: 1913-1943." Cancer Research 29(9): 1615-1641 who describe the establishment of the American 
Cancer Society and the lay lobbyist engaged in the American anti-cancer efforts. 
 Rettig, R. E. (1977). Cancer Crusade. Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press who provides a historical 
account of the establishment of anti-cancer associations in US and the Lasker group’s lobbyism for a federal cancer 
program. 
 Breslow, L., D. Wilner, et al. (1977). A History of Cancer Control in the United States, with Emphasis on the 
Period 1946-1971. Bethesda, Division for Cancer Control and Rehabilitation, National Cancer Institute which is a 
history of cancer control in the US in 1946-1971, its scientific and technical advances and the programmatic 
developments done in the field by the federal government and the ASCC/ACS.  
Patterson, J. T. (1987). The Dread Disease: Cancer and Modern American Culture. Cambridge, Harvard University 
Press who gives a cultural history of cancer and its representation in US society and the organisational means 
employed to fight the disease from 1880-1980.  
Erdey (1995). Armor of Patience: The National Cancer Institute and The Development of Medical Research Policy 
In the United States, Case Western Univesity. who gives a political history of the development of the National 
Cancer Institute and federal cancer research policy in the US in 1937-71.  
136 Cantor, D. (2007). "Introduction: Cancer Control and Prevention in the Twentieth Century." Bulletin of the 
History of Medicine 81: 1-38, p. 3.  For instance, in the US, public education was a much more dominant part of the 
country’s cancer control programs than in the early UK programs, where the medical authorities feared that 
education on cancer danger signs would e.g. more likely scare the patients away from the doctors’ offices rather 
than into them, and thus focused on professional education of physicians instead. 
On cancer control in the United States, see: 
Breslow, L., D. Wilner, et al. (1977). A History of Cancer Control in the United States, with Emphasis on the 
Period 1946-1971. Bethesda, Division for Cancer Control and Rehabilitation, National Cancer Institute, vol. 2, p. 
500-501. In the US, organised cancer control programs began in 1913 with the establishment of the private and 
voluntary American Society for Cancer Control (ASCC), whose aim was to make the public aware that cancer 
could be controlled through e.g. early detection. The ASCC used the media to spread their message, and other 
similar societies followed suit. In the public sector, some states organised cancer control as early as 1898. Also the 
Public Health Service statistician J. Schereschewsky analysed the distribution of cancer deaths in the nation, and 
called for cancer control to be made a matter of federal concern. However the federal government was late to act on 
this and not until 1937, with the National Cancer Institute-act, did it put it to practice as the NCI was given mandate 
to study the cause, prevention, diagnosis and treatment of cancer.  
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Within the conceptual framework of North and Bourdieu, this development can be explained 
accordingly: the change in relative prices caused by medical progress prompted many countries 
to react similarly by reorganising their fight against cancer, as science is universal. But the 
national differences were due to local institutional constraints. Cancer control and the other 
aspects of the anti-cancer cause were therefore organised differently within different national 
frames with regard to its organisational and disciplinary structures, the inter-relations between 
groups of specialists (e.g. surgeons and radiotherapists), and the part played respectively by the 
State, local organisations, private associations and public health organisations137. The specific 
Danish structure and way of organising its anti-cancer cause will be described in the following.  
2.2 Organising the anti-cancer cause: the Danish framework 
In order to understand the rise and organisational structure of an anti-cancer movement in 
Denmark, it is necessary to briefly depict the structures of the Danish health care system and the 
formal instititutional matrix that shaped its development. The following six pages is an 
introduction to this – and at the same time a background history of the emergence of cancer 
fighting organisations in Denmark.  
 
                                                                                                                                                            
 Patterson, J. T. (1987). The Dread Disease: Cancer and Modern American Culture. Cambridge, Harvard University 
Press, who describes how the initiatives to educate the American public on cancer signs.  
 Lerner, B. H. (2001). The Breast Cancer Wars. Fear, Hope and the Pursuit of a cure in the Twentieth Century 
America, Oxford Univerity Press., who describes the American discussions on the most appropriate treatments for 
breast cancer (e.g. effectiveness of Halstad’s radical mastectomy vs. its mutilating side-effects) and the American 
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hope of discovering cancer at an earlier and perhaps more treatable stage. Lerner’s history is on the war on breast 
cancer, the shifting choice of treatment modalities, on the nature of the control campaigns, and on the stigmatisation 
of cancer stricken women in 20th century US. 
On France, see: Pinell, P. (2002). The Fight against Cancer: France 1890-1940. London, Routledge, Pinell, P. 
(1991). "Cancer Policy and the Health System in France: "Big Medicine" Challenges the Conception and 
Organization of Medical Practice." Social History of Science 4(1): 75-101, who describes how the French 
government was persuaded by an anti-cancer association and individual investigators during the World War I to 
utilise the wartime mobilisation of expert medical teams and cross-disciplinary training institutes to build cancer 
treatment centres in order to protect the public against the peril of cancer and to standardise the treatment offered to 
patients and the training of personnel. In these centres, early detection of cancer (and thus cancer education on what 
to look for) was valued much.  
On Germany, see: Proctor, R. N. (1999). The Nazi War on Cancer. Princeton, Princeton University Press. This 
book is on the progressive and sometimes even socially responsible works on cancer control done by Nazi doctors 
and public health activists; a direct outgrowth of Nazi ideology. For instance, the Nazi health officials worried 
about the harmful effects of tobacco and asbestos which epidemiological and preventive studies had linked with 
specific cancers.    
On Canada, see: Hayter, C. R. (2005). An Element of Hope: Radium and the Response to Cancer in Canada. 
Montreal, McGill-Queen's University Press, who describes the Canadian government’s efforts to establish 
centralised treatment programs in Ontario as part of its cancer control efforts.  
137 Pinell, P. (1991). "Cancer Policy and the Health System in France: "Big Medicine" Challenges the Conception 
and Organization of Medical Practice." Social History of Science 4(1): 75-101, p. 76.  
 





Historically, the Danish state has played a dominant role in the professionalization and 
structuring of Danish health services. In the 17th century, the absolute monarch, King Christian 
V, secured the university-trained physicians’ monopoly on the treatment of internal illnesses, 
while surgery was considered a craft for the barber guild138. This was done in an attempt to 
professionalise the practice of medicine which due to the scarcity of trained physicians was most 
often practiced by self-taught citizens using non-scientific remedies handed down from 
generation to generation. Nevertheless, the State’s favorism of academic medicine over folk 
tradition and remedies during the next century owed not to its impressive effectiveness but 
rather to a royal wish to protect the health and working ability of the country’s many peasants 
who were considered of the utmost importance for Danish military and economy139.  
This tendency of state responsibility for the health of the people was exemplified in 1740 with a 
royal decree to establish the Collegium Medicum, a medical agency with a threefold purpose of 
surveying the public health, controlling the medical practitioners and advising the King and his 
central administration of lawmen on medical issues and policy140. Also, the tradition was 
continued in a 1782 royal decree on infective diseases which made it mandatory for any county 
official or estate-owner to secure peasants medical assistance from royally appointed district 
physicians or other university trained medics141. In essence, the Danish tradition for a publicly 
supported health service system for those who could not afford to pay for the services 
themselves was created not by socialist ideals but rather by a mercantilist protection of the 
country’s workforce and economic backbone. 
In 1841, the different branches of health services were given a common exam at the country’s 
only university, Copenhagen University, and its medical faculty. Now both physicians and 
surgeons had to be academically trained in order to practice. However, the centralisation of the 
country’s only medical education and medical knowledge was at least in part responsible for the 
lack of physicians/surgeons in the province. Outside Copenhagen, only a small number of 
private practicing doctors were treating people in their own homes for money. Nevertheless, for 
each large district, a physician/surgeon was appointed by the King/later State as district medical 
heads with responsibility for overseeing the private practitioners and midwifes in the area and to 
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Lindhardt og Ringhof, p. 18. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Ibid., p. 20.  
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function as the local political authority’s advisor on health related issues142. Hospitals were 
usually established where such district physicians resided.  
 Before 1840, there were only about 30 hospitals in Denmark, and most of the provincial 
hospitals were little more than a couple of sinister rooms used for isolating poor people with e.g. 
highly infectious veneric diseases143. The hospitals thus served as part state part municipally 
financed poor-law authority for paupers, while more wealthy citizens avoided the hospitals by 
any means and paid for treatment in their own homes by private practitioners. However, in 
Copenhagen, hospitals were of a different nature and encompassed clinical education of new 
physicians and surgeons. Following a smooth transition from absolute monarchy to 
constitutional monarchy – leading to a central administration of ministries with each their 
minister in the late 1840s – the country experienced a massive increase in the construction of 
public institutes such as schools, poor houses, prisons and hospitals. And as more and more 
people were educated from the Medical Faculty in Copenhagen, more trained physicians and 
surgeons chose to practice medicine in the province at either the new publicly funded hospitals 
or privately. Even though the middle and upper class still chose to pay to be treated in their own 
homes by private practitioners, new surgical and medical treatments were surfacing by the mid 
19th century, and some of these required special surgical wards and thus hospitalisation of 
patients regardless of social standing144. The hospitals evolved from being extensions of poor 
houses to gradually becoming general treatment centres, strongly promoted by the newly 
established (and health service responsible) Ministry of Law and the wealthy citizens who 
pleaded for the hospital system to be separated from the poor-law system which the wealthy 
citizens disliked being associated with145.  
The hospitals were getting a new reputation amongst the middle and upper classes, and they 
would eventually be transformed from poor houses with generalist physicians to modern 
treatment facilities with electric lighting and central heating with the sole purpose of treating the 
sick by scientifically based principles for treatment and care. However, with the separation of 
the poor-law system and the hospital system, more people chose to be treated at the hospitals 
rather in than in their own homes, and the hospitals eventually got overloaded and crowded. The 
Danish hospital system was a three-tiered system of locally financed and administered hospitals 
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(municipal, county or state owned) with each their tier governed by popularly elected bodies. 
All experienced an increase in the number of admissions at the hospitals which was of course in 
line with the purpose of securing public health and which at the same time provided important 
clinical material for medical students, but which still posed a problem in times when epidemics 
such as polio and cholera claimed more and more victims. As for financing the hospitals, the 
Danish counties had had the right to taxation instituted since 1806 in order to stimulate the 
development of the hospital sector, and as a consequence the construction and operation of the 
hospitals in Denmark became largely financed by local taxes.146  
Because of the overcrowding at the hospitals, voluntary public and state-supported sickness 
insurance was introduced in 1892 in order to ensure the less than wealthy citizens treatment in 
their own homes like the wealthy citizens147.  In fact, sickness insurance had been a tendency (in 
a privately financed version)148 since 1857, when the Danish medical association was created 
and gave the profession a stronger standing. And the increasing wealth of the Danish population 
and the growth of the cities gave rise to a strong primary health service sector consisting of 
private practitioners (more than half of the collective number of physicians in the country) while 
the secondary (hospital) sector was publicly financed149/150.  
The international medical breakthroughs of the late 19th century on the aetiology of infectious 
diseases made it apparent that theoretical disciplines such as pathology and Pasteur’s 
bacteriology had a place in modern medicine and at the hospitals. However such theoretical 
endeavours were not integrated at the hospitals as medical specialties in Denmark, and this made 
the hospitals very outdated151. Given that the hospitals were essential for the education of 
physicians and the development of Danish medicine, the introduction of medical specialties at 
the Medical Faculty of Copenhagen University and at the hospitals became a matter of great 
importance to the Danish medical associations, although conservative voices amongst the 
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profession argued against dividing medicine into small pieces152. That is, informal institutions 
within the medical field (the physicians’ conservative taste and preferences) had hindered the 
introduction. Eventually the progressive voices gained strength in numbers and this affected the 
matter at the level of state-dictated formal institution, as an incremental change in the 
institutional matrix now allowed new specialities to gain footage. The most obvious place to 
introduce the new specialties would be the Frederiks Hospital that had close ties to the Medical 
Faculty regarding the clinical education of new physicians and surgeons. In order to 
accommodate the new bridging of theoretical disciplines and clinical practice, the hospital 
would have to be rebuilt in a larger version, and in 1888-89 the Danish government decided to 
set up just that: a new hospital including no less than four institutes from the Medical Faculty153. 
Difficulties in finding a new location for the hospital, a channeling of state funds into the 
country’s defense and tedious political power struggles between two of the country’s strongest 
political parties led to legislative inertia for many decades, which again led to a lack of decision 
regarding a proposal to reorganise the structure of the health service system in relation to 
independence from the Ministry of Law. This resulted in a postponing of the hospital 
construction and a stagnation of the development of Danish medicine and experimental medical 
research154.  
It took a widespread disease to lead the way out of the dead water and pave the way for 
modernisation and reorganisation of the Danish health service system, when a new generation of 
medical professionals led the fight against tuberculosis armed with the new theoretical approach 
to infectious diseases while a change in the Danish political system in 1901 led to new formal 
institutions favouring an increased public interest in health issues155. The new system meant that 
the government was selected based on a majority vote in the newly established Danish 
parliament instead of being appointed by the King. Also, the new system was based on the 
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premise that all citizens were equal and that their voice should be heard through the 
establishment of political parties representing the people. The political party “Venstre” 
represented one of the largest groups of the Danish populations, farmers and other agricultural 
workers, and won the power over the traditional nobility and industrialist party “Højre” which 
had been in government for many decades, and in contrast to Venstre advocated that the right to 
political influence depended on your social standing. With the political change, the voice and 
concerns of the people, regardless of social standing, was brought on the agenda. And as part of 
this, the importance of the people’s health and working ability resurfaced as a political issue. 
The formal institutions for prioritising health care services and their infrastructure were set.  
The discovery of disease-causing germs and corresponding vaccines led to new hope in the 
medical profession and in the public that several diseases could be cured, prevented or managed 
by employing different scientifically based treatments and care strategies than what had 
previously been practised. This meant new ways for the state to promote public health by 
reorganising the medical system and its practices. The late 19th century’s discovery of the 
aetiology of – and vaccine for – diphtheria prompted such a state response with the 1902 
establishment of the State Serum Institute for the production of vaccines156.  In an institutional 
perspective, this meant that the scientific breakthroughs (a change of relative prices) shifted the 
institutional matrix towards the emergence of new organisations and practices.  
Tuberculosis posed a similar threat to the Danish people, and although the discovery of the 
bacterial origin of the disease had not resulted in an effective treatment by the turn of the 
century, the knowledge of its infectious nature gave rise to new precautions in the care for and 
behaviour of tuberculosis patients in order to reduce the spread of infection (special isolated 
sanatoriums, reducing the behaviour of spitting on streets etc.)157. In 1895, a group of medical 
professionals contacted the government and its medical advisory agency the Health College, in 
order to make the state effectuate such precautionary measures and build sanatoriums, make it 
mandatory for physicians to report tuberculosis incidences, and to educate the public on the 
disease (free pamphlets). All this, except the construction of sanatoriums, was put into practice, 
but the medical professionals did not rest and managed to start a people’s movement involving 
the medical professional associations, politicians, the health insurance associations and a large 
group of private supporters with the purpose of making the state take responsibility and action: 
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equal access to treatment with the establishment of public sanatoriums for all social classes and 
not just for the rich.  
In January 1901, the national society for the fight against tuberculosis was established with the 
purpose of getting the Danish people to cooperate and support the war against the disease158. It 
was a private enterprise, a people’s cause, which was eventually supported by the 
government159. The idea was to collect private funds to establish sanatoriums and get the state 
and the health insurance associations to fund the running of the places. Money poured in, and 
the cause got the governments attention. In 1902, new laws were passed to ensure better and 
state-funded tuberculosis treatment at the privately established sanatoriums160. During the next 
25 years, the society and the State managed to establish as system of treatment facilities 
unmatched in the world, with state-expenditures growing from DKK 75.000 to DKK 4.5 million 
in 1920161.  
The immediate success of using the public opinion as leverage for policy-making was noticed 
and created a new role for medical professionals as “lobbyists” in the years to come. The 
success made the organisational structure and objective of the tuberculosis society a template for 
many other medical causes that needed to organise a people’s cause to raise state funds: such as 
the first Danish society concerned with cancer. Interestingly, after 25 years of organised and 
state-funded fight against tuberculosis and the establishment of new facilities, physicians were 
not all too happy with the result. The reduction of tuberculosis-related deaths had not been 
convincing compared with the outset, and the question arose: was it worth the money162? 
However, this ominous question that was about to shape the future organisation of the Danish 





The first step towards organising the anti-cancer cause was taken by the Danish physician and 
gynaecologist Niels Peter Ernst in 1904-05. During a stay in Vienna, Ernst had worked with the 
German Professor Ernst Wertheim in the development of a new and better surgical method for 
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treating cancer of the uterus (cancer uteri)163. He had also become accustomed with the German 
establishment of the Deutches Komitee für Krebsforschung, which was set up as early as 1900, 
and he was inspired to initiate a formal organisation of cancer control in Denmark. In a talk to 
the professional association Danish Society for Gynaecology and Obstetrics, he concluded that 
the poor results in the fight against cancer were partly due to the fact that the public was not 
educated on cancer and did not know which physical signs to be aware of. The general 
practitioners did not regularly examine their patients for cancer, and although they were bound 
by the epidemic law of 1888 to report incidences of the disease (believed by some to be of an 
infectious nature), there were no reliable cancer statistics for Denmark, as the practitioners often 
did not recognise the traits of cancer as cancer and therefore did not report it as such. For this 
reason, Ernst suggested the establishment of a committee with the purpose of discussing the 
means to fight cancer and educate the public on the disease through newspaper campaigns – a 
cancer control program. His proposal was welcomed by his medical society, and a committee 
was set up.  
However, as pointed out in the works of Douglass C. North, the success of a new organisation 
depends on its ability to utilise and grow within the existing formal and informal institutions and 
constraints it moves in, and the fate of the new committee was far from what Ernst had 
envisioned. In 1905, the Cancer Committee was set up under the aegis of the Danish Medical 
Association, and it had become an academic elitist organisation that did not address the public 
directly164 - in contrast to the successful tuberculosis movement which emphasized the 
importance of public education in the control of the disease. The committee consisted of 15 
members, all of which were physicians except for the veterinarian C.O. Jensen, who was 
included because of his extraordinary achievements in tumour transplantation experiments. 
None valued cancer education of the public as part of cancer control. The omission of cancer 
education of the public reflects the preferences of the members of the committee. As opposed to 
the members of the tuberculosis society, the professional logic of the committee members 
seemed to be to subscribe to a more traditional paternalistic approach to cancer control. And no 
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other logic or capital challenged their power to “call the shots”as the cancer community was as 
of yet a very small and specialised niche in society.  
The new objective of the committee was to find out how widespread cancer was in Denmark 
and to discuss the means to fight it. This was mostly done by sending out forms to general 
practitioners so that they could report cancer incidences among their patients, and the Cancer 
Committee would subsequently collect statistical data on the extent and spread of the disease in 
Denmark. The committee therefore decided to hire a histologist to whom physicians could send 
in patient tissue samples free of charge to find out whether or not their patients had developed 
cancer165. However, these services were costly and the young committee had to secure funding 
for its enterprise from the private Carlsberg Foundation – a foundation that was a great patron of 
science and medical research in Denmark – and the Ministry of Church and Education. Because 
funds were scarce, the committee decided to focus on cancer uteri only, but after a few years of 
existence, the activities were expanded to include all types of cancer. 
The collected statistical material was troubling, as Denmark appeared to have a very high 
incidence of cancer compared with the rest of Europe. But although the government had an 
interest in the improvement of public health, it did not endow the anti-cancer cause with much 
money or formulate any specific cancer policy – perhaps because the elitist committee had not 
mobilised different and broad groups in the Danish public and private sector as had the 
tuberculosis movement. The government did not create formal institutions that favoured the 
growth of anti-cancer organisations in particular, but as previously mentioned, the 1901 change 
of political system did increase the focus on public health issues in general, so the time was ripe 
to appeal to the public that had previously exhibited great interest in the subject and donated 
funds for the establishment of other disease-fighting organisations (a change in informal 
institutions in the form of the public’s taste and preferences).  
The members of the Cancer Committee were not skilled fundraisers, though. They were 
practicing physicians with tenures or practices to tend to, and in 1910/11, the lack of sufficient 
funding led them to drop a plan to establish a cancer foundation for the financial support of 
cancer research and the treatment of cancer patients166. The surgical treatment of cancer and the 
accommodation of patients in treatment clinics were expensive, and would not become less 
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expensive if Denmark was to introduce the new radium treatment that was being used in other 
countries167. Copenhagen physicians were eager to use this new tool in the fight against cancer, 
and in 1912 they finally turned to pleading their case in the newspapers: Denmark simply had to 
raise enough money to buy a sufficient amount of radium for cancer treatment at the Municipal 
Hospital of Copenhagen. Radium was a very expensive substance, but due to a couple of private 
donations, a committee for the acquisition of radium was set up and the person with the most 
knowledge of radium and radiation therapy in the country, Professor J. F. Fischer, was elected 
chairman168.  
Meanwhile in the Danish province of Jutland, representatives of the press had started their own 
collection to buy radium for the public hospital Rigshospitalet in Copenhagen. On July 4th 1912, 
the two organisations fused into the Radium Fund. Following the passing of King Frederik VIII, 
the Danish people had collected money for gold and silver wreaths for the royal bier, but the 
new king preferred to donate the money to the Radium Fund to purchase radium169. In this way, 
the acquisition of radium was funded by private contributions, but the Radium Fund was 
managed by a group consisting of such prominent figures as the Minister of Church and 
Education, Jacob Appel, Professor Fischer, representatives from the press, hospitals, the trades 
and industry, and finally the cancer researcher Johannes Fibiger, who represented the Danish 
Cancer Committee in a newly established collaboration between the two organisations. In 1912-
14, the Radium Fund bought 125 mg of radium from Paris and established cancer clinics for 
radiation therapy (so-called radium stations) in Copenhagen, Aarhus170 and Odense near the 
                                                 
167 In Britain, surgeons were not as eager to take up radium therapy, as the Copenhagen physicians. In the 1920’s 
the Medical Research Committee had to work hard to popularise the treatment as an alternative to surgery. The 
surgeons were reluctant to take up the treatment while the lay public demanded it be more widely used, see Cantor, 
D. (1989). "The MRC's Support for Experimental Radiology during Inter-war Years". Historical Perspectives on 
the Role of the MRC: Essays in the History of the Medical Research Councilof the United  Kingdomand Its 
Predecessor, the Medical Research Committee, 1913-1953. J. Austoker and L. Bryder. Oxford, Oxford University 
Press: 181-204, p. 186-188. On radium therapy and radiology in Britain and France, see: Murphy, C. C. S. (1989). 
"From Friedenheim to Hospice: A century of cancer hospitals". The Hospital in History. L. Granshaw and R. 
Porter. New York, Routledge: 221-241, Cantor, D. (1989). "The MRC's Support for Experimental Radiology 
during Inter-war Years". Historical Perspectives on the Role of the MRC: Essays in the History of the Medical 
Research Councilof the United  Kingdomand Its Predecessor, the Medical Research Committee, 1913-1953. J. 
Austoker and L. Bryder. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 181-204, Pinell, P. (2002). The Fight against Cancer: 
France 1890-1940. London, Routledge. 
168 Rud, E. (1937). Radiumfondet og Landsforeningen til Kræftens Bekæmpelse 1912-1937. København, Egmont 
H. Petersens Kgl. Hof-Bogtrykkeri, p. 17. 
169 Bühring, O., T. Øyan, et al., Eds. (2003). 75 år med kræftsagen - Kræftens Bekæmpelse, Kræftens Bekæmpelse, 
p. 18.  
170 For more on the Radium Station in Aarhus, see:  Espersen, B. T. and A.-L. Roager (2008). Det vidunderlige stof, 
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large hospitals of these cities171. The Fund thus provided the organisational settings for the 
development of cancer therapy in Denmark.172  
                                                 
171 Rud, E. (1937). Radiumfondet og Landsforeningen til Kræftens Bekæmpelse 1912-1937. København, Egmont 
H. Petersens Kgl. Hof-Bogtrykkeri, p. 20.  The scarcity of radium made it necessary to place the radium centres in 
strategic places “covering” most of the country. The amount of 125 mg of radium purchased by the Danish fund 
1912-14 should be seen in the light of the fact that the predominant type of radium treatment – in the form of 
radium salt (eg. radium sulphate)  in metal tubes or needles inserted directly into the tumour – required a minimum 
content of 1 mg pr. unit (according to Pinell, P. (2002). The Fight against Cancer: France 1890-1940. London, 
Routledge, p. 121, and Marke, A. W. and P. Raunkjær, Eds. (1939). Den Lille Salmonsen, 9,København, J. H. 
Schultz, vol. 9, p. 662). The radium could be reused again and again as the substance’s half-life is approximately 
1620 years. According to a Danish encyclopaedia from 1939, the price of 1 mg of radium initially was 500 DKK, 
but the price had been reduced to 75 DKK/mg by 1938, Marke, A. W. and P. Raunkjær, Eds. (1939). Den Lille 
Salmonsen, 9,København, J. H. Schultz, vol 9, p. 663. According to the same encyclopaedia, the supply of radium 
at the three Danish radium stations increased to 6,066 grams in 1938 (Marke, A. W. and P. Raunskjær, Eds. (1939). 
Den Lille Salmonsen, 7,København, J. H. Schultz,vol. 7, p. 399) , which can be compared to the 9,5 grams of 
radium purchased by the American National Advisory Cancer Council in 1938 to loan to all the nations hospitals. 
At that time, only the Roswell Park Memorial Institute in Buffalo, New York, had a supply of its own. Breslow, L., 
D. Wilner, et al. (1977). A History of Cancer Control in the United States, with Emphasis on the Period 1946-1971. 
Bethesda, Division for Cancer Control and Rehabilitation, National Cancer Institute, vol. 2., p. 516. This indicates 
that radium treatment was very popular in Denmark, and as mentioned above, the Danish physicians of the Cancer 
Committee had at an earlier point in history been more eager to implement the treatment modality than their British 
colleagues.  
172 In Britain, a Radium Trust and a Radium Commission were established in 1929 by the government and a range 
of voluntary organisations for the purchase and distribution of radium to treatment facilities in a research scheme to 
develop cancer treatment. The Commission used the radium supplied by the Fund to reshape cancer services in the 
country inasmuch as the hospitals that wanted the commission’s Radium were encouraged to adopt certain 
standards of therapeutic practice. In the US, radium was purchased by a diverse range of organisations and 
individuals, and this resulted in a much more heterogeneous development of radiation therapy practices at multiple 
different institutions. See, Cantor, D. (2007). "Introduction: Cancer Control and Prevention in the Twentieth 
Century." Bulletin of the History of Medicine 81: 1-38, p. 13-14, and Cantor, D. (1989). "The MRC's Support for 
Experimental Radiology during Inter-war Years". Historical Perspectives on the Role of the MRC: Essays in the 
History of the Medical Research Councilof the United  Kingdomand Its Predecessor, the Medical Research 
Committee, 1913-1953. J. Austoker and L. Bryder. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 181-204 for a more detailed 
history of the support of British experimental radiology in the interwar years.  
It is noticeable that British radiation therapy was mainly developed at the general hospitals after World War I – and 
not at the cancer hospitals which the MRC considered too small to give radium because they were in danger of 
under-using the expensive substance. The cancer hospitals were thus excluded from the MRC research scheme for 
the development of cancer treatments. By World War II, almost every cancer hospital had lost their special 
designations and they were engulfed by the larger general hospitals. With the emergence of the new chemotherapy 
in cancer treatment, cancer patients were now located at the general hospitals where a team of surgeons, physicians, 
and radiotherapists could develop appropriate courses of treatment for them. See, Murphy, C. C. S. (1989). "From 
Friedenheim to Hospice: A century of cancer hospitals". The Hospital in History. L. Granshaw and R. Porter. New 
York, Routledge: 221-241, pp. 231-234.  
In France, the aim of the anti-cancer movement was to establish a network of specialised centres in the treatment of 
cancer. The idea was to bring together various specialised expertise within the fields of cancer diagnosis and 
treatment under the same roof in cancer centres which was intended to be the basic structure of an institutional anti-
cancer apparatus. Governmental agencies initiated the creation of the centre-network that was designed to ensure a 
high standard of e.g. the new radiation therapies as performed by specialists only. However, some specialists 
believed that the idea of specialist treatment centres was almost too popular because a high number of official and 
“unofficial” centres were created in too little time without the necessary equipment and qualified manpower, and 
the plan for standardized professional treatment was diluted and subject to power struggles between radiotherapists 
and clinical surgeons who insisted on the superiority of their particular type of treatment. See, Pinell, P. (1991). 
"Cancer Policy and the Health System in France: "Big Medicine" Challenges the Conception and Organization of 
Medical Practice." Social History of Science 4(1): 75-101, 79-84. Pinell, P. (2002). The Fight against Cancer: 
France 1890-1940. London, Routledge, p. 72 et passim.  
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Numerous cancer patients sought help at the cancer stations, but there were far from enough 
beds, let alone radium, to give proper treatment to them all. Money was short until the 
government infuced financial aid into the Fund in 1921. In addition, a private national collection 
yielded enough money to buy more radium, and a few years later the government promised to 
make up half of the running cost deficit of the stations, provided it would not exceed 25,000 
DKK per year173. The Radium Fund had to rely on the steady inflow of private gifts and 
interests of capital to cover the second half of the deficit.  
In essence, the Danish Government and Parliament had not formulated a cancer control policy 
or program as seen in other countries174 by the end of World War I, and although the Cancer 
Committee acknowledged the importance of early diagnosis in the treatment of cancer, no 
efforts were made to educate the public on the physical signs of cancer175. Cancer control, it 
would seem, rested entirely on treatment modalities, and the scarce (private) resources were 
invested accordingly. The untenable financial situation for both the Radium Fund and the 
Cancer Committee left only little room for the support of experimental and clinical cancer 
research, too, and the organisations were not able to thrive in the existing institutional matrix. 
At least not separately competing for the public’s attention and benevolence. While e.g. Britain 
was about to establish research laboratories in connection with its radium treatment centres (in 
order to scientifically determine the most suitable radium dose, exposition duration, and 
biological effects of radium) 176, the Radium Fund could not afford the scientific personnel and 
laboratory space needed for such activities. The Danish Cancer Committee had similar financial 
                                                 
173 Rud, E. (1937). Radiumfondet og Landsforeningen til Kræftens Bekæmpelse 1912-1937. København, Egmont 
H. Petersens Kgl. Hof-Bogtrykkeri, p. 22. 
174 E.g. in France, where the government initiated programs in early detection and treatment and established a 
network of cancer treatment centres as the institutional settings for these programs, see Pinell (1991). In Canada, 
cancer control programs were also initiated. For more on this, see: Hayter, C. R. (2005). An Element of Hope: 
Radium and the Response to Cancer in Canada. Montreal, McGill-Queen's University Press.  
175 Public education was a much more important part of cancer control in the US, see  Breslow, L., D. Wilner, et al. 
(1977). A History of Cancer Control in the United States, with Emphasis on the Period 1946-1971. Bethesda, 
Division for Cancer Control and Rehabilitation, National Cancer Institute, Patterson, J. T. (1987). The Dread 
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176 See Cantor, D. (1989). "The MRC's Support for Experimental Radiology during Inter-war Years". Historical 
Perspectives on the Role of the MRC: Essays in the History of the Medical Research Councilof the United  
Kingdomand Its Predecessor, the Medical Research Committee, 1913-1953. J. Austoker and L. Bryder. Oxford, 
Oxford University Press: 181-204, p. 190-191.  
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problems and it has been suggested that its lack of fundraising abilities and its elitist nature had 
rendered the committee without much political and financial impact177.  
In other words, once the cancer cause became a public cause the elitist nature and professional 
logics of the Cancer Committee no longer worked as a power conservation mechanism in 
accordance with public doxa and informal institutional matrices. This had only been possible 
when cancer control was an elitist medical activity in its own closes, academic realm or field. 
Once the matter needed public and political support, the elitist habitus and logics of the medical 
professionals worked against the Cancer Committee, as the “game” was now played in a 
different arena in which doxa favoured democratic and political power of government rather 
than physicians. The Committee simply did not play well into the institutional matrix as the 
broadly scoped and popular Tuberculosis Society had managed to do. They had created a 
people’s movement. 
Although the Danish cancer organisations had not succeeded in making the State take over the 
running costs of the radium stations like the tuberculosis movement had managed to do with the 
tuberculosis sanatoriums, and even though state funding for medicine and new buildings seemed 
to be scarce all over, a series of events gave rise to the establishment of new institutes for 
scientific and medical research that would positively affect the Danish science, medicine and 
cancer efforts. In the 1920s, a series of Copenhagen scientists received the coveted Nobel prize 
which attracted a lot of international attention to the Danish capitol. In 1920, the Copenhagen 
University physiologist August Krogh was awarded the prize for his work on capillary motor 
regulation, in 1922 the prominent theoretical physicist Niels Bohr was awarded the prize for his 
groundbreaking model of the atom, and in 1926 the physician and university professor in 
pathological anatomy Johannes Fibiger received the prize for his cancer transplantation 
experiments178. The awards made Copenhagen a scientific hotspot that attracted many 
international guest researchers, e.g. from the US, but due to the lack of funds for investment in 
e.g. laboratory facilities, the university and hospitals, the conditions for the guests’ stays were 
not optimal179.  
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The American Rockefeller Foundation noted this and opted to invest in the modernisation of the 
Copenhagen facilities under certain conditions. The Foundation found that the Medical Faculty 
and the teaching hospitals lacked the latest specialities and theoretical disciplines such as 
biochemistry and other natural science disciplines, and that professor Krogh’s specialty of 
physiology would benefit from moving into new and better buildings with modern laboratory 
facilities alongside the new disciplines180. In 1924, this led to the Rockefeller-funded 
establishment of a new building for the Medical Faculty – the Rockefeller complex181.  But 
despite the generous contributions from the American foundation to modernise Danish 
medicine, there was still a pressing need for more funds to support the fight against diseases; be 
that through treatment modalities or through research into the diseases’ causes, as the 
experimental approach required increasingly more expensive apparatus and space, and the State 
was gradually making budget cuts through a reduction of its contribution to the sick insurance 
associations. The need for funds was especially pressing for movements against diseases that did 
not fall under the medical profession’s specialities... such as cancer.   
In 1928, the Cancer Committee thus recognised that there was an immediate need for a 
reorganisation of the country’s efforts to control cancer182. Up to this point, the Cancer 
Committee had been an association of medical professionals only, but its board now felt that the 
time was ripe for including lay representation as seen in the versatile cancer organisations in the 
US183. In October that year, the Danish Cancer Committee and the Radium Fund fused into The 
Danish Cancer Society184. The fusion of the two independent organisations with different 
statutes and managements was rather complicated inasmuch as they both had to be considered in 
the making of the organisational set-up of the new society which was given a president as well 
as a chairman and a managing director. The central organ of the Danish Cancer Society was a 
committee consisting of 80 members representing e.g. the Ministries of the Interior and 
Education, the health authorities, the municipal authorities, the Danish universities, the Danish 
hospitals, the Danish Medical Association and other medical organisations, the sick-benefit 
                                                 
180 Ibid., p. 215.  
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associations, the Red Cross, the press, and financial institutions185. This committee was led by a 
president and met on a yearly basis to discuss the activities of the Head Board (20 members and 
a board chairman) which met twice a year to evaluate the activities of yet another central organ 
– the administrative management. This latter organ was in charge of the everyday management 
of the Cancer Society. In addition, the society finally responded organisationally to the lack of 
public education and established a number of regional satellite departments that worked locally 
to inform the public about cancer and to recruit new members. The purpose of the Cancer 
Society was thus fourfold: 
1. To support the operation of the radium stations and the purchase of radium 
2. To support experimental and clinical cancer research 
3. To educate the public on cancer 
4. To supplement the governmental support for cancer patients in need.186 
The Danish Cancer Society (from now on referred to as the “Society”) campaigned through the 
radio and its regional departments to recruit members, and by the end of 1928 the new cancer 
organisation had 26.000 members. The number was to increase considerably during the next 
couple of years which indicated that the fight against cancer had become a matter of importance 
to a growing part of the Danish population. In 1934, the Society decided to offer its members 
free radiation therapy at the radium stations and this was undoubtedly another incitement to 
join187. Still, the government had not formulated a cancer policy, and its contribution to the 
treatment, research and prevention of cancer amounted to less than 20 percent of the total 
costs188.The anti-cancer efforts were on private hands, and the Society relied heavily on 
voluntary contributions from individual citizens to carry the burden.  
The lack of success of the movement to make the government assume responsibility for at least 
some of the pillars of the cancer fight was perhaps surprising, as the government in the mid 
1930s prioritised the expansion of the country’s hospital system and increased its support for the 
municipal and county hospitals that were gradually increasing in numbers and being modernised 
with new specialities (even in the province), and as they saw an increase in the number of 
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physicians wanting to work at hospitals rather than as private practitioners189. The Medical 
Faculty experienced capacity problems due to an influx of medical students, and in 1935 a 
medical faculty at the recently established Aarhus University was set up to take the pressure of 
the Copenhagen faculty190.  With the 1933 passing of an act of parlament to make membership 
of sick insurance associations mandatory and paid through taxes, an through the right of private 
practitioners’ right to refer patients to the publicly financed hospitals, it would seem that the 
entire health care sector was experiencing a massive expansion in terms of new hospitals, 
specialities, institutes and financing. But even though the government seemed to prioritise this 
expansion, it did not concern cancer treatment at the radium stations or cancer research, the 
latter of which was not given high priority by the Society either, in spite of the international 
attention given to the subject and Fibiger’s Nobel prize for transferrable cancer.  
This indicated that even in an organisation of medical professionals, research (done by people 
trained in medicine) was not considered a main pillar of the fight against cancer, and this 
constituted informal institutions (their taste and preferences) acting against making cancer 
research a special priority on a state level on a par with the existing disciplines and specialities 
at the university and the hospitals from which the cancer research problems and methodology 
stem and in which its practitioners usually worked. In other words, in times of apparently 
favourable formal institutions to boost “cancer research” and “cancer treatment” as independent 
scientific disciplines and medical specialities with separate budgets, informal institutions in the 
form of the conservative traditionalism in the hierarchical medical field acted against such an 
Lundgrenian “institutionalisation”.   
2.3 The support of experimental cancer research 
The operation of the radium stations and the treatment of cancer patients was undoubtedly the 
primary objective of the Society, but it did to a lesser extent support cancer research in 
laboratories at the radium stations in Copenhagen and Aarhus, and in the Laboratory for 
Pathological Anatomy at the University of Copenhagen: an atypical laboratory combining 
research and clinical observations. The research done at the university primarily focused on the 
mechanisms of carcinogenesis and the histological classification of different types of cancer191. 
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At the radium stations, on the other hand, researchers investigated the effects and quality of 
radiation therapy on cancerous tissue. Experimental cancer research was not given high priority 
at the Copenhagen station until 1937, when the Society opened a new and larger radium station 
within the Finsen Institute – an independent private clinic that had specialised in the radiation 
treatment of various diseases of the skin192. The institute was named after the Nobel Laureate 
Niels Finsen (1860-1904), who offered light therapy to Danish cancer patients in his private 
clinic at the turn of the 19th century. The institute had traditionally had a mixed reputation 
amongst the Copenhagen physicians, as it was established in 1896 for private and sick insurance 
association funds and managed to get state-support for its day-to-day operations, and it was 
therefore in a position to soak up all private and public funding at the cost of the public health 
care system in times when political inertia had otherwise made state-support for any 
modernisation or new construction of hospitals next to impossible193. In 1937, the Danish chief 
of medicine recommended that the Copenhagen Radium Station be placed at this private 
hospital instead of at the state-owned hospital Rigshospitalet (the replacement of Frederiks 
hospital) and thus away from any association with the Medical Faculty. At the 1937 
inauguration of the new radium station, room was made for a laboratory for experimental cancer 
research but on an entirely private initiative and in private buildings.   
A few years after, yet another cancer research unit saw the day of light. The foundation of one 
of Denmark’s strongest cancer research traditions, cancer epidemiology, was laid in 1941 as the 
Society was approached by a few of its own researchers. They argued that the lack of statistical 
registration of cancer incidences and the limited knowledge about the circumstances under 
which cancer patients developed the disease had proven to be a major impediment to the 
progress of experimental cancer research194. Apart from the early statistical material on the 
spread of cancer uteri, there had been no cancer surveys in Denmark. In response to this, the 
Society established an agency to compile statistics on the incidence of cancer in Denmark in 
1942195. It was called the Danish Cancer Registry, and its purpose was to work out reliable data 
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about the morbidity and occurrence of cancer and to set up a registry of cancer patients. The 
plan was to analyse this material to identify correlations between specific types of cancer and 
e.g. the patient’s occupation, diet, age, gender, environment etc196. The conclusions from such 
surveys were priceless to basic cancer research as well as to the clinicians who reported the 
statistical data to the registry and in turn received a stronger basis for the assessment of their 
treatment modalities. The registry received data about all cancer incidences and cancer-related 
death from general practitioners and hospitals.  
It was a unique Danish collaboration between the publicly and the privately operated parts of the 
health sector. The statistical material was considered to be reliable and useful due to the linkage 
of data from the very homogenous public health sector to the private registry197. At the time, 
very little was known about the occurrence of cancer in Denmark, or anywhere else for that 
matter, and the Danish initiative thus received some attention from abroad198. Because of the 
registry, cancer epidemiology emerged as a strong research tradition in Denmark, and after a 
few years of existence, the space-consuming activities of the registry had to be moved from its 
interim premises in an abandoned World War I-hut to the top floor of the new Copenhagen 
Radium Station199. The Society’s organisational response to the lack of reliable cancer statistics 
                                                                                                                                                            
mortality statistics and assumptions about links between cancers and certain substances such as e.g. mine dust based 
on small and unreliable samples and seldom controlled for the age of the population to being a more statistically 
founded science requiring large numbers of cases before concluding such links in the 1950s. Initially, cancer 
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pathogenesis of cancer, see Patterson, J. T. (1987). The Dread Disease: Cancer and Modern American Culture. 
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, p. 78. However, in the early 20th century US and interwar Germany, cancer 
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groups of statiscians and physicians conducted separate and thorough studies on the alleged link between cancer 
and smoking. The studies resulted in publications in 1950s and more cancer epidemiological studies followed, see 
Patterson, J. T. (1987). The Dread Disease: Cancer and Modern American Culture. Cambridge, Harvard University 
Press, p. 208-209. According to Cairns, J. (1978). Cancer: Science and SOciety, W.H. Freeman and Company, p. 
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– the establishment of the Danish Cancer Registry – introduced cancer epidemiology as a new 
weapon in the Danish war on cancer. From an institutional perspective, this change in relative 
prices gave rise to new collaborations between private and public organisations in the Danish 
cancer field. The collaborating organisations were trying to utilise the opportunities in the 
existing institutional matrix to both survive and serve their individual purpose; the private being 
utilising all possible resources to fight cancer in specific, the public being utilising the allocated 
resources to provide more health care in general. Because the new collaboration allowed the 
organisations to serve their new common goal without sacrificing their individual purposes, the 
collaboration was possible within the existing institutional framework. It was a modest start to a 
public-private effort to control cancer but a start nevertheless.  
Despite the modest housing and laboratory conditions at the radium stations, the space 
consuming cancer research activities became a high priority for the Society during the 1940s. 
The Society eventually supported cancer research in labs scattered all over the country, and a 
need to coordinate these scientific contributions slowly emerged. The idea behind the 
establishment of the new radium station in Copenhagen was to make room for a laboratory for 
experimental cancer research and to bridge the gap between bench and bedside by placing this 
lab near the clinic200. This priority was reflected in the job descriptions of Dr. Julius Engelbreth-
Holm, when the Danish Cancer Society appointed him head of the cancer research lab and – at 
the same time – prosecutor at the radium station and at the Finsen Institute in 1938.  
At the time of his appointment, Engelbreth-Holm was already an internationally renowned 
cancer researcher. At the Laboratory for Pathological Anatomy at Copenhagen University he 
had worked with Dr. Oluf Thomsen on the transplantable chicken leucosis and the relation of 
this disease to the virally induced chicken sarcoma201. Their publications attracted much 
attention, and Engelbreth-Holm was thus much respected when he started working for the 
Society. From the very beginning, he dreamed of a larger and independent cancer research 
centre in Denmark and quickly made plans to expand his modest laboratory facilities at the 
radium station. As will be clear in the following, his dream stemmed from a stay in the US. But 
while the Society was not opposed to this dream, formal constraints such as the outbreak of 
World War II and the German occupation of Denmark did put it on hold. When Engelbreth-
Holm was appointed professor of pathological anatomy at the university during this period, he 
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resigned from his position at the Danish Cancer Society and any plans of expanding the private 
lab at the radium station were permanently abandoned202.   
2.4 The idea of the cancer centre 
The idea of the cancer centre in itself was not abandoned, however. As it turned out, the medical 
breakthroughs of other countries during World War II had illustrated new efficient ways of 
organising and conducting medicine which was about to inspire both Danish medical 
professionals and politicians to employ new tools in the fight against cancer: the integration of 
research and treatment.  
The war had demonstrated beyond doubt the applicability of science. In 1945, US military 
doctors published their collective findings that the mortality rate of wounded and sick soldiers 
was diminished compared to that of World War I, and that this progress was most likely due to 
better acute treatment modalities and the availability of antibacterial substances such as sulpha 
compounds, penicillin, and also plasma and mobile hospital facilities etc203. Not only did this 
bear witness to the benefits of the aforementioned medical breakthroughs, it also evidenced the 
effectiveness of a deliberate policy of supporting basic research in the hope of applying it in 
(military) medicine and industry. The heavy state funding and mobilisation of technicians, 
scientists and medical researchers in many countries had led to the practical military and 
industrial use of basic scientific knowledge: the industrial mass production of penicillin, and of 
course the atomic bomb204.  
The idea of industrial application of technological and basic scientific research was far from 
new, though. At the beginning of the 20th century, Germany and the U.S were at the forefront of 
this development. In the US, industrial patrons such as the Rockefeller Foundation established a 
close connection between industry and science in the country205. In Germany, the government-
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sponsored Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes were established in 1911, and these research institutes 
allowed researchers to dedicate themselves completely to a certain problem or research area of 
choice, with the explicit goal that this work might in time find some mode of practical 
application for the German industry206. In this way, the state provided fruitful formal institutions 
for its researchers in the form of good financial and working conditions, and the promotion of 
both scientific autonomy and the need for industrial applicability. When the Nazis gained power 
in Germany, they were in a position to develop a strong tradition of organising science for 
national purposes. In England, the importance of applicable research was stressed in 1939, when 
X-ray crystallographer J.D. Bernal published his book The Social Function of Science. In this 
book, Bernal argued that government support and planning of scientific research would be the 
best means of improving the conditions of human life.  
All in all, this take on science organisation was highly prevalent and took on similar forms in 
many other countries. However, World War II specifically illustrated the effectiveness of such 
strategies as exemplified through the famous Manhattan Project. American engineer and science 
manager Vannevar Bush was one of the leading political forces behind the development of the 
atomic bomb, but as a result of the success of the war time research strategy, he began to fear for 
the future of basic research in the country. If science was constrained by the demands of 
applicability, mankind would risk losing out on the “fluke” discoveries that emerged from 
freewheeling basic research. In his 1945 report Science – The Endless Frontier, he suggested 
another type of science policy that assured the autonomy of science by bidding the grant-
awarding authorities to allocate vast amounts of money to basic research without any special 
requirements or conditions207. The idea was often referred to as “science push”, because it 
implied that scientific progress opened new vistas for society and pushed it in certain directions 
rather than the other way around.  
All of the abovementioned ideas on the management and organisation of science led to vivid 
discussions in Denmark in the 1940s and 1950s, where a new generation of researchers 
demanded better funding and working conditions for Danish science. The Danish government 
had not been accustomed to allocating large public funds for basic research. The publicly 
operated universities were particularly accustomed to modest conditions, and like anyone else in 
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the research community, university professors had to rely on the financial support from private 
organisations such as the Danish Carlsberg Foundation and the American Rockefeller 
Foundation208. As war time inflation had taken its toll on the Carlsberg Foundation and rumours 
had it that the Rockefeller Foundation was planning to support war-ravaged countries only (and 
therefore not Denmark), the Danish research community worried that something had to be done 
to prevent Danish science from stagnating209. Scientists argued that there was an urgent need for 
funds and better working facilities, and it was their opinion that the government needed to 
provide these210. That is, the government should define and commit to formal institutions in 
favour of research.  
Although Denmark, compared to the rest of Scandinavia, did not rush to establish research 
councils in order to support basic research through grants-in-aid, the Danish government did 
create a formal institution by establishing an agricultural research council in 1946 with the 
deliberate purpose of solving the current crisis of Danish agriculture that had suffered due to its 
lack of ability to compete on the international market211. Generally speaking, though, most basic 
researchers tended to favour Bush’s “science push” model for the organisation of science, and 
used the press to propagandise and attack the government’s short-term research policy that had 
favoured applied research only212. The tone of the discussions was fierce and it was within this 
context that the most persistent idea concerning the organisation of Danish cancer research was 
hatched:  a Danish comprehensive cancer centre.  
The political discussions on the future of Danish science gave Dr. Albert Fischer the opportunity 
to present his vision for cancer research. Fischer’s interest in cancer started in the early 1920s, 
when he studied under Alex Carrel at the Rockefeller Institute in New York. Here he was taught 
a special technique for the in vitro cultivation of epithelial cells. He quickly became an expert on 
the subject and extended his interests to include cultivation of cancer cells as well. In 1926 his 
technical expertise helped him get a position as head of a guest department at the Kaiser 
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Wilhelm Institute in Berlin Dahlem213. Six years later he was made director of the newly 
established Carlsberg Biological Institute in Copenhagen214.  In a newspaper article from 
August 28th 1945, Fischer stated that any real progress in the “fight against cancer” would come 
from organisational and scientific initiatives that would use the American Manhattan Project as 
a template215: 
The first thing that needs to be done in order to make this dream come true is to give the 
scientists the right working conditions. A model research institute with all needed 
apparatus and funding in place should be established in a country which has no prospects 
of being a battleground of war. It is not my intention that this institute should be used for a 
specific project or by a specific group of researchers. It is to be at disposal when any 
urgent problem needs to be solved, and the best brains of the world within the specific 
field of this problem should gather there and join forces in finding a solution to it. This is 
what the people behind the atomic bombs did. (…) The same should be done within the 
medical sciences, and cancer poses a well-defined international problem that everybody 
has an interest in solving. (…) Naturally, it would be costly, but I believe that the money 
spent on this collaborative action would yield better results than the money spent on the 
scattered cancer research worldwide today. I wonder if it would not be better to put this 
money in an international fund to support the collaboration between the best of the best.216 
 
Fischer proposed an international institute for “problem-solving” research. His time at the 
Kaiser Wilhelm Institute had certainly not been in vain, as he had apparently adopted and 
developed the science policy behind the German research establishment. In doing so, he came to 
represent a mixed stance in the ongoing debate on Danish research policy: He tried to support 
both the mission-oriented perspective from the Manhattan project but at the same time the basic 
cell biologist in him supported elements of the “science-push” model, as will be elaborated on 
below. 
Five months later, the previously mentioned Professor Engelbreth-Holm indirectly commented 
on Fischer’s idea in the press by presenting an alternative vision for the future of Danish cancer 
research. He, too, had been abroad (the US) and was convinced that the conditions for Danish 
cancer research had to be dramatically improved. Otherwise, Denmark would be left behind the 
international developments within cancer research and treatment. And it would not be 
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acceptable for Denmark to sit on the periphery and do nothing but await results from abroad.  In 
the US, cancer agencies had struggled to reorganise cancer services by the means of a patient 
referral system, through which the individual cancer patient could be referred from his family 
doctor to local, regional or even national specialist cancer hospitals217. However, the idea of 
specialist cancer centres was not always welcomed by all (especially not by private 
practitioners), and this led to disagreement on how to organise cancer services – e.g. new 
autonomous cancer centres vs. cancer clinics in existing hospitals218. In the 1940s, support for 
the experimental research into the aetiology of cancer and potential chemotherapy compounds 
exploded, and hospital specialist cancer units established with the original purpose to provide 
cancer care were now made into cancer research centres, since their large populations of patients 
and teams of experts made them ideal settings for therapeutic trials219. The multi-disciplinarity 
of these centres dedicated entirely to cancer rang well with Engelbreth-Holm who argued that 
the field of cancer research was expanding so fast that the individual cancer researcher could no 
longer master it all, and he therefore pleaded for a more “rational” organisation of cancer 
research in Denmark:  
For the moment, cancer research is done at several hospitals and laboratories in the sense 
that each researcher works on his special task without much collaboration with his 
colleagues. (…)But these efforts are not, and cannot, be adequately coordinated. (…). 
Some are more or less hopelessly struggling to keep it all together – a task made more 
difficult each year – for nobody masters all the disciplines of clinical cancer research, 
pathology, biology, chemistry, physics, and mathematics that make up modern cancer 
research. Then what does it take? It takes a research institute that collaborates with a 
cancer hospital – a research institution that consists of several departments for each of the 
aforementioned disciplines – and which is led by different experts. It takes collaboration, 
or “team-work”, between these departments so that they will supplement and learn from 
each other. They know this in the US and they have established The National Cancer 
Institute220, in which the principle of team-work is consistent. This principle and the 
unlimited flow of resources led to the utilisation of atomic energy. One cannot expect the 
same results in cancer research, as the cancer problem is not nearly as theoretically 
clarified, but I have no doubt that a broad and coordinated offensive against cancer will 
yield far greater results than the single and isolated studies ever will.221 
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Engelbreth-Holm believed that scientific progress in the fight against cancer would stem from 
the synergy effect of placing different disciplines of basic and clinical cancer research under the 
same roof. In this way, he stressed the importance of basic cancer research to cancer treatment 
and the collaboration between clinicians and researchers. The key words were teamwork, 
centralisation and coordination, but in this type of national cancer centre the researchers were 
not forced to solve a narrow and pre-defined problem, although the work had to be relevant to 
the study of cancer. Engelbreth-Holm wanted to establish a two-way communication between 
bench and bedside. He felt that the study of cancer required intense co-operation between 
researchers of clinical, experimental, and epidemiological research and that the establishment of 
a cancer research centre at the Finsen Institute would provide the ideal setting for such 
activities. Engelbreth-Holm wanted a national wide-ranging cancer research institute222. Fischer, 
on the other hand, wanted to place an international institute in a country that was not likely to be 
ravaged by war which would impede the scientific work at a centre223. The following debate 
between the two was therefore characterised by their individual attempts to discuss the concept 
of a centre from either a national or an international perspective and scale. This meant that the 
two sometimes were not always so much commenting on the other’s proposal as much as they 
were advocating their own.   
During the process of this debate, Engelbreth-Holm commented on Fischer’s proposal to place a 
centre in a country not likely to be ravaged by war, as he argued that he feared such a country 
might not even exist and that “it would not be practical to place an institute far from the cultural 
centres of the world”224, thereby trying to make the debate about a national cancer centre.  
Fischer returned fire by dismissing the idea of a new national cancer research institute all 
together. He worried that a national institute would force the country to tie up existing funds for 
cancer research, in contrast to an international centre. He therefore presented an alternative to 
what he feared would be a monopolising cancer institute: a network of collaborating laboratories 
and research institutes endowed with an increased level of public, private, and industrial 
support225. To Fischer, it would be far more suitable for a small country like Denmark to adopt 
this mode of organisation rather than imitating the structures of the much larger and wealthier 
US. 
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 In this way, Engelbreth-Holm had managed to force Fischer into discussing potential cancer 
institutes within a national framework. However, Engelbreth-Holm claimed not to understand 
the criticism Fischer gave his idea. He did not believe that a national research institute would tie 
up all funds available for cancer research and thereby monopolise the field. He had not proposed 
a zero-sum game in which the total of all gains and losses was zero. On the contrary, his centre 
was to be backed by additional governmental subsidies and private contributions, thus making 
cancer research a high priority of the state. Also, he rejected Fischer’s network-model as 
impractical. In practice, both models would need a powerful director to coordinate research 
efforts and identify new interesting research problems. Engelbreth-Holm simply did not think 
that this would be feasible within Fischer’s proposed network of equal and autonomous research 
institutes. As this model was only a theoretical consolidation of the institutes involved, 
Engelbreth-Holm argued that it would not improve the everyday working conditions of the 
researchers who would often be too preoccupied with teaching obligations and administrative 
tasks to involve themselves in serious inter-mural collaborations226. This was clearly not the 
sweeping reform needed to reorganise Danish cancer research.  He therefore stood by his idea of 
a wide-ranging cancer institute where a staff of (mature!) researchers should be freed of such 
obligatory services.  
Engelbreth-Holm pointed to the cancer research laboratory at the Memorial Hospital in New 
York as an example of an interdisciplinary institute227. This was a research institute consisting of 
no less than eight departments for experimental cancer biology, biophysics, chemotherapy, 
protein chemistry, enzyme chemistry, and an animal stable228. The annual operating costs of this 
establishment amounted to approximately 500,000 USD. And although this was an impressive 
amount of money, Engelbreth-Holm argued that it would not be impossible to do something 
similar in Denmark, although it had to be on a smaller scale. Also, he argued that the pioneering 
work done at the cancer registry could not be outdone by any foreign institute no matter how 
much money was put into the effort. In addition to the talent of the country’s leading cancer 
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epidemiologists, progress within this field was due to the special uniformity of the Danish 
hospital system and its collaboration with the Danish Cancer Society. Engelbreth-Holm was 
even certain that Denmark had the human resources for a similar advance in other fields of 
cancer research: experimental cancer research, pathological anatomy, radiobiology, biophysics 
and biochemistry229. All that needed to be done was to provide fitting physical and 
organisational frames for this work – a national cancer institute230: 
 
Naturally, the giant American Research Institutes will have certain advantages compared 
to a Danish one. But in the end, their work will depend on the brains that lead them, and 
by looking at what Denmark has achieved hitherto in this area it will not be unfair to say 
that Denmark will have certain opportunities that cannot be outbalanced by dollars. (…) it 
is of paramount importance to change the current attitude of the grant-awarding 
authorities. Our current system of isolated institutes, which more or less are dedicated to 
other activities than cancer research, cannot compete with these systematised [American] 
team-works.231 
Using Douglass C. North’s and Bourdieu’s terminologies, the newspaper mediated debate on 
cancer centres can be explained as follows. The two researchers had knowledge of how the fight 
against cancer was organised in other countries. That is, they knew of countries whose 
governments had created more favourable formal institutions for this fight in the form of 
policies and financial support systems than the Danish government. Therefore the idea of a 
cancer centre as the organisational means to utilise the institutional latitude was by no means 
foreign to them, although they each pictured it differently. Promoting such an organisation was a 
direct challenge to the existing institutional matrix in Denmark; that cancer research was not 
organised on a national level but rather on smaller independent organisational levels often 
committed to other research purposes than cancer.  According to North, however, radical 
institutional change can only be brought about by the most powerful organisation in the field 
(which neither of the two researchers was) or through new power-optimizing alliances. The 
latter may be the reason why the two researchers chose to publish their thoughts in the 
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newspapers instead of in a more private/professional forum. An appeal to the newspaper readers 
to back a cancer centre could be the alliance needed as leverage against the government who had 
the actual power to change the institutional matrix. 
2.5 A clash of the titans? 
Fischer’s and Engelbreth-Holm’s arguments for their different models reflect different types of 
aims, values and “professional logics” as described in sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s works. 
Fischer came from a basic research institute and thus assigned a high priority to basic 
research/science as an international strive for a precise understanding of the basic mechanisms 
of nature and supported the mix of the science push model and the mission-oriented model 
which he had been acquainted with from the Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes; a place in which 
scientists were given the means to try to solve specific problems in whatever manner they saw 
fit (through basic research in the hope of serendipity breakthroughs or through more targeted 
efforts). To Fischer, cancer was one of the health and social problems that could potentially be 
solved with the help of such an international institute. But when the clinically orientated 
Engelbreth-Holm suggested his national cancer centre including patient treatment – which was a 
task to be solved nationally and locally – Fischer suddenly presented a new model for cancer 
research within a national frame: a network of cancer labs. Fischer’s new model did not include 
cancer clinics, but focused primarily on research into the basic mechanisms of cancer and not on 
the cancer patients. In this way, he stated that basic scientific disciplines such as cell biology 
were at the core of cancer research.  
The clinician Engelbreth-Holm, on the other hand, assigned a high priority to treating the cancer 
patients and suggested a national wide-ranging cancer centre encompassing both research and 
cancer treatment so that the local patients could receive treatment based on the latest scientific 
knowledge about the biology of cancer. As mentioned above, he used to be affiliated with the 
Copenhagen Radium Station and the Cancer Society’s laboratory for experimental research 
where this combination of treatment and research had been implemented. His research was thus 
more clinically orientated than Fischer’s basic cell biology, and his model reflects that to him 
cancer research was a wide research area with basic, epidemiological and clinical aspects, and 
that cancer treatment and prevention depended heavily on all of these. The two researchers thus 
disagreed on two central points: on what was at the core of “cancer research” and on what 
should be included in a cancer institute. Consequently, the bone of content in this stride was 
officially a matter of research policy: would the best results in the fight against cancer stem from 
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a carefully orchestrated co-ordination of targeted cancer research and treatment – of bench and 
bedside – or would progress more likely come from the serendipity breakthroughs of a non-
cancer-specific cell biology research effort? As it turned out, Engelbreth-Holm’s take on this 
question was more in tune with the zeitgeist and would play well into a new (research) political 
agenda of the Danish government, as will be elaborated on in the following pages.  
Furthermore, when Fischer and Engelbreth-Holm were discussing a cancer institute in a national 
frame, their personal goals and ambitions may have played a role as well. And whereas the 
research political dimension of their stride would eventually be resolved in favour of 
Engelbreth-Holm by circumstances the economist Douglass C. North would have called a 
change of formal institutions, the matter of the two contenders’ personal goals and ambitions 
gave another and sociological dimension to the stride. This meant that there were different 
reasons as to why one model won out over the other. One reason had to do with research policy, 
political agendas, and North’ian change of formal institutions. The other, which will be dealt 
with immediately below, had to do with the social standing – or symbolic capital – of the two 
contenders striving for optimising their power in a sociological arena – the cancer field – in 
accordance with the theoretical works of sociologist Pierre Bourdieu.  
In this field, Engelbreth-Holm’s model deliberately left Fischer out of the loop. Perhaps this is 
why he criticizes the dangers of monopolisation: 
Such an arrangement would make cancer research a privilege, a sort of monopolisation of 
the work in this country that will hardly be of benefit to the anti-cancer cause.  This author 
has had several peculiar experiences with the former reign of Johannes Fibiger. (…) an 
increased level of public, private and industrial support for a closer collaboration between 
Danish institutions is to be preferred.232 
In contrast to Engelbreth-Holm’s centre, a network of equal research labs would give Fischer 
some say in the decision-making processes and make him and his Carlsberg Biological Institute 
candidates for the coveted funds for cancer research. By the same token, Engelbreth-Holm’s 
concerns may have been that his idea would not receive backing from the grant-awarding 
authorities in question, if Fischer and his Carlsberg Biological Institute claimed to do cancer 
research in an attempt to, so to speak, “follow the money”. If a well-established and privately 
funded research organisation claimed to be about to dedicate itself entirely to cancer research, it 
would be very difficult to persuade the government to support the establishment of a new one.  
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On a political level, the Carlsberg Biological Institute may thus have posed a threat to 
innovation within the cancer research community, and this is probably why Engelbreth-Holm 
completely excluded Fischer and his institute from his plans for the proposed cancer centre. In 
one of his newspaper letters, the professor addressed Fischer directly on this issue and explained 
that there was no need to include Fischer’s “excellent institute” in a centre which was to be 
established to allow existing cancer researchers to shed their tiresome duties and dedicate 
themselves fully to the study of cancer. In contrast to Engelbreth-Holm and his colleagues at the 
university, Fischer and his Carlsberg Institute “were already privileged to be without such 
restraints”233. Engelbreth-Holm effectively wrong-footed Fischer and his institute – drove him 
out of the field of cancer research so to speak – and Fischer’s institute was not to become part of 
the future organisation of Danish cancer research in as much as the Danish Cancer Society and 
later on the Danish government chose to promote Engelbreth-Holm’s idea234.  
It was thus he who got a chance to draw the scientific and organisational borders for Danish 
cancer research with his model. He demonstrated that physicians such as himself had a great 
deal of influence on the Danish Cancer Society (his former employer) inasmuch as the private 
cancer charity was very susceptible to his idea. And why? Engelbreth-Holm’s symbolic capital 
consisting of his education, work associations, status amongst peers, and networking was a 
much stronger currency in the cancer community than Fischer’s. As mentioned above, the 
Society was managed in large by physicians, and the private organisation thus functioned as an 
organisational appendix to this professional group, implementing its definitions of what cancer 
research was and how it should be organised. Using the North-Bourdieu terminology, the 
Society was thus guided by the same professional logic and bound to sustain any institutional 
matrix (formal plus informal constraints) that would increase the symbolic power and wealth of 
this professional group and carry out its goals. Likewise, in case the institutional matrix worked 
against the agenda of this group, the Society would try to change it.  For this reason, it cannot 
have been very difficult for Engelbreth-Holm to persuade the Society to back his model rather 
than Fischer’s, which only emphasized the importance of basic biological disciplines in cancer 
research. As it turned out, the Society and Engelbreth-Holm would succeed in changing the 
formal institutions determining the potential establishment of a cancer centre, as the government 
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234 Rud, E. (1953). Landsforeningen til Kræftens Bekæmpelse 1928-1953. København, Egmont H. Petersen Kgl. 
Hof-bogtrykkeri, p. 101.  Later on, though, Dr. Zeuthen conducted a series of cell synchronization experiments at 
the Institute.  
 
The Cancer Centre That Never Was 
 
 92 
was persuaded to suddenly lend enthusiastic support for such establishment rather than 
principally being against state participation in such projects. The following pages will explain 
this change of heart.  
 
               
     Albert Fisher                                                    Julius Engelbreth-Holm 
2.6 Scaling down the vision - The Fibiger Laboratory 
Engelbreth-Holm’s vision of a large wide-ranging cancer research institute in which the 
experimental, radio-biological, epidemiological, chemical and patho-anatomical subfields of 
cancer research could be placed side by side with the cancer clinic, was put into practice in a 
rather amputated version in 1949235. As mentioned above, the Danish Cancer Registry had been 
moved to the new and larger Copenhagen Radium Station, and the costs of building a new 
research centre in connection with the station remained an insuperable barrier. After extensive 
negotiation with the University of Copenhagen, it was decided to establish a cancer research 
laboratory in a wing of Engelbreth-Holm’s Department for Pathological Anatomy at the 
university, and even though this solution did not fully resemble the professor’s idea of a wide-
ranging cancer research/treatment institute, it was a (modest) starting point236. However, there is 
no doubt that the cancer researcher regretted that the laboratory was not built in close connection 
with the cancer clinic, the Danish Cancer Registry and the radio-biology research at the radium 
station.  
                                                 
235 I have found no sources from 1946-1948 on Engelbreth-Holm’s model.  
236 Kieler, J. (1989). The Fibiger Institute 1949-1989. Copenhagen, The Danish Cancer Society, p.  5. 
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The lab was assigned a total area of 170 m2 which was sufficient for Engelbreth-Holm (the head 
of the lab) and a staff consisting of a cancer biologist, a chemist and a few technical 
associates237. The necessary building alterations were financed by the State while the scientific 
apparatus was purchased with the help of state-mediated Marshall aid, funds from Copenhagen 
University, The Danish Cancer Society, The Carlsberg Foundation, The Academy of Technical 
Sciences, the newspaper Berlingske Tidende, and several minor private funds238. Not only was it 
surprising to see the State give financial aid to the establishment of the centre in times of post-
war restrictive financial policy, it was directly unprecedented that the arrangement meant that 
the Danish Cancer Society and the State agreed to share the operating expenses of the lab 
between them in equal measure – fifty-fifty! Although the lab eventually needed to seek 
additional funding from other private funds and international agencies, e.g. the American NCI 
and Public Health Services, this agreement was unusual at a time when public money was short 
and seldom invested in research and especially not in medical research not completely within 
the realms of the publicly operated university.  
An important force behind this arrangement was the Danish Minister of Education and professor 
of philology, Hartvig Frisch, who was cast in the press as a villain impervious to the appeal for 
more state subsidies for Danish research which a group of Danish researchers set forward in 
order to avoid Danish research lacking behind other countries, and he was thus portraied as 
unpopular with the research community239. This picture was emphasized as the prominent 
member of the Labour Party gave a February speech at a scientific prize award ceremony at 
which he inveighed against the whimpering of the researchers, claiming that scientific genius 
could not be induced by any grant-awarding authority and that the Danish level of research 
support was only poor compared with those of larger and wealthier countries like the US240. So 
what possessed the Minister – apparently an advocate for the historical trend of minimal state 
financed research support – to make an unprecedented move to support cancer research through 
a committing, long-term operation of a cancer centre? 
The answer is – at least in part – that the Minister was somewhat wrongfully casted as the villain 
of the Danish research community. Frisch was appointed minister in 1947 when he took over 
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office from his predecessor M. R. Hartling, who had taken the post-war concern for Danish 
research seriously in the face of the depletion or re-prioritising of the private foundations (the 
Carlsberg Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation) the field had come to depend on241. In 
1946 Hartling managed to establish a scientific committee – a forerunner of the later scientific 
councils – to support basic research. From the start, the researcher and politician Hartvig Frisch 
had supported this work to improve the conditions for Danish research/science, and as minister a 
year later he continued this work although on quite different terms. The likewise newly 
appointed Minister of Finance, H.C. Hansen, exercised a very restrictive financial policy and 
considered financial support for cultural or research activities an abomination242. In this light, 
negotiating state subsidies for research was a difficult task for Frisch, and according to his later 
biographer Frisch did what he could for Danish research243. So when the minister publicly 
thundered against the whimpering of the scientific community and said they should instead 
treasure the existence of the private foundations, this could be evidence that he had to choose his 
battles carefully if he was to get anything through the financial restrictions of his colleague. And 
perhaps basic research and serendipity results were a harder “sell” than applied, problem-solving 
research-treatment interplay. 
 For example, Frisch stayed completely out of an otherwise dramatic demonstration in the 
scientific community to turn the newly established scientific commission into actual grant-
awarding research councils244, while he did choose to go into the matter of the cancer centre that 
would require substantial subsidies. Then again, the problem-solving research policy behind 
Engelbreth-Holm’s cancer centre vision, and the political attention to the latest publications of 
the cost-effectiveness of research based treatment modalities and progresses from the last 
decade245, may altogether have served as an opportunity and an example for Frisch to show his 
colleague that it pays to invest in research to bring down the public expenditures for cancer 
treatment at the county and municipal hospitals.  
                                                 
241 Christiansen, N. F. (1993). Hartvig Frisch - Mennesket og Politikeren. København, Christian Ejlers' Forlag, p. 
311. 
242 Ibid., p. 312. 
243 Ibid. 
244 Knudsen, H. (2006). "Politik, Penge og Forskningsvilkår". Viden uden grænser 1920-1970. H. Nielsen and K. H. 
Nielsen. Aarhus, Aarhus Universitetsforlag: 323-346, pp. 336-7.  
245 Jacobsen, K. and K. Larsen (2007). Ve og Velfærd - Læger, sundhed og samfund gennem 200 år. København, 
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During the 1930s, the hospital sector had experienced a massive expansion in order to 
accommodate the growing number of patients (now with mandatory health insurances)246 and in 
1946, a new hospital act was carried through to increase the level of state subsidies to these 
hospitals which in the 1940s left little room for investment in hospital/institute construction247. 
However, the focus of this act and the hospitals was treatment, not research, as the subsidies 
depended on the hospitals’ increased number of treatments. In this perspective, a joint 
agreement to establish and run the new cancer centre must have made sense to Frisch and his 
government colleagues as he managed to push through the unprecedented arrangement of 
private-public financing of the problem-solving initiative. 
So in 1949, Frisch made the unprecedented move that changed the formal institutions for the 
cancer field. He supported the establishment of the new public-private cancer research 
laboratory which was given the catchy name: The State’s and The Danish Cancer Committee’s 
Laboratory for Experimental Cancer Research at the University’s Department for Pathological-
Anatomy. It was very important for all involved parties to have their name attached to the new 
laboratory which represented an important people’s cause; the fight against cancer. However, 
the chairman of the Danish Cancer Society suggested that for convenience the lab should be 
referred to as The Fibiger Laboratory, in memory of the great Danish cancer researcher 
Johannes Fibiger248. According to the ceremony participant Einar Rud, it was a special day: 
(…)because this was the first durable collaboration between the university (i.e. the State) 
and a private institute on a scientific task, so that the State provided the outer frameworks, 
the building, and side by side with the Danish Cancer Society took care of the operating 
expenses. The Minister of Education, Hartvig Frisch, thanked the society for its initiative 
and spirit of self-sacrifice, and was confident that similar sacrifices from private 
organisations would always be a good way to get the State to contribute to the 
advancement of science.249 
Frisch and the rest of the Danish government thus made organisational expansion in the cancer 
field possible and opened up new vistas for a joint public-private fight against cancer. The 
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formal institutions were changed, and the government invited the cancer field organisations to 
utilize the new possibilities for wealth maximization and pursuit of goals that the new matrix 
offered. 
The agreement between the State and the private cancer charity was not to be observed, though. 
Perhaps because Frisch fell ill and died the year after the inauguration250. The misunderstood 
advocate of science in the government was no more. Throughout the next decades, the State’s 
contribution to the operation of the Fibiger Laboratory was gradually being reduced, leaving the 
Danish Cancer Society with the lion’s share of the expenses. Even though Frisch’s death may 
have left the government lacking a research advocate opposite the Minister of Finance, the 
gradual downsizing was still surprising as the next decades brought about massive investments 
in research facilities and hospitals due to an improving economy, the effects of the post-war 
Marshall aid given to mobilise European science, and the election of a new socialist government 
in 1953 who favoured the construction of scientific institutes/faculties and  hospitals with 
generous financial allocations in sharp contrast to the former government251. During the same 
period, however, the State increased its funding for the radium stations, and in this way the 
private Danish Cancer Society was forced to assume close to full responsibility for the funding 
of Danish cancer research while the treatment of cancer was gradually managed completely by 
the State252.  
The transition reflected what the future held in store for the young Fibiger Laboratory. The lack 
of continual governmental funding meant that the Society only managed to create an amputated 
version of the cancer centre envisioned by Engelbreth-Holm. Nevertheless, the inauguration of 
the Fibiger Laboratory had marked an unusual state-initiated creation of formal institutions that 
supported the establishment of new organisations in the cancer field. The initial political 
backing of the cancer centre – although no cancer policy was actually formulated – thus set the 
scene for the pursuit of a larger and comprehensive version of the centre for many years to 
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come. A “path” was created that could be followed or abandoned for another depending on the 
dynamics of the institutional matrix to come.  
In the first years of its existence, the laboratory established a research program for chemical 
carcinogenesis which was the favourite field of the cancer researcher who lent the laboratory its 
name. In 1956, the laboratory was fused with the University’s Institute of Cell Physiology and 
this expanded the research program with studies of DNA metabolism and cell growth. The lab 
was divided into a biology department headed by Dr. Jørgen Kieler (a former employee at the 
Aarhus Radium Station) and a biochemistry department led by Dr. Hans Klenow253. The 
university departmental structures and research programs thus shaped the work done at the 
private Fibiger Laboratory. The small laboratory was soon pressed for space, but the Department 
for Pathological Anatomy was not inclined to give away more of its own space. Engelbreth-
Holm was thus torn between his status as director for the university department and his dream of 
a wide-ranging cancer research centre, and he started to wonder whether or not the Danish 
Cancer Society would now be able to fund his old plan of placing the cancer centre at the Finsen 
site. In this way, the experimental cancer research of the Fibiger Laboratory would finally be 
united with the epidemiological and clinical cancer research at the Finsen Institute.  
However, it would be a bold move for Engelbreth-Holm to promote such an idea, for it would 
almost certainly get him into trouble with the university management and his own department 
who would suffer serious financial problems if the privately financed Fibiger Laboratory was to 
move to extramural premises254. Also the proposed scientific combination would challenge the 
domains of the traditional medical specialities by which the medical community shaped their 
fields, structured their hospitals and education system. The lab, on the other hand would lose 
one of its sponsors, but it would be given physical and strategic room to expand its activities and 
pursue the direction originally set by Engelbreth-Holm.  
But Engelbreth-Holm never did make any final decision on the matter as he died suddenly 
during a trip to London in 1961255. Without him, the prospects for putting his dream of a wide-
ranging cancer research institute into practice did not seem good, as the centre’s move and 
activities demanded much lobbyism from a visionary and well-respected representative from the 
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medical community. A community, which would most likely consider the Fibiger Laboratory an 
unwelcome disturbance of the traditional medical specialities. 
However, Engelbreth-Holm died at a time with formal institutions in favour of scientific 
expansion in Denmark. From the mid-1950s to 1970, the government had started to invest more 
money in the establishment of new scientific institutes and hospitals. This was an unprecedented 
scientific offensive with the purpose of making Danish research internationally competitive256. 
Despite the lack of state support for the Fibiger arrangement, all hope was not gone for an 
expansion and realisation of Engelbreth-Holm’s cancer centre dream. At least on paper, the time 
seemed ripe for organisational growth in the cancer field as well as the many traditional and new 
scientific disciplines257 and medical specialities at the universities and hospitals, and Engelbreth-
Holm’s dream of a wide-ranging cancer research institute thrived in spite of the death of its 
creator/originator. 
The potential new location of the Fibiger Laboratory – the Finsen Hospital – had clear financial 
interests in having the Danish Cancer Society move the lab into new buildings at the Finsen 
campus, because these buildings would also house their own Finsen Laboratory. Meanwhile, 
the arrangement would allow the Cancer Society to regain some of the influence – or more 
accurately the public visibility – it had lost when the State took over the responsibility of cancer 
treatment at the radium stations. A sound transaction for both parties. It allowed them to 
maximize their respective organisational wealth, symbolic capital and position in the cancer 
field. But the move was never realised because the Finsen building was encumbered with rigid 
restrictions that did not allow for new constructions to be made258. In May 1965, the Fibiger 
Laboratory was moved to the Copenhagen suburb of Lyngby instead. Here, 1,400m2 of office 
space had been modified to fit the needs of a modern laboratory. The Fibiger laboratory was 
now dubbed an independent institute, and according to Dr. Jørgen Kieler, who was appointed 
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director, the settings and facilities were excellent to the extent that the staff was reluctant to 
move back to Copenhagen in 1973, when the Danish Cancer Society had found a way around 
the legislative obstacles and constructed new laboratory-buildings at the Finsen campus259. 
2.7 The molecular bandwagon of cancer research 
The scientific progress and institutionalisation of molecular biology throughout the 1950s and 
1960s influenced centre plans as well. The discipline was popular, and the use of the word 
“molecular” in the titles of laboratories, disciplines and academic courses spread like wildfire. 
The “molecularisation” affected areas such as pharmacology, medicine and cancer research260. 
The popularity now resonated in the Danish Cancer Society, though both the organisation and 
the research area it supported had traditionally – and with few exceptions – been the domain of 
physicians, and not basic scientists. The introduction of chemotherapy in the 1960s made more 
medical doctors interested in the area. Even though the Fibiger Institute was not yet fused with a 
clinical department with access to patients, the molecular biology approach helped bridge the 
gap between the research programs of basic and clinical cancer work. Despite this influx of 
basic researchers into cancer research and its following isolation from the bedside, the molecular 
approach never grew incompatible with Engelbreth-Holm’s cancer centre dream of the 1940s.  
In 1967, the Head Board had decided to lease the Finsen campus for 50 years from the State, 
with the option of extending the lease or eventually buying the site, as a way to build new and 
more suitable housing for the Fibiger lab that was only temporarily stationed in Lyngby until the 
building restrictions were removed261. The construction of new research buildings was delayed 
several times as a result of the death of the project architect W. Groth-Hansen, public fiscal 
restrictions, and the very cold winter of 1969262. But Jørgen Kieler argues in his jubilee 
publication for the Fibiger Institute that Engelbreth-Holm’s dream of a wide-ranging cancer 
research centre still seemed to be a strong guideline for the Society in spite of these difficulties, 
as the cancer organisation was striving to place its research units at or near hospitals in order to 
strengthen the relation between experimental, epidemiological and clinical cancer research263.  
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If this was correct, it essentially meant that Engelbreth-Holm’s broad definition of cancer 
research affected the organisational structures264. If the Fibiger Institute was moved to the 
Finsen campus, Engelbreth-Holm’s dream was about to come true. But although the Fibiger-
staff was all for the idea, it was not happy with the move. The institute’s scientific work suffered 
from the constant changes of address, and the construction of the new premises was not 
satisfactory. In the words of Kieler: 
Our objection to the building which was to be constructed at the campus of the Finsen 
Institute was mainly directed towards the small diameter of not more than 13 m. This 
would deprive us of the advantages of being on one floor. When we finally had to move to 
this new building, The Fibiger Institute was dispersed over five floors, and the few 
elevators became a bottle neck. However, our most serious criticism was based on an ever 
growing suspicion that the Finsen Institute was not going to survive. At that time the 
hospital situation in the Copenhagen area became more and more chaotic because of bad 
planning and incompetent authorities. Huge new hospitals were being constructed in the 
suburbs of Glostrup, Hvidovre and Herlev, and at the campus of Rigshospitalet in 
Copenhagen. (…) Would there be patients enough? If not, the smaller hospitals like the 
Finsen Institute would soon be doomed. – Our suspicions eventually proved to be 
absolutely correct.265 
 
Even though plans were eventually made to move the hospital unit into the new and bigger 
Rigshospital, it had not yet been transferred when the Fibiger Institute moved to the Finsen 
Campus in June 1973. However, even with the geographical proximity to the clinical units of the 
Finsen Hospital, the Fibiger Institute was not to become the permanent wide-ranging cancer 
research institute envisioned by Engelbreth-Holm, although the Chairman of the Danish Cancer 
Society, Dr Charles Jacobsen, claimed that it was exactly that in his opening speech at the 
inauguration of the new research building266.  
The research building accommodated the Fibiger Institute of the Danish Cancer Society as well 
as the Finsen Laboratory and the pathology department and the pharmacy of the Finsen Institute. 
But the two institutes did not have a common research management or organisational interest, 
and time would tell that geographical proximity alone was no guarantee for scientific 
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move facilitated the organisational settings for both clinical and experimental cancer research, the new institute was 
not identical to Engelbreth-Holm’s dream of a wide-ranging cancer research institute because of its small size. See, 
Kjeldgaard, N. O. (1982) "Hvad skal der ske med kræftforskningen i Danmark?" Jyllands-Posten 02.03.1982, p. 9.  
265 Kieler, J. (1989). The Fibiger Institute 1949-1989. Copenhagen, The Danish Cancer Society, p. 15. 
266 KB (1973). Indvielsen af Landsforeningens nye forskningsbygning på Finseninstituttet. Fælles Sag: 1-3., p. 1. 
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coordination and collaboration between the two institutes. Engelbreth-Holm’s idea was thus not 
realised in the manner he would have hoped. 
On top of this, the outlook for greater State investments looked bleak as the oil crisis of 1973 
had put an end to the era of financial growth and scientific expansion267. The oil crisis marked 
the beginning of an era of financially restrictive state policy in the fields of science and the 
hospital sector. However, the idea of the cancer centre did seem to have found footing in the 
cancer community, and in 1981 it would once again resurface and be subject to much 
controversy as a subcommittee of the Danish Natural Science Research Council (NSRC) 
presented its recommendations for the future organisation of Danish cancer research in what was 
to become known simply as the Kjeldgaard Report. 
2.8 Perspectivating summary 
In 1945-1946, Dr. Albert Fischer and Dr. Julius Engelbreth-Holm presented their visions for the 
future of the cancer war in the daily press. They were both inspired by the organisational 
possibilities that cancer research and treatment were given in other countries, where the 
respective governments formulated cancer policies and created the formal institutions to support 
the war on cancer through new ways of organising and coordinating cancer research and 
treatment. However, no such formal institutions were created in Denmark. According to 
Douglass C. North, only the strongest entrepreneurs/organisations could make even incremental 
institutional change for new organisational possibilities. No one in the Danish cancer 
community was as of yet sufficiently strong to push for such change, and the two cancer 
researchers therefore pleaded their case to the broader public – through the media of newspaper 
– probably hoping that the power of public opinion could bring about state funding or other 
types of political engagement in the anti-cancer cause.  
The two researchers had very different disciplinary and organisational affiliations, though, and 
they did not at all see eye to eye on the nature of the proposed organisational change that, aside 
from strengthening the fight against cancer, would also improve their personal position in the 
cancer field.  The newspaper debate became a battlefield between two entrepreneurs striving to 
change the institutional matrix and to position themselves as dominant and powerful characters 
                                                 
267 Nielsen, H. (2004). Disse fag må lempes til verden... - Oprettelsen og udbygningen af Det Naturvidenskabelige 
Fakultet ved Aarhus Universitet. Gylling, Aarhus Universitetsforlag, p. 45. 
State investments in the construction and operation of hospitals remained relatively high in the 1970s, but mainly as 
the result of decisions made in the 1960s where  investment costs peaked. See, Vallgårda, S. (1992). Sygehuse og 
sygehuspolitik i Danmark. Denmark, Jurist- og Økonomiforbundets Forlag. P. 393-394. 
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in the cancer field. It was Engelbreth-Holm’s model that eventually won the support of the 
Danish Cancer Society and the cancer community, and he even managed to create a necessary 
and powerful alliance between the Danish Cancer Society and the Danish Minister of Education, 
Hartvig Frisch, which resulted in new formal institutions favouring the establishment of his 
proposed cancer centre.  
In a theoretical perspective, the reason for this line of events can be divided in two:  
1. Engelbreth-Holm’s model was favoured because of his superior symbolic capital and 
because the content of his idea played into a political agenda.  
2. The formal institutions favouring the cancer centre was the compromise of internal 
governmental disagreement on science policy in restrictive financial times. 
The two contenders in the cancer field reflected different professional logics and strength of 
symbolic capital. Sociologist Pierre Bourdieu argues that different professional groups are 
guided by different logics and that it is the overall norms and goals that unify and identify the 
group from others. The physician and cancer researcher Engelbreth-Holm belonged to the 
medical community and held the same professional logic that the management of the Danish 
Cancer Society belonged and subscribed to. In other words, the Cancer Society was an 
organisational appendix to the cancer physicians and not Fischer’s basic biological research 
community. The Society was therefore prone to understand and favour “one of their own” – a 
former employee at the Copenhagen Radium Station. Engelbreth-Holm’s symbolic capital was a 
much stronger currency than Fischer’s in the cancer field, and this is why the Cancer Society 
chose to promote his model rather than the one proposed by a cell biologist acting according to 
different professional logic than the Society’s own.  
Bourdieu often compares the rules and power struggles of a social field with the rules of 
different types of sports or war in which tactics and exit strategies are of the essence. This 
comparison seems to fit the case of Fischer’s and Engelbreth-Holm’s newspaper debate very 
well. The public was their arena, they battled with symbolic capital (scientific reputation, 
professional status, network etc.) as their weapons in order to gain the most prominent position 
in the (future) cancer field and in order to secure funding for their future work.  At some point 
Fischer must have realised that he was losing the fight, and he thus employed an exit strategy to 
avoid complete annihilation. He changed his model from an international centre to a network of 
national cancer laboratories which he argued was more suitable for a country like Denmark than 
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a large wide-ranging cancer institute (like Engelbreth-Holm’s model) that was in danger of 
monopolising the funds for Danish cancer research.  
In the Bourdieu’an universe of fields, positioning and power struggles, this should be seen as 
Fischer’s sudden accept of his model’s defeat in the cancer community (the Cancer Society) that 
favoured Engelbreth-Holm’s model due to his symbolic capital. Fischer changed his model in 
order to assign himself a lower ranging position in the periphery of the field (but not completely 
out of the loom of influence and funding) at the mercy of Engelbreth-Holm, instead of sticking 
to his original model that was completely incompatible with Engelbreth-Holm’s and which 
would surely exclude him from the field altogether. Nevertheless, Engelbreth-Holm showed no 
mercy, and Fischer and his institute was never made part of the plans for a Danish cancer centre. 
Nevertheless, the Cancer Society was neither wealthy nor powerful enough to turn Engelbreth-
Holm’s vision into practice by itself. Especially not with the institutional matrix acting against 
state support for building hospitals or scientific institutes. And seeing that the cancer centre was 
to include university and privately financed research groups as well as public clinical 
departments (hospitals), it would be necessary to convince a public authority, and preferably the 
government, to back and help finance the establishment and operation of the cancer centre. In 
1949, such a powerful alliance was created in order to change the institutional matrix. The 
Minister of Education, Hartvig Frisch, created new formal institutions for the organisation of the 
anti-cancer cause as he promoted the establishment of an amputated version of Engelbreth-
Holm’s dream of a comprehensive cancer centre: the Fibiger Laboratory.  
Frisch had been casted by the scientific community in the role of the villain as he was not 
susceptible to their pleas for greater state-funding of Danish science. Although personally 
inclined to support science and culture, Frisch’s colleagues did not share this view in harsh 
financial post-war times. In particular the Minister of Finance argued that allocations for science 
and culture were abominations, and Frisch would have a hard time getting any such initiatives 
through and remained loyal to the government’s policy on the matter. Being unpopular within 
academia, the minister Frisch must have needed to present some success story, and the Cancer 
Society’s plans of a cancer centre (starting modestly with a lab) focusing on actively battling the 
costly cancer scourge  must have presented itself at the right time, and Engelbreth-Holm’s idea 
thus played into a political agenda.  
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The lab was to be financed and operated as a joint public-private venture – the first of its kind in 
Denmark which must have made it an easier “sale” to the rest of the government. The 
collaboration between the private Cancer Society, the state-financed Copenhagen University and 
the government was an opportunity for all partners to establish a cancer centre at the lowest 
possible costs. And although the State would not uphold its part of the deal for long, the 
establishment marked a new institutional matrix with new organisational possibilities, and the 
pursuit of Engelbreth-Holm’s dream of the comprehensive cancer centre continued for decades 
to come. 
The State eventually took over all responsibility for cancer treatment in the country from the 
private radium stations, and the Danish Cancer Society therefore needed to be visible in other 
areas of the fight against cancer in order to secure the charity’s future existence. The Society 
pursued the idea of the cancer centre throughout the 1960s and 1970s for this purpose, although 
the establishment of such a unit with both research and treatment activities was both costly and 
difficult to put into practice due to a variety of reasons: building restrictions at the Finsen 
campus, the Fibiger staff’s opposition towards a move, and delays due to construction problems. 
For of course, one could argue that in times of favourable formal institutions, the state-supported 
scientific expansion in 1950-1970, it would have been the best possible time to gain state-
support for the establishment of a cancer centre. New scientific disciplines, medical specialities 
and public labs were popping up everywhere, yet the cancer centre was put on hold due to 
building restrictions? It seems unlikely if both formal and informal institutions (eg. the taste and 
preferences of the researchers) were all for the establishment, but perhaps the informal 
institutions were not that favourable anyway.  
In contrast to the 1940s, public cancer researchers at the universities and hospitals were now 
given good lab facilities and working conditions in their “home” disciplines and departments. 
They no longer had a need for a specialised cancer centre to plea for additional funding using 
problem-serving, applicable research rhetorics and arguments about bridging bench and bedside. 
No need for rhetorics stressing the apparent unity of the heterogenous cancer field. The money 
was already there for their respective disciplines. There was no need to promote a new one. The 
private Society’s researchers apparently felt the same as they initially opposed a move of the 
Fibiger Institute from Lyngby to the Finsen grounds, where the charity had plans to establish the 
comprehensive cancer centre on its own. It seems that only the Society as a cancer fighting 
organisation – a charity –  would benefit from continuing the pursuit of the centre dream and the 
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lost formal institutions that hatched it, in order to remain visible and attract donations for its 
cause and strategic research aim in the era of a State “science push” research policy. The Society 
therefore continued down the path of a cancer centre that did not pay off. It got it wrong, so to 
speak, but it did not correct its actions even though the strategy to keep on planning for a cancer 
centre may have given it some means of PR, the operation of research units of bricks and mortar 
was not in accordance with the organisation’s strategy to push for a state takeover of as many 
cancer related services as possible.  
By operating its own research units and not succeeding in handing them over to the State – 
either through a shared comprehensive centre as was the original plan or simply through 
ownership transactions as with the radium stations – the Society was not free to support research 
projects only. After all, it did not have unlimited funds. The internal conflict of the small 
charity’s strategy to pursue PR and a state-takeover whilst functioning as a cancer foundation 
also marked the beginning of a transition for the charity. A transition during which the 
organisation seemed to get it wrong for a very long time by staying on the path of past institions. 
But it was not corrected in the same way that classical economical theory claims the market will 
always correct a company making bad choices. At this point, the charity sought to gain publicity 
and visibility by pursuing the costly centre dream. Visibility that could be transformed into 
donations for the worthy anti-cancer cause and at this point, the cancer charity was not yet 
subject to market rules and strategy in Denmark, as will be discussed in the following chapter. 
Perhaps this explains the longevity of the charity and its support for the centre idea and the 
centre path in the face of other, more institutionally compliant alternatives. It was not punished 
by a stop of donations.  At any point in this lengthy process, the idea of the cancer centre could 
have been dropped for other more feasible alternatives, but it was not. It seems that Hartvig 
Frisch created a path in 1949 that was not easily abandoned in spite of potholes and a lack of 
overwhelming positive feedback and increasing returns along the way. At least not in the form 
of an established centre and state commitment.  
And there were alternative paths to be followed. Due to the difficulties of finding a suitable 
location for the proposed centre, the small Fibiger Laboratory was moved to temporary facilities 
in Lyngby where the staff thrived. The staff even feared that their work would be impaired by a 
planned move to the Finsen ground to be part of the new all-encompassing centre, as the fate of 
the Finsen Hospital was unclear and the move itself would take its toll on the Fibiger 
Laboratory’s activities. Yet, the Society continued to pursue the idea of an all-encompassing 
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cancer centre in connection with the Finsen Hospital, anyway. A path was created and followed 
even in the face of alternatives enjoying more positive feedback.  
In 1981, the Danish cancer community would lock onto this path with the publication of the 
Kjeldgaard Report in which the State’s research council made unprecedented recommendations 
to finally establish a comprehensive cancer centre. But were the recommendations built on 
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Name: Institutional affiliation: Summarised actions in this chapter (key persons only):  
Dr. Niels Peter Ernst  Danish MD (gynaecologist) and member of  the 
Danish Society for Gynaecology and Obstetrics 
Wanted to organise the Danish “fight against cancer” by establishing an anti-
cancer committee (1904).  
C.O. Jensen -Danish veterinarian and cancer researcher 




-Minister of Church and Education (1910-13) 
- Member of the Radium Fund Management in 
1912 
- 
Johannes Fibiger -Danish Cancer research and Nobel Laureate 
(1926) 
- Professor and Director of the Dep. For 
Pathological Anatomy at Copenhagen University. 





Danish Nobel Laureate (1903) and founder of a 
Light Therapy Institute       ( known simply as the 




Danish Cancer epidemiologist and pathologist 
from the Finsen Institute. Became chief of the 




- Danish cancer researcher at the Laboratory for 
Pathology (Copenhagen University) 
 - Research head of the Danish Cancer Society’s 
laboratory for experimental cancer research in 
1938-1941. 
- Professor at the Dep. For Pathological Anatomy 
in 1941.  
1945-46: Called for better institutional settings for the anti-cancer cause in 
Denmark. He wrote newspaper articles to suggest the establishment of a 
national wide-ranging cancer institute with both experimental, clinical and 
epidemiological cancer research and treatment under the same roof. He was 
inspired by the Memorial Hospital in New York. He wanted the new institute 
to be placed at the Finsen Institute, and hoped to be head of the institution, 
and got the Cancer Society to support his institution-proposal rather than the 
rivalling institution proposed by Albert Fischer.  
Dr. Albert Fischer Cell biologist. Director of the Carlsberg 
Biological Institute 
1945-46: He first proposed an international, mission-oriented research centre 
shaped by the organisational principles behind the Manhattan Project in 
order to fight cancer. However, when Engelbreth-Holm proposed a national 
cancer centre, Fischer proposed another model: a series of publicly funded 
cancer labs. He believed a cure against cancer would be obtained through the 
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findings of basic biological sciences such as cell biology.  Wrote newspaper 




-Danish Biochemist of the privately owned 
Carlsberg Laboratory, Copenhagen. 




Danish Minister of Education, Labour Party, 
(1947-49) 
Participated in the establishment and inauguration of the Fibiger Laboratory. 
Created the first formal institutions that supported the establishment of a 
public-private cancer centre. 
Dr. Einar Rud -The Danish Cancer Society 
- Was present at the inauguration of the Fibiger 
Laboratory, and author of a history of the Danish 
Cancer Society. 
- 
Dr. Jørgen Kieler (1919) Head of the biological department at the Fibiger 
Laboratory Later Director of the Fibiger Institute. 
- 
Dr. Hans Klenow (1923) Head of the Biochemistry department of the 
Fibiger Laboratory.  
In  1958, Professor of Biochemistry at 
Copenhagen University 
- 
W. Groth-Hansen Architect on the plans to place the Society’s 
research units at the Finsen grounds in the 1960’s. 
- 
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Chapter 3  The Kjeldgaard Report 
Path re-actualisation and lock-in 
 
The idea of an all-inclusive public-private cancer centre resurfaced in 1981 when a 
subcommittee of the Danish Natural Science Research Council (NSRC)268 presented a report 
with its recommendations for a more efficient organisation of Danish cancer research. As 
advisors to the government, the NSRC and its subcommittee was positioned to affect formal 
institutions. The report suggested that cancer research should be made a priority as this 
important research area was in need of coordination and state funding. The report argued that 
the establishment of a series of US-inspired comprehensive cancer centres, much like the one 
proposed by Engelbreth-Holm 40 years earlier, would help achieve coordination and yield 
better research results although the report’s own statistical data did not support such a claim. 
Most of the report’s recommendations were not put into practice because the report turned out 
not to have weighty leverage to challenge the existing institutional matrix and change the 
government’s manner of conducting research policy and national research programs. But its 
findings resulted in changes within the private Cancer Society which used the report to 
implement budget reforms and international evaluations of its research units. Changes that 
heralded a new era of business inspired managerial style in the private cancer charity. 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the formal institutions set by Hartvig Frisch in 1949 at the 
inauguration of the Fibiger Lab did not result in a realisation of Engelbreth-Holm’s idea of a 
cancer centre. The idea stagnated from 1949-1979. The stagnation happened in spite of the 
massive state investments in universities and hospitals from the mid 1950s to the early 1970s. In 
other words, the stagnation occurred in times when the State was more than willing to invest in 
new constructions as part of the strategy that an expansion of the public sector would bring 
about increased public demand for of private services in the construction business, create more 
private and public jobs (employment rate) and generally improve the economy of the country269. 
                                                 
268 The NSRC was one of six research councils set up by the government in the late 1960s, and its members were 
all scientists from a wide range of research institutes. The purpose of the councils was to review project 
applications for state funding and to advise the government on the organisation of public research activities. Also, 
the NSRC and other research councils had the mandate to identify new and interesting research areas in need of 
cultivation and suggest that they be made a special priority of the State. 
269 Jacobsen, K. and K. Larsen (2007). Ve og Velfærd - Læger, sundhed og samfund gennem 200 år. København, 
Lindhardt og Ringhof,  p. 416. 
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During the 1960s this financial boom gave rise to an average of 5% economic growth pr year, as 
unemployment was at an all time low, women entered the work force, the country changed from 
an agricultural to an industrial nation, the educational level was raised in general and the 
expenditures for the public sector accounted for more and more of the gross domestic product 
increased from 28 to 42 % in the years 1960-71270.  
The public (state/county/municipal) investments in building new somatic and psychiatric 
hospitals alone increased from 12.5 million DKK in the fiscal year 1954/55 to 917 million DKK 
in the fiscal year 1970/71271. Of this the State alone contributed from 6.6 – 169 million DKK in 
the respective period of time. Considering the then current inflation, this was a substantial 
increase of investments, and the hospitals experienced a parallel increase in operating costs as 
well. Apart from investment in new equipment and apparatus, these costs mostly covered 
salaries for the many new employees at the hospitals which took on the vast majority of the 
country’s medically educated personnel in new centralised and highly specialised treatment and 
research facilities272.  In the light of such expansion – which was considered a completely 
natural development by both politicians and their electorates – the formal institutions for a new 
cancer centre were apparently there, yet there is no evidence that anyone in the cancer 
community pushed for the idea of the centre to be put into practice with the help of these 
institutions and the state support they would result in.  
On the contrary, researchers working on cancer problems at both public hospitals and the 
university and the private Fibiger Institute did not push at all (some even opposed) the 
establishment of it if it impaired or did not markedly improve the working conditions they had at 
their respective research institutes. Only for the private cancer charity was there a need to 
promote a centre, at the organisations existence depended on its visibility in the public eye but 
which could not at this point financially support an entire centre alone and needed to reinstate 
the formal institutions for state support of 1949. So the predominant silence surrounding the 
centre idea might on a first take seem strange, but in an institutional perspective there seemed to 
be an explanation as will be evident in this chapter. In times of favourable formal institutions 
and financial high conjunctures, the taste and preferences of the researchers acted against the 
                                                 
270 Ibid. 
271 Vallgårda, S. (1992). Sygehuse og sygehuspolitik i Danmark. Denmark, Jurist- og Økonomiforbundets Forlag. 
P. 327-328. The total public (state/municipal/county) investments in the same period increased from 12.5 million 
DKK to 917 million DKK.  
272 Jacobsen, K. and K. Larsen (2007). Ve og Velfærd - Læger, sundhed og samfund gennem 200 år. København, 
Lindhardt og Ringhof, p. 416-17. Operating costs went up from 715 million DKK to 3.9 billion DKK in 1960-1971. 
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establishment of a centre as informal constraints. In part, the idea of the centre may have 
stagnated due to the deaths of its stoutest defenders Engelbreth-Holm and Hartvig Frisch.  
In part, the Danish Cancer Society succeeded in making the State take over the operation of and 
cancer treatment at the radium stations in 1962, and this achievement may have been prioritised 
over the idea of the cancer centre. One could speculate that the Society did not want to push the 
envelope by demanding a centre in the wake of the state takeover, but it seems unlikely that the 
cancer charity would deliberately refrain from seeking additional state support for the plans it 
tried to carry out in spite of building restrictions at the Finsen grounds and internal protests of 
the staff at the Fibiger laboratory. Even if it believed it could manage on its own.  
In essence, the idea of the cancer centre was neither promoted nor entirely abandoned – even 
though considered unattractive by the staff at Fibiger – in times of favourable formal institutions 
in the form of massive state investments. It is peculiar that the private charity could stand the 
pressure of holding on to an idea that due to informal constraints set by intra- and extramural 
researchers was not a good candidate to push for state support for. And that it could stand the 
pressure for so long, as the natural end to this plan – an entirely privately financed centre with 
no overwhelming backing from potential inhabitants – would be a massive financial undertaking 
for the charity and put a strain on its funding practices with grants-in-aid. How could it afford to 
pursue a not entirely popular idea? Was it waiting for the taste and preferences to change? If so, 
they actually did. The idea of a centre was re-actualised when the favourable formal institutions 
and state investments in universities and hospitals were brought to an end by an international 
financial crisis in the early 1970s.  
The oil crisis of 1973 and a subsequent financial depression made changing Danish governments 
and Folketings of the 1970s try very hard to decrease the massive growth of the public sector. 
For years, the threat of inflation was getting more and more tangible, and the public sector’s 
increased employment in times lacking available and able workers challenged the private 
sector273.  The growth had to be stopped, and the political spotlight was cast on the hospital 
sector. In the 1970s, a new agreement between state, municipalities and the counties led to a 
county takeover of the financing of Danish hospitals – except for the state-owned 
Rigshospitalet. The state contribution for hospitals decreased from 65% to 35 % and eventually 
to 0% in 1975, but at the same time the counties had the mandate to pay the bill through 
                                                 
273 Ibid., p. 425. 
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increased taxation, and a new law of 1973 made public health insurance mandatory over 
taxes274. The change of ownership of the hospitals meant that the politically governed counties 
were now in charge of planning hospital growth which had otherwise been the domain of the 
hospital doctors who had previously dictated any needs for funding new treatment modalities, 
building expansions, increase of specialities and bed numbers etc. based on their professional 
opinion. Now, the county politicians and the Ministry of the Interior led a joint effort to 
prioritise between those needs in order to control an unviable financial development, and this 
was far from popular with the medical staff and the electorates who had come to expect 
continuous expansion and growth of the public sector275. As will be evident in this chapter, the 
political attempts to cut the budget were almost impossible, and even a suspension of growth 
was experienced as massive budget cuts by electorate and hospitals. 
However, investment in expanding hospitals and their operation were not the only areas to be 
subjected to political prioritising in order to deal with the financial crisis. Science was a 
candidate as well. In particular the oil crisis of 1973 made the government pull the reins on the 
massive investments in science and medicine and start to focus on the very pressing need to find 
alternative energy sources276. It was a change of attitude towards science and medicine. 
Research first and foremost needed to be useful and it was considered safer to support strategic 
research likely to solve the problems at hand than to await the serendipity breakthroughs of pure 
basic research, as had been the philosophy of Vannevar Bush and his “science push” model.  
However, while cancer was undoubtedly a serious health issue, cancer research was not a 
separate priority of the State in addition to what it already appropriated on the state budget to the 
universities and hospitals where a good deal of the country’s cancer researchers worked, and 
through grants in aid awarded by the State’s research councils to peer reviewed projects. Since 
the State takeover of the radium stations in 1962, the State (through the National Budget) had 
traditionally spent larger sums of money on treatment than on research. But although the 1960s 
had led to an expansion of universities and hospitals and the emergence of new disciplines and 
medical specialities, the umbrella-like activities collectively known as cancer research and 
oncology still had not managed to find footing at these institutes as a separate academic 
discipline or speciality.  
                                                 
274 Ibid. P. 427.  
275 Ibid., p. 428-30. 
276 Nielsen, H., K. Nielsen, et al. (1998). Til samfundets tarv - Forskningscenter Risøs historie. Denmark, 
Forskningscenter Risø, p. 282-283. 
 
The Cancer Centre That Never Was 
 
 113 
In 1979, a group of researchers set out to plead the Ministry of Education for more money and 
recognition for cancer research activities, as the State’s National Scientific Research Council 
(NSRC) appointed a subcommittee to evaluate the basic cancer research done in Denmark and 
to suggest means to promote and organise this field277. It was hoped that the survey would reveal 
how the field of Danish basic cancer research measured up to the international standard and 
whether or not the research area could positively affect cancer diagnostics and treatment278.  
Similar surveys of the organisation of Norwegian and German cancer research had already been 
carried out in 1978, and they in turn seemed to be inspired by the first large-scale cancer 
research program in the world – the American National Cancer Program of 1971279. A program, 
that managed to set unprecedented formal institutions in favour of the war on cancer by 
committing the US government to allocate a massive amount of dollars for the program, 
increasing from 232 million dollars in 1971 to an impressive 985 mio. dollars in 1977. No other 
program in the world had ever invested this much in cancer research, as most public programs 
invested in treatment instead. The program had a strong influence on the Danish cancer field and 
thus deserves special mentioning in the following, before a discussion of the report itself can 
take place. 
3.1 Inspiration from across the pond: the American National Cancer 
Program of 1971 
The program was launched by President Richard Nixon as a “war on cancer”280, and it made 
cancer research a federal priority as Congress more than tripled its budget for this particular 
field281. The research program was a result of intense lobbying by a group of influential 
politicians, businessmen, and scientists led by Mrs. Mary Lasker. This group of lobbyists 
worried about the growing problem of cancer and argued that the State needed to increase its 
support of cancer research282. Although the American Government allocated more money for 
cancer research than any other government through its National Cancer Institute, the group 
argued that the support of coordinated and centralised cancer research was a better investment 
                                                 
277 Forskningsråd, U. f. b. c. n. a. S. n. (1981). Cancerforskning i Danmark, SNF., loose enclosure from the research 
councils dated 19.02.1982. 
278 Ibid., p. 7.  
279 Ibid. p. 79-81. 
280 On the use of military metaphors on cancer in anti-cancer campaigns, see: Lerner, B. H. (2001). The Breast 
Cancer Wars. Fear, Hope and the Pursuit of a cure in the Twentieth Century America, Oxford Univerity Press, p. 
43-45, p. 268-272. 
281 Rettig, R. E. (1977). Cancer Crusade. Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, p. 283.  
282 Erdey (1995). Armor of Patience: The National Cancer Institute and The Development of Medical Research 
Policy In the United States, Case Western Univesity., pp. 154-164. 
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than the massive amounts of money spent on the treatment of cancer. The group believed that a 
cure for cancer had to be made a national goal and that it could only be found through a state-
initiated and coordinated effort; in the same way the government had managed to put a man on 
the moon through the space program, or had split the atom through the Manhattan Project of the 
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)283. If mankind could reach such fantastic goals, it would 
surely be able to find a cure for the much more “down-to-earth” problem of cancer by 
employing the same research management style that had been used in the two successful 
programs.  
The two programs had benefited considerably from having a clearly defined goal, and the space 
program in particular had simplified the chain of command and bureaucracy by establishing 
NASA as an independent research agency reporting directly to the President. In other words, a 
coordinated attack on cancer was not only a question of mobilising science; it was also a matter 
of organizing the entrepreneurs. President Nixon and the Congress were convinced by the 
rhetorics of the Lasker-group, and in 1971 the most extensive cancer research program in the 
world was launched. The National Cancer Institute (NCI) became the “NASA” of this 
program284, and the Congress generously provided federal funds: the NCI budget was increased 
from $ 232 million in the fiscal year of 1971 to $ 985 million in the fiscal year of 1977!285  
The US government created the formal institutions in strong favour of the establishment of a 
cancer centre as the lead organisation in the war on cancer. A governmental action that can be 
seen as a response to the private lobbyism of the Lasker-group that had so effectively managed 
                                                 
283 Garb, S. (1968). Cure for Cancer: A National Goal. New York, Springer Publishing Company, INC, p. 3. 
     Rettig, R. E. (1977). Cancer Crusade. Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, p. 78. 
     Erdey (1995). Armor of Patience: The National Cancer Institute and The Development of Medical Research 
Policy In the United States, Case Western Univesity., p. 157-158.  
284 Erdey (1995). Armor of Patience: The National Cancer Institute and The Development of Medical Research 
Policy In the United States, Case Western Univesity., p. 160.  
285 Ibid., p. 167 & 189. 
For a more detailed account of the development, nature and execution of the American National Cancer Program of 
1971, see: Garb, S. (1968). Cure for Cancer: A National Goal. New York, Springer Publishing Company, INC. This 
book presented the NASA-strategy for cancer research and was used by the Lasker group to convince Congress of 
their cause. 
Breslow, L., D. Wilner, et al. (1977). A History of Cancer Control in the United States, with Emphasis on the 
Period 1946-1971. Bethesda, Division for Cancer Control and Rehabilitation, National Cancer Institute vol.2 
(chapter 8). 
Rettig, R. E. (1977). Cancer Crusade. Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, the entire book describes 
the Lasker group’s lobbyism in detail.  
Patterson, J. T. (1987). The Dread Disease: Cancer and Modern American Culture. Cambridge, Harvard University 
Press, p. 231 et passim. 
Erdey (1995). Armor of Patience: The National Cancer Institute and The Development of Medical Research Policy 
In the United States, Case Western Univesity., p. 135-170. 
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to put the cancer war on both the political and the public agenda and thereby push for a change 
in tastes and preferences; a change of both formal and informal institutions. The National 
Cancer Program was later severely criticised for its lack of coordination, its foundered research 
projects, and its use of restrictive funding mechanisms. One of the Cancer Program’s projects, 
the cancer virus project, was specifically designed and funded with the purpose of finding viral 
causes for human cancers and subsequently developing a cancer vaccine. But while virologists 
had succeeded in finding many viruses causing cancers in animals, cancer viruses seemed to be 
responsible for only a small percentage of human cancers286. The cancer virus program ended in 
1978 and was much scolded by researchers for its goal oriented design and lack of fulfilment of 
its chief objective of finding a cure for cancer, as had been the initial promise.  
Therefore, the program did not initially yield the positive feedback needed (in the form of 
medical breakthroughs), nor did it justify its continuance in a broader societal sense. The 
program did not result in a vaccine against human cancers287, but it did with time yield 
unexpected insight into the mechanisms of cancerous growth and formed the so-called 
oncogene-paradigm from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, which along with recombinant DNA 
technology opened new vistas in cancer research and united a century of different endogenous 
and exogenous theories on the cause(s) of cancers288. That is, it rendered a new understanding of 
cancer that would open new technological opportunities in cancer treatment too – and in the 
terminology of Douglass C. North it would bring about a change in relative prices. The new 
paradigm thus illustrated the important role in cancer research of the basic biological disciplines 
                                                 
286 Morange, M. (1997). "From the Regulatory Vision of Cancer to the Oncogene Paradigme, 1975-1985." Journal 
of the History of Biology 30: 1-29, p. 7.  
287 Ibid., p. 9.  
288 In 1969, American scientists Huebner and Todaro suggested that a special cancer inducing gene (oncogene) in 
Rous Sarcoma Virus was able to turn healthy cells carcinogenic. They found that the gene in question was present 
in a dormant state in all mammalian cells and could be activated by a series of things such as radiation, chemical 
carcinogenesis, and viral infections. They speculated that the presence of the genes in mammalian cells was due to 
viral infection. Nevertheless, from 1976-1984 another team of researchers - Bishop and Varmus – used recombinant 
DNA technology to prove the theory wrong. They screened healthy cells with a synthetic viral oncogene probe and 
found that the sequence of the mammalian version of the gene did not completely resemble the viral one. As a 
consequence, they proposed the theory (now known as the oncogene paradigm) that the so-called oncogenic genes 
(oncogenes) were in fact normal cellular genes that controlled the cell cycle and were only found in viruses due to 
some primordial transfection. In theory, any of the events proposed by Huebner and Todaro could disturb the 
regulatory function of this class of genes (now called proto-oncogenes) and result in cancerous growth.  
For more on the development of the oncogene paradigm, see:  
Michael, B. J. (1996). "The discovery of Proto-Oncogenes." FASEB Journal: 362-364, which is a scientist’s own 
account of the process. 
Helvoort, T. v. (1999). "A Century of Research into the Cause of Cancer: Is the New Oncogene Paradigm 
Revolutionary?" History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences: 293-330, who as a historian of science discusses the 
content and development of the oncogene paradigm compared with the myriad of theories on cancer causation 
during the 20th century.  
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– such as molecular biology – that had emerged as a discipline at universities worldwide during 
the 1950s and 1960s.   
Meanwhile back in Denmark, it was noticed that the American cancer program’s idea of cancer 
research as a federal responsibility bore witness of an institutional matrix with new opportunities 
for cancer organisations in the war on cancer, and this was particularly attractive to a group of 
cancer researchers in Denmark in the late 1970s, who in times of recession and minimal state 
support for science in general wished to make their research area an extraordinary priority of the 
State and perhaps thereby get the stamp of approval by instituting the cancer field as an 
independent academic discipline and medical speciality with a separate budget on a par with the 
well-established and prestigious fields from which the cancer activities and oncology practice 
originated.  
When a member of the government’s Natural Science Research Council (NSRC) – Professor 
Niels Ole Kjeldgaard – suggested a state-financed cancer survey, the initiative was given a 
warm welcome. As many other Danish molecular biologists, Kjeldgaard had been working on 
prokaryotes (single cell organisms) until the late 1970s when he chose to switch to the study of 
eukaryotes (multi-cell organisms) – and in particular the carcinogenic effects of viruses on 
animal and human cells289. Being a stout defender of scientific autonomy and the “science push” 
model, the university professor used his time in the NSRC to promote organisational initiatives 
that would improve the conditions for basic research290. He had likewise lobbied for Danish 
participation in the establishment of the European Molecular Biology Laboratory (EMBL) 291, 
and it may have seemed natural to him to try to improve conditions for his other interest, basic 
cancer research, as well. Judging by his involvement in such projects, Kjeldgaard clearly had an 
interest in politics and the administration of science, and it was thus no surprise that it was he 
who initiated and led the work of the NSRC subcommittee whose report was later referred to as 
“the Kjeldgaard Report” which was about to re-actualise the formal institutions created by the 
former Minister of Education Hartvig Frisch in the late 1940’s with the establishment of the 
Fibiger Laboratory.  
                                                 
289 Pedersen, F. S. and J. Justesen (1993). "Reguleringsmekanismer gennem 25 år: Fra bakteriers magiske pletter til 
pattedyrs magiske gener". 25 År: Institut for Molekylær Biologi. O. F. Nielsen. Århus, Institut for 
Molekylærbiologi: 14-19, p. 15. 
290 Interview with Niels Ole Kjeldgaard 02.12.2004.  
291 On the discussion of Danish membership of the EMBL, see Forskningsråd, S. N., S. L. Forskningsråd, et al. 
(1979). Danmark og Det Europæiske Molekylærbiologiske Laboratorium. København, SNF, SLF, SJVF: 43.. 
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                                                                      Prof. N.O. Kjeldgaard 
3.2 Scientific logic shoots for institutional change in the cancer field 
It is important to note that the Kjeldgaard Report’s analysis of cancer research (and its attempt 
to re-actualise and expand the formal institutions created by Hartvig Frisch) was initiated by a 
man driven by a basic science professional logic rather than a clinical one, as this habitus 
affected the Report’s impact on the Danish cancer entrepreneurs, their abilities to co-operate and 
utilise the organisational opportunities of the institutional matrix the Report pushed for. And 
why? As mentioned in the above, the basic biological disciplines gained a stronger footing in the 
research activities commonly known as cancer research with the emergence of recombinant 
DNA technology and the discovery of oncogenes and their biological effects. The idea that basic 
science could deliver knowledge about the molecular aetiology of all cancers was a 
breakthrough that opened new vistas in the entire cancer research field, and it made a lot of 
basic scientists, such as Kjeldgaard, switch to a field which they otherwise regarded as being 
dominated primarily by physicians. Historian J.H. Fujimura calls this world wide influx of basic 
scientists (especially molecular biologists) a “molecular bandwagon of cancer research“, and a 
gradually increasing number of medical researchers also jumped onboard this bandwagon when 
they – perhaps after some initial reluctance – had become convinced of the merits of the 
molecular techniques and wanted to employ them in their own work292.  
Some more traditionally minded medical researchers did not share this enthusiasm, though. 
They felt that the newcomers held different and incompatible views on the nature of cancer 
research. Perhaps because of their young age and affiliation with the democratisation of the 
                                                 
292 On the spread of molecular biology methods in cancer research, see: Fujimura, J. H. (1988). "The Molecular 
Bandwagon in Cancer Research: Where Social Worlds Meet." Social Problems: 261-283. 
Morange, M. (1997). "From the Regulatory Vision of Cancer to the Oncogene Paradigme, 1975-1985." Journal of 
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Danish universities, they often also promoted different ideas on science organisation than what 
medically trained cancer researchers were used to. To a basic scientist from the universities, the 
autonomy of science, the solving of scientific riddles (e.g. what turns a cell carcinogenic), the 
understanding and production of exact data and theory, the elucidation of causation correlations 
and mechanisms, and evaluating the quality and impact of the research done via (international) 
peer review were central to his or her work within the cancer field. The concerns for the 
individual cancer patient and clinical trials, on the other hand, were not part of this everyday 
work. All in all, these priorities were somewhat different from those of the professional group 
that had previously dominated cancer research: the physicians.  
This has been identified on the basis of the Kjeldgaard Report as this report is the only official 
report in which cancer researchers reflect upon their own field with regard to e.g. the content of 
basic cancer research293, their definition of basic cancer research as “investigations of 
biomedical, physiological and genetic mechanisms that affect the development of cancer and the 
spread of cancer cells” – an activity which the report separates from clinical cancer research 
(defined as “studies with direct relation to the diagnosis and treatment of cancer patients”) and 
epidemiological cancer research (“studies of the occurrence and distribution of cancer in the 
public”)294. Likewise the claim that basic scientists prioritise the autonomy of science and 
quality control through peer review is based on their own recommendations in the Kjeldgaard 
Report that, as will be evident below, showed that all the best research had been subjected to 
peer review, secured funds in free competition, and was financed through grants-in-aid295. 
Because the Kjeldgaard Report addresses many of these issues directly, it is considered the most 
important source to illustrate the basic cancer researchers’ aforementioned views and 
habitus/professional logic, although the interviews conducted with basic researchers support the 
claim that they held such views.  
But whereas basic scientists saw science as an international activity that needed to be conducible 
and reproducible regardless of geography and the individual researcher, the practice of medicine 
and clinical research had a social and more local dimension. In contrast to the basic and clinical 
scientists working within academia, the work of most hospital clinicians and researchers was at 
least to some degree shaped by an external goal: the treatment of patients. The priority given to 
solving narrow and predefined clinical research problems that followed from the patient 
                                                 
293 Forskningsråd, U. f. b. c. n. a. S. n. (1981). Cancerforskning i Danmark, SNF., p. 19-31. 
294 Ibid., p. 41. 
295 Ibid., p. 94-95. 
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treatment was thus mirrored in the professional medical logic and habitus that shaped their 
everyday decisions. As mentioned in chapter 1, the medical community was historically built 
around a hierarchical structure of medical specialities and seniority that differed from the flat 
organisational structure of the newly democratised universities in which even young staff with 
tenure had influence on a par with professors. The work of physicians required contact with the 
patient wards, and physicians and medical researchers could not easily be moved away from the 
hospitals for cross-disciplinary collaborations, and they tended to favour the type of organisation 
found where they had been trained and worked296.  
These were some of the reasons why the two groups held different views on the nature of cancer 
research and its structural organisation. As will be evident in this and the following chapters, 
these different views were not always compatible in e.g. the construction of collaborative efforts 
between the different groups. But while the new role of the basic biological sciences in cancer 
research was not unproblematic for all in the cancer community, it was a historically important 
condition for a member of the Danish Natural Science Research Council – the molecular 
biologist N.O. Kjeldgaard – to initiate and lead a survey on Danish cancer research in the late 
1970s.  
3.3 Findings and conclusions 
The NSRC subcommittee consisted of members of the NSRC, the State’s Medical Research 
Council (MRC), the Danish Cancer Society, and the Carlsberg Foundation. Its goal was to find 
out the extent and variety of basic cancer research in Denmark from 1970-1979, how it was 
financed, by whom it was done, and what could be done to promote it in the future297. Because 
the Report was on basic and not on general cancer research (including clinical activities), the 
representatives from the MRC and the NSRC were not protecting their own domain, so to speak, 
but they were working together on improving just the one domain on its own terms. They 
worked to survey the quality and organisation of basic cancer research areas to find out whether 
or not the scientific programs and/or the organisational structures were up to code or needed 
improvements. However, because the MRC never initiated a separate survey report on clinical 
cancer research, the Kjeldgaard Report became the only (and authoritative) report on cancer 
                                                 
296 This will be evident in chapter 4 which describes the efforts to establish a comprehensive cancer centre. In a 
discussion on under whose management to place the Society’s research units in this centre, the basic cancer 
researchers tended to favour the university while the clinician favoured Rigshospitalet, see: Report from the MRC-
working group: “Redegørelse til Undervisningsministeriet vedrørende en samordning af den basale onkologiske 
forskning i hovedstadsområdet”, October 1984, Personal Papers of Ole Bang, (Copenhagen), p. 30.  
297 Forskningsråd, U. f. b. c. n. a. S. n. (1981). Cancerforskning i Danmark, SNF.c, p. 85.  
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research in general and its focus on basic (molecular biology) research thus influenced the 
umbrella-like definition of cancer research in the cancer community e.g. the Danish Cancer 
Society, as will be elaborated on below. It was the only state-initiated survey on any part of the 
cancer field and it therefore must have held some importance in the cancer community 
regardless of clinical or basic persuasion, as it was the first document to remotely rubberstamp 
the diverse cancer field as an independent field; a first step towards setting the formal 
institutions in favour of state-support to and recognition of cancer research in general.  
The NSRC subcommittee, which was led by Kjeldgaard, consisted of the following members: 
Table 3.1 Subcommittee members/authors of the Kjeldgaard Report:   
Name Scientific Institution Additional institutional affiliation: 
Professor Niels 
Ole Kjeldgaard 
Department for Molecular 
Biology and Plant 
Physiology, Aarhus 
University 
- Member of the NSRC (until1981) 
- Chairman of the NSRC- subcommittee 
- Since 1981, member of the Executive 




Lab for Zoo-physiology, 
University of Copenhagen. 
- Member of the NSRC 
Professor Hans 
Klenow 
Biochemistry Department B, 
Copenhagen University.  
- Member of the NSRC (before 1981) 
MD Nis I. 
Nissen  
The Finsen Institute, 
Rigshospitalet 
- Member of the NSRC 
MD Ove Sten-
Knudsen 
Biophysical Dep., University 
of Copenhagen 
- Member of the NSRC (before 1981) 
- Prev. member of the Cancer 
Society’s Executive Committee 




- Member of the MRC 





- Member of the MRC 
Professor MD 
Mogens 
Rigshospitalet - Chairman of the Danish Cancer Society 
until 1981 (replaced by Professor MD Steen 
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Andreassen Olsen from Aarhus University) 
MD. C. Crone  Rigshospitalet - Appointed by the Carlsberg Foundation 
MD Keld Danø  The Laboratory of Tumour 
Biology, Rigshospitalet 




 (functioned as secretary to the 
subcommittee)  
 
The analysis was done by sending out questionnaires to researchers at hospital departments, 
universities and other research institutes all over the country; and on the basis of the returned 
answers, the NSRC subcommittee concluded that 114 researchers had worked on basic cancer 
research in the time span in question. The project lines of these nine years could be divided into 
nine subgroups which reflected the breadth of Danish basic cancer research298: 
 
1) Experimental medical treatment of animals. 
2) Experimental radiation therapy of animals. 
3) Other experimental treatment of animals. 
4) Tumour biology. 
5) Tumour virology.  
6) Tumour immunology. 
7) Chemical carcinogenesis. 
8) Physical carcinogenesis. 
9) Other experimental cancer research. 
Some of the research groups were very active and internationally renowned299. They were, 
however, often very small and geographically isolated from each other at different institutes. 
And while the privately-owned research units of the Danish Cancer Society were totally 
dedicated to the study of cancer, cancer research at the publicly financed research facilities (e.g. 
universities and hospitals) was mostly done in laboratories or departments primarily concerned 
with well-established disciplines such as molecular biology, pathology, and cell biology. This 
was a fact that interested the NSRC subcommittee:  
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This [the conduct of cancer research in departments for other bio-disciplines] is valuable 
because it gives basic cancer research a very broad contact face to other biological 
disciplines, which is essential in order to obtain an understanding of the specific biology 
of cancer cells; but the system also has a series of conspicuous flaws: the research groups 
tend to be very small – consisting of one or two persons only – and this can easily result in 
a suboptimal use of resources. It makes it more difficult to establish a stimulating research 
environment with a primary interest in cancer problems.300 
The often very rigid departmental structures of the universities rendered cancer research a 
fragmented discipline studied at many different departments with the resulting duplication of 
efforts, personnel, equipment, space and funds. This was also the case with anti-cancer activities 
at the hospitals, where oncology was not yet a separate medical specialty and was therefore not 
affiliated with the status of well-established specialities in the medical world. And the lack of 
research time at the hospitals made it a voluntary activity that implied a great deal of personal 
sacrifice on the part of the researcher. For these reasons, many cancer researchers tended to 
concentrate on small problems that did not require collaborative work or extensive facilities.  
In the opinion of the NSRC subcommittee, this did not indicate the wealth of fruitful research 
milieus they could have hoped for, and to make matters worse, the submitted questionnaires 
showed that only half of the 114 researchers spent all their working hours on cancer problems 
per se. The majority of cancer researchers at universities and hospitals were burdened with time-
consuming teaching duties and administrative work and could not focus specifically on cancer 
research like most of their colleagues at the private research institutes, see figure 3-1. The 
majority of cancer researchers at hospitals and universities specified that they could reserve no 
more than two hours a day for cancer research, and this worried the members of the 
subcommittee much as it had worried Engelbreth-Holm more than 35 years before. 
 
                                                 
300 Ibid., p. 87. 
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Figure 3-1: Illustration of the time spent on cancer problems by researchers at different types of research 
institutions. [H]= hospitals, [U] = universities, [S] = other state institutes (e.g. The Danish Food Institute and 
dental colleges), [P] = private research institutes, [C] = commercial laboratories.  
Source: (Forskningsråd, Udvalg for basal cancerforskning nedsat af Statens naturvidenskabelige 1981). 
 
According to the subcommittee, the pressure of time was reflected in the publication activity of 
the cancer researchers. After bibliographical analysis, the committee members concluded that 
about 46 % of these researchers had a low publication rate with only one or no cancer-related 
publications from 1970-1979301. If the rate could be considered a good indicator of a research 
project’s scientific activity, as the authors of the Kjeldgaard Report believed it could, it painted a 
depressing picture of Danish basic cancer research302. In addition to this, the committee 
members had studied the number of times the different Danish cancer publications had been 
cited internationally, and they learned that publications from hospitals and universities were 







                                                 
301 Ibid. p. 58.  
302 On the methodological challenges of the application of citation analysis for assessing cancer research 
performance in relative small or scientifically peripheric countries, such as Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland, 
see: Luukkonen, T. (1989). "Publish in a visible journal or perish? Assesing citation performance of nordic cancer 
research." Scientometrics 15: 349-367.  This study reveals a wealth of different approaches and factors that needed 
to be considered in citations studies when assessing citation performance, because the distribution of citation is 
often skewed. Luukkonen points to different factors that may affect the number of times a publication will be cited, 
such as the status, language, gender, and networking-abilities of the authors and the visibility of the journal they 
have published their articles in. The Kjeldgaard Report does not seem to have taken all of these considerations into 
account when analysing the publication patterns of the Danish cancer researchers, although the use of citation 
analysis and impact evaluations are clearly tools in accordance with the scientific logic of the Report’s authors.  
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Table 3-2: Overview of the basic cancer research activity (time spent, funds spent, publications etc.) at 

















Hospitals 4,4 24 2,8 81 160 
Universities 10,8 27 5,5 158 517 
Other State 
institutes 
6,4 14 2,4 17 13 
Private research 
institutes 
11,5 16 5,5 78 99 
Note: *The yearly total of external and internal grants spent on basic, laboratory-based cancer research.  
Source: Forskningsråd, U. f. b. c. n. a. S. n,. Cancerforskning i Danmark, SNF, (1981). 
Did this mean that the research done in the public hospitals and universities had a greater 
scientific impact than that of the private research institutes? The subcommittee avoided making 
explicit statements about this, although figure 3-2 seems to indicate so. In spite of teaching and 
administrative duties, publicly-employed cancer researchers were more productive than their 
colleagues in the private Cancer Society. It was noted, however, that the staff of research 
institutes that chose to finance their research activities through project-oriented grants-in-aid or 
discretionary funds rather than through the institutes’ core budget seemed to have higher 
publication intensity than others303. And this raised interesting questions: was there a correlation 
between the two? And could one funding model bring about more value for money than others? 
3.4 Financing Danish cancer research 
At the time of the NSRC survey, the Danish funding system for cancer research was tripartite. In 
theory, a single cancer-related research project could receive financial support from both the 
core budgets of the hosting organisation/institute, grants-in-aid from the States’ medical and/or 
natural science research councils (MRC, NSRC), and from a few private foundations and cancer 
charities, of which The Danish Cancer Society was the largest. A few prominent researchers 
were fortunate enough to secure funds from the American National Cancer Institute as well, but 
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far from everyone was blessed in this way. An average research group would hope to receive 
financial backing to cover expenses for e.g. staff salaries, running costs, and equipment through 
the core budget of the research institute which was financed by the “owner” of the institute – 
either the State/county/municipality or the Danish Cancer Society. The research group would 
then have to apply for additional project-oriented grants to cover the remaining costs of their 
research activities through the MRC, the NSRC, and/or the Cancer Society where grants were 
awarded through a biannual peer-reviewed process. These funding organs tried to coordinate 
their activities so that the grants would be distributed without inappropriate overlaps.  
As shown in figure 3-1, the Danish medical industry did not take much of an interest in basic 
cancer research, and although the NSRC subcommittee regretted the lack of industrial support, it 
found the tripartite funding system satisfactory as it gave cancer researchers more than one 
chance to secure funding. If they had been turned down by one of the three organs, they could 
always turn to another304. On the other hand, this was only true in times when there was enough 
money for all qualified research projects which was not the case in Denmark throughout the 
1970s and the 1980s. The subcommittee’s report stated that the total financial allocations for 
basic cancer research in 1977-79 had been an average of 16.2 million DKK/ year (of which 12.7 
million DKK /year accounted for internal financing, and the 3.5 million DKK/ year was 
allocated through external project oriented grants-in-aid)305. The public sector financed about 59 
% of the 16.2 million while the private Cancer Society managed to procure the remaining 
41%306.  
With some concern, the subcommittee noted that a large portion of the allocations was 
earmarked for specific purposes. It had been a tradition in Denmark to cover most of the costs 
for research materials and equipment through the state-financed core budget of the universities, 
but the subcommittee noted that this tradition had gradually been phased out and funds were 
now being tied down for salaries instead. Unfortunately, this had happened without a 
corresponding increase in the external project-oriented grants from the national research 
                                                 
304 Ibid.c, p. 88. 
305 Ibid.c, p.47 et passim.  
As mentioned in the introduction, it was very difficult to find the exact amount of money spent by the research 
councils/state & the private foundations on cancer research. This was also a problem for the NSRC subcommittee, 
but they based their estimates on the returned questionnaires in which cancer researchers were asked to inform the 
subcommittee of the size, type and source of funding (see Forskningsråd (1981), p. 114.). It has not been within the 
scope of this dissertation to send out similar questionnaires.  
306 The financial responsibility of the Danish Cancer Society was 50% if one looked at the external financing –  
project oriented grants – alone.   
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councils and the Danish Cancer Society. In short, this meant that the free project-oriented grants 
paid for equipment and that there was less money for actual cancer experiments!307 A similar 
development was identified in the private sector where substantial amounts of funds were being 
tied up in e.g. the physical buildings for the research units of the Cancer Society. This was 
indeed an unfortunate development, and though the Society had increased its available 
appropriations for cancer research due to an extraordinarily good anniversary collection in 1978, 
the changed funding practices forced researchers to spend more and more time away from the 
laboratory writing grant applications. The subcommittee suspected that this had prevented the 
growth of fruitful basic cancer research milieus, and although the objective of the Report had 
not been to survey clinical and epidemiological cancer research, Kjeldgaard estimated that the 
same was true for these fields308.  
3.5 The recommendations 
Having concluded that most cancer research in Denmark was done in spite of poor working 
conditions, that the effort was generally too uncoordinated, and that only about 15-20 of the 
Danish cancer researchers were of international standard, the NSRC subcommittee was faced 
with a difficult question: Was it really worth it? Should Denmark conduct cancer research 
despite its small size and modest results, or should it focus its efforts elsewhere and just await 
the results of scientifically weightier nations such as the United States and the United Kingdom?  
Kjeldgaard’s attitude seemed to be that Denmark must invest in cancer research and education in 
order to understand and apply the latest international results. But while an international 
breakthrough in the knowledge of oncogenes and their role in the development of cancer seemed 
to be within reach, no one could guarantee research driven progress in a small country like 
Denmark. However, Kjeldgaard argued that serendipity breakthroughs in cancer research could 
just as easily happen in a Danish laboratory as in an American one, and they would surely come 
only to those who dared to put something at stake by supporting research309. Last but not least, 
other representatives of the scientific community argued that Denmark should continue its 
efforts within the cancer field because research was the very backbone of the Danish educational 
                                                 
307 Forskningsråd, U. f. b. c. n. a. S. n. (1981). Cancerforskning i Danmark, SNF., p. 88.   
308 Kjeldgaard, N. O. (1982) "Hvad skal der ske med kræftforskningen i Danmark?" Jyllands-Posten 02.03.1982, p. 
9.   
   The combined yearly allocations for these fields was about the same as for basic cancer research. 
309 Ibid. 
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system310. But in particular, the authors of the Kjeldgaard Report used socio-economic 
arguments as a strategy to appeal to the lay government:  
(…) the public expenses for cancer research can reasonably be compared to the 1500 
million DKK/year that is spent on the treatment and hospitalisation of cancer patients311 
In other words: it pays to invest in science! On this point it is evident that the Kjeldgaard Report 
reflected a scientific logic as it argued that progress in the fight against cancer was most likely to 
come from the laboratories; thus trying to expand the institutional matrix to improve the 
opportunities for scientific organisations in the cancer field. This logic was also reflected in the 
Report’s recommendations. In the cancer survey questionnaires sent out by the subcommittee, 
the individual cancer researcher was asked to propose organisational and/or financial initiatives 
that could help promote and mobilise Danish basic cancer research. Although the answers were 
manifold, the researchers seemed to agree that a few initiatives might be able to improve their 
daily working conditions. These initiatives turned out to be in complete agreement with the 
recommendations of the Report’s authors, who had spent months collecting and analysing data 
on the state of Danish cancer research. They were as follows: 
1) Make basic cancer research a priority of the NSRC and the MRC. 
2) Increase allocations for cancer research in the form of free, temporary and project-
oriented grants to the most valuable, relevant, and efficient research projects. This could 
be facilitated through the establishment of a State cancer research fund, intended to 
award grants via the peer review process to the best projects only. 
3) Establish comprehensive cancer research centres in connection with the hospital 
oncology centres and the universities in Copenhagen, Aarhus, and Odense. (In contrast 
to the single national centre proposed in the 1940s, the Report now recommended 
several centres at the country’s province medical faculties that were not fully established 
in the 1940s. But now there was an academic infrastructure to support more than one 
centre.)312 
                                                 
310 Henningsen, I. (1982). "Flere spørgsmål end svar." Naturkampen: 20-23, p. 21. 
   Christiansen, J. (1982). "Cancerforskning i Danmark." Ugeskrift for Læger 144: 815-816, p. 816.    
311 Forskningsråd, U. f. b. c. n. a. S. n. (1981). Cancerforskning i Danmark, SNF., p. 14.  
312 This recommendation may have been due to geopolitical concerns. Kjeldgaard himself was a professor at Aarhus 
University, and there was some competition between the original Copenhagen University and the later established 
ones in the province, as demonstrated during the negotiations for the establishment of the faculty of science at 
Aarhus University that was only reluctantly accepted by some Copenhagen professors in the 1950s and 1960s. See, 
Nielsen, H. (2004). Disse fag må lempes til verden... - Oprettelsen og udbygningen af Det Naturvidenskabelige 
Fakultet ved Aarhus Universitet. Gylling, Aarhus Universitetsforlag, p. 25.  
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4) Strengthen pre- and postgraduate training in clinical and biological aspects of oncology 
at the universities. 
5) Recruit more promising researchers to do cancer research by offering special long-term 
cancer research scholarships313. 
The first recommendation was to make cancer research a special priority of the Danish research 
councils, which would require a change of the formal institutions. This could be done through a 
change of practice in the councils’ grant awarding activities, but perhaps more importantly 
through their function as the government’s political advisory boards. If the research councils 
succeeded in making cancer research a special governmental priority – much as the search for 
alternative energy sources had become after the oil crisis in 1973 – the subcommittee would 
have come a long way in re-actualising and expanding the formal institutions created in 1949. 
The recommendation and the desire to change the existing institutional matrix was clearly 
inspired by such change in the US, i.e. the American National Cancer Act of 1971, which made 
cancer research a federal responsibility. However, making the cancer problem – or any research 
problem – a special priority of the Danish government was quite difficult.  
Denmark was late in catching on to the research policy recommendations made by the OECD in 
the 1960s. Such recommendations stated that the governments of the OECD countries should 
play a more active part in the management and development of research policies for a more 
efficient use of science and its results, but this was not on the political agenda in Denmark until 
the 1980s, and even then, the Danish research system did not seem geared to it314. There was no 
effective coordinating political organ, and Danish research policy was thus “characterised by 
pluralism in the three main sectors - academic research, research in the public sector or at 
government institutes for applied research [in Danish: sektorforskning], and the technological 
service system - without any notable political coordination”315. One of the main problems was 
that there was no autonomous ministry for research until 1993316. The lack of transverse 
coordination and research policies made it more difficult for the small Danish nation to initiate 
                                                 
313 Forskningsråd, U. f. b. c. n. a. S. n. (1981). Cancerforskning i Danmark, SNF., p. 98. 
314Jensen, B. L. (1996). "Dansk forskningspolitik - fra finkulture til national strategi." Økonomi og Politik: 30-39, p. 
31. 
315 Ibid. p. 33. 
316 Hansen, H. F. (2002). "Hvilken slags politik er forskningspolitik?" Økonomi og Politik 75: 41-56, p. 49.  
From the mid 1980’s, several attempts were made to stem this so-called “sectorialisation” of the Danish research 
system: In 1986, the government established its first research board. In 1987, the Minister of Education was made 
Minister of Research as well. In 1993, the first actual Ministry for Research was established. In 1995/1996:  a 
common law of sectorial/non-academic and publicly financed research institutions was passed.  
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strategic research projects in the public sector or at government research institutes as compared 
to larger nations, because the individual ministries often did not have the necessary capacity to 
initiate research programs in special research areas317.  
The process was even more complicated if the prioritised area did not fall naturally under the 
aegis of one ministry alone – such as the Ministry of Health or the Ministry of Education – but 
called for a cross-ministerial collaboration. All too often, the different ministries were averse to 
giving up influence over the specific research efforts they had traditionally controlled and 
financed through their own special ministerial pool funds, and their culturally different 
approaches to the question of research were thus reflected in their everyday administration of 
cross-disciplinary and poly-ministerial pools and programs318. This unfortunate rigidity in the 
way Danish research was managed on the administrative level strongly impeded the possibility 
of ministerial collaboration, and in the words of the government officer of the Danish Ministry 
for Research, Bjarne Lundager Jensen:  
The traditional pluralistic or sectorial/ministerial organisation of the Danish research 
system has, however, had a difficult time responding to the politicians’ demand for more 
efficient resource utilisation of the public research and development effort.319 
Nevertheless, an administrative unit that functioned as secretariat for the six research councils 
aimed at overcoming these problems by co-ordinating the various research administrations in 
order to facilitate cross-ministerial projects for the benefit of society320. As cancer was 
considered a serious problem for the Danish society, cancer research seemed like an obvious 
candidate for such coordinated effort. To this end, the NSRC subcommittee suggested that a 
special State cancer research fund be set up (recommendation number 2). Again, this 
recommendation neccessitated changes at the ministerial level which were required to carry out 
most of the Report’s recommendations and change the institutional matrix towards prioritising 
and funding cancer research.  
This proposed change was by far the most difficult to carry through because of its inherent 
implications on the ministerial and cross-ministerial orchestration of research programs and 
                                                 
317 Larsen, P. O. (1981). Forskningspolitik i et lille land, Forlaget Rhodosp. 111.  
318Jensen, B. L. (1996). "Dansk forskningspolitik - fra finkulture til national strategi." Økonomi og Politik: 30-39, p. 
32.  It is not within the scope of this dissertation to provide an in depth analysis of the structure of the Danish 
political system and/or its funding mechanisms. The brief descriptions given in this chapter are only included to 
provide the background for the actual topic of this thesis – the cancer centre that never was. 
319 Ibid., p. 31.  
320 Larsen, P. O. (1981). Forskningspolitik i et lille land, Forlaget Rhodos, p. 185. 
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science policy, as it required the different ministries to lay aside internal ministerial power-
struggles, to collaborate and to pool funds into a cross-ministerial cancer fund. The ministries 
were essentially asked to channel their influence on science policy and strategic funding into the 
research councils and the cancer fund’s administration: a transferral of authority. The proposed 
cancer fund was supposed to consist of a board of cancer experts that would be appointed by the 
research councils but did not necessarily have to be members of these organs. The idea was to 
let these experts identify new and promising areas within the cancer field that needed special 
attention. In this way, the experts would review projects and award multi-annual grants for 
promising long-ranging and extensive cancer research programs which exceeded the limits of 
what the research councils were normally able to finance with their limited budgets grants321. 
Thus, the experts would have the authority to shape a more flexible Danish cancer research 
policy by identifying specific research areas in need and initiating research programs, and by 
terminating them if they were not up to the standard. The expert board would have to coordinate 
its funding activities with those of the Danish Cancer Society, the MRC and the NSRC to avoid 
overlaps. The subcommittee estimated that the fund would need an initial capital of DKK 5 
million a year for both basic and clinical cancer research, and that this amount was not to be 
given at the cost of other medical research areas322. Nor was the establishment of a fund 
intended to relieve the NSRC and the MRC of their responsibility to support regular cancer 
research projects.  
These first two recommendations of the Kjeldgaard Report were clearly inspired by the US 
efforts in organising cancer research. As mentioned above, the support and management of 
cancer research was considered a federal duty in the US, and the idea of a State cancer research 
fund in Denmark seems to be an attempt to make the Danish State play a similar role with 
similar formal institutions. Even compared to other European countries in which private cancer 
charities financed the majority of all cancer research, public investment in Danish cancer 
research was relatively low, and if the recommendations of the Report were put into practice, the 
financial and political conditions for Danish cancer research would be greatly improved.323 But 
when the Report was finally published, the chairmen of the MRC and the NSRC endorsed the 
recommendations with some reservation: 
                                                 
321 It is not clear from the Report to which degree the experts would identify these areas on their own (top-down) 
and to which degree they would consider potential suggestions from the researchers themselves (bottom-up).   
322 Forskningsråd, U. f. b. c. n. a. S. n. (1981). Cancerforskning i Danmark, SNF., p. 95. 
323 Ibid., p. 84.  The relative contribution in DKK/inhabitant: Norway (4.2), Denmark (4.3), Sweden   (5.4), England 
(5.7).  
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The councils recommend that the recommendations of the report be put into action, but 
the councils must express reservation towards the idea of the establishment of a State 
cancer research fund. The reservation is tied to the concern that the financial means for 
such a fund could be taken from already existing research funds. 
In case such a fund is established, it must take place with an expansion of Danish cancer 
research in mind and with new and additional funds, given that the fund (…) must be in 
charge of the implementation of larger, multi-annual projects which are difficult or 
impossible to finance at the moment.  
It must be stressed that the sums set aside by the research councils for basic cancer 
research are the maximum of what can be allocated for this research if the remaining 
research within the area of responsibility of the councils must be catered for to an 
acceptable extent.324 
The two chairmen found it necessary to emphasize these points in a loose leaf attachment to the 
Report even though the exact same point was explicitly stated in the Report itself. The chairmen 
had probably learnt from experience that cancer research had never been a financial priority of 
the Danish State – here meaning the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health – and that 
it was not likely to ever be so. Any funds for cancer research would thus not be additional to the 
existing state support for research in general, but rather a re-distribution at the cost of other 
worthy non-cancer areas. And the chairmen were not alone in their suspicion towards the State’s 
methods and the outlooks for obtaining additional funding with the use of arguments favouring 
applicable science. The State had traditionally focused more on the treatment of cancer than on 
cancer research, and it was a common perception in the cancer community that the State had 
even used the financial capacity of the Danish Cancer Society as a pretext for continued 
“inaction” in this field.325  
Even back in 1979, the then chairman of the Danish Cancer Society, Dr. Mogens Andreassen, 
questioned the political interest in supporting cancer research – and making the organisational 
changes needed to follow the Report’s recommendation – by stating that there were other ways 
of helping the anti-cancer cause than through the research councils or as special posts through 
the State Budget: 
If the politicians wanted to help us [the Danish Cancer Society, eds.], they could do so by 
making the testamentary donations which are earmarked for us tax-free – that is 
completely free of the 12 % inheritance tax.326 
                                                 
324 Kildeberg et al. (1982). (loose leaf attachment to the Kjeldgaard Report) 
325 Kjeldgaard, N. O. (1982). "Kræftforskning er for spredt og bør styrkes i offentligt regi." Forskningen og 
Samfundet 8(2): 6-7. 
   Henningsen, N. (1979). "Efter et kræftår." Ugeskrift for læger 141(3): 181-184 p. 181. 
   Olsen, S. (1982) "Er indsatsen i kræftforskningen tilstrækkelig?" Politiken København 15.02.1982.  
326 Henningsen, N. (1979). "Efter et kræftår." Ugeskrift for læger 141(3): 181-184, p. 181.  
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But whereas Andreassen had questioned the very willingness of the politicians to help fight 
cancer, the two chairmen of the research councils might even have feared this political 
willingness. Whereas it was probably very unlikely that the ministries would ever give up power 
and influence by establishing new formal institutions in the form of a heavily financed cancer 
fund, few politicians would dare to be openly averse to the idea of making cancer research a 
priority of the State, but they would be pressed to find “new” money for the initiative in a time 
of budget cutbacks. A political initiative to make cancer research a special priority would thus 
be in danger of becoming either an empty gesture or an unfair redistribution of the scarce 
research funds available at the cost of other worthy research areas within the existing 
institutional matrix of ministerial domains and power struggles. It ended up a shuffling of 
existing funds and programs. Then again, there was always the odd chance of success as seen in 
other countries. As such, the proposed cancer centre and fund may have challenged the existing 
research disciplines and medical specialities on their funding and traditional hierarchy as they 
called for re-structuring across organisations and funding practices. 
According to the Kjeldgaard Report, rising cancer-related mortality rates and the hope that 
cancer research would soon elucidate the biology of cancer slowly made some of the European 
governments increase their contributions for cancer research as they began to focus on different 
ways of organising this field in the wake of the American cancer program of 1971327. Therefore, 
the recommendations of the NSRC subcommittee were statements of hope that the Danish 
government would follow suit. This in spite of a serious lack of thorough documentation in the 
report of the alleged European development. But even if the government did follow suit, the 
channelling of new funds into cancer research projects would not be enough. The Kjeldgaard 
Report argued that there was a need for a profound organisational and educational restructuring 
of the Danish cancer research enterprise which was characterised by many small and 
uncoordinated research efforts in futile or even weak research milieus scattered all over the 
country. According to the Report, something had to be done – but what?  
The Report itself was the first ever attempt to analyse the status, goals, financial means and 
future organisation of a large biomedical research area328. And although every single one of the 
researchers who had filled out the cancer survey questionnaires seemed to agree that there was a 
definite need for a more appropriate national cancer research coordination, no Danish science 
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manager or researcher had much experience in dealing with the structural challenges at hand.  
The organisation of a biomedical field posed the special problem of coordinating the research 
and administration at state-funded universities (with democratic structures/autonomy of science) 
and the country’s state/municipal/county-owned hospitals (traditional physician hierarchy/ 
activities centred on the patients) along with the research done at several privately operated 
research institutes. How was this to be done? 
The members of the NSRC subcommittee considered the US to be one of the first nations to 
have given this matter any serious thought. The subcommittee members had had a hard time 
getting hold of any material on how other countries had organised their cancer field, but the 
American cancer researchers and science managers seemed to be the ones who had published 
most on the subject because of the National Cancer Act of 1971. Nevertheless, the 
subcommittee members had only managed to find a copy of the NCI Fact Book (1979) which 
informed them on the activities and structure of the National Cancer Program329. There are no 
indications in the Kjeldgaard Report that the subcommittee had got hold of any material on the 
preceding discussions of the difficult implementation of the Cancer Act. At least it is not listed 
where the Report presents and discusses the international literature available330.  This is 
surprising because many of the recommendations of the Kjeldgaard Report seem to be adopted 
directly from this Act, or at least from the way American cancer research was organised in 1979 
– e.g. with regard to the section on the establishment of new and so-called “comprehensive 
cancer research centres”331. For this reason, it is worth while taking a closer look at the US 
history behind the organisational instrument which the NSRC subcommittee adopted as its third 
recommendation to the Danish government: the establishment of Danish comprehensive cancer 
centres.   
3.6 The concept of “comprehensiveness”: inspiration from the US 
In addition to the public National Cancer Institute (NCI), the United States lent room to several 
large and wide-ranging private cancer research and treatment centres such as the Roswell Park 
Cancer Institute, the MD Anderson Cancer Center, and the Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer 
Center which had inspired Engelbreth-Holm’s dream of a similar Danish institute in the 1940s. 
                                                 
329 This does not mean that no material was available on discussions of the organisation of cancer research in other 
countries, but for some reason the subcommittee did not get a hold of it. Some of the material available at the time 
will be presented in paragraph 3.6.  
330 Forskningsråd, U. f. b. c. n. a. S. n. (1981). Cancerforskning i Danmark, SNF., p. 81.  
331 For the full text version of the National Cancer Act of 1971, see, Kennedy, E., H. Wilson, et al. (1972). 
"National Cancer Act of 1971." Cancer 29(4): 917-921. 
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These exemplary enterprises tried to bridge the gap between bench and bedside by placing basic 
and clinical cancer research under the same roof. As mentioned in chapter 2, the idea of 
organising cancer services and research in so-called multidisciplinary institutes or “centres” 
became popular after World War II and took on new strength as the National Cancer Institute 
began to provide support for already established and freestanding cancer centres from the 
beginning of the 1960s, in the hope that a series of autonomous but collaborating and 
geographically equitably distributed centres would provide cancer patients with the best care – 
based on the latest research – no matter where they lived332. When President Nixon signed the 
National Cancer Act of 1971, confidence in the organisational values of the cancer centre took 
on new strength as the Act directly instructed the NCI to establish an additional 15 centres.333 
But in spite of the federal efforts to use the privately owned and successful cancer centres as 
models for a new national coordination of the cancer research enterprise, not everyone agreed 
that this was the right way to go about it. Already during the preparation for the Cancer Act in 
1971, the American virologist Seymour S. Cohen argued that the “blind” establishment of 
several autonomous cancer centres had not been the right tool for the job of organising the anti-
cancer effort334. Much like the situation in Denmark, American cancer research of the early 
1970s was a fragmented discipline that was not given much interest in terms of Lundgren’s 
“outer institutionalisation”335 by the administration of most medical schools and universities, 
and according to Cohen, these research institutes were therefore not suitable instruments for the 
development of cancer research. But unfortunately, he felt that the situation was not markedly 
better at the categorical336 cancer institutes (or “centres”, as they became known in this 
decade)337: 
There are numerous private and governmental institutes whose ostensible aims are to 
perform research on cancer. Coming into existence or expanding largely after World War 
II, when much less was known about cancer, virology, or cell biology, the institutes rarely 
had systematic programs. They stressed that since cancer was a largely unknown entity, 
any research on growth would help to clarify the cancer problem. This position was 
emphasized to attract scientists mostly interested in biological problems other than that of 
                                                 
332 Roberson, W. M. Ibid.: "Current National Cancer Institute Center Programs." 887-888, p. 888.  
333 Kennedy, E., H. Wilson, et al. Ibid.: "National Cancer Act of 1971." 917-921, p. 3.  
334 Cohen, S. s. (1971). "Cancer Research and the Scientific Community." Science 172: 1212-1214.  
335 Again, this term refers to the emergence of scientific disciplines and is not related to Douglass C. North’s 
concept of “institutions”.  
336 Categorical cancer centres are here defined as research units ideally dedicated specifically to study cancer 
problems, as opposed to the medical schools at which cancer research, according to Cohen, was reduced to sub-
areas of established disciplines.  
337 Cohen, S. s. (1971). "Cancer Research and the Scientific Community." Science 172: 1212-1214, p. 1213. 
 
The Cancer Centre That Never Was 
 
 135 
cancer and to facilitate obtaining financial support for these workers. As a result, cancer 
institutes now contain many investigators who are only secondarily interested in cancer. 
The institutes have frequently obtained associations with universities and have used 
similar tenure regulations, which now handicap reorganization of these institutes. It is 
clear that, even as in the universities, research in these institutes is fragmented and lacks a 
serious program and direction”338 
 
The very concepts of both cancer research and the cancer institute – the cancer centre – had to 
be clearly defined. Much like the umbrella like terms “cancer” and “cancer research”, the 
definition of the cancer centre was blurred to say the least, as it was used to designate an array 
of very disparate research institutes. There seemed to be a pressing need to define exactly what a 
cancer centre ought to be and to find out if and why it was thought to be the right organisational 
mode in the war against cancer. Cohen must have doubted the virtues of the “cancer centres”, 
the idea of which had been persistent in the US attempts to rationalise the organisation of its 
cancer treatment services. This despite the fact that the early 20th century was marked by a great 
deal of disagreement between professional groups on whether the centre was the right tool for 
the job, or if the cancer treatment planned to be offered at the centre could just as easily be 
delivered through existing hospitals or through a combination of central units with satellite 
clinics in order to reach the most patients339. And even though support for cancer research and 
chemotherapeutic trials increased tremendously in the mid-20th century – and it became popular 
to move these activities under the same roof as the cancer treatment units to form larger “cancer 
centres” – Cohen did not necessarily think that this solution had proven itself:  
In sum there is no organization on the national or international scene which can easily 
facilitate the solution of the numerous large and identifiable problems in cellular and virus 
biology, drug design, and clinical pharmacology as a rational exercise in scientific 
collaboration.340  
Cohen was far from the only one pondering the effects of the cancer centre as an instrument for 
scientific collaboration and progress in the war on cancer. On December 9 and 10 of 1971, only 
two days after the signing of the National Cancer Act, a conference on the topic “Planning for 
cancer centres” was held in Washington. It was initiated by a small committee that had run into 
problems planning for a cancer centre at Washington University School of Medicine and wanted 
to discuss these problems with anyone who had already built a cancer centre or was planning to 
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339 Cantor, D. (2007). "Introduction: Cancer Control and Prevention in the Twentieth Century." Bulletin of the 
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do so341. The conference received backing from the NCI and the private American Cancer 
Society (ACS), and it sought to provide answers to important questions that surprisingly had not 
been directly addressed before: Just what exactly is a cancer centre? Why have a cancer centre? 
How do you develop and operate a cancer centre? And do cancer centres really improve cancer 
research, provide better medical care for the cancer patient, and provide better teaching about 
cancer?342 
The conference showed that there is no final answers to these questions, or at least that the 
concept of a cancer centre was constantly evolving and had to be re-defined over and over again 
throughout history because the knowledge of cancers and thus the nature of the heterogeneous 
cancer research and treatment was changing and continuously required new organisational 
settings to accommodate these changes (with regard to technical equipment, geographical 
location, the distance between bed and bench side etc.). The name of these cancer fighting 
entities had been used to represent a bewildering array of organisations and had evolved 
accordingly from “cancer institutes” to “cancer centres” and eventually to the so-called 
“comprehensive cancer centres”. This term was coined by the NCI in order to satisfy the 
language of the National Cancer Act of 1971, which demanded a group of cancer centres with 
precise organisational structures and a broad approach to the cancer problem (including 
research, clinical care, epidemiology, and community outreach).343  
According to American radiation oncologist Jerome M. Vaeth and Australian radiobiologist 
Peter Ilbery, who have both written about the concept of cancer centres, the organisational 
forerunners of the comprehensive cancer centre were believed to be the strongly centralised 
Scandinavian radiation therapy centres344. The traditional cancer centre concept which sprang 
from these roots was “a large geographical building or buildings, usually in a large city, 
inhabited by cancer patients, specialists, research workers and students, and engaged in care as 
well as research and training”345. This particular definition is very similar to the centre proposed 
by Danish cancer researcher Dr. Engelbreth-Holm in the 1940s. Engelbreth-Holm mentioned the 
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American cancer institutes as the sole source of inspiration for his proposed model. Even though 
he himself was working at a cancer lab at a radium therapy station, he clearly did not think it 
constituted the kind of traditional Scandinavian centre referred to by Vaeth and Ilbery in the 
above. So whether or not the American cancer researchers and therapists had at some point in 
history found inspiration in the Scandinavian radiation centres, it was the American take on “the 
cancer centre” that resonated well with Engelbreth-Holm in the 1940s and later on with the 
authors of the Kjeldgaard Report.  
No matter the origin, the abovementioned traditional concept of the cancer centre was further 
elaborated with the NCI centre program of 1971, which introduced the latest organisational 
weapon in the war on cancer in the form of a series of autonomous but collaborating 
comprehensive cancer centres which seemed to be “better” than non-comprehensive ones. 
Apparently, a cancer centre was not a clear-cut definition which pointed to one type of research 
institute; on the contrary, it referred to a myriad of research and treatment facilities all over the 
world. In 1976, the International Union against Cancer (UICC) found that 81 countries346 had 
cancer centres, and that these could be roughly categorised in the following fashion:  
                                                 
346 Denmark was among the 81 countries in the UICC-survey from 1976. The UICC had set up four categories of 
cancer establishments, and the Danish Cancer Research Institute in Aarhus and the Fibiger Institute were 
characterised as typical “cancer research institutes”, inasmuch as they both housed clinical and experimental cancer 
research (see, UICC (1976). International Directory of Specialized Cancer Research and Treatment Establishments. 
UICC Technical Report Series vol. 23. Geneva, UICC.), p. 78-80). The Fibiger Institute even provided professional 
education for cancer-research workers, but none of the two private institutes offered treatment of cancer patients 
and could thus not be called “comprehensive”. The UICC categorised the radium stations in Aarhus and Odense as 
“hospital units”, and it distinguished the Finsen Institute as a “comprehensive cancer centre”, because the Institute’s 
field of activity included experimental and clinical cancer research as well as cancer treatment and rehabilitation, 
cancer control, and professional education. The UICC survey claimed that the Institute had about 125 full-time 
cancer researchers with either medical or scientific training on the payroll along with 843 lab technicians, nurses, 
and administrative staff. Nevertheless, neither the authors of the Kjeldgaard Report – including Nis I. Nissen of the 
Finsen Institute – nor the rest of the Danish cancer community seemed to be aware of the “comprehensiveness” of 
the Finsen Institute. Perhaps they had not read the UICC survey, or perhaps they did not agree with its conclusions. 
After all, the Finsen Institute was not a cancer institute devoted to the study and treatment of cancer alone – in other 
words – it was not a categorical cancer institute. In fact, only the Institute’s Finsen Laboratory could live up to this 
definition, so the data from the Finsen Institute must have been misinterpreted by the international UICC. The 
Finsen Institute consisted of several treatment and research clinics, and the Finsen Laboratory was only one of 
them; and as the Kjeldgaard Report had stated that there were only 114 active cancer researchers in the country, 
there could not possibly be 125 full time researchers working at the Finsen Institute with cancer as their main 
objective, even though the UICC seemed to be under the mistaken impression of it. As a result, the union believed 
the cancer centre to be much larger, than it actually was. Or perhaps the Danish cancer researchers simply could not 
easily fit the Finsen Institute into the same category as the large and famous American comprehensive cancer 
centres such as the Roswell Park Cancer Institute, the MD Anderson Cancer Center, and the Memorial Sloan-
Kettering Cancer Center that had inspired professor Engelbreth-Holm many years earlier.  However, the question of 
whether or not the Danish researchers were acquainted with the UICC definitions is irrelevant. They wanted 
something which the Finsen centre could not provide, comprehensive or not. The cancer researchers wanted to 
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 Hospitals or other medial establishments having a SEPARATE identifiable 
organisational department devoted to, and specialised in the diagnosis and 
comprehensive multi-disciplinary treatment of all cancer patients or of a given site 
or sites.  It is expected that such a department or unit would have a director to co-
ordinate cancer treatment in the hospital, and would also be engaged in clinical 
research.  
 University departments or biomedical research centres which are engaged in a 
structured program of cancer research. 
 Cancer research institutes – which may be defined as physically or organisationally 
essentially autonomous entities devoted entirely or almost entirely to a wide 
spectrum of basic and clinical cancer research. Such institutes will have a staff of 
research workers (medically and/or scientifically qualified) and technicians, and a 
wide range of equipment, usually with facilities for the training of cancer-research-
workers.  
 Comprehensive cancer centres - which may be defined as physically or 
organisationally autonomous entities devoted to the diagnosis and multi-
disciplinary treatment of cancer patients, to basic and clinical cancer research, and 
to the training of personnel in cancer diagnosis, treatment and research. In addition, 
they will probably have facilities for some or all of the following: a cancer registry, 
rehabilitation, a social-welfare service, convalescent and intermediate care, home-
care support, patient follow-up, and public education.347 
The NCI cancer centre program and the ACS put their faith in the latter type of research facility 
as the tool that could coordinate the broadest attack on cancer by strengthening cooperation 
between basic, epidemiological and clinical cancer research, by offering the most modern cancer 
treatment for patients, by offering cancer training, and by providing community outreach 
services348. In the opinion of the NCI and the ACS, the comprehensive cancer centre was 
considered to be “one of the most important features in the new era of the fight against 
cancer”349. To make sure that other types of cancer institutes were not confused with these ideal 
                                                                                                                                                            
coordinate Danish cancer research in fitting organisational frames at a fitting location, and as will be evident in the 
following, the clinical units of the Finsen Institute were not considered good enough. 
 
347 Ibid., p. III.     
348 Shingleton, W. W. (1989). "Cancer Centers- Origins and Purpose." Archives of Surgery 124: 43-45, p. 44. 
   Edwards, M. H. (1972). "Role of the Cancer Center in Training." Cancer 29(4): 889-891, p. 889. 
349 Adams, L. W. (1972). "Cancer Centers and the American People." Cancer 29: 821-823, p. 823. 
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centres, the NCI issued a set of requirements for any centre that aspired to bear the mark of 
“comprehensiveness”350. These criteria have been condensed to the following351:   
a) A comprehensive cancer centre should be a geographic unit/entity. 
b) It should be affiliated with a university or a medical school, to facilitate recruitment of first class 
staff. 
c) It should have a clear vision and a set of goals, plainly and prominently stated. 
d) It should be multidisciplinary (incl. basic, clinical and epidemiological research departments). 
e) It must possess a high quality research program in basic, clinical, epidemiological, and evaluative 
research which exists in an environment conducive to a collaborative effort. It should promote 
interdisciplinary collaborations through a program objective (but not at the cost of academic 
freedom). 
f) It should have an effective process for inter-professional criticism (peer-review). 
g) It should be led by a director in absolute charge of budget, space, research program, and appointment 
of staff. 
h) It should be organised to combine patient care (hospital/clinic), research (labs, continuous purchase 
of the best equipment), and education (libraries, communication media, conference- and classrooms). 
It must give equal attention to all three of these areas of cancer work.  
i) It must inform and advise the public on cancer352. 
In contrast to the traditional concept of the cancer centre as a building in which the different 
aspects of cancer work were simply placed under the same roof in the hope of fluke 
collaborations, the criteria can be seen as an early attempt to organise a cross-disciplinary attack 
on cancer by focusing on science management rather than just on the spatial structure of the 
centre353.   
                                                 
350 NIH (1974). The Cancer Centers Program: The National Cancer Institute. Washington, US Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare 
Public Health Service 
National Institutes of Health., p. 9.  
 Patrice Pinell describes similar definition problems and attempts to distinguish “official” cancer treatment centres 
from “unofficial” ones in France in the 1920s, see: Pinell, P. (1991). "Cancer Policy and the Health System in 
France: "Big Medicine" Challenges the Conception and Organization of Medical Practice." Social History of 
Science 4(1): 75-101, p. 80-81.   
351 Shingleton, W. W. (1989). "Cancer Centers- Origins and Purpose." Archives of Surgery 124: 43-45, p. 45. 
352 Clark, R. L. (1972). "Administrative and Fiscal Aspect." Cancer 29: 846-851, p. 848-849. 
   Clark, R. L. (1977). "Comprehensive Cancer Centers." Comprehensive Therapy 3: 9-14, p. 12.  
   Simone, J. V. (2002). "Understanding Cancer Centers." Journal of Clinical Oncology 20(23): 4503-4507, p. 4504. 
353 This emphasis on actively creating the right milieu and administrative frames for scientific collaborations and 
synergy is echoed in recent definitions of a cancer centre: 
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Following this shift of focus in the definition of a cancer centre in the 1970s and onwards, the 
process of planning a centre was changed too. The Washington conference in 1971 reflected that 
it was time to abandon the traditional idea of finding a suitable architectural unit or facility 
before giving any thought to the cancer centre as an organisational unit with accurately planned 
research programs and management.354 According to the proponents of the new approach, 
anyone planning to establish a cancer centre would do better if they set out to formulate the 
specific research/clinical program and objectives of the cancer centre as the very first step of the 
planning process355. This could be done only by delineating elements (such as surgery, 
microbiology etc.) and identifying potential groups who needed to be in the centre. The 
technical, spatial, or co-operational requirements of these scientific and/or medical activities 
would help shape the structure and nature of the centre.  
The next step would ideally be to appoint a director of the centre and assign all responsibility for 
further planning to him and, perhaps, a small planning committee. Only at this point could the 
formal planning efforts begin for such matters as finance, housing and everyday administration. 
It is worth noticing, though, that the proponents of this view did not then – or since – establish 
precisely which internal organisational and fiscal arrangements could function in a cancer 
centre. Nor did they find a conclusive answer to the question of whether or not it was feasible 
and desirable to have different types of public and private organisations356 cooperate to form a 
centre, or if the centre was more likely to come into existence and function if only one 
organisation (such as the State) was in charge financially and managerially357.  
Back in Denmark, the American discussions of this question would have been of immense 
importance to the NSRC subcommittee who readily adopted the idea of the comprehensive 
cancer centre as the primary tool to coordinate Danish cancer research and to bridge the gap 
between bench and bedside, although the organisational structures and the part played by the 
                                                                                                                                                            
”A cancer center is a formal organization of diverse and complementary specialists who work on the cancer 
problem together and simultaneously rather than serially. The center is under sufficient central authority to focus 
efforts and organize resources for the efficient and synergistic accomplishment of its goals in patient care and/or 
research. The center enables and catalyzes a high level of cancer-focused achievement that would not happen 
without such formal organization of staff and programs. Leadership in forging progress in the understanding and 
management of cancer distinguishes a cancer center.” (Dr. Joseph V. Simone, Huntsman Cancer Institute, US 
(2002)), see: Simone, J. V. (2002). "Understanding Cancer Centers." Journal of Clinical Oncology 20(23): 4503-
4507, p. 4503. 
354 Walter, W. A. (1972). "Planning for Cancer Centers." Cancer 29(4): 891-893, p. 892.  
355 Ibid. 
     Durant, J. R. (1972). "Planning for Cancer Centers - Workshop III Summary." Cancer 29: 909-913, p. 911. 
356 Hospitals, private charities, university research labs etc. 
357 Orbison, J. L. (1972). "Review of Proposals." Cancer 29(4): 916. 
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public and the private sectors in Denmark were markedly different from those of the United 
States. When the Report was written there were no public cancer research centres, and the 
Report thus recommended that a series of publicly-owned comprehensive cancer centres should 
be established in connection with the hospital oncology departments and the universities of the 
largest cities in the country. 
The recommendation was essentially the same as Dr. Engelbreth-Holm’s in the 1940s with the 
exception that the Report supported the establishment of a series of centres instead of just one in 
Copenhagen. Of course, back in the 1940s, the country only had one fully established medical 
faculty and most of country’s cancer research was done in Copenhagen, and it would have made 
no sense to propose more than one single national centre. Still, the content of the 
recommendation was basically the same as in the 1940s: bridging the gap between bench and 
bedside by making clinical and scientific specialities and disciplines work together under the 
same roof and with the same chief objective. At the time when the Kjeldgaard Report was 
published, this would require the moving of several separate research groups into the same 
geographical unit to mimic the traditional organisational structure at the universities358.  
The Report anticipated that this would be the case in Copenhagen, which in addition to lending 
room to the excellent hospital Rigshospitalet and Copenhagen University also lent room to the 
Danish Cancer Registry, The Fibiger Institute and to The Carlsberg Biology Institute, which 
since the death of Professor Fischer had functioned as an institute for cell biology but now 
planned to specialise in cancer research359. For this reason, the Kjeldgaard Report suggested that 
one of the proposed new State-financed comprehensive cancer centres should incorporate this 
private institute in the enterprise and that: 
(…) it would be natural to consider also including the cancer research institutes of the 
Danish Cancer Society in the plans for the state cancer centres, as part of the Society’s 
endeavours to realise a governmental take-over of the institutes which the Society has 
established with great foresight. Meanwhile, in cases where a constructional frame cannot 
be established, a cancer research institute will be regarded as a scientific and research 
financial unit in which scientists and research groups at different already existing institutes 
are joined in to a single research unit with a shared research management. General 
appropriations for cancer research from universities or foundations can be channelled 
through this organisational structure. No matter what, it is imperative that such cancer 
research institutes have a certain size and mode of organisation that will ensure a great 
degree of flexibility so that the necessary lab, equipment, and staff facilities can be 
reallocated at any time to the most active research groups and thereby provide the 
                                                 
358 Forskningsråd, U. f. b. c. n. a. S. n. (1981). Cancerforskning i Danmark, SNF., p. 92.  
359 Ibid., p. 93.  
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practical foundation for an optimal use of appropriations from the proposed state cancer 
research fund.360 
The NSRC subcommittee appears not to have read much material on the subject or discussed the 
international experiences, and it therefore could only have had a very vague idea of whether or 
not a comprehensive cancer centre would be a fruitful organisational mode for Danish cancer 
research. Because even though the UICC and the NCI had chosen the comprehensive cancer 
centre as their weapon of choice in the war against cancer, they were not necessarily right361. Or 
perhaps the Committee used the “comprehensive cancer centre” as a tool to bring about the 
institutional changes seen in other countries just to secure better funding for cancer research, no 
matter if they believed in the centre or not. On the other hand, such cynical (mis)use of 
documentation of international programs would be a short term solution, as a potential change of 
formal institutions would require maintenance through e.g. positive feedback and increasing 
returns in the form of scientific and medical breakthroughs, the realisation of the promised 
socio-economic benefits etc. The centres needed to perform and deliver!  
The Kjeldgaard Report’s survey was a chance to ask a number of critical questions. For to what 
degree was it feasible or even desirable to coordinate the heterogenic field of Danish “cancer 
research”? Did it make sense to place a good deal of the research groups under the same roof in 
a centre, or would certain parts of the cancer research field not collaborate with each other as 
their work was so far apart that it would not at all make sense to collaborate? The term “cancer 
research” referred to a myriad of different research activities of which far from all would benefit 
from being placed beside each other (e.g. cancer virology projects and projects into the relation 
between diet and cancers).  
                                                 
360 Ibid. 
361 In his book “The Dread Disease” (1987), James T. Patterson describes the growing public resentment towards 
the American Cancer Program and the “Cancer Establishment” (The NCI, the ACS, and the large comprehensive 
cancer centres) that received a tremendous level of funding but did not deliver what the public perceived as 
sufficient breakthroughs in the war on cancer in the 1970s and 1980s. In other words, the program did not deliver 
the increasing returns og positive feedback needed to legitimize continuing the program in the same manner (by 
building centres) – going further down the same path so to speak. Also cancer authorities such as Michael Shimkin, 
who was otherwise supportive of research, were unsatisfied with the way the program was designed and executed. 
Objecting in particular to the “profusion of centres, comprehensive, specialized, and what-have-you”, he would 
rather that the program had made long term investments in “smaller laboratories and leave them alone to reach for 
the brass ring”.(Patterson, J. T. (1987). The Dread Disease: Cancer and Modern American Culture. Cambridge, 
Harvard University Press, p. 268). For obvious reasons, the Danish NSRC subcommittee could not have been aware 
of this work in 1979-1981 when they prepared the Kjeldgaard Report, but the criticism voiced here was also heard 
in the late 1970s , and the subcommittee was either unaware of this 1970s debate on the efficiency of the American 
cancer centres, or perhaps the committee members ignored it before the publication of the Kjeldgaard Report and 
during the subsequent preparations for the Rockefeller-centre, the idea for which derived from the Kjeldgaard 
Report and which will be discussed in chapter 4.  
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But this was not dealt with in the Report, whether it was due to a deliberate omission or to blind 
belief in the success of the American cancer centres based on the scarce material that was at the 
authors’ disposal. At least the NSRC subcommittee could not have found unambiguous proof of 
the universal positive effects of the comprehensive cancer centre in the NCI fact-book of 1979, 
which seems to be the only published material on the matter which was available for the 
subcommittee at the time. But the critical questions were not asked in the Report, and this point 
was noticed when the Kjeldgaard Report was finally published in 1982.  
3.7 Reactions to the Kjeldgaard Report 
Following the date of publication, Kjeldgaard and the chairman of the Danish Cancer Society 
promoted the Report’s findings and recommendation in newspapers and journals362. They 
argued that the politicians were obliged to support cancer research from a socio-economic point 
of view. They claimed that cancer was the cause of up to 25 % of all deaths in the country, and 
that the combined number of Danish cancer patients were hospitalised a total of 850,000 days 
per year and that the cost of treating these patients amounted to DKK 1.500 million/year363. In 
comparison, the State364 allegedly spent only about DKK 30 million/year on cancer research that 
could potentially deliver the cure against the dreaded disease (e.g. the promising discovery of 
oncogenes). The man who lent his name to the Report – Kjeldgaard – thus argued that it could 
not be difficult to see that in this case it paid the most to research. It was a science-push-man 
now using the benefits of applicable/strategic research as selling points.  
Economic arguments of this calibre usually appealed more to politicians than did statements 
about the virtue of science for the sake of science itself, as they played into the institutional 
matrix and political agenda of trying to decrease the ever rising operating costs of treatment at 
the hospitals. As mentioned above, many politicians would jump at the chance to express their 
sympathy and support for a research-based war on cancer, although they could not allocate 
“new” discretionary funds for the cause and would probably have to resort to redistributing the 
already scarce existing means at the cost of other research areas, as the two chairmen of the 
                                                 
362 See, Kjeldgaard, N. O. (1982) "Hvad skal der ske med kræftforskningen i Danmark?" Jyllands-Posten 
02.03.1982, Kjeldgaard, N. O. (1982). "Kræftforskning er for spredt og bør styrkes i offentligt regi." Forskningen 
og Samfundet 8(2): 6-7, Kjeldgaard, N. O. (1982) "Er det kun de gamle der får kræft?" Jyllands Posten København 
16.03.1982,Olsen, S. (1982). "Dansk kræftforskning: Monopol eller samarbejde?" Forskningen og Samfundet 8(3), 
Olsen, S. (1982) "Er indsatsen i kræftforskningen tilstrækkelig?" Politiken København 15.02.1982, Olsen, S. 
(1982). Kommentar. Private papers of Jes Forchhammer..  
363 Kjeldgaard, N. O. (1982) "Hvad skal der ske med kræftforskningen i Danmark?" Jyllands-Posten 02.03.1982, p. 
9, Forskningsråd, U. f. b. c. n. a. S. n. (1981). Cancerforskning i Danmark, SNF., p. 97-98. 
364 Throughout the material of this thesis, cancer researchers refer to the “State” in newspapers and meeting minutes 
without always specifying which ministry, research organ, or agency they are talking about.  
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NSRC and the MRC had feared. And as is also mentioned above, the chairmen agreed that the 
Report’s recommendations were commendable, but feared that the authors of the Report did not 
have realistic expectations of the State’s involvement in the financial support of cancer research, 
and this was supported by a cancer researcher who has since claimed that he did not at the time 
believe that the Report operated within the confinements of the “art of the feasible”365.  
This probably referred to the new formal institutions needed to carry through the 
recommendations: extensive changes in the way Danish ministries conducted research policy 
and initiated strategic research programs. It has only been possible to find a few reactions to the 
Report from people outside the cancer community, and most of this criticism tended to be 
diffuse worries not specifically aimed at the findings of the Report366. However, a statistician 
from the Department for Mathematical Statistics at Copenhagen University, Inge Henningsen, 
aimed her criticism directly at the Report’s findings and recommendations. Although her 
criticism was published in a minor left wing journal that was not necessarily read by the authors 
of the Report, her concerns were important as she called attention to the fact that the statistical 
data in the Kjeldgaard Report did not support its recommendations!367 In particular, Henningsen 
wondered why the Report argued that cancer research at the Danish universities would be 
improved by the establishment of comprehensive cancer centres dedicated entirely to the study 
and treatment of cancer, when the Report otherwise clearly stated that the best research with the 
most international impact was in fact done at the universities and not at the entirely cancer-
focused research centres of the private Danish Cancer Society (see figure 3-2).368 In other 
words, there was no statistical basis in the cancer survey for the recommendation of the 
comprehensive cancer centre: 
                                                 
365 Interview with Jørgen Rygaard 22.02.2005. 
Patrice Pinell’s work on the organisation of interwar French cancer services, describes how the French public 
authorities created a program for the establishment of a network of treatment centres and how the program was –at 
least on paper – fashioned as a harmonious adjustment between what must be done, what is financially and 
technically possible, and what is permitted by various constraints (Pinell (1991), p. 77). However, it did not take 
long before the harmony proved to be unobtainable in practice, and it seems that many Danish researchers feared 
that the Kjeldgaard Report did not balance such concerns either. 
366 In Kjeldgaard, N. O. (1982) "Er det kun de gamle der får kræft?" Jyllands Posten København 16.03.1982, p. 8, 
Kjeldgaard quotes two doctors for having doubted the socio-economic benefit of supporting cancer research, and in 
Lindboe, O. (1982). "Kræft-forskning under revision." Forskningen og Samfundet 8: 24, p. 24., the editor of State 
Research Secretariat’s journal uses the Report to undermine the Danish Cancer Society. However, none of this 
criticism was taken seriously by Kjeldgaard or Olsen, see: Kjeldgaard, N. O. (1982) "Er det kun de gamle der får 
kræft?" Jyllands Posten København 16.03.1982, p. 8, Kjeldgaard, N. O. (1982) "Hvad skal der ske med 
kræftforskningen i Danmark?" Jyllands-Posten 02.03.1982, p. 9. and Note from Steen Olsen  handed out to the 
members of the Scientific Council of the Danish Cancer Society, (1982), Personal Papers of Jes Forchhammer, 
(Bagsværd), p. 2. 
367 Henningsen, I. (1982). "Flere spørgsmål end svar." Naturkampen: 20-23, p. 23.  
368 Ibid. 
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As mentioned before, there is no documentation in the Report to support the fact that the 
proposed changes would benefit Danish cancer research. The suggestions must thus be 
based on the subcommittee’s subjective estimation of how cancer research ought to be 
organised, or, on the purely tactical consideration that it is all about adjusting to the taste 
of the authorities when you need money from them.369 
Indeed, the questionnaires sent out by the NSRC subcommittee had asked the cancer researchers 
to make their own suggestions as to how to improve Danish cancer research, and the final 
recommendations of the final Report seem to be more in accord with these suggestions than with 
the Report’s own statistical data. The cancer researchers did indeed propose the establishment of 
state-financed comprehensive cancer centres, but it has not been possible to find the grounds for 
them doing so. It is possible that some of them may have worked in – or were inspired by – 
American comprehensive cancer centres but no documents have supported this idea.  
In a Bourdieuan perspective, the cancer researchers were all entrepreneurs in the cancer field, 
and as such it is likely that they promoted the idea to better their standing (new facilities, 
funding, professional status and so forth) regardless of the lack of proof of concept. 
Furthermore, Henningsen’s criticism of the Report’s discrepancy between its recommendations 
and statistical material indicates an occurrence of path dependence. The apparently uncritical 
adoption of the American cancer program’s emphasis on comprehensive cancer centres goes 
against the Report’s findings. In a path dependence perspective, the Report thus goes against a 
more productive path with increasing returns. The Report had shown that research done at 
institutes not dedicated entirely to the study of cancer delivered cancer research with the most 
international impact, and on this basis it would not make sense to build specialised centres. 
However, the Report suggested that this be done, and it thus re-actualised the path created by 
Hartvig Frisch in the late 1940s whilst ignoring the alternatives, even though this path had never 
produced increasing returns in the form of a productive and public-private comprehensive 
cancer centre. There had been no increasing returns which classical economic theory otherwise 
claims to be necessary to continue down a chosen path. Something else (and informal) in the 
institutional matrix must have influenced the choice. The researchers’ subjective tastes and 
preferences seemed to have played a bigger role than statistics in the Kjeldgaard Report’s 
recommendations to the State. In this case, informal institutions such as the personal taste and 
preferences of the researchers themselves were used to re-actualise and perpetuate the formal 
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institutions from the 1940s in order to make the establishment of a state-financed comprehensive 
cancer centre possible.  
As for the Report’s recommendation to establish a State cancer research fund with a general 
staff of distinguished scientists, this organ was very similar to the American foundation that 
helped eliminate poliomyelitis in the US, although not all of the scientific problems connected 
with the disease were solved.370Henningsen characterised the recommended changes as an 
unmotivated Americanisation of the much smaller Danish research system. The Kjeldgaard 
Report had shown that only 15 % of the 114 active cancer researchers in Denmark displayed a 
high publication intensity, and that future Danish cancer research was to be based on this small 
group of 15-20 brilliant researchers. Henningsen wondered if this was enough for a broad 
national cancer program, although she assumed that each of these few researchers would get to 
lead their own groups consisting of less brilliant “craftsmen-scientists”371.  
The proposed system is a relatively slavish transfer of the American funding system. I do 
not know whether the American cancer research compared to its effort generates better 
results than the Danish? But even if it did, one could question whether or not this system 
could be easily transplanted to Denmark, where traditions are completely different and 
where it will be implemented at a completely different scale. The suggestions represent 
what one could call the Los Alamos syndrome: The research manager’s dream of being 
able to say to the local Oppenheimer: “Here are unlimited funds, get us the best staff 
members – and make us the nuclear bomb!” without considering that when you offer 
DKK 50,000 and ½ lab assistant, you will not even make one ten thousandth of a bomb 
before someone else will be all done with it. If Danish research is to do anything rational, 
it must not be a competition with the large nations in miniature format or at snail pace. 
When and if the Danish research milieu makes its mark, it will rather be because of its 
peculiarities; the way it is arranged in niches.372 
Henningsen makes some valid points. The recommendation of a state-financed and strategic 
cancer fund severely challenges the existing institutional matrix. As mentioned above, the 
establishment of the fund would require a restructuring of the use of ministerial ressources, a 
new cross-ministerial collaboration on the complex issue of research policy and the initiation of 
strategic programs, and the transfer of ministerial control over the use of strategic research funds 
to the administration of the cancer fund and a comprehensive centre. An administration that 
would be able to define the direction and content of the strategic program. If there were no 
compelling (statistical) evidence that such an arrangement would in fact yield better result than 
                                                 
370 For more on this see Cohen, S. s. (1971). "Cancer Research and the Scientific Community." Science 172: 1212-
1214, p. 1214. 
371 Henningsen, I. (1982). "Flere spørgsmål end svar." Naturkampen: 20-23, p. 22. 
 The report did not either reflect thoroughly on the concept of critical mass in a program or a cancer centre.  
372 Ibid., p. 23. 
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status quo in the cancer community, why would and should the State set up such a strategic 
program? And without this initiative and change of formal institutions, the proposed cancer 
centres and the rest of the Report’s recommendations would only come about – if at all – in an 
amputated version within the existing institutional matrix. The outlook was bleak for the vision 
presented in the Report’s recommendations.373  
3.8 The Danish Cancer Society and the Kjeldgaard Report 
Although the reactions to the Kjeldgaard Report from outside the cancer community were few in 
number – and nothing followed from the few actually expressed – the Report was discussed 
vividly in the private Danish Cancer Society which as a private charity depended on a good 
public image. The Society had not criticised the Kjeldgaard Report’s findings even though the 
Report had indicated that the research activity and quality of the organisation’s own research 
institutes had not been good. Of course, two members of the Society’s Head Board had been 
among the authors of the Report, and the Society’s chairman, Steen Olsen, thus only half-
heartedly defended his much criticised research institutes by noting that the main objective of 
both the public and the private sectors was to maximise the effort against cancer, and that it 
would be unprofitable to measure one against the other “as Hogarth’s hard-working and lazy 
apprentice”374.  
The researchers at the Society’s Fibiger Institute and the Aarhus Cancer Research Institute 
vividly claimed to have proof that the statistical data of the Report were faulty and unjust to 
them and therefore pressed the Scientific Council and the administration to discredit the Report, 
but the Society’s management never publicly criticised the Report375. The researchers, however, 
were given the opportunity to present their own data at one of the Society’s strategy meetings on 
March 5 1982. At this meeting, research director Jørgen Kieler and cancer researcher Kay 
Ulrich of the Fibiger Institute presented their own criticism of the Kjeldgaard Report’s figures 
and conclusions. In addition, they wanted to know who had initiated the Report and why376.  
                                                 
373 It has not been possible to find any response to Henningsen’s criticism from the authors of the Kjeldgaard 
Report. 
374 Note from Steen Olsen given to the Scientific Council of the Danish Cancer Society, (1982), Personal Papers of 
Jes Forchhammer, (Bagsværd), p. 3.  
375DVU (1982). Mødereferat fra det Videnskabelige Udvalg 03.03.1982. Bagsværd, Personal Papers of Jes 
Forchhammer., p. 2.  
376 Kieler & Ulrich (1982): Svar på den kritik der er rejst af KB’s eksperimentelle institutter i den af SNF udgivne 
rapport om cancer forskning samt i Professor Kjeldgaards oplæg til stretegimødet den 5/3-1982., Archives of the 
Danish Cancer Society, (Copenhagen). 
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This request seems to indicate that the two cancer researchers were under the impression that the 
cancer survey was done with an ulterior motive besides that of improving Danish cancer 
research in general. They argued that the real objective was to discredit the research institutes of 
the Danish Cancer Society. Also, they wanted to know what had been the political intent behind 
the establishment of the NSRC subcommitte, and suggested that it might have been “to help 
financially distressed university laboratories by moving money from the institutes of the Cancer 
Society to the universities”.377 Kieler also pointed to the fact that the Fibiger Institute had been 
moved so many times that the research and publication rate of its staff had suffered. It was thus 
unfair to compare this nomadic unit to the universities. Nevertheless, the Danish Cancer Society 
brushed off the critique by agreeing with the conclusions of the Kjeldgaard Report, and it never 
publicly criticised the Report’s findings.  
It seems that Kieler’s and Ulrich’s criticism was met with a deafening silence, and that this 
might have been the private Society’s way of “setting them straight” with the help of a report 
from the State’s research council. Kjeldgaard himself was appointed member of the Society’s 
Executive Committee in 1981, and even though this was one year prior to the publication of the 
Report, the Society was already aware of its findings, as it had several representatives on the 
NSRC subcommittee378. Kjeldgaard’s new capacity allowed him to draw on his experience from 
the cancer survey and make suggestions for changes in the management and organisation of the 
private society’s activities. He had not been able to do so as chairman of the NSRC 
subcommittee – which only had a mandate to recommend changes in the public sector – 
although the statistical material of the survey had clearly called for changes in the private cancer 
charity as well.  
According to Kjeldgaard, his entry into the Danish Cancer Society was not coincidental379. 
Although he was the front figure of the Kjeldgaard Report, he had not been alone in taking the 
initiative for the survey. He had often discussed the matter of cancer research with his fellow 
NSRC members, and in particular his old friend and renowned biochemist university professor 
Hans Klenow and university professor in biophysics Ove Sten-Knudsen who both wanted to 
restructure the research field and were somewhat critical of some of the research done at the 
Society’s institutes. University professor Hans Klenow had worked at the Fibiger Institute in the 
1960s, and the university biophysicist Sten-Knudsen had previously been a member of the 
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Society’s Executive Committee and in this capacity he had then been chairman of a board 
discussing the research strategies of the Fibiger Institute, its relation to the Executive 
Committee, its relationship to the universities, and its leadership, and he had experienced some 
problems getting his points across to Kieler380.  
Kjeldgaard and Sten-Knudsen therefore knew the private Society quite well, and Kjeldgaard has 
since argued that the Report partly came into existence in the hope of evaluating the research 
effort of the well-greased, but perhaps a bit old-fashioned private organisation381. According to 
Kjeldgaard, he and Sten-Knudsen felt that Danish cancer research was dominated by 
“physicians who did not collaborate well”, and that this was the reason why it had been so 
difficult to coordinate the research area382. In his recollections, Professor Klenow indicates that 
there were internal power struggles at the Fibiger Institute in the 1960s, where he conducted 
cancer experiments with 2´- deoxyadenosine to study DNA synthesis in tumour cells. In 1963, 
Klenow was offered a chair in biochemistry at the Medical Faculty of the University of 
Copenhagen, and his considerations before taking the position paints a picture of the Danish 
Cancer Society: 
Our working conditions were in many ways excellent and we had a minimum of 
administrative obligations. Also the financing of our work was no big problem. In 
addition, I could hardly see myself as one of these wise and influential professors with 
heavy responsibilities. On the other hand, there were within the Danish Cancer Society 
diverging viewpoints with regard to which direction cancer research ought to follow. I had 
found that it had been a problem that the direction I had chosen was not among the 
popular ones and that it probably would not be so in the future either. After many 
considerations and with reluctance I finally applied for the position.383 
According to Jørgen Kieler, Klenow’s research rightly belonged within the realms of academia 
and not at the private and entirely cancer-focused Fibiger Institute, as Klenow’s work on DNA 
synthesis was not adequately focused on the cancer problem alone384. But as mentioned above, 
the introduction of the recombinant DNA technology and the discovery of oncogenes allowed 
the basic biological disciplines to find their way into clinically orientated cancer organisations 
worldwide – and even into the Fibiger Institute – in order to complement and support its 
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research program in which tumour immunology and the elucidation of the malignant phenotype 
of the cancer cell were central themes.  
However, in the opinion of the traditional physician Kieler, the import of young molecular 
biologists from the university, such as Jes Forchhammer, resulted in new but not necessarily 
welcome ideas on science management and the conduct of cancer research. The academic 
discipline and the professional logic of its practitioners brought with them an air of the 1968 
student revolution that had introduced democracy into the concept of scientific leadership and 
undermined the traditional professorial power at the universities385. According to Kieler, the 
Fibiger Institute was “not confronted with the revolution of 1968, but we were confronted with 
its results to which we objected to various degrees, mainly depending on age and position, 
political orientations and possible also wisdom.386” The introduction of molecular biology thus 
represented a multifaceted cultural clash at the Fibiger Institute, which was about political, 
organisational, but also professional differences. Forchhammer was the first in Denmark to 
apply molecular concepts and methods to the study of mouse cells transformed by oncogenic 
viruses, and according to Kieler this new program was popular: 
This was a new program that attracted a number of young scientists from the university. 
With one exception they were trained in basic research and not in medicine, and none of 
them had any clinical experience. Thus, the engagement in the ultimate goal of cancer 
research – the prevention and cure of malignant neoplasia – remained a very theoretical 
issue which was completely overshadowed by the prospects of the personal career. They 
were intelligent, competitive, and very independent. They differed from the medical 
fellows not only by their background, their most valuable knowledge of basic research, 
and their laboratory training, but also by the fact that they were going to stay in 
experimental research for the rest of their lives, while most of the young medical fellows 
were looking forward to returning to the patients. For the senior staff whose members all 
had a hospital background the daily discipline, including working hours and collaborations 
was almost a reflex. Now it became a problem that gave rise to discussions in the 
laboratory and in the board of directors [a board mediating contact between the Executive 
Committee and the scientific research units of the Danish Cancer Society]. It was obvious 
that the chairman professor Sten-Knudsen and the director of the Fibiger laboratory, 
[Kieler], differed on this point as on most others.387 
In this quotation, Kieler gives his personal experience of how personnel with different 
educational background act differently and reflect different types of logic. The medical doctor 
Kieler did not jump onboard the molecular biology bandwagon as it entered cancer research, 
which was an activity that had traditionally been dominated by physicians and not by basic 
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researchers. He had always promoted a mix of basic and clinically oriented cancer research and 
did not think that the basic biological disciplines were the most important. Others, such as 
biophysicist Sten-Knudsen and Kjeldgaard, felt differently and regarded the basic discipline as 
an important and progressive element of modern cancer research388. Therefore, they felt that the 
stagnation at the physician dominated Fibiger Institute and the lack of coordination in the cancer 
community had kept Danish cancer research from fulfilling its true potential, and that 
particularly the prominent chief of the private Fibiger Institute, Dr Jørgen Kieler, embodied the 
problem, as Kjeldgaard concluded in retrospect: 
Sten-Knudsen was very critical of Kieler. That is, at the time we felt that perhaps Kieler 
dominated cancer research too much, and things like that, and in reality we discussed that 
there really was not much going on in cancer research. Therefore, Ove Sten-Knudsen and 
I suggested that we should try to make a report about cancer research. And then we got the 
others onboard.389 
Kjeldgaard and Sten-Knudsen identified what they believed to be a problem in Danish basic 
cancer research, and they wanted to find out if they were right and if anything could and should 
be done about it through a survey of the country’s cancer research. As mentioned above, Kieler 
and the Society’s Executive Committee (then represented by Sten-Knudsen on the joint 
Executive Committee/Scientific Council/Fibiger Institute-board) had previously had troubles 
seeing eye-to-eye on central issues such as the management style and research policy of the 
Fibiger Institute, and it is thus not surprising that the Danish Cancer Society used the Kjeldgaard 
Report – which was written by the NSRC and the MRC (and not just people affiliated or 
previously affiliated with the Society) – to implement a (budget) reform that would help 
centralise power in the Society. However, this attempt to reduce the influence of the 
traditionally minded physicians such as Kieler, was naturally not the official reason why the 
Kjeldgaard Report came into existence, but Kieler and Ulrich were right to question the report’s 
motivation, and they disagreed with its focus on basic research and definition of cancer research 
as a scientific strive to solve the riddle of the mechanisms of carcinogenesis on a par with the 
study of the clinical aspects of the disease.   
Kjeldgaard’s previous entry on the Executive Committee of the Danish Cancer Society must 
have been ominous for the two. In a Bourdieuan perspective, the private cancer charity was 
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experiencing internal feuds due to the professional logics of its entrepreneurs: the managers of 
the Society’s research units and the “newcomers” in the Society’s central administration.  
On the one hand, there was the clinically trained cancer researchers – like Kieler – who 
managed his research unit, shaped its research program’s content, and administered the financial 
frame due to his professional logic and habitus. A logic strongly shaped by his medical training 
and place in the medical community that made him inclined to adopt its values and hierarchical 
managerial style: the virtue of clinical experience and the power of seniority. This was reflected 
in his managerial style in which he decided which research endeavours to support. On the other 
hand was the influx in the central management of persons such as Kjeldgaard, a molecular 
biologist with strong basic science logic and a different take on science policy. In contrast to 
Kieler, he had no clinical background and believed that the new biological sciences would 
contribute to the war on cancer on a par with the previously dominant clinical approach. Also, 
he did not come from or subscribe to the hierarchical seniority system of the medical world. He 
was a basic scientist from a university used to having his work and grant-applications subjected 
to a system of peer-review as a means of quality control, and the reforms he was about to carry 
through were expressions of such a system.  
Kieler and Kjeldgaard held different types of capital as well. Kjeldgaard, being internationally 
renowned for his pioneering work within the field of molecular biology and nationally renowned 
for establishing the country’s first department for molecular biology390 and initiating the 
Kjeldgaard Report, may have had the advantage of having the most visible accomplishments 
and the timing of the molecular bandwagon of cancer research (as mentioned in chapter 2). That 
is, to the broader scientific and medical community he must have represented a new and 
promising approach to cancer research while Kieler had not jumped onboard this bandwagon or 
delivered equally promising approaches lately. Because of his strong scientific standing and 
reputation, his national and international political engagement to strengthen molecular biology 
and cancer research with new state-supported initiatives, Kjeldgaard held the most symbolic 
capital within the Society. However, within the broader medical community, this may not have 
been the case, as Kieler was a trained physician – one of their own – and in an even broader 
societal context he may have had more social capital due to the fact that he had been part of the 
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active resistance during the German occupation391. However, the clash between Kieler’s and 
Kjeldgaard’s respective approaches to the war on cancer was reinforced; as yet another type of 
professional logic entered the Society’s management. 
For Kjeldgaard was not the only new face in the Society’s management. Dr. Mogens 
Andreassen’s eight-year-long term as chairman expired in 1981, and he was replaced by 
Aarhus-professor and physician Steen Olsen392. The very same year, the Society’s director 
tragicly died, and Mr. Ole Bang took his place when he was appointed by a newly established 
Executive Committee led by Steen Olsen. While Kieler described the former direction as well-
liked administrators who never meddled with scientific matters, he did not have the same praise 
for the provincial newcomers who had replaced them so abruptly: 
We knew that the loss of this representative of old culture, warm humanism, and the best 
traditions of the civil service was irretrievable. After Mogens Andreassen followed the 
Triumvirate. It was also the era of the Province that put an end to the domination of the 
Capital. A well known pathologist from Aarhus, Professor Steen Olsen, who had left the 
Executive Committee of the Cancer Society in 1978 in protest against the policy of the 
society at that time, now became the president of the Cancer Society. His closest 
collaborator and advisor in the Executive Committee was Professor Niels Ole Kjeldgaard, 
a molecular biologist, also from Aarhus. Professor Kjeldgaard was only known to us as 
chairman of a committee which had recently published a report on basic cancer research in 
Denmark, a field in which he as a plant physiologist had not previously engaged himself. 
The third member of the Triumvirate was a banker from Odense, Mr. Ole Bang, who was 
appointed Mygind’s successor.393 
On the basis of their support of the Kjeldgaard Report, it would seem that both the physician 
Olsen and Kjeldgaard believed that basic natural science was in fact useful to cancer research 
and might eventually provide the “magic bullet” against the disease. They also shared the same 
views on research organisation and evaluation, and this was reflected in the Cancer Society’s 
future policy, as will be elaborated on in the following chapters. In the above, it is clear that 
Kieler did not agree with this policy and even tried to undermine the scientific authority and 
capital of the new executives by referring to them respectively as a renegade and a plant 
physiologist with no experience in cancer research. It is true that Kjeldgaard had not worked in 
cancer research for very long, but he had never been a plant physiologist. Kieler’s comment 
refers to the fact that Kjeldgaard’s department for molecular biology was fused with the local 
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department for plant physiology in 1976394, and the comment can be seen as an example of 
power play in which Kieler tried to obscure the role of basic scientists like Kjeldgaard in the 
traditionally physician dominated field of cancer research (undermining Kjeldgaard’s scientific 
and symbolic capital) and as Kieler’s attempt to defend the mode of hierarchical science 
management which he had been used to and through which the directors of the Society’s 
research units got to shape the content of the research programs. A model, the Kjeldgaard 
Report and the new executives were now changing.  
The incompatibilities between the views and professional logics of Kieler and those of the new 
management led to a long-lasting dichotomy. Olsen and Kjeldgaard were university professors 
and their views reflected a basic scientific logic, but as members of the Society’s management 
they also had to adopt the goals and values of the private cancer charity as an independent 
private corporation that no longer merely functioned as an appendix to the medical world.  The 
Society now followed its goal to fight cancer by using marketing strategies and making 
investments in order to protect its capital and secure the organisation’s continued existence. The 
man who effectively helped implement this business-orientated professional logic was the 
Society’s new director. 
3.9 Modernising charity 
The new director, Ole Bang, came from an entirely different culture than the researchers. He had 
been a successful banker and head of office in a series of charity organisations such as The 
Danish Red Cross and The Danish Refugee Council.  He was the epiphany of an administrative 
culture, and in the words of Dr Bent Harvald who was to become Bang’s colleague in the 
Cancer Society: 
Ole Bang had a colossal economic instinct. He was what we physicians call a “DJØF” – 
no – he was the super DJØF! As a consultant at several hospitals, I had been involved in a 
lot of administrative work, but I had never met anyone like him.395
In Danish, the abbreviation “DJØF” designates membership of the association of Danish 
lawyers and economists and usually designates an administrator working within the public 
sector. However, the abbreviation is also used derogatorily about administrators in the public 
sector – especially in strictly specialist milieus such as the public health sector396. The physician 
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Harvald thus seems to have used the term in a blurry and not so nuanced manner, showing that 
he did not take Bang’s experience from the private business world into account. Bang was thus 
not the classical DJØF-type, because these usually did not have any experience from the private 
sectors.  Bang, however,  represented a private corporate professionalism and a business logic, 
and to Harvald, any non-physician working in an administrative position must have been a 
DJØF. In that respect, he may have shared this view with most medical specialists. It was thus a 
man from the private corporate sector with progressive administrative and fundraising ideas who 
entered the scene and was given the job to serve an “old-fashioned, but at the same time well-
operated organisation”397.  
He assigned a high priority to a rational pursuit of the organisation’s goals and securing funds 
for its continued existence, and he introduced new fundraising methods to do so. All this reflects 
aspects of what can be termed business logic. With the introduction of Bang, Olsen and 
Kjeldgaard, changes were thus bound to be made in the private charity and its research units, 
and perhaps Bang heralded a new era for cancer physicians at the hospitals as well, as the 
biomedical field in both the private and public sectors would be subjected to a new business-
inspired management philosophy throughout the 1980s398. As mentioned above, this was already 
heralded in the 1970s with the county takeover of hospitals as economically motivated political 
prioritising in the funding of hospitals replaced the economic boom’s carte blanche for the 
medical staff.  
Recent literature argues that the described process or “DJØF’ication” of the health sector was 
more likely a culturally dictated perception rather than an actual phenomenon supported by 
statistics399. It is not within the scope of this thesis to describe the influx of new types of 
leadership/management in the public sector. However, as I will argue in the following chapter, 
Bang was to become the front figure of the Society and his fundraising skills were about to 
change the influence of the organisation, but he was hired by his management and did his job by 
implementing its policy – not his own. A policy made by e.g. Kjeldgaard and Olsen, and which 
clashed with the clinical-medically orientated logic of the most traditionally minded physicians 
in the cancer community.   
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One of the first political changes to be made was a budget reform inspired by the Kjeldgaard 
Report’s findings, namely that the most cited publications sprang from research that was 
primarily financed through project-oriented grants. These research projects had been through a 
peer review process (e.g. in the public research councils or the Scientific Council of the Cancer 
Society), and the Report concluded that because sufficient funds were not available to satisfy all 
applicants, the different research councils had to prioritise according to the quality and cancer 
relevance of the projects. In this way, only the best possible research projects would receive 
financial backing. At the Danish Cancer Society, however, the process was a bit different. The 
directors of the charity’s three research units had traditionally received core grants to cover 
expenses for housing, maintenance, equipment, salaries and their research programs. Thus, the 
unit directors were given financial leverage to assess which research projects to support or 
terminate. The new budget reform tried to implement the findings of the Kjeldgaard Report by 
making the charity’s own researchers apply for funds through the Society’s Scientific Council in 
direct competition with the publicly employed researchers who could apply on the same 
terms400. All in direct accord with the basic science logic of Kjeldgaard. 
On a practical level, the reform deprived the unit directors of their mandate to design the 
research program of their own institutes. Some of this power had now been assigned to the 
Scientific Council of the Society and to the State’s research councils. Naturally, this evoked a lot 
of anxiety and anger amongst the Society’s researchers as they were no longer guaranteed funds 
for their research. In addition, an International Scientific Advisory Committee (ISAC) was 
established to make continuous evaluations of the scientific work at the Fibiger Institute and the 
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Cancer Research Institute in Aarhus, to comment on their research plans, and to advise the 
Society’s management with regard to budgeting and science policy. This committee consisted of 
a number of international cancer researchers who would visit the two institutes once a year, 
assess the publications of the institutes, and subsequently write an annual report with their 
findings and suggestions for improvement401. Many of the Society’s researchers and members of 
the Scientific Council argued that the ISAC was yet another way to restrict the mandate of the 
research units’ directors402. In this way, it appears as if the Kjeldgaard Report was used to justify 
the implementation of a new power balance and structure within the Danish Cancer Society, so 
that the cancer charity could support the war on cancer in the way the new management believed 
to be most efficient403.   
In a Bourdieuan perspective, the private cancer charity experienced internal feuds due to the 
clashing professional logics of its entrepreneurs. As mentioned above, it was a clash between 
medical logic, basic science logic and the new business inspired logic of Ole Bang. They 
clashed on important issues such as management and content of research programs at the 
Society’s units and on what constituted efficient operation of the cancer charity in general. 
While Kjeldgaard seemed to possess more symbolic capital than Kieler in the cancer community 
because of his scientific and political achievements, Bang was a non-scientist from an 
administrative culture with little or no recognition in the broader and physician dominated 
cancer community. He nevertheless was awarded great influence and standing as director of the 
Cancer Society, as the executive committee (consisting of both physicians and basic scientists 
taking on an administrative role) acknowledged his potential value for the Society and the war 
on cancer inasmuch as his skills and business logic could modernise the old-fashioned charity to 
yield better results and gain more political influence.  
But Bang’s logic and the business inspired changes he brought with him did not resonate well 
with some of the Society’s physicians who regarded the DJØF’ification process with anxiety. 
The Society’s internal feuds on these matters indicated that it would probably not be easy to 
unite the rest of the cancer field’s entrepreneurs in a joint cancer centre, seeing that the field was 
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marked by so many different views on the centre’s content, management and placing at large. 
Power struggles were bound to happen. 
3.10 A centre takes form 
The new management of the Danish Cancer Society did not find it appropriate for a private 
cancer charity to have and finance its own research institutes. When funds were being tied up in 
bricks and mortar buildings, the Society could not easily pursue its ambition to strengthen 
Danish cancer research by always using the money entrusted to the Society in the best possible 
manner. The Society wanted to support new initiatives which the public research councils were 
not able or likely to support404. If these initiatives proved to be scientifically tenable and fruitful, 
the Society would press to make the public authorities take over the projects. In this way, it was 
and would continue to be one of the Society’s finest tasks to insist that the State should live up 
to what – the Society claimed – was its responsibility to support the war on cancer, by 
constantly pointing to deficiencies and solutions405.  
However, this could only be done if the Society did not permanently take on tasks that morally 
belonged under the aegis of the State. The operation of several cancer research institutes was 
just that. According to the new director, Ole Bang, the main strategy of the Danish Cancer 
Society was to set new research initiatives in action with very little funds to do, so e.g. the 
establishment of the Cancer Registry, and if the initiatives proved viable the Society would aim 
at having the public authorities resume responsibility for the initiatives’ continued existence.406 
The Danish Cancer Society wanted to hand over their research institutes to the State in order to 
secure a flexible funding system – the spearhead ambition. Although the Kjeldgaard Report had 
not had the mandate to tell the private cancer charity what to do, it had hinted at this solution.It 
was a break with the strategy that during the scientific expansion in 1950-1970 had prompted 
the Society to push for a private realisation of the cancer centre dream in the hope that operating 
research units would be good PR. Now, the Danish Cancer Society did not want to hand over 
the important research institutes unless the State could guarantee that the researchers would be 
given the same or even better working conditions. This was a promise which the State could not 
easily make in times of recession, but the Kjeldgaard Report’s recommendation of speedy 
coordination of cancer research through the establishment of comprehensive cancer centres gave 
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the Society hope that the time was ripe for the transfer – now that the NSRC subcommittee was 
trying to expand the institutional matrix sufficiently and revive the idea of a comprehensive 
cancer centre – as Chairman Steen Olsen argues in the following:  
The idea of coordinating the cancer research laboratories (public as well as private) in the 
different geographical regions and in close proximity to the clinical oncology departments 
is eminently important. It is first and foremost necessary, and can most easily be 
established in Copenhagen, and efforts are being made to put the idea into practice. 
Further negotiations about this await only the final decision as to where the clinical 
oncology departments will be placed. The Society and its established research institutes 
participate positively in these efforts. It must be stressed that we do not have the remotest 
intention of shutting down these institutes. They have made themselves a (national and 
international) reputation through extensive and renowned work, and it is understandable 
that the Danish Cancer Society wishes to preserve their identities. At the same time, it is 
preferable for the State to take on part of the expenses, and in the long run become fully 
responsible for the operation of the institutes. Thereby, the Danish Cancer Society will 
release a lot of funds which can be channelled to projects in need of support through our 
Scientific Council – be that in public or our own laboratories. Regardless of the financial 
conditions, the Danish Cancer Society will work to create coordinating frames for the 
cancer research activities that are being pursued in Copenhagen.407 
The coordinating endeavours which Olsen referred to were inspired by the Kjeldgaard Report. 
Since 1980, Rigshospitalet had had plans of moving the Finsen Institute (and thereby the Finsen 
Laboratory) to the site of Rigshospitalet as a result of new legislation pressing for a public 
takeover of the Finsen Hospital, just as Jørgen Kieler from the Fibiger Institute had predicted408. 
Rigshospitalet had therefore planned to move the research groups at the antiquated Finsen 
Institute into the modern buildings on Blegdamsvej where Rigshospitalet resided (see appendix 
E). Then, the University of Copenhagen and the Danish Cancer Society expressed an interest in 
coordinating all the cancer research in Copenhagen, and the hospital’s expansion plans were 
thus changed to include a comprehensive cancer research centre as well409. Such a centre would 
unite the cancer research groups at Rigshospitalet, the Finsen Laboratory, the University, the 
Cancer Registry, and the Fibiger Institute.  The latter was particularly interesting to the State, as 
it had specialised in laboratory-based oncology research and was thus ideal for placing in close 
                                                 
407 Note from the chairman Steen Olsen to the Scientific Council of the Danish Cancer Society (1982), Personal 
Papers of Jes Forchhammer, (Bagsværd), p. 3-4.  
408 Koordinationsgruppen (1982). Redegørelse om Rigshospitalets rammer. København, Rigshospitalet: 59., p. 22.  
Review from the Ministry of the Interior: ”Redegørelse til folketinget om Rigshospitalets fysiske rammer”,  
16.02.1984. , Personal papers of Ole Bang, (Copenhagen). p. 1.  
409DVU (1982). Mødereferat fra Det Videnskabelige Udvalg 23.09.1982. Bagsværd, Personal Papers of Jes 
Forchhammer. p. 4.  
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connection with Rigshospitalet’s planned oncology centre that was to include the Finsen 
Laboratory410: a bench-to-bedside type of centre.  
Put in short, the plans included coordination on several levels which was in accordance with the 
recommendation of the Kjeldgaard Report and (coincidentally) the US criteria for 
comprehensive cancer centres: 
1) A coordination of medical specialities and basic science disciplines. A difficult task 
considering the fact that the proponents of these often held different and incompatible 
views on the approach to cancer research, science management and of each other. 
2) A coordination of differently managed private and public organisations. The integration 
of the private Society’s research units in the centre was one thing, but the fusion of 
public university and hospital departments with each their different (hierarchical) 
structures and managerial modes was no less problematic. Which mode should be 
employed in the centre? 
3) A physical coordination. The centre was supposed to be a physical entity bringing the 
different parties under the same roof. The centre was not only about disciplinary 
coordination and collaboration; it was about physical coordination/proximity. And a 
common ground had to be found on this issue as well, literally.  
The centre plan was only an addition to a forthcoming fusion of the small Finsen Hospital with 
the large Rigshospitalet. As an addition in times of recession, the centre would have to be built 
without making the existing hospital plans more expensive. That is: the addition meant more 
initiatives for the cost of one! And why? The Minister of Education had already put the costly 
expansion plans of Rigshospitalet on hold because of the recession, and he wanted to analyse 
possible cost-efficient alternatives to the proposed plans which gave an opening for new 
suggestions such as the inclusion of a cancer centre provided that such coordination of 
Copenhagen cancer research could be carried out without additional funds for the already 
planned hospital move!411 In essence, such plans would have to be carried out within the 
existing institutional matrix and without additional funds compared to what the hospital fusion 
                                                 
410 “Annual report of the chairman of the Danish Cancer Society (1982).”, Personal papers of Ole Bang, 
(Copenhagen). p. 3. 
411 Letter from the Ministry of Education to the MRC,  March 3rd 1983, Personal papers of Ole Bang, 
(Copenhagen), p. 1-2.  
     Letter from the MRC to the Ministry of Education,  June 17th  1983, Personal papers of Ole Bang, 
(Copenhagen), p. 1.  
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was already getting; just as the foremen of the two research councils (the MRC and the NSRC) 
had anticipated and feared at the publication of the Kjeldgaard Report with its bold 
recommendation to change formal institutions.  
The proposed move of the Finsen Institute to a special wing of Rigshospitalet was considered to 
be an all too expensive solution, and the Ministry of Education therefore asked the hospital and 
the MRC to find alternative and cheaper models. The Finsen Institute could either stay put at its 
location on Strandboulevarden (the Finsen campus) and have its antiquated buildings 
modernised, or be moved into the Rockefeller complex on the campus of Rigshospitalet at 
Blegdamsvej (see appendix E).  The establishment of a comprehensive cancer centre would 
greatly depend on the fate of the Finsen Institute, and the two alternative locations were vividly 
discussed by Rigshospitalet, the National Board of Health, the MRC, the Medical Faculty of 
Copenhagen University, and the Danish Cancer Society412.  
Although it had been an old dream of Engelbreth-Holm to establish a cancer centre on the 
Finsen grounds back in the 1940s, the modernisation of the Finsen Institute on 
Strandboulevarden did not appeal to any of the involved parties. The buildings dated back to the 
turn of the century, and it was generally felt that even if they were expensively modernised and 
upgraded, the buildings were too worn-out and old-fashioned to be able to accommodate the 
needs of modern research and rational hospital management 10-15 years into the future413. There 
would inevitably be a need to rebuild the Finsen Institute at this point, and the solution could 
very well end up being much more expensive than rebuilding the Rockefeller complex on 
Blegdamsvej to fit the needs of the Finsen Institute and a comprehensive cancer centre. The first 
model would amount to approximately DKK 281 million in immediate construction costs, 
whereas the second model would amount to DKK 375 million414.  
However, as the first model would almost certainly result in further construction work a decade 
later, the second model was considered the best and cheapest solution by almost all involved 
parties. The 375 million DKK was to be spent on the establishment of 10,000 square meters of 
underground installation for radiation therapy under the Rockefeller complex, and the different 
interested research units would be placed above ground in the buildings on Blegdamsvej and 
                                                 
412 Except for the MRC, all of these institutes were interested in moving one or more of their research groups into 
the centre. 
413 Review from the Ministry of the Interior: ”Redegørelse til folketinget om Rigshospitalets fysiske rammer”,  
16.02.1984. , Personal papers of Ole Bang, (Copenhagen), p. 1.  
414 Ibid, p. 7.  
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Juliane Maries Vej which constituted the complex. The National Board of Health and the 
management of Rigshospitalet preferred the Rockefeller solution to the one on 
Strandboulevarden415. Although they did not have any formal say in the final decision as to 
where to put the Finsen Institute, managers and researchers from outside the realms of 
Rigshospitalet discussed the matter as well. As the discussions of a cancer centre evolved, more 
administrative representatives of the different institutes were involved as will be evident in 
chapter 4.  
The MRC took it upon itself to organise and coordinate further negotiations between the parties 
involved, and even if the restrictive financial policy of the new government had made most 
parties doubt that the plans would be put into practice in the near future, the parties’ proposal of 
a cancer centre had made its impact on the government. Or at least it made a minor dent. 
Although no additional funds were allocated for the purpose, the formal institutions set by the 
government did not directly oppose a cancer centre, provided that it was built for free. The 
following year, the Ministry of Education surprisingly invited all the interested organisations to 
join an MRC-established working group with the objective of continuing the discussions of 
coordinating cancer research in Copenhagen416. Given that the Minister of Education had not 
granted any extra allocations for the establishment of a cancer centre and had actually put the 
expansion plans of Rigshospitalet on hold because of the restrictive financial policy of the 
government, the Minister’s initiative in establishing a cancer centre might be interpreted as an 
empty political gesture – a strategic manoeuvre to please the crowd by presenting the seemingly 
popular cancer centre without any extra costs. But could this be done through rational planning?  
Had the notion of a cancer centre become an obvious tool to score points with the electorate? Or 
was the government just careful not to invest in projects that could be financed by others, 
because it was trying to bring down the national debts established in the 1970s.  
The government was out to trim the public sector through rational planning, and while no actual 
budget cuts were made for the hospitals, the lack of annual budget growth must have felt much 
like severe budget cuts and downsizing. The government quickly became synonymous with 
these concepts as it bade counties and municipalities to stop public growth and to take on new 
public responsibilities without additional money to do it for417. The freezing of hospital 
                                                 
415 Ibid.  
416 Ibid. 
417 Jacobsen, K. and K. Larsen (2007). Ve og Velfærd - Læger, sundhed og samfund gennem 200 år. København, 
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expenditures led to a remarkably low cost increase of 4.6% over ten years from 1980-90418. The 
public authorities were pressed to balance the economic strategy with an increasing number of 
hospital admissions, the public demand for better and more expensive treatment modalities etc. 
Making decisions about which diseases and patients to prioritise within the existing budgets was 
inevitable and unpopular with both the medical community and the Danes in general. The plan 
to place a cancer centre within the hospital for no additional money should be seen in this 
political framework, and the establishment of a working group of enthusiastic members 
believing in the cause despite the zero-sum game could be an expression of the cancer 
community’s efforts to make the “umbrella-like” concept of cancer research seem uniform and 
politically appealing. The unfortunate zero sum/no growth game was the only chance to do so. 
The working group consisted of members of the Danish Cancer Society, the University, 
Rigshospitalet, the Finsen Institute, and the MRC and the NSRC. The working group would 
elaborate the proposal for a cancer centre on the Rockefeller grounds, and they insisted that the 
oncology departments of the Finsen Institute (and not just the laboratory) be included in the 
centre.  
All except for the representatives of the Medical Faculty of the University were in favour of the 
idea of establishing a cancer centre at the Rockefeller complex419. The University 
representatives, on the other hand, feared that the establishment of a cancer centre at the 
Rockefeller complex and the adjacent buildings on Juliane Maries Vej would physically 
interrupt the research and education at the Medical Faculty, as the institutes in these buildings 
and at the faculty’s Panum Institute were deliberately and strategically placed in order to 
                                                 
418 Ibid. The exact costs are 1980: 30.2 billion DKK  1990: 31.3 billion DKK. 
419 The Carlsberg Biological Institute was also situated in the area in question, and as this institute had originally 
been built for cancer research, a member of the Danish Cancer Society’s Scientific Council – professor Martin 
Ottesen – suggested that cancer researchers might have “certain moral rights to this building”.  Still, the planning 
group of the different institutes preferred to move the Cancer Registry, the Fibiger Institute and the Finsen 
Laboratory to the Rockefeller complex, in order to execute the first step of the plan to establish an actual 
(comprehensive) cancer centre in connection with the clinical oncology departments. This proved to be a wise 
decision, as the management of the Carlsberg Foundation decided to close the Carlsberg Biological Institute in 
1982, and it was seen as yet another example of how time was running out for private research institutes revolving 
around a single charismatic researcher.  
See:  DVU (1982). Mødereferat fra Det Videnskabelige Udvalg 23.09.1982. Bagsværd, Personal Papers of Jes 
Forchhammer., p. 4. 
Kræftens Bekæmpelse: “Annual report of the chairman of the Danish Cancer Society (1983).”, Personal papers of 
Ole Bang. (Copenhagen). p. 3. 
Rasmussen, L. (1982). "Virksomheden på Carlsbergfondets Biologiske Institut i professor Erik Zeuthens 
forstandertid". Årsskrift for Carlsbergfondet 1982. Carlsbergfondet. København, Rhodos: 46-51, p. 51. 
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promote interdisciplinary research collaboration and optimise the medical training of students420. 
If the Fibiger Institute and the Finsen Laboratory were to be moved into the Rockefeller 
complex, other institutes would have to be moved out and this could disrupt the carefully 
planned organisation of the Medical Faculty.  
Nevertheless, the Faculty eventually complied when Rigshospitalet and the Ministry of the 
Interior finally decided to move the clinical units of the Finsen Institute to Blegdamsvej, and the 
location of a future comprehensive cancer centre was now in place: the Rockefeller complex421. 
In this way, the cancer centre would move closer to the American NCI-definition of 
“comprehensiveness” and to Engelbreth-Holm’s dream of a cancer centre with both treatment of 
cancer patients and basic, clinical, and epidemiological cancer research. Were the pieces of the 
puzzle finally falling into place? 
3.11 Perspectivating summary  
In 1981, a report on the state of Danish cancer research was issued by the State’s Natural 
Science Research Council (NSRC) with the bold objectives of changing the formal institutions 
for cancer research and of improving the conditions for the cancer field in general through a 
series of recommendations. University professors and NSRC members Niels Ole Kjeldgaard and 
Ove Sten-Knudsen wanted to reorganise and coordinate the field of basic cancer research in 
Denmark. Based on their own and their colleagues’ experiences with the research milieus at the 
private Cancer Society’s Fibiger Institute in particular, they argued that the field had stagnated 
and was dominated by traditionally minded physicians such as the head of the Fibiger Institute, 
Jørgen Kieler, who did not appreciate the influx into cancer research of university molecular 
biologists with no clinical experience. They represented a new basic science approach to cancer 
research and argued that the field had to be modernised – privately and publicly – to deliver 
future results. And although the state of the research done within the private Cancer Society was 
not the official reason for them doing so, the two persuaded other NSRC (and MRC) members 
to initiate a state-supported survey of Danish basic cancer research.  
The published results and recommendations became known as the Kjeldgaard Report. The 
Report’s bibliographical studies revealed that publications from the Society’s privately owned 
research units (such as the Fibiger Institute) were generally cited less often than the publications 
                                                 
420 Letter from Ove Nathan to the Ministry of Education, September 5th 1983. Personal papers of Ole Bang, 
(Copenhagen), p. 1-2.  
421 Note from Keld Danø, June 1st 1984. Private papers of Ole Bang, (Copenhagen), p. 3.  
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from the hospitals and universities. If this could be seen as a measure of the quality of the 
research done there, the private research units were in need of improvements. Seeing as the 
Report had also found that the most cited publications came from research groups supported 
through discretionary funds obtained in free competition, the Report indicated that the private 
Cancer Society would do well by making budget changes so that its institutes would no longer 
receive project funding through their core budgets, but through a peer reviewed process and in 
direct competition with each other and extramural researchers. The management of the Cancer 
Society agreed with the Report and readily used it to implement such a budget reform. This was 
a reform that, much like the Kjeldgaard Report had hinted towards, deprived the research 
directors of influence over the research profile of their units, as it was now up to the Society’s 
Scientific Council, the MRC, and/or the NSRC to award grants in aid to worthy projects from 
the private units, if they were deemed qualified.   
In essence, this meant that the Kjeldgaard Report became the occasion for a change in the 
scientific profile of e.g. the Fibiger Institute, and Kjeldgaard himself was appointed member of a 
new management of the Cancer Society that with the help of a new director from the private 
business sector would use business-inspired managerial style and reforms to modernise the 
private cancer charity. In the context of the private Cancer Society, the Report had the following 
consequences: 
Budget reforms: The Report led to budget reforms that would deprive the directors of the 
Society’s research units of their unchallenged influence on the units’ research profile and project 
support, as the reform introduced a peer-review system through which the intramural researchers 
had to compete for funds on a par with extra mural researchers so that only the best projects 
would prevail. This reform mirrored the basic-science logic of Kjeldgaard and clashed with the 
medical logic of e.g. the Fibiger Institute’s medically trained director, who subscribed to the 
hierarchical managerial style of the medical/hospital sector in which seniority meant that the 
director would traditionally have full control of finance and research profile. The reform thus 
embodied a clash between a new molecular biology approach to cancer research which was 
traditionally dominated by physicians with clinical experience with patient care, and those who 
did not rave at the sight of the molecular bandwagon that was internationally heralded to bring 
progress to the cancer field. Nevertheless, due to the stronger symbolic capital of Kjeldgaard 
(international scientific reputation for his work and his political engagement in and for national 
and international scientific agencies and councils), the Society favoured Kjeldgaard and his 
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views over Kieler’s through the budget reform. Also, the scientific logic of Kjeldgaard was in 
fine accord with the new director of the Society, a representative from the private business 
sector, Ole Bang, who also wanted to use the resources of the charity in the most rational 
manner, and the introduction of this business logic reinforced the effects of the Kjeldgaard 
report on the Society. 
Power struggles: The internal power-struggles on symbolic capital due to differences in 
professional logics in the wake of the Report made it clear that there was a clash between 
management and other parts of traditionally physician dominated cancer charity. It was not a 
homogenous unit with a clear cut and common vision and mission. It was no longer a unit of 
physicians subscriping to an orthodox acceptance (doxa) of unchallenged medical influence and 
power in the organisation. The introduction of newcomers with other types of professional 
backgrounds, logics and capital made it possible to contest the standing symbolic capital. 
Within a larger political context, the Report tried to change formal institutions for cancer 
research by suggesting that the State made cancer research a special priority – an area of 
strategic importance – by establishing a special strategic State cancer research fund (in addition 
to the Research Council’s support for cancer research projects) and that the State revived the 
idea of wide-ranging (or comprehensive) cancer centres in Denmark. These recommendations 
were an attempt to re-actualise the formal institutions and path created by Hartvig Frisch in 
1949, although the idea of the centre now took on a different form than in the time of Frisch and 
Engelbreth-Holm who had originally focused on a national cancer centre. The recommendation 
was now to establish a series of coordinated centres in connection with the country’s medical 
faculties, of which only the one in Copenhagen had been fully established in the 1940s, and it 
therefore did not make sense then to talk of more than one centre.  
But although the form was now geopolitically different, the content of the centre idea was still 
the same and as ambitious as ever: the coordination of medical specialties and basic science 
disciplines in order to bridge the gap between bench and bedside and deliver directly applicable 
breakthroughs in the war on cancer, which was otherwise fought by research groups scattered all 
over the country and which often had only little contact with each other. A rhetorics of unity in 
the cancer research field was established in the Report to attract more funding.  
The Report’s recommendations were bold. However, some parts of the biomedical community 
feared that the Report expected too much from the public authorities who could not easily 
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channel additional funds into cancer research without taking them away from other worthy 
research areas. Especially since the 1980s recession had brought the Danish government to 
enforce a strict financial policy with a zero-growth-principle for the public sector. The formal 
institutions did not favour what the Report recommended. And indeed, the Report did ask a lot 
of the State. Perhaps more than a lot in order to carry through the proposed initiatives: it was not 
just a plead to establish a fund and some cancer centres. It was a plead to change the way the 
government initiated strategic research programs. If the State was to establish a fund as 
described by the Report, where the research councils were in full control, the different ministries 
relevant to the cause would have to pool their respective funds and set aside internal competition 
and channel money, influence and power into the initiative. And as this was not common 
practice in the government’s different ministries (that did not then include a ministry of research 
or cross-ministerial research policy agencies), such change of formal institutions was not likely. 
It would at least be very difficult to carry through such a change of practice without compelling 
evidence for the benefits of the fund and the centres. And these unfortunately seemed to be 
missing in the Report.  
The Report was criticised by statistician Inge Henningsen for making its recommendations 
without presenting proof that they were in fact means to strengthen and coordinate Danish 
cancer research. In particular, the recommendation to establish comprehensive cancer centres 
seemed to be based more on the personal preferences of the cancer researchers that participated 
in the survey which the Report was based on, rather than on statistical data or international 
literature on the advantages and disadvantages of such organisations. That is, it created informal 
institutions for a centre in the form of the taste and preferences of an apparently united cancer 
field rather than in the form of actual statistical evidence. In fact the Report’s statistical material 
indicated that a centre dedicated entirely to cancer research would not be the tool to yield 
research with the most international impact compared with that of the state-operated universities 
and hospitals. Nevertheless, the recommendation resonated well in the Danish cancer 
community. And to some extent also within the government even though there was not a thread 
of evidence to support the cost-effectiveness and benefits of such a construction in the Report. 
In fact, there was evidence of the opposite, but the Report was never widely discredited. And 
why was that?  
1) It was the first state-initiated survey on cancer research. As such it was an important 
document for the cancer community (irrespective of clinical or basic science persuasion) 
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as it somehow lend a stamp of state approval to the umbrella-like concept of cancer 
research that was not an independent and recognised academic discipline at the 
universities, just like oncology was not a medical specialty at the hospital with the status 
such categories imply in the medical and scientific communities. It was a first step 
towards a more prestigious identity, coordination and better funding of the cancer field. 
And the Report’s questionnaires revealed that most cancer researchers pointed to 
comprehensive cancer centres as the tool to secure all three of these things, as they had 
seen in the American Cancer Program of 1971 (even though this program’s 
establishment of cancer centre networks was later discredited by many). So the personal 
beliefs triumphed over statistical evidence. 
2) The Danish Cancer Society used the Report as a pretext to carry through internal 
reforms, and therefore had no desire to discredit it.  
3) Although the State (the ministries) never did change the formal institutions in the form 
of a state cancer research fund or increased funding of cancer research in general, the 
idea of the comprehensive cancer centre had a footing in the cancer community as the 
tool to obtain progress in the war on cancer, and few politicians dared to oppose this 
agenda. Therefore, the idea of the cancer centre was not taken off the table in spite of the 
missing proof of concept. But the politicians promoted it under the existing institutional 
framework and for no extra funds – as part of an already planned fusion of two hospitals 
– so the political risk was minimal. In reality, however, the formal institutions were 
hardly accommodating towards the centre as it would require mastery of innovation to 
expand the existing (and already downsized) hospital plans with a cancer centre for no 
additional funds.  
In spite of a complete lack of evidence, the plan for a comprehensive cancer centre was pursued, 
as the Minister of Education, Bertel Haarder, saw fit to include such an initiative in existing 
hospital plans if it could be done for essentially for no extra costs. The Cancer Society, the 
MRC, Rigshospitalet and Copenhagen University made plans to establish a joint state-private 
centre at the Rockefeller Institute in Copenhagen, even though the task must have seemed 
difficult at best. 
Was there a rational basis for this development? The Report’s recommendations were not 
supported by its own statistical data, the Report never succeeded in changing the formal 
institutions needed to carry out the recommendations of a fund and a centre as envisioned by the 
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Report’s authors, there was a financial recession, and the government had no tradition of making 
cross-ministerial collaborations on the matter of strategic science policy initiatives. It was thus 
no surprise that the Report’s recommendations were not carried out as described. It was, 
however, remarkable that the Report somehow managed to revitalize the idea of the cancer 
centre to the extent that the Minister of Education allowed it to be part of a cost-neutral 
expansion of existing hospital plans in the Copenhagen area. And the cancer community jumped 
at the chance in spite of the existence of what in retrospect should have served as red warning 
lights:  
1) A lack of institutional change meant that the government did not take on leadership and 
prioritise the centre plans. A cancer centre was cordially allowed into existing plans if 
the planners could find a way to establish the centre at no cost. There was no state 
leadership or incitement to bring the many different parties together and make them 
agree on a common research program. Because this was not a strategic initiative of the 
State with well-defined and top-down dictated purposes and content. Seeing how the 
same matter gave rise to serious intramural differences of opinion within the private 
Cancer Society, a consensus amongst many different public and private organisations 
would probably not be easy to reach. 
2) Because the initiative had to be carried out under the existing institutional matrix and as 
part of already existing plans to move the Finsen Hospital to Rigshospitalet, the Minister 
of Education, Bertel Haarder, effectively forced the cancer community to plan a centre 
for no additional public funds – and worse – by basing the plans on an already (at least 
almost) decided on location as the first step of the planning process. And this went 
against all recommendations from the Washington conference on the planning of cancer 
centres, which stated that planners would do better by taking the following steps: a) 
reach consensus on a common research program for the centres inhabitants, b) decide 
which research groups to move into the centre, c) appoint a director and organisational 
style for the centre, and d) find a proper location. In fact, the conference stated that the 
model of planning on the basis of a location was old-fashioned and inappropriate.  
As chapter 4 will show, the maintenance of the existing institutional matrix and the frames set 
by the government for the planning of the cancer centre – with its lacking top down leadership 
and strategy – resulted in a power vacuum that made it almost impossible for the different 
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planning parties to agree on any of the Washington recommendations. But then again, these 
recommendations were probably not known by any of the planners, and they enthusiastically 
tried to plan for an essentially irrational scheme under less than optimal conditions and starting 
points. The attempt to create a cancer centre under quite hostile formal constraints (the zero-
sum-game) would probably leave the funding responsibility with the private Cancer Society 
which could explain why the public planning parties stayed at the negotiation table even in the 
face of minimal state subsidies. Whereas a targeted cancer centre had not been the tool to attract 
additional public funding to the hard pressed public researchers in worn down laboratories, the 
cancer centre could perhaps attract more from the private Cancer Society. In this respect, the 
public organisations acted rationally by continuing the planning process in order to utilize the 
existing institutional matrix. They delivered the favourable informal institutions that had been 
absent from the Society’s previous attempts to create a centre during the scientific expansion.  
The Cancer Society, on the other hand, acted more irrationally. Facing no additional state 
funding or prospects of a state take over of its research units, the charity was not likely to re-
create the centre-friendly institutional matrix of 1949, when it had managed to make the State 
assume some financial responsibility for a shared project and thereby fulfil its spearhead 
ambition not to invest in bricks and mortar and so forth. In fact, the government’s zero-sum-
game effectively forced the financial burden onto the shoulders of the private charity. While it 
and its public planning parties may have hoped that the government would eventually cave and 
give extra funding for the project, they would at least have had to consider the possibility of that 
not happening and planned accordingly. The Cancer Society stayed in the planning process. 
With no prospects of handing over its research units. With no prospects of fulfilling its 
spearhead ambition anytime soon. It stayed.  
In an institutional perspective, it stayed on the path of the cancer centre in spite of formal 
constraints hindering positive feedback. Just as it had done during the 1950-1970 era, in which 
informal constraints had prevented the Society from realising its dream and – essentially – its 
organisational strategy for continued existence. Back then, the rationale seemed to have been to 
hold on to its research units until more favourable informal institutions would occur, because the 
units served as good PR in times when the State had finally assumed responsibility for cancer 
treatment at the Society’s radium stations. Now the situation was different with no apparent 
returns at all. The Kjeldgaard Report re-actualised the centre dream, but the Society locked in on 
its path.  
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Summing up from a path dependence perspective, this meant that the Kjeldgaard Report re-
actualised the path created with the establishment of the Fibiger laboratory in the late 1940s, 
although this path had never been productive with increasing returns in the sense that the 
proposed (comprehensive) cancer centre with continuous state-funding had never been fully 
established. Instead this path was full of obstacles in the form of formal and informal 
constraints: lack of state-funding, building restrictions on the Finsen campus, no backing from 
public researchers, and the Fibiger Lab staff’s reluctance to move back to Copenhagen from 
Lyngby. In spite of a complete lack of evidence that the idea of a state-financed cancer centre 
was the right tool to coordinate a Danish war on cancer – in fact there was evidence to the 
contrary – the Kjeldgaard Report mirrored the subjective taste and preferences of the country’s 
cancer researchers who supported the idea of the state-financed comprehensive centre, and it 
recommended to the State the building and financing of a comprehensive cancer centre.  
No alternatives to the idea of the cancer centre were scrutinized in the Report, although its own 
statistical material pointed towards organisational alternatives to – and away from – the idea of a 
specialised cancer centre. And as choosing the irrational in the face of better alternatives can be 
seen as a mark of path dependence, it thus seems likely that path dependence occurred. A path 
was created in 1949 but yielded no increasing returns, it was re-actualised by the Kjeldgaard 
Report, and it was then perpetuated/locked-in by the decision to start planning for a state-
financed centre at the university hospital’s Rockefeller Campus, even though the State could not 
commit to setting aside the necessary funding for it, no formal institutions were changed to 
make cancer research a strategic priority of the state, the planners would have a hard time seeing 
eye-to-eye on central issues, and although the starting point of the planning process was existing 
hospital plans which according to a Washington conference on the topic of planning cancer 
centres was not appropriate for a good planning process.  Still, the outlook of putting the idea of 
the cancer centre into practice was at this point  – rational or not – very interesting to the cancer 
community, and the planning parties went to work with a “can do” spirit oblivious of the 
recommendations from across the pond. Could a comprehensive cancer centre finally beat the 
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X - As a NSRC member, he took the initiative for a national cancer survey 1977-79, and 
published the findings in the so-called Kjeldgaard Report, and uses them to reorganise 
the cancer research field in the wake of the American  National Cancer Act of 1971 re-
actualising the formal institutions created by Hartvig Frisch in 1949. As a member of the 
Executive Committee of the Cancer Society, he helped bring about a budget reform 
based on the findings of his Kjeldgaard Report: that the best research projects were peer 
reviewed and funded through grants-in-aid. At the Society’s research institutes, the heads 
of research decided which projects to fund through the institute’s core budget. The new 
budget reform changed this, and forced all intramural researchers to apply for funds on 
equal footing with extramural researchers through the Society’s Scientific Council. This 
reform deprived the research heads (such as Jørgen Kieler) of a lot of power over the 
research profile of their institutes. As a member of the Society’s Executive Committee, 








- Member of 
NSRC (until 
1983) 
- author of 
Kjeldgaard 
Report 








State/NSRC X - Like Kjeldgaard, Klenow supported basic cancer research. According to Klenow, Jørgen 
Kieler had previously dismissed Klenow’s work on DNA synthesis as insufficiently 
focused  the cancer problem, when they both worked on the Fibiger Institute – thus 
making a science policy statement about the scientific profile at the institute. Klenow 
later took on a university professorship, but as author of the Kjeldgaard Report, which 
 







stressed the importance of basic biological research in cancer research, Klenow pushed 
for increased support for basic cancer research and a more democratic mode of 
organisation at the Society’s research units. 












































State/MRC X - Not explicit in this chapter 
 
















X - As chairman of the Danish Cancer Society, Andreassen used the report to pressure the 
public authorities (such as the Ministry of Education) to increase its funds for cancer 
research. Also, if the Report’s recommendation of a comprehensive cancer centre was 
carried through, the Society would be able to hand over its research departments to the 
State/University, which was one of the Society’s (and thereby Andreassen’s) aims. 
MD C. Crone - Rigshospitalet 
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- X As a statistician, she wrote an article attacking the Report’s tendency to accentuate 
human and economic benefits of supporting cancer research. She claimed that there was 












X - As new chairman of the Cancer Society, he promoted the findings of the Kjeldgaard 
Report, in the hope that it would increase the support for the anti-cancer cause in general. 
Also, he and his Society used the report to carry through a Budget Reform within the 
Cancer Society, See Niels Ole Kjeldgaard.  




(x) X Kieler was opposed to the Kjeldgaard Report’s emphasis on basic biological disciplines 
in cancer research and its views on science organisation. He was also unsatisfied with the 
way the report portrayed the quality of the work done at his Fibiger Institute (as low-
ranging). He appealed to the management of the Society by arguing that the Report’s 
finding was based on faulty or insufficient bibliographical studies. He was also against 
the Budget Reform – which was initiated because of this finding – and which deprived 
him of a great deal of decision making power, see Niels Ole Kjeldgaard. But although 
Kieler did not like the Report’s emphasis on molecular biology in cancer research and its 
views on research organisation, he did agree with the Report’s idea to establish a 
comprehensive cancer centre. cancer centre. 





(x) X Like Jørgen Kieler above. 





- - - 
Ole Bang -Economist 





X - As a banker/economist used to operating private businesses, he introduced new and 
progressive administrative and fundraising ideas into the old-fashioned cancer charity. 
He wanted to transform the organisation into a modern corporation/business, and on this 
point he implemented the Kjeldgaard Report’s suggestion that it was time to introduce 
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quality evaluations in the Society’s research units and to establish a comprehensive 
cancer centre, through which the Society could eventually hand over its research units to 
the State. 




- X Did not support all of the Report’s suggestions, as he did not think it was the Ministry of 
Education’s responsibility to establish a special cancer research fund. In addition, the 
report showed that the best cancer research was already done at the state-held 
universities and hospitals so why change this? However, Haarder did support the idea of 
a comprehensive cancer centre as long as it did not require additional funds.   
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Chapter 4: The Rockefeller Centre 
Path perpetuation 
 
The planning and establishment of a comprehensive cancer centre required a new type of 
collaboration between different public and private funding bodies and research organisations. A 
successful outcome of the endeavour was heavily dependent on a delicate power balance 
between all of the involved parties. But was it really possible to establish and govern a cancer 
centre in a way that would satisfy the interests and demands of them all, when they did not 
necessarily share the same political and scientific aims? This chapter will show how the very 
idea of a cancer centre appealed to researchers, research administrators and politicians for 
different reasons that were not always in accord with the formal institutions set by government, 
the recommendations of the Kjeldgaard Report, or the US recommendations for planning  a 
cancer centre.  And which  in some cases had very little to do with cancer research. There was a 
lack of a clear cut definition of what type of cancer research program to include in the potential 
centre. In fact the topic was avoided by the planning group, and this made it very difficult to 
decide which type of centre to build and  which research groups to select for the centre based on 
its scientific profile. Instead, political and economical agendas of the planners took forefront. 
And when one of these planners, the Danish Cancer Society, suddenly rocketed towards new 
wealth and power due to favourable formal institutions and new business inspired leadership, it 
markedly changed the organisation’s interests in a potential cancer centre.   
 
The fate of the small hospital, the Finsen Institute, was decisive for the location of a cancer 
centre. In 1984, the Ministry of the Interior decided that the hospital would be moved to 
Rigshospitalet on Blegdamsvej. And this locked in on the location of the proposed cancer 
centre: the Rockefeller Institute (see appendix E). The multi-unit working group planning for the 
cancer centre consisted of representatives from Copenhagen University, the MRC, the NSRC, 
the Danish Cancer Society, Rigshospitalet and the Finsen Institute (which had been under the 
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Table 4-1 Members of the working group:  
Name  Scientific Institution Representing 
Budget and Planning Director J. 
Rastrup Andersen 
The Budget and Planning 
Department of Copenhagen 
University 
Copenhagen University 
Professor Svend Olav Andersen Department for Biological 
Chemistry A, Copenhagen 
University 
The NSRC (member until 1985) 
Director Ole Bang The Danish Cancer Society The Danish Cancer Society  
Associate professor, MD, 
Elisabeth Bock 
The Protein Laboratory, the 
Medical Faculty, Copenhagen 
University. 
The Medical Faculty, 
Copenhagen University. 
Professor Niels Ole Kjeldgaard - Department for Molecular 
Biology, Aarhus University 
- Member of the Society’s 
Executive Committee 
The Danish Cancer Society  
Major consultant, MD, Nis I. 
Nissen 
The Medical Department, the 
Finsen Institute 
The MRC (1983-1987) 
Major consultant, MD, professor 
Steen Olsen 
- Department for Pathological 
Anatomy, Aarhus Municipal 
Hospital 
- Chairman of the Danish Cancer 
Society 
The Danish Cancer Society 
Professor MD Jens F. Rehfeld - The Clinical-Chemical 
Department, Rigshospitalet 
- MRC member (until 1983) 
The Medical Board of 
Rigshospitalet 
Major Consultant, MD, Mikael 
Rørth 
-  The Oncology Department, the 
Finsen Institute 
The Medical Board of the Finsen 
Institute 
Professor, MD, Morten 
Simonsen 
- Department for Experimental 
Immunology, Copenhagen 
University 
- Member of the MRC (1982-
1986) 
The MRC 
(chairman of the subcommittee) 
Associate Professor, MD, Eva 
Steiness 
Head of the Medical Faculty, 
Copenhagen University 
The Medical Faculty Board, 
Copenhagen University 
Head Clerk Ulla Thorsteinsson  Ministry of the Interior Observer from the Ministry of 
the Interior 
Head Clerk Lone Østergaard Ministry of Education Observer from the Ministry of 
Education 
Head Clerk Bente Møller The State’s Research Secretariat Secretary for the Secretariat of 
the MRC 
 
Representatives of the MRC, the NSRC, the Danish Cancer Society, Rigshospitalet and the 
Finsen Institute found it very important to establish the research labs in close connection with 
the clinic; also, the Cancer Society and the Finsen Institute wanted their research units to be kept 
together. Representatives from Copenhagen University were, however, of a different opinion. 
They were not satisfied with the decision to place a cancer centre in the Rockefeller complex 
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because it severely interrupted the carefully planned structure of the Medical Faculty422. In order 
to make room for the centre, many of the Faculty’s departments would have to be moved to 
another location, much to the dismay of the staff and students. As the planned comprehensive 
cancer centre was already facing space problems, the University representatives Eva Steiness 
(Dean of the Medical Faculty) and university basic cancer researcher Elisabeth Bock wanted to 
restrict the number of research units that were allowed to move into the potential centre. In a 
presentation to the rest of the group, the two estimated that the most interesting candidates (in 
terms of research programs) would mainly come from the Medical Faculty, the Finsen Institute, 
the Fibiger Institute423, and the Danish Cancer Registry424. However, the latter was only to be 
included if there was enough room425.  
As will be elaborated on, there was no thorough discussion of which groups were considered 
interesting and why – which was after deciding on a research program was step two of the 
recommendations from the Washington conference on planning for cancer centres – but the 
University representatives’ estimation seemed to comply with a wish of disturbing the structure 
of the Medical Faculty as little as possible. In other words, the University representatives did not 
want to keep the Fibiger Institute, the Finsen Institute and the Danish Cancer Registry together 
at all costs, especially not if it meant that yet another of the Faculty’s own departments had to be 
moved.  
Because the biomedical field at the University was very broad in scope and undertook research 
based education, it had been very difficult for the Faculty to pinpoint and separate the cancer 
related groups from the rest of the field, because these groups were all integrated in the 
Faculty’s other activities426. The two representatives thus advocated that as many of the basic 
biomedical disciplines as possible should be allowed to stay in the Rockefeller complex on 
Blegdamsvej and Juliane Maries Vej, see appendix E. In essence, the objective of the University 
was not to decide on a meaningful cancer research program for the centre but to maintain the 
                                                 
422 Letter from the Head of Copenhagen University to the Ministry of Education, September 5th 1983, Personal 
Papers of Ole Bang, (Copenhagen), p.1-2. 
423 The two University representatives included the Fibiger Instititute despite the poor rating it was given by the 
Kjeldgaard Report. 
424 It seems that Bock and Steiness would only approve of a cancer centre in the Rockefeller building if it 
contributed to or fitted the activities of the Medical Faculty or at least disturbed them as little as possible.   
425 Letter from Eva Steiness and Elisabeth Bock, March 12th 1984, Personal Papers of Ole Bang, (Copenhagen), p. 
7.  
426 Report from the MRC-working group: Redegørelse til Undervisningsministeriet vedrørende en samordning af 
den basale onkologiske forskning i hovedstadsområdet, Oktober 1984, Personal Papers of Ole Bang, 
(Copenhagen), p. 14. 
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existing structure of the Medical Faculty to the widest extent possible. That is, to make sure that 
a potential cancer centre did not impair the housing and funding set-up for the medical faculty.  
In addition, the University representatives found no need for placing two new research 
professors in the centre, as the MRC had planned to do427. These extraordinary professorships 
were co-financed by the MRC, the Danish Cancer Society, and the pharmaceutical company 
Novo Nordisk A/S that was known for its products for diabetic care428. The positions were 
created in 1982 as an attempt to follow the recommendations of the Kjeldgaard Report. By 
offering promising young cancer researchers relatively lucrative 5-year research positions, the 
MRC hoped to persuade them not to go abroad and be forever lost for Danish cancer research429. 
The first two research professors of the kind were basic cancer researchers Dr Lennart Olsson 
and Dr Lars-Inge Larsson, who at the time were placed at Rigshospitalet and at the University 
Department for Pathological Anatomy, respectively430. The two University representatives 
argued that: 
It is not obvious that room should be made for these two professors, as they are already 
placed in relatively close geographical proximity to the Rockefeller complex, and one of 
them has been appointed professor in Aarhus.431 
Besides being against housing the two research professors in a comprehensive cancer centre that 
was – in their opinion – already pressed for space on the drawing board, the two University 
representatives disliked the fact that a move would make the MRC a research organ running its 
own research units432. This was not part of the Council’s terms of reference. In summation, the 
objection from one of the participating organisations (the University) shows that there was no 
upfront consensus in the working group on the matter of what the planned centre should include 
in terms of a common research program and research groups, and on who should finance and 
run the centre. 
                                                 
427 Ibid.  
428 The reason why a pharmaceutical company traditionally concerned with diabetes would support biotech/cancer 
studies could be that the broad cell biological approach could potentially reveal important knowledge on the 
molecular mechanisms of diabetes as well. Or it could be an attempt to branch out into the cancer field, which due 
to the molecular bandwagon was offering hope of new areas for drug development.  
429 The Chairman’s report to the Head Board of the Danish Cancer Society, April 30th 1984, Personal Papers of Ole 
Bang, (Copenhagen), p. 4.  
430 Professor Lennart Olsson was primarily financed by the MRC and NOVO, while Larsson primarily received his 
funds from the MRC and the Danish Cancer Society.  
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Consensus was not required to continue the planning, though, and after lengthy discussions, the 
University representatives’ stand was outvoted by the other parties who felt that it was 
uncompromising and therefore incompatible with an actual realisation of the cancer centre 
plans. Concerns for the existing structures of the Medical Faculty were not considered as 
important as “unifying” cancer research in a comprehensive centre which, if built, would 
provide the physical frames and the professional legitimacy to cancer research as a scientific 
discipline on a par with the existing disciplines at the Medical Faculty.  
But would it be able to unite practitioners of the umbrella-like activity of “cancer research” on a 
scientific level through joint research programs?  Potential residents of the comprehensive 
cancer centre were listed by the working group without reference to a common research 
program or discussion thereof, even though the list entailed very diverse and not directly 
convergent aspects of the umbrella-like concept of cancer research. As mentioned in chapter 3, a 
Washington conference on planning for cancer centres recommended that identifying a common 
and unifying research program was the important first step of the planning process and the 
rational basis for deciding on a centre’s potential research groups, its director/managerial set-up, 
and finally its location. Clearly, the Danish planning group adopted another approach than that 
emulated from the experiences with the US cancer centre program.  
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Table 4-2 List of potential research groups/institutes for the Rockefeller Centre  
Name:  Home Institution: Research area Current net 
size of lab in 
m2: 







Basic toxicology unknown 





Research and education in medical microbiology (cell biology, 
tumour virology, tumour immunology) 
- 










See above - 
The Department of 
Microbiology 
The Institute of 
Odontology, 




The Faculty of 
Science, CU. 
Cancer immunology - 
The Fibiger Institute The Danish Cancer 
Society 
1) Chemical carcinogenesis 
2) Molecular Oncology 
3) Tumour Endocrinology 
4) Tumour Virology 




~ 34 TAP 
6 guests) 
The Finsen Institute  Rigshospitalet 1) Biochemical mechanisms of cancer invasion 
2) Cytogenetic studies of malign neoplasms 
3) Experimental studies of resistance to chemotherapeutic 
agents 
4) Production of monoclonal antibodies 
 




~ 20 TAP) 
The Danish Cancer 
Registry 
The Danish Cancer 
Society  
Epidemiology and registration of cancer incidences: 
1)  Cancer & occupation 
2)  Cancer risk & environment 










Financed by MRC 
+ NOVO 
1) The genetics of malignancy 
2) Intratumour phenotypical variation 
3) Cell lines from lung cancer and Hodgkin’s disease 
4) Monoclonal antibodies for early diagnosis of lung 
cancer 
5) Tissue-receptor interaction 
6) Technical production of monoclonal antibodies 
150 m2 
 
(1 SP, 10 
students/assist






Financed by MRC 
+ The Danish 
Cancer Society 
Immunocytochemical studies of peptide hormones and 





Source: Report from the MRC-working group: “Redegørelse til Undervisningsministeriet vedrørende en samordning af 
den basale onkologiske forskning i hovedstadsområdet”, October 1984. 
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Deciding which groups were to move into the centre was far from the only problem the working 
group had to address. The issue that courted the most controversy in the group was the question 
of the structure and management of the centre. What mode of management should be employed 
in a centre consisting of an array of independent private and public research units with different 
political administrations, managerial setups, and different objectives (patient treatment vs. basic 
laboratory research; public vs. private need for PR)? A letter from the MRC chairman to the 
working group exemplifies concerns in the cancer community over these issues, as the MRC 
strongly believed that a coordination of the cancer research field would not happen just by 
moving the units under the same roof,433 and it thus argued that there was a pressing need to 
establish a joint administration for the activities of the centre. But which mode of administration 
should it be?  
The self-owning but state-financed universities were governed by the statutes of the Danish 
University Act of 1970. This Act reduced professorial power and undermined the traditional 
hierarchical structure at the universities by allowing students and technical/administrative staff 
to have a say in the decision-making process. Given that a department head was elected by his 
entire staff and not only by an elitist faculty, this mode of management was very democratic. 
Things were quite different at the publicly owned hospitals, though. Here the hierarchical 
structure, in which chief physicians and surgeons were on top, was still maintained. When 
Rigshospitalet took over the Finsen Institute in 1980, this private institute naturally fell under 
the structure and management of the larger state-owned Rigshospitalet. Generally speaking, the 
University and Rigshospitalet represented different takes on research administration and 
ownership even though these organisations had historically been intertwined through research, 
professorial positions and educational programs.  
In addition to this, the fate of the Cancer Society’s privately owned Fibiger Institute and the 
Danish Cancer Registry was not yet clear. The Danish Cancer Society wanted to fulfil its 
spearhead ambition by turning over the reins of the two research units to the State (as part of 
either Rigshospitalet or Copenhagen University) while investing its resources in research instead 
of physical buildings. Such a transaction had been strongly endorsed by the Kjeldgaard Report, 
and plans were made for the State to takeover the Danish Cancer Registry in the early 1980s. 
However, according to the Society’s chairman, Steen Olsen, the public authorities (the Ministry 
                                                 
433 Letter from Chairman Poul Kildeberg (MRC) to the cancer centre working group, May 24th 1984. Personal 
Papers of Ole Bang (Copenhagen), p. 2.  
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of Education) were too reluctant to acknowledge the full extent of their responsibility for this 
indispensable registry, and so the Society was forced to continue financing the majority of the 
Registry’s activities434.  Nonetheless, the plans for a cancer centre put an administrative transfer 
of the Fibiger Institute and the Danish Cancer Registry right back on the agenda. For in which 
context should these institutions be placed? That of Copenhagen University? Of Rigshospitalet? 
The answer to this question was crucial to the structure of the contemplated comprehensive 
cancer centre, as its administration would have to be flexible enough to accommodate a gradual 
ownership change of two of the research units to be included in the centre.  
In September 1984, the working group concluded its work and submitted a report to the MRC, 
the Ministry of the Interior, and the Ministry of Education435. The views of the group were so 
divergent on important issues that it had become necessary to outline both a majority and a 
minority proposal for a comprehensive cancer centre, its management, and its structure.  
In a path dependence perspective, it is important to note this decision. Consensus was never 
reached on crucial issues of the plans to establish a cancer centre. In fact, two different 
proposals were submitted to the political authorities/ministries that were about to decide the fate 
of the centre plans in times of minimal state research support, recession and such formal 
constraints acting aginst the centre being established at all. Still, the working group did not find 
it necessary to advice the political authorities not to support the centre plans although the 
group’s discussions, the split proposals, and a letter from the chairman of the MRC had revealed 
real concern about the feasibility of a joint centre. So even though there may have been good 
reason for the working group (representing the cancer community) to push for a cancer centre in 
spite of this – e.g. the group may have hoped that the centre would in time source in additional 
state or private funding and professional recognition to the cancer field – a joint cancer centre 
was promoted to the politicians in the face of obvious obstacles and alternatives. And according 
to Douglass C. North, this is an indicator that path dependence may be at large. 
4.1 The two models 
The working group agreed that a “cancer centre” at the Rockefeller complex would be the ideal 
tool to create the kind of fruitful research milieus the Kjeldgaard Report had called for in 1981, 
and that the staff of this centre should consist of a balanced mix of experienced older researchers 
                                                 
434 Olsen, S. (1982) "Er indsatsen i kræftforskningen tilstrækkelig?" Politiken København 15.02.1982. 
435 Annual report of the Chairman of the Danish Cancer Society (1985), Personal Papers of Ole Bang, 
(Copenhagen), p. 5.  
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in tenure and younger ones in short time positions436. This would supposedly make the centre’s 
research program dynamic and flexible enough to take on new research projects and/or 
terminate others over a short period of time. While it was clear to all the members of the 
working group that the purpose of the cancer centre was to coordinate the research efforts of the 
cancer researchers in Copenhagen, their concluding report lacks reflection on whether or not 
they hoped a synergy-effect of placing these groups under the same roof would emerge by itself, 
or if a more formal coordination and management strategy was needed.  
The group was interested in establishing the kind of organisational framework that would best 
support collaboration in the centre, but it is not entirely clear whether the sort of collaboration 
referred to was cross-disciplinary scientific teamwork between the new inhabitants of the centre, 
or if it was simply the financial partnership of the public and private funding organs that made 
the centre possible in the first place, because a common research program was never discussed. 
The members of the working group also held very different views on what a “fitting 
organisational framework” in fact was. In their report to the MRC, the Ministry of the Interior 
and the Ministry of Education, the members thus presented two models for different types of 
cancer centres.  
The majority model. The majority of the working group backed a model that was very similar to 
the comprehensive cancer centres proposed by the Kjeldgaard Report of 1981, and Engelbreth-
Holm’s vision from 1945437. It combined basic, clinical, and epidemiological cancer research 
with cancer treatment and education.  The idea was to move the Fibiger Institute, the Danish 
Cancer Registry and the Finsen Institute into the Rockefeller complex in close connection with 
the cancer relevant University research groups and the clinical oncology departments at 
Rigshospitalet438. The University would provide the physical settings for the centre in the form 
of the 4.200 m2 large Rockefeller complex which could house an estimated 10-20 research 
                                                 
436 Report from the MRC-working group: “Redegørelse til Undervisningsministeriet vedrørende en samordning af 
den basale onkologiske forskning i hovedstadsområdet”, October 1984, Personal Papers of Ole Bang, 
(Copenhagen), p. 25. 
437 The model was backed by Ole Bang, Steen Olsen, and Niels Ole Kjeldgaard representing the Danish Cancer 
Society. Also, it received backing from Eva Steiness and Elisabeth Bock of the Medical Faculty; as well as from 
Nis I. Nissen ( Rigshospitalet and the  MRC) and Mikael Rørth (The Finsen Institute), and finally from the Head of 
the University’s Budget and Planning Division , J. Rastrup Andersen. 
See the report from the MRC-working group: “Redegørelse til Undervisningsministeriet vedrørende en 
samordning af den basale onkologiske forskning i hovedstadsområdet”, October 1984, Personal Papers of Ole 
Bang, (Copenhagen), p. 24. 
438 Ibid, p. 26.  
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groups or 50 researchers with additional technical and administrative personnel439. According to 
the Report these researchers – and those from Rigshospitalet and the University who were 
already situated in or near the complex – would make the centre large enough to have the critical 
mass necessary for a cross-disciplinary and cross-organisational attack on cancer. But although 
there would be room for visiting fellows and the two research professors who would frequent 
the premises for short periods only there was no financial latitude for a separate department for 
them.  
The model included a possible organisational mode for the centre as well. At the specific request 
of the Danish Cancer Society, the management of the centre was designed with special 
consideration for the fact that the Society still carried the full financial burden of the Fibiger 
Institute and the Danish Cancer Registry440. The working group members, who backed this 
model, all agreed that the two private research units would ideally be placed under the auspices 
of the State:  
The majority adopts the perception of the Danish Cancer Society that the financial 
responsibility for the Fibiger Institute and the Danish Cancer Registry should be 
transferred to the State in the long term. A majority (Steen Olsen, N. O. Kjeldgaard, Eva 
Steiness, Elisabeth Bock, J. Rastrup Andersen and Ole Bang) finds that a transfer of these 
institutes to the Medical Faculty of Copenhagen University would be natural, while a 
minority (Mikael Rørth and Nis Nissen) finds that a transfer to Rigshospitalet would be 
the best solution. We recommend that the funds now earmarked for the operation of these 
institutes be put into the fund pool distributed to public and private cancer researchers 
through peer review and quality assessment by the Society’s Scientific Council. The 
majority finds that the collaboration and management structure should be adjusted when a 
transfer to Copenhagen University/ Rigshospitalet has been completed.441 
A model of management was created to accommodate the present and future ownership of the 
two private research units. From an early onset, the Danish Cancer Society had proposed the 
establishment of a so-called administrative “Supervisory Board”, consisting of representatives 
from each funding body (the Society, the MRC, the University, and Rigshospitalet) as well as a 
scientific “Coordination Council” consisting of representatives from each research unit in the 
comprehensive cancer centre442.  
The purpose of the Supervisory Board was to ensure administrative coordination of the scientific 
activities in the centre, and to obtain the necessary resources shared by all of the otherwise 
                                                 
439 Ibid, p.27. 
440 Ibid, p. 28. 
441 Ibid, p. 30. 
442 Note from the Danish Cancer Society to the working group. “Note on the management of a coordinated 
oncological cancer research complex”, May 28th 1984, Personal Papers of Ole Bang, (Copenhagen).  
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administratively independent research units – that is – resources for animal stables, libraries, 
repair workshops, canteens etc. The Board would be responsible for a fair spreading of shared 
expenditures as well. The individual funding organs represented in the Board would still hold 
full responsibility for appointment of staff, project funding, and basic funding of the operation 
of their respective research units443. In this way, the comprehensive cancer centre could be 
established for a minimum of additional funds, as its research groups would be financed by the 
same means as always. The financing plan was thus in accord with the strict “no-growth” 
financial policy for public expenditures set by the government that backed the centre only on the 
condition that it would be established and run without additional funds. The “State” – here 
meaning the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Education – would only have to finance 
the modernisation and technical equipment of the buildings444, and in the long run, the cost-
effectiveness of rational large-scale operation of the centre (such as shared equipment etc) was 
believed to save money for the funding bodies compared to the current arrangements. At least 
this was one of the Report’s arguments to promote the centre plans, as it played into the formal 
institutions set by the government with its focus on rational planning. 
In contrast to the Supervisory Board, the Coordination Council would be responsible for 
facilitating an actual collaboration between the different research groups in the centre. It was the 
Council’s job to find out if the research programs of the different groups complemented each 
other. The working group did not, however, give any instruction as to what to do if this was not 
the case. Perhaps the group felt that scientific coordination was a straightforward process that 
needed no further elaboration in the Report. In any case, the management model proposed by the 
Cancer Society focused on form rather than content. As mentioned in chapter 3, the Washington 
conference on planning for cancer centres suggested a “content first, form later” approach, 
inasmuch as the research program would be a rational basis from which to identify the centre’s 
research groups, and lastly to choose who and how to run and finance the centre. Nevertheless, 
the Society’s model was readily adopted by the majority of the working group, and the private 
cancer charity thus succeeded in leaving its mark on the proposed comprehensive cancer centre 
from the start. 
                                                 
443 Report from the MRC working group: “Redegørelse til Undervisningsministeriet vedrørende en samordning af 
den basale onkologiske forskning i hovedstadsområdet”, October 1984, Personal Papers of Ole Bang, 
(Copenhagen), p. 29. 
444 Ibid, p. 30. 
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The minority model. The minority of the working group proposed an entirely different type of 
centre, although it too was to be located in the Rockefeller complex (form). Instead of a 
categorical cancer centre that would have cancer research as its only objective, three445 group 
members wanted to establish a centre for cell biology and basic cancer research (content). To 
them, cancer research was a sub-field deeply embedded in the basic cell biology research 
discipline, and this was reflected in the research program they presented. Their proposed centre 
thus emphasised fundamental research rather than applied446.  In other words, the centre 
anticipated by these representatives assigned a low priority to bridging the gap between bench 
and bedside, and the plans for the centre thus only included non-clinical units: the Fibiger 
Institute, the Danish Cancer Registry, the two research professors Olsson and Larsson, the 
Finsen Lab, and a few departments from the University.  
The centre would have to be established gradually as not all of the 5682m2 needed were 
available right away447. Professors Olsson and Larsson, the Finsen Laboratory and the 
University’s Protein Lab were to move in immediately, while the rest of the research units (from 
the Danish Cancer Society and the University) would have to wait. Much like the model 
proposed by the majority of the working group, this centre model did not deal specifically with 
how to ensure collaboration between the new “tenants” of the centre: 
Both the Fibiger Institute and the Danish Cancer Registry are, until further notice, owned 
and run by the Danish Cancer Society. Shared management and administration for the 
entire Centre for Cell Biology and Basic Cancer Research is not likely from the start. A 
fruitful scientific inter-relationship can nevertheless be expected through a physical 
coordination in the same building. This is true for the smaller and predominantly 
immunological research units at Copenhagen University which, from the viewpoint of 
science, ought to be placed in the Rockefeller complex alongside the new centre, even 
though they would remain university departments on the administrative level.448 
In contrast to the model proposed by the majority, this basic research centre assigned much 
more space and influence to the research professors – and to Lennart Olsson in particular – even 
though they did not have security of tenure in their short 5-year contracts. The logical basis for 
this unusual arrangement can be found in the untraditional ways in which the centre was 
                                                 
445 Copenhagen University biochemistry professor and NSRC member Svend Olav Andersen, Rigshospital clinical 
chemistry professor and former MRC member Jens Rehfeld, and the Copenhagen University experimental 
immunology professor and MRC member Morten Simonsen. 
446 Report from the MRC working group: “Redegørelse til Undervisningsministeriet vedrørende en samordning af 
den basale onkologiske forskning i hovedstadsområdet”, October 1984, Personal Papers of Ole Bang, 
(Copenhagen), p. 31.  
447 Ibid, p. 32. 
448 Ibid, p. 33. 
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supposed to be financed. A financial strategy that could be seen as an attempt to create better 
conditions for scientific centres in times of the government’s no-growth policy. In fact, the 
minority group may have seen their model as the only way to create a strong and impactful 
centre under the existing institutional matrix (the government’s financial strategy) by playing 
into this matrix and existing political priority of biotechnology, as will be evident in the 
following.  
4.2 Playing into the matrix 
In 1984, the Danish government sent out a report on political initiatives to strengthen research 
and development in Denmark. The report promised an increase in funds for basic and biotech 
research, through the launching of large cross-ministerial research programs449. The enterprise 
was to be financed by a newly established Danish National Research Foundation, and the 
minority of the working group saw this new initiative as a possibility for realising the new 
centre. In addition to the usual funding channels, the new basic cell biology centre was therefore 
planned to be financed in three rather unusual ways. First and foremost, the three representatives 
wanted a cut of the new State funding for long-term biotechnology research programs which 
fitted their plans for a basic cell-biological centre well450. Secondly, the representatives hoped to 
forge a better link between biomedical research and Danish industry. While few Danish 
pharmaceutical companies (such as Novo Nordisk A/S) had supported cancer research, the 
pharmaceutical industry was generally more interested in broader cell biology programs and 
could better be persuaded to contribute financial assistance to the minority’s centre than the 
cancer centre proposed by the majority of the working group. Thirdly, and perhaps most 
surprisingly, the three representatives suggested that their new centre could be operated in part 
through the profits of patenting: 
This possibility is new in Denmark but not in the rest of the Western World. It includes 
revenues from the industrial application of discoveries and inventions done in research. 
Such revenues can come from selling patent rights and licences. Under Danish patent law, 
any scientific personnel at the universities and other institutes of higher education hold the 
rights of their own inventions unless otherwise provided by law or agreement. The MRC 
and the NSRC have not yet made their allocations subject to a proviso to limit this right. 
For this reason, a written pledge from one of the research council’s research professors 
[Lennart Olsson] to involve the MRC in expected revenues from the sale of patent and 
                                                 
449 For more on all of the government’s political initiatives, see:  Regeringens forskningspolitiske redegørelse af 10. 
maj 1984. 
450 Report from the MRC-working group: “Redegørelse til Undervisningsministeriet vedrørende en samordning af 
den basale onkologiske forskning i hovedstadsområdet”, October 1984, Personal Papers of Ole Bang, 
(Copenhagen), p. 38. 
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licensing rights of his discovery in relation to early cancer diagnostics is even more 
important, as the patent is expected to result in massive revenues.451 
The MRC intended to use the expected income from the patents to finance the continued 
operation of the Centre for Cell Biology and Basic Cancer Research. A self-financing centre that 
was independent of shifting State funding practices and such formal constraints. Of cource it 
was dependent on the centre’s researchers taking out commercial patents and sharing the profits 
with the MRC like Olsson had pledged to do. Lennart Olsson and his research, which will be 
described further in the below, was therefore of paramount importance to the centre and he 
became a “favourite son” 452 of the MRC.  
The Danish press portrayed Lennart Olsson as the new international superstar of cancer research 
when he returned to Denmark from a successful stay at Stanford University as a research fellow 
in the early 1980s. The journalists were impressed by the young cancer researcher. Olsson was 
born in 1949 and had managed to win scientific awards ever since his first year as a medical 
student in Copenhagen, and he became a medical graduate when he was 26 years of age453. In 
the following years, he became head of a laboratory for cancer biology at Villejeuf in Paris, but 
from 1979-1981 he worked at Stanford University School of Medicine with Dr Henry Kaplan in 
his Cancer Biology Research Laboratory. The two worked well together, and their collaboration 
resulted in the development of a technique to create a special human hybridoma, a monoclonal 
antibody factory that might help diagnose and treat cancer at an early stage of the disease454,455.  
                                                 
451 Ibid, p. 38. 
452 Manuscript by Niels Ole Kjeldgaard for a meeting at the DCS January 23rd 1992:  “The history of the cancer 
research centre”. Archives of the Danish Cancer Society, (Copenhagen), p. 1.  
453 NN (1984). "Lennart Olsson: Danskeren, som amerikanerne investerer millioner i." Illustreret Videnskab: 66 
454 Olsson, L. and H. Kaplan (1980). "Human-human hybridomas producing monoclonal antibodies of predefined 
antigenic spcificity." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 77(9): 
5429-5431, p. 5429-5431. 
455 The human immune system is a sophisticated weapon against many diseases, but according to Olsson, it was 
inefficient in the battle against cancers. In the early 1980s, Olsson speculated that the reason for this might be that 
the antibodies produced by the lymphocytes of our immune system were not specific enough. It had been proven 
that tumours generally consisted of many different cancer cells with different properties, and Olsson thus believed 
that these different cancer cells displayed a series of specific (protein) characteristics, or antigens, that distinguished 
them from normal cells (Olsson, L. and H. Kaplan (1980)). A cocktail of antibodies produced specifically for each 
of these antigens was thus needed to fight the tumour. Such antibodies were called monoclonal antibodies. 
However, there were technical obstacles in the way of the production of the amount of monoclonal antibodies 
needed. While normal lymphocytes produced an array of antibodies with different degrees of specificity inside the 
human body, they did not survive for long in a Petri dish. In 1976, Köhler and Milstein from Cambridge University 
thus tried to exploit the property of cancer cells (to be able to divide in vitro) with the antibody production of a 
normal lymphocyte in order to produce a synthetic cell for the mass production of monoclonal antibodies in mice, 
and the construct was called a hybridoma. In other words, the synthetic construct was a permanent cell line derived 
from an artificial somatic cell hybrid formed through a fusion between a cultured neoplastic lymphocyte and a 
normal lymphocyte, and Olsson and Kaplan were the first to produce a version produced from human cells. Olsson 
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Olsson and Kaplan, who had made their findings public at a scientific conference in Paris in 
1981, had patented the technique for the production of the special hybridomas and hoped that it 
would lead to better diagnosis and treatment of diseases such as cancers456. If the monoclonal 
antibodies were labelled radioactive and injected into a patient, Kaplan and Olsson hoped that 
the radioactive trace of the accumulated antibodies would reveal the exact position of tumours. 
In one article, Olsson informed the journalist that preliminary animal studies indicated that the 
monoclonal antibodies could be used to treat the tumours as well, although none of this had been 
sufficiently documented yet, and that we had to await the results of many years of laboratory 
work in order to know for sure457. Despite the lack of certain empirical proof of concept, Olsson 
stated to the Danish press that he had been offered tenure and an impressive salary at many 
different American research institutes458. According to Olsson, his and Kaplan’s patent would be 
very valuable, if they were right, and he claimed that they had already been approached by 
several American pharmaceutical companies.  
Still, Olsson chose to return to Denmark where the technical and financial conditions for his 
research were far from as good as in the States459. According to Olsson, the decision to return to 
Denmark was made because he and his wife wanted to give their three children a Danish 
upbringing, and because he feared that he would quickly be phased out of the American research 
elite if he could not continue to produce groundbreaking results in the years to come460: 
There are commercial interests in parts of the American research that I would not like to 
be working for. And it would require a heavy work load that would not otherwise allow 
me to have a normal life outside.461 
The Danish press was excited that the prodigy son returned to Denmark, and they portrayed the 
young researcher as a highly intelligent “Renaissance man”, who aside from cancer research 
excelled in everything from literature to table tennis462. To the MRC, Olsson must have been an 
interesting candidate for a research professorship, which as mentioned above was established to 
                                                                                                                                                            
informed the Danish newspapers that although the hybridoma had not yet been subjected to thorough clinical trials, 
American pharmaceutical companies were eager to invest faith and money in the project. 




459 Andersen, P. N. (1981) "USA har sat en pris på hans hovede" Weekendavisen 28.08.1981. 
460 Ibid. 
    Meyerheim, M. (1982) "Dansker i verdensformat" Politiken 07.02.1982. 
461 Ibid. 
462 Ibid.  
    Dall, O. (1982) "Kræft er ingen dødsdom" Fyens Stiftidende 27.11.1982. 
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keep promising young researchers from moving abroad on a permanent basis. It seems that the 
MRC thought the plans for a national cancer centre could help them give Olsson the best 
possible facilities to work in, although the Danish standard would never compare to that of the 
US.  
It was thus no surprise that the centre proposed by a minority of the MRC working group – two 
of the three were MRC members – offered quite different facilities for Olsson than the model 
proposed by the majority of the working group. The three representatives may have thought that 
this model with its special financing (patenting profits and biotechnology program funds) was 
more likely to result in a (biotechnology) centre than the model backed by the majority of the 
working group, which relied on additional funds from the Ministry of Education and the 
Ministry of the Interior. That is, the minority model played into the existing formal institutions 
set by government with the “zero growth of public costs”- policy and the inevitable process of 
prioritising/choosing which areas to support or not.  
A biotech-based approach to cancer, an internationally renowned research professor within this 
field, and a patent financing model must have fitted the government’s plans and policy pretty 
well, although the clinic-less centre did not match the definition of a comprehensive cancer 
centre or present a unified front of clinical and basic cancer efforts like the majority model and 
the Kjeldgaard Report aimed to do. The MRC and the NSRC were to be in charge of the overall 
management of the proposed centre. A management consisting of representatives from these two 
research councils, the University, the Cancer Society, Rigshospitalet and the European 
Molecular Biology Laboratory in Heidelberg (EMBL) was to be established and lead the centre 
according to statutes written by the two research councils the MRC and the NSRC, who would 
also appoint the chairman of the joint management463. Rigshospitalet would appoint a leader to 
take care of the administration of the centre and its scientific activities, and he or she would 
answer only to the board of directors.  
Considering that the three representatives were all members or former members of either the 
MRC or the NSRC, this distribution of power between the research councils and the hospital is 
no surprise. Nor was the research council’s insistence on giving its own two research professors 
– Lennart Olsson and Lars-Inge Larsson – prominent positions in the centre. Although only 
                                                 
463Report from the MRC-working group: “Redegørelse til Undervisningsministeriet vedrørende en samordning af 
den basale onkologiske forskning i hovedstadsområdet”, October 1984, Personal Papers of Ole Bang, 
(Copenhagen), , p. 35. 
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three out of the eleven members of the group backed the proposed centre for cell biology and 
basic cancer research, the proposal was included in the report so that the Minister of Education 
and the Minister of the Interior could decide for themselves when they finally received the 
report in October 1984.   
The two models each reflected different views on the nature of cancer research 
with respect to their different emphasis on clinical research in the centre. And because of this, 
the two models represent different takes on – or definitions of – the “cancer centre”. One model 
excluded the clinic as part of the centre’s grounds of existence (emphasizing basic science only), 
while the other actively tried to integrate it. The models also differed with respect to 
management: the minority model was a centre managed in large by the MRC and the NSRC, 
while the majority model included a poly-institutional direction board with representatives from 
each institute involved in the establishment of the centre. This latter model of the majority thus 
tried to unite the differently administered research groups from the hospitals, the University and 
the Cancer Society – who as mentioned in the above had different takes on cancer research and 
research administration – and make them function as one in the form of the proposed centre. But 
would this model function in practice? One man openly doubted this from the very beginning, 
and even though he was not part of the working group, he got his doubts included in the report 
to the politicians. 
A note from Dr Keld Danø with his view on the centre plans was appended to the report. Danø 
was a basic cancer researcher (cell migration) and head of the Finsen Laboratory. His status as 
one of the country’s leading cancer researchers gave him some say in the matter of planning a 
cancer centre. It was not unlikely that the two Ministers of State would take the opinion of a 
potential “inhabitant” of the future centre into consideration alongside the official 
recommendations of the working group’s report. And Danø did not wholeheartedly adopt either 
of the two proposed models. Like the majority of the working group, he supported a 
comprehensive cancer centre with the main objective of doing cancer research, and he was 
therefore openly averse to the idea of a broader cell biological research centre464: 
The purpose of the coordination is partly to reach the critical mass necessary for a fruitful 
research milieu, and partly to obtain greater flexibility in the use of resources and 
apparatus. An optimal centre size that would accommodate this purpose can be reached 
                                                 
464 Note from Keld Danø to the working group: “Møde 30.05.1984 med arbejdsgruppen vedrørende samordningen 
af den basale cancerforskning i hovedstadsområdet”, June 1st 1984, Personal papers of Ole Bang, (Copenhagen), p. 
2.  
 
The Cancer Centre That Never Was 
 
 194 
through a coordination of existing research without an increase in the total funding level. 
It should be noted that such a centre can in fact be too large, so that it practically stops 
functioning as a unit. For this reason, a cancer research centre should not try to 
monopolise cancer research in the Greater Copenhagen area, and it should only include 
groups with cancer research as their primary objective.  
In this connection it should be noted that cancer research is per definition applied research 
seeking to solve cancer related problems (cf. the Kjeldgaard Report). Any direct 
incorporation into the cancer centre of special branches of the basic cell biology, which 
has no direct cancer relevance, does not seem to be scientifically well-founded. Instead, 
there ought to be a close collaboration between a cancer research centre and the institutes 
(present and future) that deal with the parts of cell biology, biochemistry and 
pharmacology relevant to the actual cancer research projects.465 
He argued that the heart of the centre should be the Fibiger Institute, the Finsen Laboratory, the 
cancer groups of Copenhagen University, and the Danish Cancer Registry. To Danø, it was 
crucial that the centre was organised as one department – a single unit – with a common (non-
DJØF?) management: 
The research management ought to be in the hands of the employed, highly qualified 
cancer researchers. Any external influence on the direction of the research should take 
place only in connection with the occupation of tenures and the allocation of project-
oriented funds. The administrative management should be performed through one of the 
institutes with long-time experience in the administration of medical research – that is 
Rigshospitalet or the Medical Faculty of Copenhagen University. This action will ensure a 
use of the already present administrative experience, and ensure that management 
conditions will constantly be adjusted to the experiences of other institutes; it will also 
ensure that a close relationship to these related institutions/departments is maintained. The 
establishment of a separate board of directors for the department/institute with 
responsibility for the everyday operation and consisting of representatives from different 
authorities – which do not necessarily have the same scientific aim – carries a serious risk 
of an unclear objective and an unstable management with ensuing inappropriate use of the 
resources for the department/institute.466  
So even though Danø agreed with most of the proposal set forth by the majority of the working 
group, he did not support the proposed Supervisory Board with representatives from all the 
involved institutes, as he feared that this type of management would prevent the centre from 
fusing its different parts into one. Nevertheless, he preferred the majority’s model over the one 
proposed by the minority of the working group: a model that would split up the planned  
“Finsen Institute/ Fibiger Institute/ Danish Cancer Registry”-cluster.  As a result, he backed the 
majority’s position on the condition that the three research units were kept together. The 
management of the Danish Cancer Society, who was actually represented in the working group, 
took a similar stance on the matter in its annual report to its members:   
                                                 
465 Ibid. 
466 Ibid. p. 4.  
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In 1985, the management of the Society will continue negotiations with the authorities 
involved, with the implementation of the majority’s recommendation in mind, but on the 
condition that it can be done on acceptable financial terms and that satisfactory physical 
settings for the activities of the Society’s institutes will be provided.467  
 
4.3 A cancer centre = Form + X + politics? 
As the abovementioned quotes indicate the form, financing, and management of the centre was 
important to the different planning parties and associated individuals. More so than the 
definition of a research program. That is, finding a shared and clearly defined objective for all of 
the potential inhabitants of the centre and letting this objective be the rational basis to identify 
the research groups from. Instead it would seem that the “inhabitants” would be chosen based on 
either financing models (patent-strategy), the matter of available space in the centre, or other 
organisational interests such as not splitting up the Cancer Society’s own research units. Such 
criteria did in no way guarantee cross-disciplinary collaboration between the research groups or 
guarantee the sudden emergence of a unifying research program. For instance, the research done 
at the Cancer Registry, the Fibiger Laboratory and the Finsen Laboratory – although all part of 
the anti-cancer cause – was still so different in nature that collaboration was not a sure thing.  
Again the umbrella-like concept of cancer research cloaked internal differences and 
heterogeneity that worked against the values used to “sell” the centre to the government: “unity” 
and “collaboration”. Those were concepts that signalled a common war on cancer, a common 
identity, and a common field worthy of recognition, status, and political priority. Just like the 
Kjeldgaard Report, the centre plans were the first of the kind in the cancer community and as 
such they had a symbolic value: a statement of unity to improve the standing of cancer research 
in the political and scientific/medical fields on a par with the well-established research areas (in 
the form of academic disciplines and medical specialities at the universities and hospitals) the 
efforts originated from. Perhaps this is why there are no explicit discussions of a research 
program in the MRC report as that would have opened a can of worms, so to speak, by revealing 
a lack of unity. The focus was thus on form and finance instead, and a research program became 
an as of yet unknown “X” in the equation.  
The Society had already exercised some measure of control over the plans, inasmuch as its 
suggestion for a centre management had been fully adopted by most of the working group. 
However, the Society reserved the right to await the final financial and structural plans before 
                                                 
467 Kræftens-Bekæmpelse (1984). Årsberetning 1984. København, Kræftens Bekæmpelse, p. 15. 
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agreeing to move the Fibiger Institute and the Danish Cancer Registry into the centre. The 
Society wanted to make sure that the two units would not be separated or given worse facilities 
than in their present situation. Also, the charity might have been anxious to see whether or not 
the State would agree to finance the modernisation and fit-up work of the public Rockefeller 
complex – and thereby change formal constraints – as the report of the working group was 
suggesting468. But while the Society and the other involved parties awaited the response of the 
Minister of Education and the Minister of the Interior, a group of researchers from the Cancer 
Registry (Cancer Society), the Fibiger Institute (Cancer Society), and the Finsen Institute 
speculated on how to coordinate their research efforts in the future centre – which was 
something that had not been discussed in depth in the report469. The difficult topic of 
content/research program was thus dealt with bilaterally to the official report to the government. 
These institutes had a broad spectrum of activities ranging from chemotherapy and radiation 
therapy to research into tumour immunology, hormones, metastasis and aetiology470.  Indicating 
that the oncogene paradigm and the molecular bandwagon of cancer research now had a strong 
impact on clinicians in the country, researchers from the Finsen Institute’s clinical departments 
argued that the central problem of Danish cancer research was the lack of contact between the 
clinical and basic aspects of cancer research471. They argued that clinical cancer research could 
certainly benefit from the results of basic cancer research and vice versa. While the oncogene 
paradigm had delivered a new theoretical foundation for the understanding of cancer, the clinic 
delivered important knowledge about how cancer cells and tumours functioned in vivo in 
contrast to the in vitro models of the laboratory, which were often “plastic” tumour cell lines in 
Petri dishes that no longer represented cancer as it would act and develop in a human body. 
Also, the clinicians offered important knowledge from clinical trials. So, the clinicians were 
particularly interested in the new molecular oncology and believed that it would be an advantage 
for all to try to bridge the gap between clinical and basic cancer research. But how was this to be 
brought about?  
                                                 
468 Report from the MRC-working group: “Redegørelse til Undervisningsministeriet vedrørende en samordning af 
den basale onkologiske forskning i hovedstadsområdet”, October 1984, Personal Papers of Ole Bang, 
(Copenhagen), p. 30. 
469 The researchers were: From the Finsen Institute: Keld Danø, Susan Thorpe, K. Hou-Jensen, Nis I. Nissen, J. 
Bjerregaard, J. Lock-Andersen, Helge Johansen, and Mikael Rørth. From the Cancer Registry: Ole Møller. From 
the Fibiger Institute: Britta Christensen, Vibeke Tromholt, Svend Ottesen, Jes Forchhammer, Anne Lykkesfeldt, 
Hanne Jessen and Jørgen Kieler.  
470 Jørgen Kieler:  “Minutes of a meeting held at the Fibiger Institute the 4th of December 1985”, Personal Papers 
of Jes Forchhammer, (Bagsværd), p. 2. 
471 Ibid, p. 3.  
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As mentioned in chapter 2, cancer centres in other countries such as the UK and the US had 
traditionally been shaped by scientific discoveries (of e.g. x-rays and radium) and the new 
treatment possibilities that followed from these discoveries. To this group of Danish researchers 
and clinicians, the latest theoretical breakthrough in the understanding of the biology of cancer 
likewise made it necessary to place basic scientists and clinicians side by side in a new centre, 
so that they could continuously exchange data and correct each other’s models and eventually 
produce better treatments. In doing so, the structure of the centre would reflect the historical 
trend in cancer research. However, the Danish cancer researchers and clinicians seem to have 
been aware that the differences in the way their activities were administered at their respective 
institutes could hinder the bridge building. At least, they speculated in administrative changes to 
make the transfer of the different public and private research units into the centre easier: special 
positions at the Cancer Society.  
So what did this mean? At that time, the Society was rethinking the structure and content of its 
research tenures, and the researchers therefore discussed whether or not the new tenures should 
have job descriptions and conditions that would force applicants to cross the traditional borders 
of clinical and basic cancer research472. Or perhaps the Society could even sponsor contracted 
research in areas in need of cultivation. In this way the three cancer research units would be able 
to collaborate and coordinate their efforts, and although the fate of the proposed Rockefeller 
centre had not yet been decided on, public and private researchers had already taken the first 
steps toward an informal coordination of what the centre was all about – namely cancer 
research.  
In retrospect, the successful establishment of a comprehensive cancer centre in the Rockefeller 
complex also implied collaboration between different public and private authorities, and as is 
argued in the previous chapter, it was difficult enough to establish cross-ministerial research 
programs even without having to involve a cancer charity from the private sector as well. The 
implementation of the Rockefeller plans thus depended on a delicate power balance between the 
different funding organs which all had to protect their own interests and investments. The 
ministries had to be very careful not to engage themselves in costly projects that could possibly 
be financed by other (private) parties, in a time when the government was trying to reduce the 
massive national debt established by the former government in the 1970s. Meanwhile, the 
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Danish Cancer Society was a private organisation that had to protect its own financial interests 
in order to survive and continue to serve the anti-cancer cause.  
In the terminology of Douglass C. North, the different entrepreneurs were about to embark in 
negotiations for a transaction – or a co-operation – on the basis of inadequate information about 
each other’s motives and strategies. It was risky business. In contrast to a standard transaction 
between trading parties with contracted terms, rights and enforcement, this co-operation was not 
yet subject to contracts or third party enforcement to prevent defection. And given the 
economical situation of the time and the fact that the political strategies of the individual 
funding body seemed to be to commit to financing as little as possible of the proposed centre 
(either from the start or in the long term), immediate or gradual defection seemed a likely 
outcome of the negotiations for more than one of the entrepreneurs. Especially since a clearly 
defined research program was not part of the negotiations and such a viable program would 
perhaps require coordination efforts demanding a managerial setup that could decrease the 
influence of some of the planning parties and thus again increase the risk of defection.  
The incitement to follow through on the plans, on the other hand, was the Cancer Society getting 
the state to take over responsibility for research units, and the State establishing a public-private 
but largely privately funded cancer centre. It was an unwritten mixture of expectations on the 
short and long term of the cancer centre. It was a balance of trust and power between the 
funding bodies during their negotiation. A balance that was disturbed, as the income and power 
of the Danish Cancer Society suddenly increased over few years and made the private charity a 
major power broker in the cancer community and not just the appendix of the medical 
community it had traditionally been since its establishment in 1928.  
4.4 The growth of the Danish Cancer Society 
When Ole Bang was appointed Director for the Danish Cancer Society in 1981, he brought with 
him a deep acquaintance with the private business and financial sector along with professional 
management and effective marketing and fundraising strategies that would soon make the 
Danish Cancer Society the envy of many other Danish charity organisations which had not been 
accustomed to such fundraising campaigns. Strongly aided by the work of the Cancer Society’s 
PR-department, who used external consultants and bureaus in their work, Bang managed to raise 
public awareness of the cancer problem and the cancer charity’s need for monetary contributions 
in the war against cancer. And this was quite effective in times when the government was 
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making budget cuts in the health care sector. Choices to cut funds for certain treatments, 
procedures or patient groups were very unpopular with the Danish public that had come to 
expect the availability of a high level of quality health care services in the tax-financed health 
care system.  
In 1985-86, a political decision to impair the costly HIV screening of donor blood as a way to 
reduce costs became a publicly debated scandal as haemophiliac recipients of donor blood were 
tragicly infected with HIV through the procedure473. The case illustrated that a financially rather 
than medically based prioritising between budget posts in the hospital sector was dangerous to 
the citizens and politically reckless474. In this way, the formal institutions set by governmental 
policy must have aided the Danish Cancer Society and its cause. To the public, the private 
charity was doing what the government neglected to do.  
Society director Ole Bang introduced new and aggressive fundraising methods that increased the 
income of the annual national collection and the number of testamentary gifts for the Society. 
The idea was to spend more money on advertising in order to raise more money; to make the 
Danish Cancer Society known as an organisation that would be able to make a difference in the 
war on cancer if the public was willing to help475. According to his colleagues, he was the first 
to introduce lobbyism in a Danish charity organisation, making a point of constantly letting 
politicians know the nature and extent of the cancer problem, and just how much potential 
solutions would cost476. In this way he managed to secure continuous profits from the State’s 
national lottery. In his own words: 
We worked with analysis and marketing methods that at the time were a rare sight in a 
humanitarian organisation. The risk of mistakes was reduced by continuously analysing 
and testing new initiatives i.e. through the dialogue with the involved parties: members, 
lottery punters, ordinary contributors, businesses etc. We did that, for instance, before 
approaching the members, half of which would later agree to donate an additional 
biannual contribution; or before 20.000 members agreed to supply a permanent monthly 
donation to the Danish Cancer Society, or before approaching lottery punters about 
becoming members or making regular donations to the Society. The income of the lottery 
was multiplied, the membership was more than doubled to 375.000, and the average 
member’s donation was considerably increased. 477 
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Ole Bang’s management of the Danish Cancer Society became models for other Danish 
charities, like the Danish Heart Foundation who considered employing similar strategies478. This 
was understandable, given that the Danish Cancer Society increased its income sevenfold from 
1980-1989, see figure 4-1. 














Source: (Kræftens-Bekæmpelse 1980-1994). 
 
Throughout the 1980s this newfound prosperity allowed the Society to fund many more research 
projects than they used to. The Society’s Scientific Council was soon able to allocate more 
grants for both intramural and extramural cancer research than the State’s Medical Research 
Council, MRC. In fact, the Society’s own budgets indicate that at the end of the decade, the 
Cancer Society’s Scientific Council (SC) handed out more funds for cancer research than the 
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Source: Forskningsrådenes Årsberetninger & Kræftens Bekæmpelses Årsberetninger. 
 
The figure illustrates the increasing wealth of the cancer charity. The Society indisputably 
became the most important funding organ for Danish cancer research. And with money came 
influence, so the delicate power balance between public and private funding organs suddenly 
shifted. Much like a private business, the Cancer Society had to protect its own interests. Its goal 
was to support the anti-cancer cause by employing its collected funds most sufficiently, but at 
the same time it could no longer just hand out all of its funds to research and public education, 
because it had to secure a financial foundation in order to survive and be able to serve the cause 
for years to come. It needed a strategy to navigate in shifting institutional matrices and market 
conditions. And for this purpose, the Society’s new director acted in the same manner that a 
private corporation director would: he emphasized rational target attainment, modern marketing 
and fundraising.  
As is evident from the above, he was so successful in turning the old-fashioned cancer charity 
into a modern business with increasing incomes that the Society could no longer be expected to 
go along with just about anything the medical researchers wanted it to. It was a force to be 
reckoned with in times of political pressure on the health care sector. In a Northian perspective, 
the Society exploited the existing institutional framework set by government and the public’s 
Appropriations of the MRC and the Scientific
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response to the government’s strict financial policy and economically rather than medically 
based priorities within the hospital sector. The Society used the matrix to optimize its standing, 
wealth and influence: its symbolic capital. It did so through a mixture of Ole Bang’s managerial 
skills and the public’s response to the governmental policy of zero-growth in the public sector 
which after decades of booming hospital expansion must have felt as actual downsizing and 
gambling with public health rather than “just” a suspension of growth.  
In other words, the strategy of the Danish Cancer Society enjoyed increasing returns in the form 
of increasing charitable donations from the public and wise investment strategies which gave the 
organisation a new power position and a new basis for deciding whether or not the proposed 
Rockefeller centre would in fact serve or impair the cancer charity’s new role and objective. The 
Society had made a shift of strategy that was now paying off and had transformed the 
organisation from modest charity to a modern, powerful cancer-fighting business. And the two 
versions of the Society had very different means to promote and reach their objective.  
4.5 Path perpetuation in the face of destruction 
In August 1985, an article with the title “The State lets civil citizens pay for the fight against 
cancer” was run in one of the leading Danish newspapers. The article argued that the State did 
not assume responsibility for finding and financing a solution to the cancer problem, and even 
though the Cancer Society was experiencing great increases in its income and supposedly paid 
for more than two thirds of all cancer research projects, it was continuously dependent on 
voluntary contributions to be able to prevent the country’s anti-cancer efforts from collapsing480.  
Both the journalist of the article and the researchers and officials it quoted used the word “State” 
without always clarifying which agency, council or ministry they were referring to. This made 
the allegations against the State a bit confusing, as it is unclear to whom they refer. The “State” 
became an undefined and blurred opponent.  
The article brought quotes from Society chairman and Aarhus physician Steen Olsen and the 
head of management in the State’s Research Secretariat, Ib Terp, who agreed that the State – 
still meaning the State’s research councils, the MRC and the NSRC – had gradually downsized 
its allocations for cancer research, because of the newfound wealth of the private cancer charity, 
so that they could support other worthy research projects. The article used this information to 
argue that the State (here meaning the research councils) used the private effort as a pretext for 
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doing nothing, although Terp also stated that the research councils had made cancer research a 
special priority since the publication of the Kjeldgaard Report. But without additional funds 
from the Ministry of Education, this declaration of intent would be nothing more than an empty 
gesture. The head of the Danish Cancer Registry, cancer epidemiologist Ole Møller Jensen, was 
quoted saying that the State did not even contribute to the international WHO cancer centre in 
Lyon, and that Denmark was thus free-wheeling on the results of other countries’ cancer 
research481.  
In addition, it is interesting that the two quoted MD’s claimed that the financial support for 
clinically orientated cancer research was a public responsibility. The State – here meaning the 
Public Health Service – had a national responsibility for the quality of treatment of cancer at the 
county-financed hospitals and the State-financed Rigshospitalet, and perhaps the MD’s 
gradually expanded their perception of this responsibility to include support for cancer research 
as well. If so, they blurred the lines between health policy and research policy and the support 
of these. To the average man on the streets, though, the difference must have been non-existent 
in the first place.  
It is equally interesting that the physicians and the author of the article consistently refers to the 
“State” without specifying which public organ or agency is actually to be held accountable for 
the lack of cancer research policy and research support. Was it the research councils? The 
Ministry of Education? The Ministry of the Interior? None of these organs were bound by law to 
create special policies for individual research areas, or to support them with funds in addition to 
what was already being channelled through the State Budget to basic budgets of universities and 
hospitals, and as grants-in-aid from the research councils.  
Perhaps this is why the Minister of Education, Bertel Haarder, was quoted in the article for 
saying that instead of discussing the State’s inability to channel more money into Danish cancer 
research, the Danish people should rejoice in the fact that so many private individuals were 
willing to work for the cause482. In other words, the “State” was not disclaiming its supposed 
responsibility for the support of cancer research, but the Danish people had simply become more 
willing to donate money to the cancer charity. This was a somewhat positive spin on things from 
Haarder whose government was actively trying to reduce the national debt that had been created 
in an attempt to cover the uncontrollable growth of public expenditures; and to avoid financing 
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costly projects that could just as well be financed by others such as the wealthy Cancer Society 
which was after all established with the purpose of financing the anti-cancer cause. In addition 
to this, Haarder used another argument to justify the alleged lack of State support:   
It would, of course, be better if the public authorities could contribute even more, but there 
are also other important research areas, and I feel that we have spent quite a lot of time 
and effort on cancer research.483 
Haarder thus argued that the mere writing of the Kjeldgaard Report and the preparations of the 
comprehensive cancer centre were more than enough attention to the cancer field, although none 
of these initiatives had yet entailed additional appropriations from the State – be that the 
research councils, the Ministry of Education, or the Ministry of the Interior. The article further 
argued that the Danish Cancer Society was beginning to question the “State’s” willingness to 
build a comprehensive cancer centre, given that the government had not yet discussed the 
financial aspects of the proposed cancer centre, and that the Minister of the Interior, Britta 
Schall Holberg, had amputated the Finsen Institute by reducing the number of clinical posts 
from 26 to 14 in the spring of 1985484.  
The article thus did not paint a pretty picture of the State’s involvement in the fight against 
cancer, and it was published while Haarder’s Building Directorate slowly started negotiations 
with relevant funding bodies in order to find the financial means to establish a comprehensive 
cancer centre in the Rockefeller complex. Many questions had to be answered before Bertel 
Haarder and Britta Schall Holberg would decide on which of the proposed models to go by. For 
who was to finance what? The article mostly quoted representatives of the Cancer Society, and it 
accordingly made the Cancer Society look good as it stressed that the charity sponsored up to 
two thirds of all cancer projects, although no precise balance sheets or numbers were presented. 
The article became the first major offensive from the Society against the public authorities in the 
power play that was ahead. The negotiators flexed their muscles in public, perhaps to use this 
forum as third party enforcement in the as of yet contract-less power play and centre-
negotiating? 
On December 4th 1985, a meeting regarding the Rockefeller plans was held in the Building 
Directorate of the Ministry of Education. Representatives from all the involved institutes were 
invited, and the purpose of the meeting was to determine the space requirements of the research 
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groups expected to move into the complex, and to find out how much the initial renovation and 
refitting would cost. The head of the Building Directorate, Preben Larsen, stated that a total of 
4100 m2 in the Rockefeller complex would be made available for the centre during 1986, and 
that this space could be shared between the Fibiger Laboratory, the Cancer Registry and the 
Finsen Laboratory485. Up to this point, the Danish Cancer Society had estimated that the 
activities of its two research units would require approximately 3000 m2, and so the Finsen 
Laboratory was left with a total of 1100 m2486. The Building Directorate had calculated that the 
costs of the necessary renovation and reconstruction of the available premises would amount to 
DKK 65 million – special expenses for equipment not included – and according to Preben 
Larsen, the meeting participants had no fundamental objections to the spatial and financial 
proposal, and he therefore presented the centre plans in the Ministry of Education. In a 
following letter to the Society, Copenhagen University and Rigshospitalet, Preben Larsen 
explained the Minister’s reaction: 
The matter has subsequently been presented to the Minister of Education who has 
basically approved of further developments of the aforementioned basis on the condition 
that a reasonable clarification of the budgetary premises for the mentioned expenses will 
be worked out. This problem has been negotiated with the Ministry of Finance, and there 
is now such clarification available that the Building Directorate finds that there are 
sufficient grounds for continuous considerations about the establishment of the Cancer 
Research Centre.487  
The Building Directorate thus gave a preliminary green light for continuing the negotiations for 
a majority model cancer centre now that the State’s financial involvement had been specified. A 
transaction could be within reach. No defection as of yet. Ole Bang and the rest of the Danish 
Cancer Society were worried about the December meeting, though. Bang had given his and the 
Society’s acceptance of the general terms for further planning of the centre, but he had not done 
so without hesitation. It was not at all clear to which extent the budgetary plans would be 
accepted by the Ministry of Finance, and in addition to this Bang had argued that an ongoing 
and rapid expansion of the research activities of the Fibiger Laboratory and the Cancer Registry 
would soon require more space than the Society had initially been assigned488.  The increasing 
income of the Society had allowed it to plan for the establishment of a new experimental unit for 
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epidemiological and environmental cancer research, and this unit would have to be factored in 
as well. Also, there were plans of creating an annex laboratory for clinically relevant 
experimental research in cancers of the urinal tract, a clinical tumour-endocrinology research 
unit, and a molecular oncology group at the Fibiger Institute489. These were all space-consuming 
activities, and the Danish Cancer Society therefore demanded that in case the Rockefeller 
solution was agreed upon, it had to be possible to re-negotiate the spatial arrangements in the 
years to come490.  
The Society was also beginning to fear that the public authorities such as the MRC, the NSRC, 
the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Education would go against the recommendations of 
the Rockefeller centre report by gradually trying to minimise their financial involvement in the 
establishment of the centre – gradual defection – and thus leave the private cancer charity with 
the lion’s share of the expenses. The situation was thoroughly discussed within the management 
of the Danish Cancer Society, and in his annual report to the Head Board, Chairman Steen Olsen 
summed up the Rockefeller situation: 
Many different interests have wished to be taken into account in this matter, but as the 
party that in any case will have to finance over 80 % of the running costs of the cancer 
research centre over the next years, we find it reasonable to stick to the previously agreed 
on negotiation platform. We therefore want the following three key points to apply to 
future negotiations: 
First of all, it is our wish to contribute actively to the coordination of the Copenhagen area 
cancer research. 
Secondly, we have stressed that a cancer centre should be established on the basis of an 
accumulation of the existing institutes (the Fibiger Institute, the Danish Cancer Registry, 
and the Finsen Institute), and that we cannot under any circumstances take part in a 
solution that presupposes a geographical separation of the Society’s two institutes or parts 
thereof. Furthermore, we will naturally not accept any impairment of the present area 
extent and laboratory conditions.  
Thirdly, we have offered to take on the costs of establishing our own laboratories in a 
Rockefeller complex fitted for laboratory work, but we have stressed that we did not find 
it reasonable that we should assume responsibility for the renovation of the State’s 
property for privately collected money.491 
Although the chairman argued that the Society was all for a Rockefeller centre on these 
conditions, he and his organisation must have seriously doubted that the financial negotiations 
with the State would ever fall out right. At least, they had been looking for alternative ways to 
establish a centre and serving its own interest by keeping its research units together: 
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If the Rockefeller solution cannot be put into practice on the outlined conditions, we will, 
on our part, have to resign to the next best solution, which is that we will try to establish 
the cancer centre in the Danish Cancer Society’s research building in Ndr. Frihavnsgade 
[the former Finsen campus], which is modern and well equipped for high-tech laboratory 
work. This is, however, only feasible if the part of the building which is rented to the State 
for Rigshospitalet’s pharmacy, is released. In that case, one would be able to house the 
Fibiger Institute, the Cancer Registry, and the Finsen Laboratory, and in addition be able 
to provide laboratory space for other cancer research groups. During the negotiations, the 
Danish Cancer Society has stated that the expansions made possible by the Society’s 
financial advancement, will, in the long term, make it necessary for the Society to have 
more research areas at its disposal. For this reason, we have presumed that in case a 
Rockefeller solution is decided on, we can arrange a negotiation procedure regarding the 
floor space that may later be available in the Rockefeller complex.492  
A Cancer Society defection from the negotiations and Rockefeller plans was now a definite 
possibility. On May 13th 1986, the Rockefeller parties held another meeting at the Building 
Directorate. The Danish Cancer Society’s need for space was brought up, and different solutions 
to the problem were assessed. According to Ole Bang, the Society was asked to come up with a 
detailed list of necessary requirements for laboratory space, and to consider if it would be able to 
manage the situation if it was promised an additional 1000 m2 right away, whilst any further 
needs could be met in another 2-3 years493.  
However, Bang was not satisfied with the outcome of the meeting, as he noted that Preben 
Larsen assumed that the Cancer Society would pay rent for the laboratory space it would be 
assigned. Following the meeting, he wrote a letter to Preben Larsen in which he clarified the 
Society’s opinion on this matter. According to Bang, it was the Society’s fundamental position 
that the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Education should provide the laboratory 
space free of charge, as the Society would evidently have to take on most of the centre’s 
remaining expenses494. However, if this was to be the crux of the matter, the Society was willing 
to negotiate. But given that meanwhile the Minister of Education had suddenly proved unwilling 
to pay all of the aforementioned DKK 65 million for renovation and reconstruction; it meant 
more expenses for the Danish Cancer Society. In his letter, Bang elaborated: 
As you know, we are fighting nail and tooth to prevent the financial burdens of Danish 
cancer research from being increasingly placed on the Society. On this basis, we do not 
find it reasonable that, in addition to having to pay for the majority of the actual research 
activities in the Rockefeller complex, we have to pay rent to the State. The issue is further 
emphasised by Professor Pindborg’s [the new chairman of the MRC, who was professor at the 
Dep. For Pathology and Medicine, CU] comment that with the support received by the 
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Society from the Danish people, there was no need for the MRC to set aside more funds 
for cancer research. When Pindborg incidentally and unsolicitedly offered to give up the 
disposal of areas for MRC initiatives in the cancer research centre, it has to be seen 
against this background [the comment].495 
It has not been possible to find sources that shed light on the reason why the MRC chose to give 
up its space in the Rockefeller centre to the Society. It may have had such a strong wish to 
establish the cancer centre so that giving away the space for the two MRC-supported research 
professors really was not a high price to pay, if it meant that the Danish Cancer Society would 
move its research units to the Rockefeller complex and that the centre would come into 
existence. Given that the minority proposal of the MRC centre report had been discarded, 
research professors Olsson and Larsson would not have any significant position or laboratory 
space in the centre anyway. And although the research council was undoubtedly trying to cut 
back its funds for cancer research, so that it could support other worthy causes that did not 
otherwise benefit from a wealthy private charity organisation like the Cancer Society, it does not 
make sense for the MRC to give up space in the Rockefeller centre for this reason, as Bang 
argued in the above. The MRC would still have to finance the two research professors, no matter 
where they resided. Ole Bang was almost certainly aware of this, and it would appear that he 
may have had other motives for lashing out at the MRC chairman Pindborg and his offer. 
Perhaps the Danish Cancer Society was trying to get out of the Rockefeller plans, and needed a 
pretext to do so? In this case, Pindborg’s efforts to meet the stated needs of the Danish Cancer 
Society would have been very inconvenient to the Society. At least, that was how Preben Larsen 
from the State’s Building Directorate saw it. 
Immediately after having received Bang’s letter, Preben Larsen retorted. He wrote to Bang and 
stated that while he had been sad to hear about the Society’s initial anxieties about the spatial 
arrangements of the proposed centre, he simply could not understand the views presented by 
Bang in his latest letter: 
In my opinion it has always been clear that the Society in some way had to illustrate its 
positive attitude towards the establishment of a cancer centre, but with the latest move I 
am more or less forced to assess the situation in the way that one does what one possibly 
can to prevent the plans from being put into practice, if the views and wishes of the other 
parties concerned should be taken into consideration.  
On the basis of the floor space surveys we did in 1985, it was completely clear that it 
would be difficult to grant the stated wishes, and the Society’s stated wish at the meeting 
on 13th May – despite of this – to be granted an expansion of its laboratory space with 
1400 m2 or approximately 40% more than the previously granted floor space, could at 
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first glance be seen as prohibitive. I point to the fact that as recently as at the meeting in 
the Ministry on 4th December 1985 the Society indicated that it stood by the previously 
estimated needs for floor space.  
Even so, I favoured continuing the plans, as I must assume that all concerned parties were 
still prepared to positively and actively contribute to the realisation of the plans for the 
cancer research centre. The fact that I – as stated at the meeting – have put quite a lot of 
energy into clarifying the financial problems reflects the State’s emphasis on realising this 
project. The latest move in which the Society altogether refuses to participate financially – 
also through a subsequent  payment of rent – makes the matter almost impossible in my 
opinion, but I will as a matter of course loyally present the problem to the Minister of 
Education.496 
Shortly after, Ole Bang responded to Preben Larsen. He argued that Larsen’s accusations against 
the Society were greatly exaggerated, and that it was hardly fair to say that the Society had 
disclaimed all financial responsibility for the centre497.  After all, the Society was already 
financing 80% of the cancer research in the proposed centre and had not completely dismissed 
the idea of a rental arrangement. The rent was not a major expense compared with what the 
Society was already spending on the housing of the Fibiger Institute and the Cancer Registry, 
but Ole Bang and the Society did not like the political message of the arrangement: that the State 
believed cancer research to be a private affair498. As for the Society’s need for more laboratory 
space, Bang would report back to Preben Larsen as soon as the Executive Committee had met 
with the two directors of the Society’s research units, Jørgen Kieler and Ole Møller Jensen. 
Together, they would assess whether or not it would be possible and favourable to move the two 
units into the Rockefeller complex under the proposed spatial conditions499. 
4.6 Collapse!  
On 9th July, the Danish Cancer Society informed the Ministry of Education that it no longer 
wished to take part in the further planning of the Rockefeller cancer centre. Kieler and Møller 
had come to the conclusion that a move to the centre would mean an impairment of their 
working conditions, unless even more space could be released500. The Society’s Executive 
Committee eventually decided that the Rockefeller solution simply did not offer enough space to 
house the ever-expanding Fibiger Institute and the Cancer Registry without splitting up the 
units, and this was not an option501. The Society thus declined the offer of being part of the 
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cancer centre in the Rockefeller complex. In Chairman Steen Olsen’s annual report to the Head 
Board on 5th December 1986, the situation was explained as an unfortunate collapse of a good 
idea, and that in many ways the abandonment of the project was the result of the massive private 
donations to the Society and that this could only be considered a good thing502. Furthermore, 
Olsen argued that: 
This does not necessarily mean that the idea of a cancer research centre in the Copenhagen 
area has to be abandoned. The Society’s research building in Ndr. Frihavnsgade is 
modern, spacious and well-equipped, and when the departments of Rigshospitalet 
(pharmacy and pathological department) have been moved out, it will at the present time 
be able to house our own research activities and to some extent make room for other 
research groups which have a natural need for a close physical contact with the activities 
of the research centre. (…) As there will be additional space at the Finsen campus, when 
the move of Rigshospitalet’s departments has been completed, we have contacted the 
Building Directorate of the Ministry of Education to inquire about our potential inclusion 
in the negotiations about the future use of the Finsen campus, with regard to our interest in 
disposing over additional buildings in the area. 
We trust that the collaboration with the oncology departments of Rigshospitalet will be 
maintained and expanded, given that the distance from Blegdamsvej to Ndr. Frihavnsgade 
is, after all, limited. Let there be no doubt that the Society will continue to work for a 
coordination of cancer research.503 
The decision must have been frustrating for Preben Larsen and the representatives from 
Rigshospitalet, the University, and the MRC. They had all invested time and energy in the 
planning of the comprehensive cancer centre from which the Society had now pulled the plug, 
and to some parties the decision must have seemed rather rash. The Society’s argument to defect 
from the project must have puzzled the other negotiating parties, as the space problems had been 
known by all for quite some time. Perhaps the Society could have pulled the plug on the centre 
plans a little earlier in the planning process instead of putting on a performance at a negotiating 
table they might not really wanted to join? This evoked anger amongst the others who felt that 
their time had been wasted. Ole Bang was very aware of this: 
After five years of discussions, the anger of our collaboration partners was great and 
understandable. I agreed with the decision of the Executive Committee, but in retrospect, 
it was a mistake not to acknowledge the situation at an earlier stage.  
After that, our three collaboration partners tried to carry out the Rockefeller plan without 
us – but unfortunately their efforts were in vain. As for us, we began working on the 
alternative plan for the establishment of “The Danish Cancer Society’s Research Centre” 
in our research building at the Finsen campus.504 
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As mentioned above, the Society was already making plans for an alternative centre at least 
seven months before it backed out of the Rockefeller plans. So why did it not retreat from the 
Rockefeller plans at that point? Why did it go on for at least seven months of intensive 
bargaining about extra square meters? It seems as if the Society may have had other motives for 
dropping the Rockefeller plans than the mere lack of space. In his memoirs, Ole Bang offers a 
possible explanation: 
In overall terms, it was the position of the management – a position that I incidentally had 
expressed in my job interview with the Executive Committee – that as a general rule, the 
operation of cancer research institutes had to be the responsibility of the public authorities. 
The main strategy of the Danish Cancer Society had to be to start new research initiatives 
(including institutes) for a limited amount of money, as we had done with the Danish 
Cancer Registry, the efforts within the field of environmental carcinogenesis, and the 
establishment of a department for experimental clinical oncology. When the initiatives had 
proved their viability, we had to strive towards making their continued development and 
operation a governmental responsibility. During the 1980s, however, it became clear that 
this strategy was completely unrealistic for financial reasons. Our efforts to strengthen 
cancer research thus had to include the continued operation of our own research institutes 
with the advantages such a thing implied and the demands it posed for firmness of intent, 
among other things. This did not just concern new initiatives, but also the termination, 
reduction or radical changes of already established initiatives.505 
As it became clear to the Society that a potential State takeover of the Cancer Registry would 
most likely mean a considerable impairment of the units’ financial situation and scientific work, 
the private cancer charity gradually gave up its ambition of handing over all of its research units 
to the public authorities. In fact, only the departments of the Aarhus Cancer Research Institute 
were ever successfully integrated in a university hospital, after the Society’s International 
Scientific Advisory Committee (ISAC) had advised the Society to split up the institute and 
terminate or move the different departments to public research institutions in Aarhus506. Also, 
Ole Bang and the Executive Committee of the Society had begun noticing certain advantages in 
running their own research units. 
As mentioned before, the 1980s financial situation in Denmark was characterised by heavy 
inflation. During periods of heavy inflation, the interest rate is usually also high, and for a 
private business like the Cancer Society this could have meant a high yield of its capital. 
However the interest rate is subject to great variation, whereas investment in real estate would 
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be much safer for the private Cancer Society which was heavily dependent on the voluntary 
contributions of the Danish people. The investment in physical buildings was thus seen as a way 
of protecting the increasing capital of the cancer charity against the strong inflationary pressure 
of the 1980s, and from the point of view of the private Society it therefore made sense to buy the 
Finsen campus from the State immediately after it resigned from the Rockefeller project.  
But although this was supposedly a sound and acceptable strategy from the point of view of an 
economist like Ole Bang and anyone else from the financial world, it would not please the more 
traditional-minded parts of the scientific community. As will be evident in the following 
chapter, many cancer researchers still thought of the Danish Cancer Society as a modest cancer 
charity – a foundation – and not a modern business with aggressive business strategies. 
According to one of the Society’s physicians, he was often met with the notion that a foundation 
was supposed to invest in research projects rather than in bricks, and he thus felt that the 
newfound wealth and ambition of the private charity was fraught with problems507.  
The Executive Committee of the Society made long-term investments in bricks and mortar in 
order to secure Danish cancer research in case the Society ceased to receive the testamentary 
gifts and private donations which were the organisation’s entire basis of existence. In other 
words, they did what they had to do to survive under difficult market conditions (formal 
constraints), which thus greatly influenced the way the Cancer Society acted and planned for the 
future. However, the Executive Committee must have suspected that Preben Larsen, 
Rigshospitalet, the Copenhagen University, and the MRC would not accept this argument as a 
legitimate way out of the Rockefeller project. Rather than seeing the investment in research 
buildings as a way of securing funds for future cancer research, the representatives could easily 
see it as an obstructive case of property speculation which was not in tune with the modest 
ideology of traditional charities.  
Ole Bang never brought the matter up during the negotiations for the comprehensive Rockefeller 
centre, but as it turned out this evasive manoeuvre could not prevent the Society from incurring 
the wrath of the negotiating partners. This is understandable, given that the Society had made an 
actual U-turn during the negotiations: from being very interested in the Rockefeller centre and 
handing over its research units to the State (to be placed at either  Rigshospitalet or the 
University), to pulling back from the negotiations in order to pursue its own plans of buying 
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property for a privately financed cancer research centre. And although it made good financial 
sense for the Society to act as it did, the decision was not met with understanding by parts of the 
scientific community who did not necessarily accept the cynical dispositions a business leader 
has to do in order to make his business thrive or simply survive, as will be evident in Chapter 5.  
According to the theories of Douglass C. North, the development of the negotiations for the 
cancer centre and the Society’s withdrawal from the Rockefeller project is not surprising. As 
mentioned in chapter 1, the decisions of an organisation are restricted by formal and informal 
institutions. Only stable institutional settings will lead the organisation to believe that it will 
gain continuously from a transaction over time and therefore maintain the same choice/action in 
order to secure an efficient bargaining power. However, if the institutional matrix changes, so 
might the organisation’s choice and actions. Most institutional change is incremental, but over 
time even these small changes create new situations for the organisations and evolve into a 
different set of choices than was originally the case. The increased wealth of the Cancer Society 
from 1980-86, the international economical instability of the time, and the changed managerial 
style of the private cancer charity eventually led the organisation to doubt whether the centre 
plans were in fact supporting or threatening the continued survival of the organisation itself. It 
thus reversed its initial attitude towards the proposed Rockefeller centre.  
But although these changes in economy and organisational strategy led the cancer charity to 
defect the Rockefeller plans, the organisation still put forward a suggestion of establishing a 
cancer centre at another and (for the charity) more lucrative location. This suggestion, although 
content-wise inferior to the comprehensive Rockefeller vision, served the purpose of protecting 
the cancer charity against the decreasing societal returns, PR and collegial attacks that would 
surely arise from a complete abortion of the cancer centre idea. The MRC chairman Pindborg 
pressed to continue the Rockefeller project in spite of the Society’s defection, but his efforts 
were in vain. With the loss of the dominant funding body, the Minister of Education no longer 
believed in the project and withdrew his previous offer of financing the rebuilding and 
renovation of the Rockefeller complex508. The money was not automatically reserved for the 
proposed larger cancer centre at the Finsen campus, however.  
In essence, the matter can be seen as an organisation (the Cancer Society) reacting to a multi-
level problem (the planning of a public-private cancer centre) by utilizing the opportunities 
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given by institutional changes/constraints on many levels. A global recession resulted in strict 
national/state level financial policy and minimal state research support. This acted as constraints 
for the public researchers, the University and the hospitals  who were pressed to find alternative 
funding elsewhere in order to maintain their laboratories and funding levels in reasonable states. 
By appealing to the State for a cancer centre like the one proposed in the Kjeldgaard Report – 
using socio-economical arguments to underscore the value and applicability of “cancer 
research” and a “cancer centre” with the ability to bridge bench and bedside – these public 
researchers and their organisations teamed up with the Danish Cancer Society which, who for 
strategic and PR purposes, had kept the centre dream alive throughout the last decade of 
abundant science push state support (favourable formal institutions) and unfavourable informal 
institutions (the researchers’ lack of need to appeal for special budgets or conditions for 
categorical research centres). Now, the State’s support for science and medicine had changed 
dramatically, and a three-partite strategy to attract more funding was put in motion to 1) argue 
the applicability of cancer research (“it pays to invest in cancer research as it yield better 
treatments”) and demand additional funding for this venture, 2) team up with the Cancer Society 
who traditionally supported this strategic science policy and thus attract funds from this 
organisation, 3) appeal to the public to create new and powerful informal institutions (the taste 
and preferences of the politicians’electorates) to affect State policy. 
And while the State entered into negotiations for a cancer centre in the hope that a centre could 
be established cost-free as part of existing hospital plans – or by getting the Cancer Society to 
cover the lion’s share of any additional costs – the cancer organisation tried to affect the State 
and the public to expand the institutional matrix sufficiently for it to carry through its shifting 
strategies whilst it gained strength and leverage through the competence of an individual, its 
new director Ole Bang. The matter illustrates how the institutional matrix surrounding the 
Rockefeller plans was not subject to a one-directional top-down change such as e.g.: global 
level state levelorganisational levelindividual/public level. On the contrary, the matrix 
seemed to be the result of a multitude of intertwined and unidirectional movements across 
levels. Some were successful in bringing about (incremental) change and affecting the actions of 
others, and some did not have enough momentum or power to bring about change to others. As 
the next chapter will show, an organisation could be just as (or even more) vulnerable to 
informal constraints created on the individual level as it would be to formal constraints from a 
State level. For this reason, a “level”- specific analysis is not the aim of this thesis. 
 




The plans to establish a comprehensive cancer centre in Copenhagen was a chance for the 
cancer community to: 
1) Coordinate and strengthen the Copenhagen cancer research for a more efficient attack on 
cancer and to change formal institutions towards the State prioritising the area 
financially. 
2) Signal a united front in the war on cancer: that the many different research and clinical 
activities made in the war on cancer were in fact different but mutually beneficial and 
that it should be prioritised politically and (secondarily) recognised professionally in the 
scientific-medical communities on a par with the established disciplines and specialities 
they sprang from.  
3) Decide on the future of the Danish Cancer Society’s research units. The idea of 
coordinating differently managed and financed public and private research groups 
originally (in the Kjeldgaard Report) implied a State takeover of the private Cancer 
Society’s research units. The management set-up of a new centre would have to be 
flexible enough to accommodate a gradual ownership change of the Society’s units over 
the years to come. 
Following the Kjeldgaard Report, a MRC-led working group set out to sketch a model for a 
comprehensive cancer centre in a report to the government. The green light for such an 
arrangement was given by the Minister of Education, provided that the new centre could be 
established within the confinements of the already planned expansion of Rigshospitalet and at 
no additional costs. This was an expression of the government’s financial strategy to control the 
growth of public expenditures that had boomed throughout the previous decades. A no-growth 
policy for public expenditures meant no actual downsizing per se, but in the hospital sector the 
policy was felt as serious budget cuts inasmuch as the introduction of new and expensive 
treatments and more hospital admissions had to be provided on a “frozen” budget. This 
inevitably led to unpopular economic prioritising in the health care sector when it came to how 
to allocate existing funds. Were some services, treatments, diseases or patient groups more 
deserving of support than others?  
The plans of a comprehensive cancer centre in theory played into these formal institutions set by 
government inasmuch as a united attack on cancer through the establishment of a 
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comprehensive cancer centre would supposedly have long-term socio-economic effects in the 
form of improved cancer treatment and prevention (as stated in the Kjeldgaard Report). 
Provided, of course, that the centre could bring about a synergy effect between existing anti-
cancer initiatives in the Copenhagen labs and clinics. And provided that such a synergy effect 
and the centre facilitating it could be established at no additional costs which had definitely not 
been the idea in the Kjeldgaard Report that revived the idea of the cancer centre. In this way, the 
formal institutions were not favourable for a cancer centre.  
Also, the task of finding unity in the cancer community and sketching a consensus model for a 
cancer centre proved very difficult from the start under the given institutional matrix. The 
planning parties held very different views and preferences on matters such as content, form and 
financing of the centre. So much that the former topic was only vaguely touched upon in the 
planning process. This was most likely done in order to prevent the proposed centre from 
collapsing in its making, as communicative efforts and diplomacy were needed to unite the 
financially pressed planning parties in compromise if the centre was ever to have a chance on 
the zero-sum-game conditions. The matter of scientific content was irrevocably linked with a 
selection and exclusion of research groups belonging to these planning parties, and the working 
group was not ready to address this issue up front or to find a model to accommodate the 
conflicting interests in the group. It would not be in the interest of the working group as a 
collective to display conflict over the basis of a centre if that State was ever to provide 
additional funding or even the proposed laboratory space for the centre.  Instead, the group 
focused on the financing and management of the centre. These matters typically courted 
disagreement as well, but this most have been seen as part of a “natural” administrative 
negotiation rather than a matter relating to the very rationale of a centre. 
And the members of the MRC working group planning for the centre did not agree on these 
points either. The members thus handed in a report outlining both a majority and a minority 
model. The majority model resembled the comprehensive cancer centres of the Kjeldgaard 
Report, and was to be run by a Supervisory Board consisting of representatives of each institute 
(Rigshospitalet, the Society, Copenhagen University and the MRC) and a Coordination Council 
with representatives from the research groups of the centre. A model that might have aimed for 
unity through a managerial model satisfying all different funding bodies, but which severely 
lacked focus on a unifying research program for the centre’s potential inhabitants. Form, not 
content! Also, it presupposed that the Ministry of Education would agree to allocate funds for 
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modernising and equipping the physical building housing the centre. And this was not in direct 
accord with the formal institutions of the time. 
The minority model, on the other hand, tried to play into these institutions with a different 
financial model and a focus on content (prioritising a specific research program) by proposing a 
biotechnology centre financed by biotechnology program funds and the patent profits of the 
centre’s researchers (in particular Lennart Olsson who was given a prominent place in this 
centre), and which was to be run by a director appointed by Rigshospitalet according to statutes 
written by the MRC. However, this model excluded clinical activities from the centre and thus 
did not resemble a comprehensive cancer centre. Also, it made no attempt to unite the involved 
parties of the cancer community through a common managerial model which by the minority 
was considered an impossible task. It would be a centre of independently managed groups 
united only through a biotech-approach to cancer. Content, not form!  
Both models presupposed that the physical coordination of the centre’s research groups would 
result in a “synergy effect”: that something new would emerge that could not have occurred 
without the centre. But neither of the models referred to such documented effect from other 
known centres in the World. Therefore, the additional scientific and socio-economic effects of 
coordinating the Copenhagen area cancer research remained a loose and intangible promise. In 
this sense, the MRC working group did not plan for the centre in the manner that the 
Washington conference on planning for cancer centres (chapter 3) had concluded was best. The 
Washington model was based on more than a decade of experience of building cancer centres, 
and according to this, planning for a cancer centre should proceed through the following steps: 
1) Identify a viable and shared research program. 
2) Identify relevant research groups. 
3) Find a director and a managerial/financial set-up. 
4) Find a proper location. 
In Denmark, the MRC working group focused on similar steps but in a different order: 4, 3 & 2. 
Step 1 was apparently expected to occur automatically. However, up until this point cross-
disciplinarity and cross-organisational collaboration had not emerged by itself between the 
existing research milieus. At least not in the opinion of researchers not present at the planning 
and negotiation table. The researchers therefore began bilateral discussions of this topic after the 
MRC working group had handed in their report to the government. They concluded that unity 
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and collaboration in a cancer centre would require an organisational and managerial set-up that 
would potentially deprive the funding bodies/planning parties of some of their influence on the 
centre. In other words, it could disturb the delicate power balance between these parties which 
may be why the matter of centre content was not discussed in the official report.  
Given that the working group had not been able to present a consensus model for a centre, 
further evidence of (irreconcilable) differences between the planning parties would not have 
been positively received by the Minister of Education and the Minister of the Interior in their 
assessment of the proposed initiatives and their odds of success. A poorly described project 
content does not necessarily mean that no one will fund a project, if the benefactors have faith in 
the project’s aim and organisation. A publicly known conflict over scientific content, on the 
other hand, would illustrate to the state and the public that the proposed centre had an unstable 
foundation if the planning parties could not even agree on this point. 
So while the majority model of the report signalled a united public-private front against cancer, 
the project organisation was in practice only as strong or as brittle as its ability to agree on the 
centre’s content – the research program – as defining such a program would naturally lead to 
including and excluding different lines of research, research groups and perhaps even planning 
parties from the centre. The omission of the inherent scientific conflict over centre content in the 
official report was a short sighted solution to win time and perhaps binding agreement from 
funding bodies.  
The report, including both models, was presented to the Minister of Education and the Minister 
of the Interior who had to decide which model to back. With their blessing, the negotiation 
parties eventually continued developing the majority model of a comprehensive cancer centre at 
the Rockefeller Institute, despite the lack of content presentation, and despite the fact that the 
proposed multi-institute management of this centre would not necessarily function in practise, as 
cancer researcher Keld Danø pointed out. The project would be a joint co-operation between the 
State-held Rigshospitalet, Copenhagen University, the MRC and a private anti-cancer 
organisation (the Cancer Society) who each held different views on cancer research and research 
administration and had to protect their autonomy and interests.  
A successful establishment of the centre thus depended on a power-balance between these 
institutes. And the balance in return depended on a fair division of financial responsibility and 
laboratory space between the different planning parties. If the matter of a shared scientific 
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program to be addresses up front in the planning process, it would be in a scenario in which the 
state supllied the majority of the centre funding. In this way, the groups would be more likely to 
select research group for the centre on the basis of their scientific relevance to a shared program 
rather than on the basis of the quid per quo principle of financial negotiations between the many 
smaller funding bodies at the negotiation table. As such level of state funding was next to 
impossible to obtain at the time, particularly the Danish Cancer Society must have realised that 
the financial burden would eventually be brought on its shoulders. This alone would effectively 
change the power balance between the negotiators. And the balance did shift dramatically as the 
income of the Cancer Society increased considerably from year to year.  
The growth of the Society owed in part to the financial skills of the new Society director Ole 
Bang, and partly to the government’s financial policy to control public expenditures and make 
economically based – rather than medically based – priorities in the health care sector. This 
policy was very unpopular with the Danes. Especially when such priorities backfired in a very 
public scandal about budget cuts of HIV screening of donor blood. The private Cancer Society 
capitalised on doing what the man on the street thought the State ought to be doing. In other 
words, the organisation thrived by utilising the existing institutional matrix created by 
governmental policy and the public feedback to it, as the Society enjoyed increasing returns in 
the form of charitable donations for the anti-cancer cause. Whilst the Society did not succeed in 
making the cause a state financial priority by creating institutional change (like the Kjeldgaard 
Report had called for), it succeeded in making it a people’s cause under the existing institutional 
matrix.  
Sociologically speaking, this fruitful strategy gave the Society improved wealth and influence – 
symbolic capital – in the social field of the cancer community and the broader public society. 
And it gave the Society a new platform from which to negotiate its involvement in the proposed 
cancer centre. A new situation was suddenly created that required careful management 
evaluation of the Society’s future strategy in the matter of the cancer centre. Should it act as the 
modest and physician dominated charity as in the beginning of the 1980s, or should it continue 
to follow the winning strategy that had transformed it into a modern corporate charity 
employing modern business strategies?  
The society chose the latter with the official explanation that the financial growth had led to an 
expansion of the Society’s scientific activities at its research units. In 1986 the Society pulled 
back from the Rockefeller plans arguing that these plans would no longer be able to give the 
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Fibiger Laboratory and the Cancer Registry enough laboratory space. However, at the same time 
the research councils and the Ministry of Education were gradually downsizing their support for 
cancer research projects and the proposed Rockefeller cancer centre, respectively, because the 
government was actively trying to reduce the national debt and therefore did not want to commit 
itself to costly projects that could otherwise be financed the wealthy Cancer Society.  
The Cancer Society disliked being forced into financing the lion’s share of the centre without 
being given proportionate influence on it. With the increased income, the Society had become 
the major powerbroker of the cancer community over the course of just a few years and it could 
not be expected to go along with just anything, especially not if it went against the cancer 
charity’s interests and strategy to survive (through asset management, publicity, investment in 
real estate etc), and the organisation thus pulled out of the Rockefeller project whilst arguing 
that the centre could no longer provide sufficient laboratory space for the Fibiger Laboratory 
and the Cancer Registry. But although this was the official explanation for the defection from 
the planning process, there seemed to be more to the matter than this.  
The Society had looked into the possibility of buying the Finsen area and establishing a private 
cancer research centre there for no less than seven months before backing out of the Rockefeller 
project. Taking the market conditions (inflation) of the time into account, the private cancer 
charity began to speculate in ways to protect its assets and secure its continued survival and 
support for the anti-cancer cause for years to come. The Society’s director Ole Bang and the rest 
of the Society’s direction thus changed their minds about handing over the Society’s research 
units to the State, as the units held publicity value for the private business and because the 
investment in real estate was a potential financial strategy to protect the wealth of the Society 
against the inflationary pressure. Institutional constraints such as the market conditions were 
thus determining factors in the Society’s choice of strategy during the Rockefeller negotiations. 
But when the cancer organisation pulled out of the project, it upset the other negotiation parties 
who had spent time and energy on planning for the comprehensive cancer centre. The Society’s 
involvement in the project was pivotal, as the cancer charity would be one of – if not the – most 
important funding body. The fact that the Society had continued to negotiate for seven months 
after having begun to search for an alternative solution at the Finsen area did not make things 
better. From the perspective of the Society’s management, however, this was a sound decision 
owing to the fact that the organisation was in the process of finding its strategic stance in times 
of great financial and managerial transformation from modest charity to corporate charity. 
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According to the business logics of Bang, it was very wise for an organisation like the Society to 
find out if the positive economic development it experienced was a significant and continuous 
trend or if it was just a fluke, isolated phenomena before committing to any larger financial 
agreements. For this reason, the Society wanted to keep their options open with both the centre 
and the investment strategy. 
Still, as the next chapter will show, the collapse of the Rockefeller plans did not lead to the 
collapse of the cancer centre idea all together. It was carried on in a new and scientifically quite 
different form that no longer resembled a comprehensive cancer centre.  
In a path dependence perspective, this should have been the logical end of the centre-path – that 
is the path’s destruction – but it was not. And this is where the path dependence perspective 
offers the case nuance. The internal political and financial rearrangement in the Cancer Society 
(budget reform, new director etc.), the formal and informal institutions set by government and 
the public response to governmental policy, and the financial manoeuvring of the Society’ new 
direction led the private charity to newfound wealth and influence from 1980-1986. The results 
of and feedback to this strategy made the charity start questioning whether the institutional 
framework that girded the idea of the comprehensive cancer centre would in fact threaten or 
support the organisation’s chance of survival in the 1980s pressed economy. From its start by 
the Kjeldgaard Report, the comprehensive cancer centre had been part of an offensive to change 
formal institutions in favour of a political prioritising of cancer research. As mentioned in 
chapter 3, the Report did not have enough leverage to create institutional change, but the 
government allowed the idea of a centre to be continued, on the (crippling) condition that it 
could be done for no additional funds (under the existing formal institutions). The negotiation 
parties initially agreed to continue planning under these terms. However, the Society’s sudden 
increase of symbolic capital during the planning for a cancer centre gave the charity new options 
for optimising its standing and fulfilling its objective than the establishment of the Rockefeller 
cancer centre.  The cancer charity eventually decided that the centre plans in their current form 
were in fact not convergent with the Society’s newfound symbolic capital and strategy in the 
social field of the cancer community. It therefore defected from the Rockefeller transaction. 
According to the conceptual framework of Douglass C. North, the Society’s actions were far 
from surprising. An organisation is restricted by formal and informal institutions, and only 
stable institutions will lead the organisation to believe it can gain continuously from a 
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transaction over time and maintain efficient bargaining power in such transactions. However, 
with institutional changes (even incremental ones) the organisation’s choices in a matter might 
change over time. In the case of the Rockefeller centre, the Society started out by backing the 
plan in the belief that the plan was the best way to support its anti-cancer cause through 1) a 
synergy effect of the research it supported and 2) through using the plans to make the State 
assume financial responsibility of the private research units (the Society’s spear head strategy); 
thus freeing up capital for direct research support rather than investments in bricks and mortar 
which was too expensive for a modest cancer charity that would rather function as a foundation. 
This was the strategy of a modest cancer charity with limited funds and power, to which a 
change of formal institutions (State takeover of research units) was needed to survive. However, 
the situation quickly changed due to a series of events: 
 The restrictive governmental financial policy maintained formal institutions that were 
not compliant with such change.   
 These formal institutions soon became increasingly unpopular with the Danes (= an 
incremental change of informal institutions in the form of taste and preferences). 
 The Society hired a new director with great business skills to exchange this institutional 
matrix to wealth and symbolic capital.  
These events opened new windows of institutional opportunity for the Society and caused it to 
change its strategy and its choices in the matter of the Rockefeller centre. Its support for the 
cancer centre was fraught with too many unknown factors such as the financial arrangement 
between the negotiating parties (including the uncertainty surrounding the government’s attitude 
towards financing the modernisation and equipment of the Rockefeller buildings), the fate of the 
Society’s research units in the proposed centre, the nature of a potential research program, and 
the political agendas of the other planning parties. Agreeing to finance part of the centre would 
be equivalent to a traditional financial transaction. And according to economic theory, a 
transaction based on such incomplete information about the other transaction partners is in risk 
of suffering defection. Especially, if the centre was originally planned to be the tool to change 
formal institutions towards favouring cancer research and making it a financial priority of the 
government.  
Such a political agenda of the planners was not likely to succeed any time soon, and as the 
Society thrived in the institutional matrix the centre plan was originally planned to change (as 
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put forth in the Kjeldgaard Report), the Society had to re-evaluate its participation. Why engage 
in a project fraud with so many uncertainties compared with the new strategy that seemed to be 
working for the organisation? Why not serve the Society’s own interests by making sound 
investments in real estate, create a privately controlled and financed research centre that would 
not split up or impair the Society’s research units, and secure future capital for the fulfilment of 
the organisation’s anti-cancer cause?    
However, defection from the plans would not be popular – although logically based. In the 
absence of a third party enforcer as seen in traditional contractual economic transactions, the 
Society was really only in danger of suffering a decrease in broader societal returns (the public 
opinion and contributions) if defection was portrayed unfavourable in the press or resulted in 
internal conflicts in the cancer community. That is, if the decision to defect was not seen as a 
logical choice to best support the anti-cancer cause. And although this was a serious threat to an 
organisation that depended on its image and charitable donations, such a negative portrayal in 
the media was not made at this point in history. And why not? Why did the path of the cancer 
centre not collapse due to the defection? 
The answer to these questions is that the Society simultaneously presented plans for a new 
centre maintaining its chief objective of coordinating Copenhagen cancer research. And 
although this centre did no longer entail clinical activities because it was not placed at a hospital 
or medical faculty – and was no longer a comprehensive cancer centre – the centre was “sold” to 
the public and the cancer community as the means to showcase unity of the heterogeneous 
cancer field. Though the defection from the Rockefeller plans evoked anger amongst the 
negotiation parties, they did not immediately dismiss the idea of the new and scientifically 
inferior centre at a different location. And why is this? The path was perpetuated in spite of a 
deteriorating content compared with the original comprehensive vision. From a sociological 
perspective, the scientifically heterogeneous cancer community may have had much at stake 
beside the actual coordination different research groups’ work.  
Whereas the recommendations of the Kjeldgaard Report had called for institutional change in 
favour of the State prioritising “cancer research” as a field with higher level of funding, it had 
become clear that such institutional change would not occur, and the omission of content 
presentation in the MRC report’s majority model (the Rockefeller plans) can be interpretated as 
the planning parties’ attempt to just get something out of the situation.  
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First and foremost, though the parties could not document or guarantee any synergy effect of 
coordinating the existing cancer research milieus, and that the plans were thus in danger of 
being nothing more than a very expensive move of research groups, there may have been an 
interest from some of the planning parties in getting the State to finance the modernisation and 
equipment of the Rockefeller plans as this would improve the working conditions of many of 
the research groups. But even this went against the original deal with the Ministry of Education: 
a zero-sum game coordination. In order to persuade the Ministries of Education and the Interior 
of such additional funding, the planning parties would have to put up a united front. And this 
may have been the reason why the matter of a research program for the centre was not 
thoroughly discussed in the Rockefeller report, as deciding on a specific scientific objective 
would no doubt be difficult due to the heterogeneous nature of cancer research and because it 
would potentially lead to conflicts between the planning parties. Any selection of a specific 
program entails the exclusion of others.  
The exclusion of research lines would mean the exclusion of research groups from the planning 
party organisations: the University, the hospital and the Society. And in times of decreasing 
State support (the State research councils) for cancer research, exclusion could be very costly for 
these organisations. In summation: signalling unity by postponing the difficult matter of centre 
content can be interpretated as the cancer community’s attempt to get State approval for 
planning for a cancer centre that could perhaps yield some measure of additional State support 
in spite of the formal institutions and zero-sum games of the time. And in this perspective, the 
content and location of the centre is not as important as the potential financial gains to be made 
for the individual cancer research milieus. Of course, the lack of clinical contact in the new 
centre meant exclusion of at least some hospital researchers. But given the fact that the suddenly 
wealthy Society was now the major powerbroker and funding body in the cancer community, 
any disgruntled voices may have drowned in times of recession and downsizing of State funds 
for cancer research, as any initiative from the wealthy Cancer Society would not be immediately 
dismissed by the public research institutes in order to “follow the money” so to speak.  
Secondary to this objective, one could think of another sociological gain to be made from the 
centre plans. A strive for a shared identity, unity, and recognition (symbolic capital) by their 
peers as an independent discipline or speciality may have played a role in the perpetuation of the 
centre path, although the Society’s new centre plan was markedly different than the one 
proposed by Engelbreth-Holm, the Kjeldgaard Report and the MRC working group. If a cancer 
 
The Cancer Centre That Never Was 
 
 225 
centre – no matter the location – was in fact established, this would probably be a first step 
towards “institutionalisation” of cancer research on a par with the academic disciplines and 
specialities from which the field sprang at the universities and hospitals.  A gain of cultural and 
social capital.  
In conclusion: for a short while the informal and formal institutions were almost in favour of 
continuing the path of the cancer centre. But informal institutions can be idle and change 
quickly, as the Society would soon experience in the years to come. The Rockefeller plans did 
not succeed in coordinating cancer research or changing the formal institutions in favour of 
cancer research, nor was it able to showcase the cancer community as a united front in the war 
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Table 4.1: Gallery of key persons in chapter 4  






































- Wanted the Society’s research units (the Fibiger Institute and the Cancer Registry)  to be 




















- He supported the proposal of a cell biology centre at the Rockefeller Institute, which is not 
surprising as he was an NSRC-member. He did not want this centre to include the clinical units 
of the Finsen Institute, as the centre was to focus on basic cell biological problems. He 
proposed that the centre should be financed in part by national biotechnology program funds 
and by the income of patents from the researchers in the centre (in particular Lennart Olsson), 
which played better into the formal institutions set by government than a cancer centre. 
Proposed that the centre should have a leader appointed by the Rigshospitalet and governed by 
statutes written by the MRC and NSRC.  
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Until 1985, the Society and its Director Ole Bang wanted to integrate the Society’s research 
units at the Medical Faculty of Copenhagen University. Bang thus supported the Rockefeller 
Centre. In this way, the private charity was not obliged to tie up money in bricks and mortar, 
but could instead channel the money directly into research projects. The economist Bang’s 
purpose was to serve the Cancer Society, and he believed this could best be done by  running it 
as a modern business, and he thus subscribed to a private business logic assigning a high 
priority to rational target attainment, asset management, publicity, and fundraising. He was very 
successful in doing this, increasing the organisations income considerably. Bang also 
represented the Society in the negotiations for the Rockefeller Centre, but he worried that the 
other negotiation parties wanted the Society to finance the lion’s share of the centre and even 
expected the Society to pay rent for its laboratory space in the centre, although the Society 
claimed to be financing up to 80% of the centre’s operating costs already. In 1986, the Cancer 
Society withdrew from the Rockefeller project. Due to the Society’s great financial and 
scientific expansion, Bang and his management claimed that the Rockefeller centre plans did no 
longer allow for enough room for the Society’s expanding activities.  However, Bang and the 
Society had known about these space problems for a long time and started planning for a 
separate private cancer research centre at the Finsen grounds seven months prior to the decision 
to withdraw from the Rockefeller project.  It would seem that Bang/the Society had changed 
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their minds about operating the Society’s own research units, as the investment in physical 
buildings and research offered certain advantages to the Society in the form of PR, financial 
protection against inflationary pressure etc., and Bang thus changed strategy and wanted to 
acquire the Finsen lot for a private cancer research centre. New institutional framework laid the 





















- Wanted a centre, but did not want it to disturb the organisation of the Medical Faculty or take 
space away from its other research fields and activities. Wanted the Society’s research units to 
be integrated at the Medical Faculty under academic management. She may have hoped that the 
Society’s involvement in new organisational structures such as the Rockefeller Centre would 









the Society  
- Member of 




- He was the author of the Kjeldgaard Report (1981) that had suggested the establishment of a 
comprehensive cancer centre, but as a member of the Society’s Executive Committee he now 
adopted the values and norms of this private business and agreed with the decision to withdraw 
from the project in 1986, as Jørgen Kieler and Ole Møller Jensen had suggested. Also, the 
Rockefeller centre did not really resemble the centres Kjeldgaard had proposed in the Report in 
terms of size, budget, and the financial involvement of the Ministry of Education.  
 
































- The clinician Nissen liked the Rockefeller centre because it brought bench and bedside closer 
together (clinical, exp.- and epidemiological research and treatment). Also, the Society’s 
involvement in a centre might mean more funds for clinical research. Nissen wanted the 
Society’s research units to be integrated at Rigshospitalet, where he worked (hierarchical 
hospital structures). He was among the group of clinicians who welcomed the interaction of 
















As the rest of the Society’s management, Chairman Steen Olsen wanted to establish a 
comprehensive cancer centre at the Rockefeller Institute until 1985, and up until this point he 
also wanted the Society’s research units to be integrated at the University’s Medical Faculty. 
But although Olsen wanted the centre to be established, though under better spatial and 
 












financial conditions than what the negotiations led to, he supported Jørgen Kieler and Ole 
Møller Jensen’s suggestion to pull out of the project, see Kieler. According to Keld Danø, 
Olsen was for the Rockefeller centre, but in his capacity as chairman of the Society, he had to 
agree with Bang and the Executive Committee that the right solution would be for the Society 
to build its own research centre at the Finsen grounds. In his annual report to the Head Board 
(1986), Olsen spins the collapse of the Rockefeller plans into the logical consequence of 



























- Rehfeld supported the proposal of a cell biology centre at the Rockefeller Institute. He did not 
want this centre to include the clinical units of the Finsen Institute, as the centre was to focus on 
basic cell biological problems. Proposed that the centre should be financed in part by national 
biotechnology program and by the income of patents from the researchers in the centre (in 
particular Lennart Olsson). Proposed that the centre should have a leader appointed by the 
Rigshospitalet and governed by statutes written by the MRC and the NSRC. As an MRC 
member, he was interested in creating the best possible organisational and financial structures 
for biomedical research. The reason why he backed the minority model can be that he believed 
it to be the one most likely to be established from a financial point of view – even without 
additional support from the Ministry of Education. 
 
























- The clinician Rørth liked the Rockefeller model because it brought bench and bedside closer 
together (clinical, exp.- and epidemiological research and treatment). Also, he may have hoped 
that the Society’s involvement in a centre meant more funds for clinical research, and he 






















- See, Jens Rehfeld.  
 
























- She wanted a centre but did not want it to disturb the organisation of the Medical Faculty or 
take space away from its other research fields and activities. Wanted to transfer the Society’s 











- As a research professor, he had agreed to donate the profits of his patents to the cell biology 
centre, as proposed by the minority of the working group (S.O. Andersen, Rehfeld, Simonsen). 
This minority model assigns Olsson a prominent place in the centre, and Olsson may for this 













Society - X He and Dr. Ole Møller Jensen informed the Society’s Executive Committee that the Rockefeller 
plans did not fit the needs of the Cancer Registry and the Fibiger Laboratory which had 
expanded their scientific activities considerably. His Fibiger Institute had been moved several 
times in the 1960s and 1970s, and Kieler claimed the many moves had damaged the publication 
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intensity and work of his staff. In spite of this, Kieler claimed to support the idea of a 
comprehensive cancer centre albeit in better and larger physical settings until the Cancer 
Society’s wealth supported his institute’s rapid expansion beyond the physical capacity of the 
planned Rockefeller centre, at which point he advised the Society’s management to abandon the 


















X  Danø was not part of the working group that prepared the Rockefeller plans or of the group that 
negotiated them. Nevertheless, he was a potential inhabitant in the new centre and managed to 
get his personal statement about the two centre models attached to the report to the MRC, and 
the ministries of education and interior. He wanted the Fibiger Institute, the Finsen Laboratory 
and the Cancer Registry to form the core of a comprehensive cancer centre at the Rockefeller 
Institute (close to the hospital’s oncology wards), and this centre should be organised as a single 
unit with one common management (consisting of researchers, not lay representation from the 
Society). He did not want a management with representatives from each involved organisation 
(as proposed in the majority model), because he feared that the conflicting aims and interests of 
these organisations could end up preventing the centre from functioning as an entity.  
Ib Terp Head of the 
State’s 
The State - - Was quoted in a newspaper article that the MRC and the NSRC had deliberately and gradually 
downsized their allocations for cancer research because of the wealth of the Cancer Society. His 
 


















The Society  - X He and Kieler informed the Society’s Executive Committee that the Rockefeller plans did not 
fit the needs of the Cancer Registry and the Fibiger Laboratory, which had expanded their 









(X) - In response to the allegations made in the press by researchers, the Cancer Society and 
journalists that the “State” did not contribute enough to the fight against cancer, Haarder argued 
that the public authorities had other equally important research fields to support, and that the 
State already funded cancer research through the MRC, the NSRC and the core budget of its 
hospitals and universities. Haarder supported the Rockefeller plan on the condition that it would 
not require additional funds from the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of the Interior, as 
this would conflict with the formal institutions/financial policy set by government for non-









(X) - Much like Bertel Haarder.  
Preben 
Larsen 




X - Larsen had to find room for a potential cancer centre  the Rockefeller Institute. Larsen leaded 
the negotiations for the Rockefeller centre and was frustrated over the collapse of the plans 
 









when the Cancer Society did no longer want to be a part of the project in 1986.  













State/MRC X - As chairman of the MRC, Pindborg wanted to establish the best possible financial and 
organisational structures for biomedical research. If the wealthy Cancer Society was involved in 
the plans, the financial latitude of the project would be greater than what the research councils 
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At first glance, the plans for the Finsen area lent new hope that Denmark would finally put the 
40-year-old dream of a national cancer centre into practice. In theory, the establishment of a 
centre would bring about new and better lab facilities for selected research groups, and perhaps 
a pipeline to increased (private) funding, and a symbolic “institutionalisation” of cancer 
research in the form of a large scale physical entity devoted to this activity only. As such, the 
establishment held several advantages for the public and private cancer researchers, and at the 
same time the centre served the Society’s new strategy to coordinate its own research units and 
protect its capital against the inflationary pressure of the time through investments in the real 
estate of the Finsen campus. The Society’s strategy would only succeed, however, with 
increasing societal returns if the charity’s defection from the Rockefeller plans did not evoke 
public anger or doubt about the organisation’s commitment to the anti-cancer cause vs. its 
corporate growth interests. And this was difficult. Still the main objective of establishing a 
centre – the coordination of science – remained strangely absent from the debates as no one 
touched upon the matter of centre content. And whereas the Society used the idea of the cancer 
centre as leverage to obtain their goals, its critical counterparts used it as leverage against the 
Society: it had become a means to ensure influence rather than the objective of a centre to 
coordinate the cancer field. The path of the cancer centre soon dissolved beneath the feet of the 
cancer community. 
 
The Cancer Society proposed a cancer centre at the Finsen campus after the collapse of the 
Rockefeller plans. And it was quite different from what the Rockefeller centre had been about. 
The Rockefeller centre was supposed to be a state-owned but joint public-private project, 
whereas the new centre was a private venture of the Danish Cancer Society. And because the 
clinical oncology departments of the Finsen Institute were about to be moved from the Finsen 
campus to Rigshospitalet on Blegdamsvej, the scientific profile of the proposed centre was also 
different. As the director of the Fibiger Institute – Jørgen Kieler – noted in his annual report, this 
changed the very status of the centre itself: 
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The dream of a “Comprehensive Cancer Research Centre” covering both clinical, 
epidemiological, and experimental cancer research had to be abandoned, but this does not 
exclude the establishment of a Center for Experimental and Epidemiological Cancer 
Research. The Fibiger Institute is very much in favour of such a centre which primarily 
should include the Fibiger Institute, the Finsen Laboratory, and the Cancer Registry. But 
other laboratories might find place in the buildings that are being evacuated by the clinical 
departments of the Finsen Institute.509 
The centre was no longer “comprehensive”, as it lacked cancer treatment and purely clinical 
cancer research. Instead, it was now a “cancer research institute/centre”, and Kieler appears to 
have been one of the few Danish cancer researchers who cared about the fact that the new centre 
no longer resembled Engelbreth-Holm’s dream from 1945 or the outlined comprehensive cancer 
centres of the Kjeldgaard Report from 1981. He hoped that the new centre would still be able to 
collaborate with clinicians from Rigshospitalet and the Medical Faculty of Copenhagen 
University as they were less than 2 miles away510. From a scientific point of view, the new plans 
were not as likely to bridge the gap between bench and bedside as the Rockefeller solution had 
been, and it was far from certain that all the former collaboration partners would be interested in 
the new project.  
Nevertheless, the major power broker of the cancer community was indeed interested and able 
to finance the entire thing, and this made the opinion of the other collaborators almost irrelevant. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the management of the Danish Cancer Society was 
interested in buying parts of the Finsen campus and it wanted to coordinate its own research 
units there511. In order to do so, the Society would have to invest heavily in research buildings, 
and this was a deliberate financial strategy to protect the organisation’s growing capital from the 
inflationary pressure of the time. By establishing a cancer research centre at the acquired 
property – consisting mostly of its own research units – the Danish Cancer Society would get an 
added bonus in the form of publicity. And this was a significant bonus, as a survey from 1985 
had revealed that the Danish public knew surprisingly little about the Society’s research 
activities. Only 3% were aware that the Fibiger Institute was run and owned by the Danish 
Cancer Society512. 18% believed this to be true for the Cancer Registry, while a total of 21% 
                                                 
509 Fibiger-Institute (1987). Annual Report 1987. Copenhagen, The Danish Cancer Society, p. 8. 
510 Fibiger-Institute (1986). Annual Report 1986. Copenhagen, The Danish Cancer Society, p. 7. 
511 The Danish Cancer Registry had outgrown its premises at Trekronergade in Copenhagen, and needed to be 
moved elsewhere. By purchasing more buildings at the Finsen campus, the Society was able to coordinate the 
registry with its Fibiger Institute and the state-owned Finsen Laboratory which were both already present on 
campus.  
512 Meeting minutes of the Society’s research managers November 12th 1985. Personal papers of Jes 
Forchhammer, (Bagsværd), p. 5.  
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were aware of who owned the cancer research institute in Aarhus. At the same time, 
approximately 50% of those polled were under the impression that all of these institutes were 
run by the State513.  
This was of course unfortunate for the private cancer charity that had declared a research-based 
war on cancer, and needed the public’s voluntary contributions in order to exist and run its 
research units. If the public believed the only entirely cancer-orientated research institutes in the 
country to be publicly financed, why would they bother supporting the private Cancer Society? 
However, the management of the Society began referring to the proposed new cancer research 
centre as “The Danish Cancer Society’s Research Centre” in order to solve the problem514. The 
new centre would move the Society’s research institutes closer together and make the Society 
appear as a strong unit. Together with the State-owned Finsen Laboratory, these institutes would 
form the very core of a new cancer research centre, which would in time be able to 
accommodate other research groups as well515. If put into practice the centre would appear a 
powerful and predominantly private initiative – and this was good publicity!  
But whereas the Society was trying to make the public aware of the value of its research 
institutes, the Society’s International Scientific Advisory Committee (ISAC) was struggling to 
make changes within them. The ISAC had made annual site visits to the Fibiger Institute and the 
cancer research institute in Aarhus for several years, and their well-meant suggestions for 
structural changes were not always welcomed by the Society’s scientific staff. Some of the 
recommendations had been followed – e.g. the split-up of the cancer research institute in Aarhus 
– while some had been ignored by the management. The ISAC had had to repeat its 
recommendations several times to no avail. In their 1987 report to the Danish Cancer Society, 
the ISAC members therefore decided to focus on more general issues of Danish cancer research 
instead. They were concerned with the slow rate of progress of some aspects of the Fibiger 
Institute’s research program, but they did not find themselves capable of assessing the 
performance of the Society’s research unit in relation to the rest of Danish cancer research 
without a national frame of reference516. The ISAC members thus wanted the Society to use the 
planning of the new research centre as a chance to take stock of its research and structure: 
                                                 
513 Ibid. 
514 The chairman’s report to the Head Board (1988). Personal papers of Ole Bang, (Copenhagen). p. 9.  
515 Fibiger-Institute (1988). Annual Report 1988. Copenhagen, The Danish Cancer Society, p. 1. 
516 ISAC report to the Danish Cancer Society, October 1987. Personal papers of Jes Forchhammer, (Bagsværd). p. 
3.  
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The ISAC therefore suggests that a global review of the cancer research supported by the 
Society be undertaken by an international review committee. The size of Denmark makes 
such an exercise feasible and indeed particularly important for a small country; a similar 
approach has been adopted by the Natural Science Research Council in Sweden. The 
ISAC is of course prepared to participate in this process and it believes that a further 
isolated review of the Fibiger Institute is not necessary before this comparison has been 
made. The review should provide a useful basis for the development of a strategy for the 
future development of the Society’s research program as a whole.  The review would be 
particularly timely in the light of discussions about the comprehensive cancer centre, the 
impending retirement of Dr Kieler, and the need to rationalise some areas of research, for 
example the AIDS program.517 
The proposed “global review” of all Danish cancer projects would have been more extensive 
than the survey presented in the Kjeldgaard Report. This report had based its findings on 
questionnaires and bibliographical citation studies, but the survey proposed by the ISAC would 
entail a review of each individual cancer research project and program. It would no doubt have 
been a good idea to evaluate the entire Danish cancer research effort with the aim of 
restructuring and coordinating the field on an overall level before establishing the new centre. In 
this way, the need for a formal coordination of the country’s cancer efforts and the need for a 
cancer research centre could be evaluated. Such a survey would identify and benchmark the 
particular Danish strengths in the very diverse cancer research field and point to those which 
were most likely to bring about the breakthroughs and socioeconomic effects from the war on 
cancer which had previously been stated as potential outputs of a centre initiative – as put 
forward by the Kjeldgaard Report. And according to the Washington conference on planning for 
cancer centres (chapter 3), only a rationally selected and shared research program would lead to 
rational identification of relevant research groups for a centre.  
But although the proposal of a ”global review” of Danish cancer research was discussed in the 
Scientific Council it was never put into practice, and some of the Society’s researchers were 
even beginning to question the purpose and benefit of the ISAC itself518. It would seem that the 
committee was no longer considered an authority to be reckoned with, as the Society had 
already implemented the structural changes it wished to implement (like the budget reform, 
chapter 3) , and because the ISAC was merely repeating its other recommendations year after 
                                                 
517 Ibid., p. 4. The ISAC members and the Danish cancer researchers did not seem to work with such clearly 
defined concepts of what a cancer centre should be as the UICC and used the term “comprehensive” more loosely 
than the UICC in reference to a larger centre with a broad spectrum of activities.  
518 Jes Forchhammer’s meeting minutes of the Scientific Council January 1st 1988. Personal papers of Jes 
Forchhammer, (Bagsværd).  
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year, it proved relatively superfluous519. Like the Rockefeller centre, a rational and survey based 
content/research program for the Finsen centre did not seem to be of primary interest to the 
Society (neither to its researchers or its administrators) which at the time was experiencing 
internal cultural clashes that could potentially lead to a less than smooth facilitation of the 
planned Finsen centre, as will be evident in the following. 
5.1 Chimeras, cultural clashes and cracks in the centre’s foundation 
To some extent the ISAC was unnecessary as its advisory functions were assigned to the 
Scientific Council (the private pendant to the State’s research councils) and a new scientific 
department in the Society. In 1987, the Society’s Executive Committee reorganised its science 
administration by establishing a ”Scientific Department” with the official purpose of assisting 
the Scientific Council with its increasing workload (e.g. the preparatory processing of grant 
applications) and to aid the central management on scientific planning and the launching of 
larger research programs520. The chairman of the Scientific Council, physician and Aarhus 
University professor, Dr Erik Amdrup, was appointed head of the new department for a two-
year period until his professorship in Aarhus ended. In addition to these official functions of the 
department, Amdrup mentioned another in his memoirs: 
The employees at the research units and those in the other departments (management, 
finance, collection, education, patient support, and membership departments) had very 
different educations and working cultures, and apparently not much in common apart from 
their employer. From experience it is known that this can be the cause of a negative 
atmosphere. 
It was thus also the task of the head of the Scientific Department to create a stronger link 
and a greater understanding between the researchers and the employees of the head 
office.521  
Amdrup himself was an experienced physician and medical researcher, and his new 
administrative job was to mediate between his peers and management (or as he calls it, the 
administrative), the work of which he understood through years of committee work. He and his 
department were the necessary buffer zone to prevent the heterogenous groups of the cancer 
charity from clashing. However, it was not easy to be a researcher involved with research 
administration on this level, and the cultural differences within the Society were far from 
eliminated with the establishment of the new department. The prominent and senior member of 
                                                 
519 Meeting minutes of the Scientific Council April 17th-18th 1989. Personal papers of Jes Forchhammer 
(Bagsværd).  
520 Meeting minutes of the Scientific Council November 16th-17th 1987. Personal papers of Jes Forchhammer, 
(Bagsværd). p. 3.  
521 Amdrup, E. (1998). Som jeg så det - en kirurgs tilbageblik. Danmark, Gyldendal, p. 191.  
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the Society’s scientific staff, Jørgen Kieler, had previously lashed out at Ole Bang and the 
Executive Committee for implementing the budget reform, (see chapter 3). Back then, he had 
not only lashed out at Ole Bang, but also at professors Steen Olsen and Niels Ole Kjeldgaard – a 
medical and a basic science researcher, respectively – by trying to undermine their characters 
and professional competences. Much like Amdrup, they too had to unite a scientific and an 
administrative interest in their voluntary and honorary jobs in the Executive Committee, and 
they were criticised by conservative voices – such as Kieler – for not being true to their roots in 
the scientific community because they now adopted the aims and values of the Cancer Society 
as a modern business in capacity of their membership of its management. The new chairman of 
the Society, Bent Harvald, was another example of a medical researcher in an administrative 
position, and in some sense he and the others were all “chimeras” in exposed positions.  
In addition to this, only the director of the Society (Ole Bang) was paid for the work. The 
members of the Scientific Council, the Executive Committee and the Head Board were all 
volunteers who had other jobs and worked for the Society in their spare time. The committee 
work therefore offered no financial bonus for people like Amdrup, Steen Olsen, Niels Ole 
Kjeldgaard, and Bent Harvald, whose views reflected a medical or basic scientific logic along 
with the private business logic of the Cancer Society meaning that they were open to different 
kinds of attacks as compared to persons reflecting only one of these. The most conservative 
voices of the scientific staff expected a researcher in an administrative post to promote the 
interest of scientists only, as Bent Harvald experienced when the Executive Committee decided 
to split the Fibiger Institute into five sub-departments with a new form of management in 
1989522: 
70-year-old Jørgen Kieler was about to retire, and the Executive Committee saw this as a chance 
to restructure the Fibiger Institute. When Kieler was director, the institute was managed in a 
patriarchal and hierarchical fashion that revolved around the director, and this was now 
considered a bit old-fashioned and replaced by an oligarchic board of senior researchers and the 
heads of departments523. As mentioned in chapter 3, Niels Ole Kjeldgaard and Ove Sten-
Knudsen had criticised the Fibiger Institute for not implementing a more democratic mode of 
governance, as had become custom at the universities. Jørgen Kieler, on the other hand, had 
made it part of his lifework to protect this traditional hierarchical administrative structure at the 
                                                 
522 Biannual report of the Chairman (December, 1989). Personal papers of Ole Bang, (Copenhagen). p. 21-22.  
523 Ibid. p. 22.  
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Fibiger Institute and the fruitful research milieu he believed to be a direct consequence 
thereof524.   
For this reason, Kieler was highly affected by the central administration’s decision to reorganise 
his institute the very moment he retired, and he was not going to take it lying down. The 
divergence between him and the Society’s administration – and Ole Bang in particular – had 
gained new strength through the planning of a symposium for the 50th anniversary of the Fibiger 
Institute in June 1989. Years of less amicable relationship between Bang and Kieler were put on 
display, as the two disputed over a minor administrative matter and accused each other of 
wrong-footing the heads of research and of sabotaging collaborative efforts.525 When asked by 
the new Chairman, Bent Harvald, if he was interested in a special retirement reception, Kieler 
answered that he wanted to let this dispute with Bang (and thus the management whose 
decisions Bang had implemented) mark his farewell instead. In a letter to Harvald he described 
the situation in the following way: 
This would be in harmony with the unhappy experiences we have had during the last 8 
years, and which should not be forgotten or camouflaged. On the contrary it should serve 
as inspiration for you and others to carry through radical reforms for the improvement of 
the relationship between the researchers and the political and administrative management. 
(…). I wish you good luck with your work for the Danish Cancer Society. I get dizzy at 
the thought of the extent of your tasks, but at the same time I feel relief to leave it to 
others to defend the interests of research.526 
Kieler’s views (that an institute’s director alone ought to be in charge of making decisions 
regarding its structure and research profile) mirrored a medical logic that was juxtaposed to both 
the basic scientific and the private business logic of the members of the Society’s management 
with regards to how research should be administrated. Kieler obviously saw it as his and any 
other researcher’s job to defend the autonomy of (medical) science against excessive 
administration, and he feared for the future of the Fibiger Institute, now that he was no longer 
there to protect it. And the new structural changes at the Fibiger Institute must have confirmed 
his worst fears. As a consequence, he was glad that Bent Harvald had replaced Steen Olsen as 
chairman, and hoped that Harvald would now be able to balance out the power of the 
“triumvirate”, (see chapter 3). However, it would seem that his hopes had been too high: 
                                                 
524 Letter from Jørgen Kieler to Bent Harvald October 2nd 1989. Personal papers of Jes Forchhammer, 
(Bagsværd).  
525 Letter from Jørgen Kieler to Bent Harvald June 19th 1989. Personal papers of Jes Forchammer, (Bagsværd). 
    Letter from Ole Bang to Jørgen Kieler June 14th 1989. Personal papers of Jes Forchammer, (Bagsværd). 
526 Letter from Jørgen Kieler to Bent Harvald July 6th 1989. Personal papers of Jes Forchhammer, (Bagsværd).  
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My hopes that you would correct the wrongs committed by Steen Olsen & Co. are fading. 
The structural changes of the Fibiger Institute, which Ole Bang is now implementing, 
must have been approved by you and you are thus contributing to destroy all that my 
employees and I have spent many years creating. For my part, it is my lifework. You can 
probably understand my disappointment and indignation, but even your predecessor must 
feel uncomfortable. His declared goal was formerly to concentrate and coordinate. Now 
the Cancer Research Institute in Aarhus has been closed, and subsequently the Fibiger 
Institute is next in line to be split, and sooner or later it will be time for the Cancer 
Registry as well. And at the same time there is much talk of a large cancer research centre. 
I wonder if this talk will not be as phoney as the talk of coordination, and for that matter 
the talk of the wonder of molecular biology. You have lost all credibility, and the Cancer 
Society is in its worst ethical crisis ever. I think you should consider your role in this game 
once more and very thoroughly. 527 
Bent Harvald thus experienced the challenges of being a researcher in an administrative position 
who also had to protect the interests of the Society as a business. To the perhaps most 
traditionally-minded representative of the scientific staff, Jørgen Kieler, the actions of Steen 
Olsen and Harvald were considered to be almost worse than those of Ole Bang. Whereas Bang 
came from the private corporate sector and acted according to the private business logic and 
habitus affiliated with it, Kieler clearly expected something different from the two researchers. 
To Harvald, this complaint must have been an omen of what was to come and proof of the 
thankless tasks of a “chimera”, a strange living being pieced together by two different 
professional groups with often conflicting and interpenetrating interests.  
The management of the private Cancer Society had to assign a high priority to publicity value, 
asset management, and quality/efficiency analysis of their products – be that cancer research at 
their research units, public education etc. – in order to spend their collected funds in the best 
possible manner. The charity had to pin-point any non-cost-efficient (research) activities and 
organise them more rationally, and this was not always in accordance with the wishes of the 
units’ medical researchers like Kieler who as heads of their departments wanted to decide for 
themselves. For instance, the Kjeldgaard Report had shown that the publication rate and impact 
factor of the researchers and work the done at Kieler’s Fibiger Institute had not been as good as 
at the hospitals and the universities. The Fibiger Institute was operated and funded by the 
Cancer Society, and in this respect the work done at the Institute was a product of the private 
cancer organisation. If its products did not have the same or better quality than the university’s 
and the hospitals’, the cancer organisation thus had to change the link in the production that 
lessened this quality.  
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The Kjeldgaard Report had suggested that such a change could be made by implementing a 
budget reform, and as mentioned in chapter 3 this reform deprived the directors of the Society’s 
research units of influence over the units’ research profile. Because of the budget reform, the 
directors no longer had the power to dictate the content of the research program, as each 
individual project had to apply for funding through the peer review processes of the Society’s 
Scientific Council and the State’s research councils in free competition with other projects. 
Also, if the Society found that the very structure of the institutes was impeding its “product” 
quality, it would want to make changes. If a department at an otherwise well-functioning 
institute worked on scientifically dead-end project lines, it made sense to shut them down and 
spend the money on something better. At least, it made sense from the point of view of the 
businessman Bang but also basic scientists Kjeldgaard, Sten-Knudsen, and the ISAC members – 
it was after all the Kjeldgaard Report and the ISAC who had suggested the changes in the first 
place – and who had argued that only the best and peer reviewed research projects should be 
funded.  
The matter thus represented a clash between Kieler’s medical logic on the one hand and Bang’s 
business logic and a scientific logic on the other. Although Kieler did not succeed in preventing 
the restructuring of his institute and had to retire, he did not give up the fight against the 
administration of the Society. As his protest was only met with silence by the Executive 
Committee, he wrote and published a special anniversary history of the Fibiger Institute in 
which he did not conceal his attitude towards the administrative and political management528.  
He forwarded this writing to all the members of the Head Board and the Scientific Council, and 
although it was far from all of the scientific staff who were in direct conflict with the 
management – it was more or less only Kieler – it became clear to all that the Society suffered 
from intramural differences of opinion. And even the tiniest crack in the foundation of the 
Society must have been very unwelcome, when the Society had just defected from the 
Rockefeller plans to pursue its own Finsen plans in order to continue its new corporate strategy 
and utilisation of the existing formal and informal institutions (the government’s unpopular 
financial policy for the hospital sector and the public’s response to this) which was paying off in 
the form of increasing societal returns and charitable donations. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the defection from the Rockefeller plans and the 
commitment to a new and business inspired strategy to invest in real estate and harvest the PR of 
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having its own research units had transformed the modest and physician dominated charity into 
a modern business (albeit non-profit). And this change and defection would only succeed 
continuously as long as no one – and especially not the public – doubted the Society’s intentions 
and ability to pursue its anti-cancer cause. And time would tell that the Society had not heard the 
last of Kieler’s criticism, as he would closely monitor the organisation’s plans to coordinate 
Danish cancer research through the planned cancer research centre in the 14000 m2 large Finsen 
buildings529.  
5.2 The negotiation table revisited 
The internal cultural clashes in the private Society mirrored a similar reaction and development 
in the public hospital sector. As mentioned in chapter 4, the government’s attempts to control 
the growth of public expenditures and the subsequent prioritising within a set economical 
framework was increasingly unpopular with the public who had come to expect the availability 
and abundance of public health care services. In order to signal the importance of the 
hospital/health care sector in times of economical short commons, the government established a 
Ministry of Health (previously a domain of the Ministry of Education) in 1987530. However, at 
the same time the mantra of the government seemed to be to increase productivity and efficiency 
at the hospitals through the means of the market oriented tool New Public Management, which 
the politicians had seen used in other countries such as Sweden, New Zealand and England in 
order to make public hospitals act and perform as efficiently as private businesses531. The 
introduction of New Public Management gave rise to restructurings at the hospitals which 
instead of separate medical, patient care, and administration  hierarchies were now given 
centralised administrations led by – most often – non-medically but economically or politically 
trained directors (the so-called DJØF professional group)532. The former dominance of the 
medical profession in health care policy making seemed to be over533, and the new directors 
made use of the New Public Management tool to accommodate the governmental pressure to 
economise health care.  
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The main burden of the government’s financial policy thus fell on the hospitals which in the 
name of rationalisation were subjected to a reduction of the number of hospital beds, reduction 
of the catalogue of services etc. The medical profession of the hospitals learned to live with 
certain rationalisation measures and restructurings – such as each hospital department now 
having a chief MD – but the introduction of the overall centralising directions and the influx of 
the DJØF professional group (law, economics, political studies) and their politically 
synchronized contract and performance management led to scepticism and antagonism534.  
The transformation of Danish public hospitals throughout the 1980s was modelled after the 
strategies of private businesses and market conditions in order to ensure agility and efficiency 
on a par with competing private businesses (a managed competition policy) and it scared many 
members of the medical community who feared that the public hospital sector would be slowly 
privatised  and turned into organisations in which bureaucrats rather than medical professionals 
made the important calls – perhaps with fatal consequences for the patients535.  The 
transformation of the modest and physician dominated Cancer Society into a modern business 
with corporate strategies must have been equally ominous for public cancer researchers, who 
increasingly depended on funding from this major powerbroker in the cancer community. 
Planning for a new and privately dominated cancer centre by the end of the 1980s has to be seen 
in the light of these parallel developments in the private and public part of the cancer 
community. Their largest funding body started acting less and less like the modest and physician 
led foundation it once was, and more and more like a private business on market terms.  
From 1988 and onwards, the Danish Cancer Society was in dialogue with the State’s Building 
Directorate Preben Larsen about the conditions for buying the building plot between Ndr. 
Frihavnsgade (where the Fibiger Institute was placed) and the former Finsen Institute536, see 
figure 5-1. The negotiations were kept in strict confidence as they had to do with significant 
amounts of money and many different interests. On January 11th 1989, the MRC initiated a 
meeting for representatives of the Society, the MRC, Rigshospitalet, and Copenhagen 
University537. The purpose of the meeting was to inform the public research institutes of the 
Society’s centre plans and to find out whether or not they were interested in participating in the 
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project538. The proposed research centre was large enough to accommodate both of the Society’s 
own research units, the Finsen Laboratory, and a number of public cancer research groups. 
Lawyer Erik Vraa from Rigshospitalet opened the meeting by stating that although the 
ownership of the Finsen grounds had not yet been established, it was his understanding that the 
Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Health were positive towards the cancer research centre 
initiative539.  
                                   Figure 5-1 Drawing of the Finsen Park 
 
Note:The two adjacent and darkened buildings in the top of the drawing is the Fibiger Institute which is 
owned by the Cancer Society. The other buildings used to house the Finsen Institute before the clinical 
departments of this hospital were moved to the Rigshospitalet. The Cancer Society was interested in buying 
all of these buildings. 
Source: The Annual Report of the Fibiger Institute 1987. 
 
The ownership of the Finsen grounds was very important. As of yet it had not been established 
whether the area rightfully belonged to the Ministry of Health or to Rigshospitalet in specific, 
and until this issue had been established the Danish Cancer Society would not be able to acquire 
these quarters. Ole Bang attended the meeting on behalf of the Society, and he stated that the 
proposed centre would have to be owned by the Danish Cancer Society and that the Head Board 
had insisted on naming it “The Danish Cancer Society’s Research Centre”540. Basic cancer 
researcher Elisabeth Bock, who represented Copenhagen University, was worried about the 
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minimal level of influence which external research groups would be given in an entirely 
Society-owned research centre. So was Aarhus University professor in anatomy and MRC 
member Arvid Maunsbach, and he therefore preferred the centre to be run jointly by the State 
(i.e. the University, Rigshospitalet, and the MRC) and the Society541. According to him, it would 
perhaps be best to use the management mode proposed by the majority of the MRC working 
group during the planning of the Rockefeller centre.  
Erik Vraa from Rigshospitalet took it a bit further and suggested that the centre should be made 
a self-owning institute. This did not, however, go down well with Ole Bang and the Society’s 
accounting manager Mads Bjerre, and they insisted that the most realistic solution to the 
problem was to have one single owner of the centre (the Society) while the other parties could 
rent their way in542. This would give the Society the power to negotiate with each and every 
interested research group and to make sure that the centre was operated entirely on the Society’s 
terms and yielded the necessary PR for the organisation. The two Society representatives acted 
in accordance with the private business logic that had come to characterise the charity’s actions 
and strategies for asset management and publicity543.  
Dr Jørgen Rygaard of the pathology department at the Copenhagen Municipal Hospital attended 
the meeting on behalf of the MRC, and he argued that it was “unrealistic to believe that the State 
would start a new cancer research centre”, and that he fully understood the Society’s need for 
making itself more “visible”544. Rygaard argued that he as a member of the State’s Medical 
Research Council did not believe that the State545 – and here he probably referred to the 
Ministry of Education, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Ministry of Health – had intentions 
of starting a new cancer research centre, and that the centre would only come about if the 
Society paid for the entire venture. In this way, he indicated that it was only fair if the power and 
influence of the Society was proportionate with the money the organisation invested in the 
centre. As a former employee and primus motor of the Society’s Information Department in the 
                                                 
541 Ibid. p. 2.  
542 Ibid. p. 3.  
543 Now that the changes suggested by the Kjeldgaard Report and the ISAC had been implemented (such as the 
budget reform, the split up of the Aarhus Research Institute etc) – which were all the result of a scientific logic – 
the Society was being run as a private business and adopted Bang’s business logic in order to survive under the 
unfavourable market conditions.   
544 Meeting minutes of the MRC, January 11th 1989. Archives of the Danish Cancer Society, (Copenhagen), p. 3. 
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late 1970s, he clearly understood the charity’s need of publicity – of being visible to the man on 
the street.  
His views were not shared by the other representatives of the MRC, however. MRC member of 
Copenhagen University’s Department for Human Pathophysiology Dr Jørn Giese argued that the 
State was in grave need of “visibility” as well, and that a joint State-Society centre would make 
the public know that the State546 took its responsibility for cancer research very serious547. A 
representative of Rigshospitalet, oncologist Dr Mikael Rørth, pointed to the fact that the 
essential discussion was not about management and ownership. According to Rørth, it was 
clearly more important to find a scientific foundation for the proposed centre, and all parties 
were inter-dependent on this matter. In Rørth’s opinion, the present proposal for a cancer 
research centre was the last chance for such large-scale collaboration, and it was time to put it to 
good use548. Nevertheless, the parties never reached an agreement on either the management 
mode or the scientific content/program of the new centre, and they decided to await a decision 
on the ownership and sale of the Finsen grounds before further discussions could take place. Ole 
Bang, managed to put it on record that the name of the centre was very important to the Society. 
But when the Society’s representatives gave an account of the meeting to the Head Board and 
the Scientific Council, they neglected to mention the difficulties discussing an administrative 
and political management of the new centre. According to Ole Bang, none of the public parties 
had pledged to participate in the centre, but they had all expressed a strong interest in the centre 
and pushed for a centre to be established this time around549.  He stated that the MRC, for one, 
was very interested in moving future cancer-related research professorships into the centre, but 
although the MRC was willing to allocate discretionary funds for this activity, it was not willing 
to pay rent for the laboratory space that the research professors would occupy550.  
This declaration is not reflected in the meeting minutes of the MRC. Furthermore, the MRC did, 
at this stage of the negotiations for a centre, perhaps not have as great an interest for placing its 
research professors in the centre as was the case during the earlier Rockefeller negotiations. As 
                                                 
546 Here Giese probably uses the term ”State” to refer to the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Education, as 
the Ministers heading these institutes were directly involved in the negotiations for the centre, and particularly 
Bertel Haarder had previously been accused by Steen Olsen and Niels Ole Kjeldgaard of not supporting the anti-
cancer cause (in the press mediated discussion of the conclusions of the Kjeldgaard Report in 1982).  
547 Meeting minutes of the MRC, January 11th 1989. Archives of the Danish Cancer Society, (Copenhagen), p. 3. 
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549 Biannual Report of the Chairman, April 1989, Personal papers of Ole Bang, (Copenhagen), p. 14. 
Jes Forchhammer’s notes from the Scientific Council meeting January 12th 1989, Personal papers of Jes   
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for the MRC’s aversion against paying rent, it was not normal procedure for a research council 
to invest in anything besides project-oriented grants. There is of course always the possibility 
that the MRC also made its decline a way of commenting on the Cancer Society’s demands 
during the Rockefeller negotiations. However, rent was not an issue with the other parties, at 
least not according to Ole Bang: 
The University expressed an interest in having 1000 m2 - but hardly over 3000 m2 – of 
laboratory space at their disposal for University research groups, while Rigshospitalet 
stated that in all probability it wished to place the Fibiger Laboratory and a few other 
activities in connection with the research centre. Most recently, the Minister of Health has 
stated an interest in placing in the centre an Institute for Health Analysis, which is to be 
created by merging the National Board of Health’s department for medical statistics with 
the Danish Institute of Clinical Epidemiology.551 
Again, the MRC minutes reflect that more or less all the representatives from the MRC, 
Copenhagen University, and Rigshospitalet were opposed to the idea of a cancer research centre 
within the context of the Danish Cancer Society. They would rather have a jointly operated and 
co-financed centre managed by all involved parties. Still, Bang gave the Society’s Scientific 
Council the impression that the public researchers widely supported the centre. But if he did 
exaggerate the interest of the public parties in his presentation to the Council, or at least take it 
for granted a bit prematurely, there was good reason to do so. The Society was about to spend a 
considerable amount of money on the Finsen building stock, if the Scientific Council gave the 
plans thumbs up from a scientific point of view. The Scientific Council consisted of intramural 
and extramural cancer researchers who were all strongly rooted in the research community as 
either basic or clinical researchers, and a common trait for them was that they did not 
necessarily appreciate a financial strategy to invest in real estate, if the money could have 
otherwise been spent directly on cancer research. The management’s business strategy was 
therefore incompatible with the Scientific Council on this point, but the establishment of a 
cancer research centre on the premises, on the other hand, would legitimate the purchase of the 
Finsen area. But if the extramural research groups did not have an interest in moving into the 
new centre, the Scientific Council would probably be wary about purchasing the Finsen grounds 
which were far too large for the Society’s own research units alone.   
The meeting illustrated the gap between the logic of the Society’s management and those of the 
rest of the cancer community, who slowly began to question whether it was appropriate for a 
private cancer charity to have so much power in the cancer community in a way that left no 
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room for objections. The Society followed its fruitful strategy of employing business inspired 
investment models and choices and utilised the institutional matrix to improve its standing and 
symbolic capital (making its economic capital predominant) in the cancer field. The organisation 
clearly stated the importance of a Society-dominated centre in order to serve its own cause and 
goals, and this must have worried some of the involved public planning parties. They would be 
left out of the loop in a centre dominated by a private cancer organisation that now embodied the 
bureaucratic privatisation tendencies seen at the hospitals (albeit at a minor scale) through the 
introduction of New Public Management, and the fear of centralised direction and potential non-
medical/non-scientist influence over scientific planning may have contributed to the edginess of 
the negotiation parties at the meeting.  
The meeting thus marked a breakdown of negotiations between the collaboration partners, and 
the differences of opinion in the cancer community grew stronger during that year552. Professor 
Heine Høi Hansen from the Society’s Scientific Council and Rigshospitalet’s Radium Station 
informed the press that he was worried that the Society had grown too powerful for the good of 
Danish cancer research, and in a newspaper article this anxiety was expressed in the following 
way: 
A cemented monopoly in Danish research. A private organisation with so much capital 
that it enjoys more influence on cancer research than the State. “I do not dare to think 
what would become of Danish cancer research without money from the Danish Cancer 
Society. In many places, the research would come to an abrupt halt”, says physician Heine 
Høi Hansen of Rigshospitalet’s Radium Station. “But it is worrying that one single 
organisation possesses so much power that the research is dependent on a single line of 
research. What if it turns out to be wrong?”. Heine Høi Hansen is also a member of the 
Society’s Scientific Council which is composed by of 12 independent experts. 553 
A group of physicians and clinicians were distressed that the Society tended to neglect to award 
grants to clinical research projects and that the organisation seemed to prefer molecular 
oncology. Oncologist Mikael Rørth from Rigshospitalet who had just attended the January 
meeting, criticised the Society for letting marketing strategies and commercial interests dictate 
the Society’s research policy: e.g. launching the large-scale project “Diet and Cancer” that 
entirely bypassed the Scientific Council554. Other critics, who remained anonymous in 
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newspaper articles, accused the Society of initiating scientific projects on the basis of their 
popularity amongst their members and donators rather than on their scientific quality555.  
All in all, it appeared to the readers of the articles as if the Society did not receive the wide 
support from either intramural or extramural researchers it had hoped for. At this point, the 
powerful organisation did not retaliate or try to defend itself in the press even though the public 
opinion (informal institutions in the form of taste and preferences) was of pivotal importance to 
the Society and the success of its new strategy of serving the anti-cancer cause through real 
estate investments and strategic popular research programs rather than the traditional peer 
reviewed grant allocation activities it had used to perform as a modest cancer charity. In spite of 
the failed negotiations at the January meeting, the Society pushed for further negotiations about 
a sale of the Finsen grounds. This time, the organisation took another approach, as it embarked 
on direct negotiations with the Ministry of Health who had turned out to be the rightful owner of 
the Finsen hospial. However, the Society’s dealings with government officials were kept in strict 
confidence, and it has not been possible to find many official records of the proceedings.  
5.3 Using the press as a battleground 
The Minister of Health, Elsebeth Kock-Petersen, wanted to put the Finsen complex on sale in 
open tendering (outsourcing), as was standard practice in the process of privatisation556: the 
transfer of ownership from the public sector (government) to the private sector (business). In 
this way, the Ministry was guaranteed the highest bid from interested buyers. However, a special 
exemptions clause allowed for a direct sale to an interested buyer, if a special, weighty cause so 
indicated557. The Society argued that there was hardly a worthier cause than the establishment of 
                                                                                                                                                            
In the late 1970’s, the American anti-cancer establishment assigned increasing priority to the study of the role of 
diet and nutrition in controlling cancer. Laboratory studies had identified several natural and manmade carcinogenic 
agents in food additives, and epidemiological studies showed that migrants moving from other countries to the US 
and adopting the native dietary habits eventually showed patterns of cancer incidences similar to those of the 
natives. However, the evidence was far from conclusive, and critics pointed to the fact that it was far too difficult to 
pinpoint the role of specific foods among the many environmental and genetic factors that could also cause cancer. 
Also, foods that statistically had been linked with cancers in certain nationalities were not linked similarly in other 
nationalities. In addition to this, critics noted that there were no thoroughly controlled studies of the effects of diet 
over entire life spans of the study’s subjects. However, the epidemiological studies on nutrition and cancer offered 
an attractive hypothesis: that cancer could be controlled through the diet, and leaders of the NCI and the ACS began 
stressing the importance of this in spite of the inconclusive evidence, see: Patterson, J. T. (1987). The Dread 
Disease: Cancer and Modern American Culture. Cambridge, Harvard University Press p. 260-262.  This lack of 
unequivocal proof vs. the attractiveness of the hypothesis may have been the reason why the Danish Cancer Society 
was criticised for bypassing its scientific council and launching the “Diet and Cancer” program which was financed 
with collected funds earmarked specifically for this purpose.  
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557 Biannual Report of the Chairman, December 1989. Personal papers of Ole Bang, (Copenhagen). p. 27. 
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a national cancer research centre, and that it was only appropriate for the Minister of Health to 
use the special clause, so that the Society would not have to pay more than necessary for a 
cancer research centre that ideally ought to have been financed by the State in the first place. 
According to the press coverage, Elsebeth Kock-Petersen insisted on calling for tenders, as she 
had pledged to the government and several other political parties represented in the State’s 
Privatisation Council558. This was in direct accord with the Government’s general policy of 
rationaliation and making public organs act in synch with market conditions. Ole Bang and the 
Society thus had to make a high bid on the grounds (DKK 140 million) – a price estimated by 
the Ministry of Tax – in order to avoid aggressive competitive bidding from other interested 
parties559. However, the bid turned out to be too low. In the words of chairman Bent Harvald: 
Even so, the Minister of Health decided to put the Finsen grounds for sale in open 
tendering, and after failed negotiations with the Minister and due to the importance of the 
matter, we were compelled to enter a public confrontation with the Minister.560 
The arena of this confrontation was the media. In September 1989, the Danish Cancer Society 
went to the press. It accused the Minister of Health of refusing to sell the Finsen campus at a 
reasonable price and thereby of thwarting the efforts to establish a cancer research centre561. 
According to one newspaper article, the result was a minor media debate562 involving several 
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political parties; the Society received political backing and sympathy, and the socialist political 
opposition to the Government mustered a majority in the Folketing that demanded a direct sale 
of Finsen to the Society563. The matter was scheduled to be debated on October 31st 1989, but 
the government gave in to the massive pressure one day before the hearing. In a press release, 
the Minister of Finance announced that the Government would let the Society buy the Finsen 
complex564. The opposition did not rest, however, and two parties even wanted to reduce the 
price of the Finsen grounds.  
According to Bent Harvald, the parties argued that it was hardly fair to make the Society pay the 
full price for the complex, given that some of the buildings were originally built for the Radium 
Station by the Society itself, before the Station and the buildings were handed over free of 
charge to the State in the early 1960s565. The situation was such that the Society already owned 
one of the buildings at campus and rented certain other buildings – i.e. the buildings which the 
Society had handed over to the State – for the rest of its activities, see figure 5-1566. A sale of the 
Finsen campus to any other candidate than the Society would have put the cancer charity in a 
tight spot, as it would risk being evicted from its rented buildings and having its sole laboratory 
building situated on a stranger’s lot. But with the political backing for the sale the press-
mediated war was over, and the Minister of Health admitted that the management of the Society 
had played their cards well: 
They controlled the press; and there was no room for professional debate. It is hard to 
disagree with the Cancer Society. Their message is simple and powerful in the media: Are 
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you for or against cancer? They made it seem as though I was fighting against a people’s 
cause.567 
The strategy of Bang and his colleagues had been effective. They had to protect the financial 
interests of their business, the Cancer Society; by buying the Finsen grounds at the lowest 
possible price with the purpose of 1) making sound investments in real estate, 2) establishing a 
cancer centre to strengthen Danish cancer research, 3) getting the publicity benefits of the centre 
(continuing to utilise the informal institutions in the form of increasing societal 
returns/charitable donations and support). As of now, the strategy of defecting the Rockefeller 
plans and the transition from modest charity to modern cancer corporation had been relatively 
frictionless in the public eye, and the pursuit of other “self-serving” plans had paid off without 
consequences for the Society such as e.g. attacks on its Achilles heel: Its public image and its 
dependence on the continued contributions from private donators.  
In a sociological perspective, the wealthy and research supporting Society had managed to do 
this by defining its economic capital as symbolic capital (power) in the cancer field. The Society 
had suceeded in coaxing the Minister of Health into selling the grounds directly to the Society, 
and the organisation considered it a victory. But there was no time to rest on the laurels. In a 
dynamic social field battling on different types of capital, there is a thin line between being 
powerful and a tyrant.  
On January 21st 1990, one of the country’s leading newspapers ran an article about the 
dominance of the Society in the cancer community568. The article was very critical of the 
Society’s aggressive marketing strategies in general and of Ole Bang in particular, as the 
strategies were his professional specialty, so to speak, and not that of his executive committee. 
The authors had interviewed several intramural and extramural researchers, who expressed their 
concern about the structural organisation of the Society and the absolute power which its 
management exerted on the cancer community. Not surprisingly, long-time critic Jørgen Kieler 
was among the cited researchers. However, the head of the Society’s “Diet and Cancer” project, 
Dr Ejvind Thorling, also lent voice to the growing criticism against the Society. He was 
concerned about the fact that director Ole Bang was cast in the role as secretary at the meetings 
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for the Society’s Scientific Council. He did not find it appropriate for the director to be involved 
in these purely scientific meetings569.  
In addition to this, the article criticised the fact that the Scientific Council did not have a fixed 
order of priority regarding which cancer-related projects to support, as it claimed that the 
(undisclosed) list of interviewed researchers were not satisfied with the Council’s statement that 
it only allocated funds according to the criteria of “quality”, and as the undisclosed researchers 
argued that clinical cancer research was not prioritised enough compared to experimental cancer 
research570. But apart from shedding light on the brewing troubles between the scientific culture 
and the political administration of the Society, the newspaper article stirred up troubled waters 
by bringing details from an at-the-time unpublished letter from Ole Bang to the Minister of 
Health. According to the reporters, who did not mention how they had got hold of the letter, 
Bang wrote to the minister 13 days before the Folketing had planned to discuss the matter of the 
sale of the Finsen grounds to the Society in October 1989. In his letter, Bang supposedly gave a 
thorough description of “The Danish Cancer Society’s Research Centre”, and he argued that he 
had presented the plans to representatives from the MRC, Rigshospitalet, and the University at 
the MRC-initiated meeting on January 11th 1989571. According to Bang, these representatives 
had expressed their interest in and support for the proposed centre plans, much as he had told his 
Head Board on the same occasion572.  
As mentioned above, the minutes of the MRC-led meeting did not reflect such support. On the 
contrary, the representatives were wary of a centre dominated completely by the Society. 
Nevertheless, the uncorresponding accounts of the January meeting did not surface until the 
following October. According to the newspaper article, the Minister of Health forwarded Bang’s 
letter to the MRC on October 19th 1989, and the members of the Council subsequently dismissed 
Bang’s version of the events as a “misinterpretation”573. The representatives had never been 
interested in a cancer research centre owned by the Society, and in which the public research 
groups would not be allowed much influence. On the contrary, the MRC wanted a type of 
                                                 
569 Ibid. 
570 See also, Kristiansen, M. (1989) "Læger føler sig til grin" Weekendavisen 08-12-1989, where the same is 
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571 Note on the Danish Cancer Society’s Research Centre, October 18th 1989. Archive of the Danish Cancer Society, 
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572 Ibid. p. 2.  
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management through which the involved institutes were given equal status and rights, and it 
recommended that the Ministries of Education, the Interior, and Health should contribute with 
their share of buildings and half of the expenditures of the centre574. This would help balance the 
unequal power distribution between the Cancer Society and the other publicly owned and 
financed institutes involved in planning for the centre. The current situation, in which the 
Cancer Society was the major powerbroker in the cancer community, was reflected in the 
proposed and entirely privately owned cancer centre, and this was not a favourable situation for 
the other negotiation parties who sought influence and were thus forced to do whatever they 
could to change the situation and to even out the playing field. 
The Society’s cancer research centre did not have the wide scientific support that Bang claimed. 
But although the MRC and the Minister of Health were aware of this inconsistency, the 
government gave in to the massive and combined pressure of the political opposition and the 
press to sell the Finsen campus to the Society only three days after. So why did the MRC and 
the Minister not come forward with their findings at that point? The Minister was caught in a 
political power play where any attack on the Cancer Society would be interpreted by the press as 
an attack on the anti-cancer cause, so it is understandable that she forfeited. Especially seen in 
the light that the government was already unpopular in the press and the public for introducing 
rationalisations and prioritising in the hospital sector instead of supporting expansion of the 
area. As mentioned before, the Ministry of Health was established partly as a response to the 
public criticism in order to signal the goverment’s acknowledgement of the health care sector’s 
importance. The Finsen matter was therefore a sordid business for the Minister of Health, as 
forcing a cancer charity to pay full or even over-price for the Finsen grounds as part of the 
government’s privatisation strategy would surely be perceived by the public as cynical.  
As for the members of the MRC, many of which were cancer researchers themselves, their 
silence is more curious as they were not vulnerable to accusations of being “for” cancer or 
vulnerable to falling out of grace with electorates. They may simply have wanted to steer clear 
of the “mess” for as long as possible. Whatever their reasons for silence, the matter was only 
brought to light with the newspaper story in January 1990, as the reporters presented their 
findings to the members of the Danish parliament (Folketing) who after hearing about the matter 
for the first time felt misled by the Director of the Cancer Society, and were no longer animated 
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to sell the Finsen complex to the cancer charity575. When the reporters confronted Bang with 
their findings, he admitted to having over-interpreted the interest of the other institutes in the 
potential cancer research centre, but he did not think it made that much of a difference: 
But I will not apologise for it. They do, in principle, support the plans for a research 
centre. And we have never stated that the public laboratories should be run in the context 
of the Society. And I cannot believe that the State will not collaborate just because the 
centre will bear our name. For that it will. I guarantee it.576 
The Society’s management had not been presented with the MRC’s response to Bang’s letter to 
the Minister of Health577. The allegations in the newspaper article thus came as a surprise. On 
January 23rd 1990, Ole Bang and Bent Harvald wrote a letter to the newly instated Minister of 
Health, Ester Larsen, in order to straighten out the matter. In the letter, they explained the 
discrepancies between the Society’s and the MRC’s accounts of events as a misunderstanding: 
The Danish Cancer Society wishes to announce that it has, of course, never stated or 
imagined that public or other extramural cancer research laboratories, which under the 
terms of agreement may be placed within the physical frames of the centre, should be run 
in the context of the Danish Cancer Society.578 
Apparently, there had been a breakdown of communication at the January meeting 1989, for 
Bang and Harvald now claimed that they had always wanted the centre to be governed in the 
manner in which the majority of the MRC-working group had suggested in their report on the 
Rockefeller Centre in 1984, see chapter 4. This mode of management entailed a “Supervisory 
Board” and a “Coordination Council”, and these bodies represented the funding bodies and 
researchers involved in equal measure. Bang and Harvald insisted that the Society had been 
acting in good faith, and that the centre would naturally be governed in a democratic manner. 
Still, the name of the centre had to be “The Danish Cancer Society’s Research Centre” for 
marketing purposes. 
On the very same day that Bang and Harvald wrote the said letter, politicians such as the now 
former Minister of Health Elsebeth Kock-Petersen and Arne Melchior used the press to air their 
moral condemnation of the Society’s alleged manipulation of the Folketing’s Privatisation 
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Council579. Arne Melchior stated that he had been misled by the Society and demanded that the 
sale of the Finsen campus be postponed until the researchers and the cancer charity came to an 
agreement on the terms of the centre580. Just as the Society had used the press to make the 
politicians give them a choice to buy the Finsen ground, others were now using the press against 
the Society581. On January 24th 1990, the MRC dismissed the Society’s explanation that it was 
all just a misunderstanding, and the Privatisation Council threatened to sell the Finsen campus to 
someone else than the Society582. The Society tried to make it clear to all that it had never been 
its intention to control or interfere with the research of the public research groups in the new 
centre, but it was to no avail583. And the organisation was attacked from other sides as well. 
Heine Høi Hansen was chairman of the professional society the Danish Cancer Research 
Association, cancer researcher at the Copenhagen Municipal Hospital, and a member of the 
Society’s Scientific Council. On January 26th, he accused the Society of monopolising Danish 
cancer research and advised the Folketing’s Privatisation Council not to sell the Finsen 
ground584. According to Høi Hansen, the members of his professional association of cancer 
researchers wrote a letter to the Folketing’s health policy group and announced their full support 
to the MRC and its accusations against the Society585. According to Høi Hansen, the members 
of the association wanted the politicians to make sure that the centre would have an 
independent, professional and scientific management, and this was taken to heart, as the 
Folketing’s Privatisation Council decided to postpone the sale until the Society reached an 
agreement with the State-owned research groups586.  The council wanted the Minister of 
Education and Research and the Minister of Health to take their stand on the issue587.  
                                                 
579 A council consisting of representatives from the political parties of parliament/the Folketing, who discussed the 
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In the Northian and Bourdieuan terminology, the Society was losing bargaining strength, as a 
change in informal institutions (the taste and preferences of the public) seemed to be influenced 
by the media campaign that discredited the Cancer Society and its actions. Whereas the 
Society’s image as the proponent of the noble anti-cancer cause had previously been working 
for the Society in the form of positive public feedback and contributions (exchanged to social 
and economic capital) – bargaining power – that could morally force the government to make a 
transaction to sell the Finsen grounds, this leverage was now gone. The politicians now set the 
terms of transaction as they responded to a change in the public opinion (their electorate) and 
the loaded media campaign. The Society no longer dictated the terms of the sale and was 
struggling to make the best bargain possible under the new unfavourable power-balance. 
Purchasing Finsen was pivotal to the Society and its new business inspired investment strategy. 
By undermining the image of the Society and by portraying its attempts to mislead the 
politicians as somewhat shady and cynical, and by questioning its motives to create a centre, the 
critical researchers undermined the economic capital of the Society as an amoral currency and 
positioned themselves as the morally superior contenders of the anti-cancer cause. They had hit 
the Society in the one place where it hurts, and the public therefore reacted accordingly. It was 
the kind of third part enforcement in the form of broader societal returns (or lack thereof) that 
had not punished the Society’s defection from the Rockefeller plans, but which was now taking 
its toll on the Society, its centre plans, its investment strategy and continued existence. Those 
who were formerly the weaker in the social field were now growing stronger and stronger 
through strategic alliances with politicians from the government’s Privatisation Council. In 
summation, a change in informal constraints affected politicians to act against the Society’s 
interests. Had the Society’s management flown too close to the sun? 
The Cancer Society hastily extended invitations to the MRC, Rigshospitalet, and the University 
in order to unravel the difficult situation at a meeting on January 31st 1990. The MRC declined 
as they wanted to wait for the two ministers to call for a negotiation meeting, and because the 
MRC members needed more time to discuss the financial and political aspects of the proposed 
centre. Nevertheless, a meeting between representatives of the Society, Rigshospitalet, and the 
University was held. It has not been possible to find any minutes of this meeting, but it is 
described in chairman Bent Harvald’s report to the Society’s Head Board, February 14th 1990. 
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In this report, Harvald claims that the parties agreed to pursue the plans for the research centre, 
and he quotes a press release that was allegedly written by all the meeting participants588.  
Given that it has not been possible to find the original paper, or a version signed by all 
participants, it is uncertain whether or not all of the participants actually contributed to writing 
the statement and/or agreed to its content. With this reservation in mind, the chairman’s report 
gives the impression that the meeting participants agreed on a centre governed according to the 
guidelines of the Rockefeller centre-proposal, and that the Society had waived its demand for 
the name of the centre which was now called “the Finsen Park”589. The press release was 
forwarded to the Minister of Health and the Minister of Education590.  
Meanwhile, both extramural and intramural researchers used what seemed like a momentary 
weakness on the part of the Society to attack through the press. Some of them argued that Ole 
Bang meddled too much with the allocation of grants for cancer research projects591. Dr Heine 
Høi Hansen, who was a member of the Scientific Council, criticised the fact that the Council 
was only allowed to share out 37% of the amount of money set aside by the Society for research 
activities592. The Society stated in its annual reports to its members that it allocated 60% of its 
income to cancer research. The remaining 23% that was not spent by the Scientific Council was 
allegedly distributed by the Society’s Executive Committee which, in contrast to the Council, 
did not consist entirely of members with scientific expertise. The money was thus spent on 
general grants and basic budgets for the Society’s own research units593. This was, however, not 
entirely clear from the Society’s non-transparent budgets.  
It is noteworthy that these accusations went beyond the then current question of whether or not 
Ole Bang and Bent Harvald had deliberately manipulated the Privatisation Council into selling 
the Finsen grounds. They constituted a much broader attack on the Society as a whole, and the 
focus of the media debate began to blur. The average reader must also have been confused by 
the many participants in the debate. On February 1st, a group of researchers from both the 
publicly held institutes and the Society co-wrote a newspaper article in which they stressed that 
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591 Hilton, G. (1990) "Kræft-direktør i modvind" Berlingske Tidende København 31.01.1990, p. 5.  
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they – the researchers – had no problems collaborating and that they were all for a research 
centre and coordinating Danish cancer research594. They argued that the same was true for the 
institutes which they represented595.  
So who were in fact fighting and why? According to the author of another newspaper article 
published on the very same day, the conflict was between a group of publicly-employed 
researchers and the political administration of the Society, but the reporter also mentioned a 
disagreement between the Society on the one hand and the respective administrative levels of 
MRC, Rigshospitalet, and the University on the other. When looking at the material in question, 
it seems that there was more than one conflict going on at the same time, and that at least some 
reporters were mistaking them for being about the same thing, although they were not. The 
attack on the research policy and administrative structure of the Society did not have anything to 
do with the ongoing negotiations about the Finsen Park.596 However, the Society and its 
impending purchase of the Finsen Campus were vulnerable to any discrediting PR at this stage, 
and the press/the public opinion was in the position to be both judge, jury and executioner.  
Seen from a Northian and Bourdieuan perspective, this again indicates that the critical voices 
had positioned the Danish public as a third party enforcer in the transaction of establishing a 
cancer centre in order to influence the initiative as much as possible. The enforcement was not 
traditional in the sense known from economic transactions bound by legal contracts such as the 
State’s sale of the Finsen grounds to the Society. Such a transaction would be surrounded by 
rules and regulations and legal ramifications, if any transacting party should choose to defect a 
signed deal. But as mentioned above, the sale of the Finsen campus was State leverage to make 
the private Cancer Society construct a privately financed cancer centre in which the public 
negotiation parties (and their research groups) would be given the same influence and terms as 
in the now collapsed co-financed Rockefeller plans. Nevertheless, a sale could still be completed 
at market price without the use of the exemption clause and would in such a case be morally and 
legally independent of the establishment of a cancer centre. And this would make the Society 
regain power to use the grounds at its own discretion. Leverage concerning the sale was thus 
directly linked to the exemption clause (and the subsequent reduction of the State’s asking price) 
that allowed the State to sell to an interested party with a “worthy cause” and reason for 
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purchasing the campus. Such a worthy cause could be a cancer centre – or the anti-cancer cause 
in general – but by using moral arguments to force the politicians to use this clause, a sale would 
make the Society morally (but not legally) obligated to establish a cancer centre.  
When the press revealed somewhat shady negotiation tactics on the part of the Society, the 
intentions and moral of the cancer organisation was suddenly questioned and brought in play by 
critics, politicians and the press in the broader societal transaction known as the establishment of 
a cancer centre which all public and private planning parties could agree on. Because of the 
exemption clause, the Society opened a can of worms inasmuch as the organisation was 
suddenly vulnerable and subjected to all kinds of attacks on its moral conduct regarding:  
a) The Finsen sale. 
b) The establishment of a cancer centre. 
c) Its internal organisational dispositions regarding support for research. 
In effect, the public opinion became the third party enforcement of the establishment of a cancer 
centre, and defection would potentially be very costly for the Society this time around. The 
broad media attacks ensured that the matter became a morally contingent transaction rather than 
just the plain sale of the Finsen campus. In this sense, the formal institutions (the exemption 
clause) and a change of informal institutions (taste and preferences of the public/press) were 
used to discredit the Society and to force it to yield influence on the centre AND the 
organisation’s internal practices. A giant was forced to its knees.  
In sociological terms, the critics saw the Society’s strategy to use the exemption clause as an 
opportunity to undermine the cancer organisation’s position in the cancer field by battling on 
one of the types of capital the Society had once had in abundance but which due to its new 
business inspired strategies and negotiation tactics could now be questioned: social capital. The 
Society’s position as the main banner lead in the morally weighty war on cancer was 
undermined by cancer researchers and politicians doubting both the organisation’s intentions in 
buying the Finsen (its investment strategy) and its use of money entrusted to it by the public. In 
other words, the Society’s choice to go for economic capital was now questioned. The transition 
from modest charity (moral, social capital) to modern lobbying and investing business was now 
beginning to suffer a lack of positive feedback and broader societal returns.  
At the time it would be difficult to predict or measure the effects of this change on the level of 
voluntary contributions to the Society if it did not immediately ride off the storm. In a short 
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period of time, the Society had gone from a non-apologetic response to the media campaigns to 
now bowing to many of the demands from the (public) critical researchers, which it had 
otherwise stood firm on (such as the centre’s name and management model). Demands which 
were otherwise in conflict with the Society’s strategy to capitalise on publicity value of the 
centre’s name and to hold the most influence over the privately financed centre. In a Northian 
perspective, the strategy was suffering a lack of positive feedback due to a change of informal 
institutions, and the Society would therefore have to change tactics accordingly. Its reaction to 
extend influence to the critics indicates that: 
a) The purchase of the Finsen grounds was very important to the Society. So much that it 
was willing to give in on principle points regarding a potential cancer centre. 
b) The Society acknowledged the power of the press and public opinion as third party 
enforcement. 
c) The Society’s strategy to buy the Finsen by appealing morally for the use of the 
exemption clause backfired, and the subsequent admissions were an attempt to ride off 
the storm whilst still acquiring the Finsen campus that was pivotal for the organisation’s 
investment strategy. 
 
5.4 Roles and morals 
On the urging of the Privatisation Council, the Minister of Health and the Minister of Education 
and Research announced that they would now mediate in the conflict over the matter of 
management in the Finsen Park, and they considered inviting the negotiating parties to another 
meeting. But according to the vice-chairman of the MRC, oncologist Mikael Rørth of 
Rigshospitalet, the ministers had to consider their own role in the conflict as well597. As 
mentioned above, the State was a transaction party itself and therefore should and could not 
effectively mediate. According to Rørth, the ministers had to decide whether or not the 
Ministries of Education, the Interior, and Health should participate on a par with the Society in 
the financing of the centre. Rørth argued: 
The State has a unique opportunity to be in on the research centre. We [the MRC] have 
suggested that the State contributes with either buildings or by reducing the price of the 
Finsen area. But we never received an answer.598 
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In practice, the lack of response from the ministers deprived the MRC of a mandate to negotiate 
any financial aspects of the Finsen Park proposal, which was why they had not participated in 
the previous meeting between the negotiating parties. The MRC was severely handicapped by 
this, and the conflict between the parties could hardly be resolved. And without this resolution, 
the Privatisation Council of the Folketing would not sell the Finsen campus. In theory, the 
negotiations remained deadlocked, but it was in the midst of all this that the Society sent out the 
aforementioned second press release stating that the cancer charity, Rigshospitalet and the 
University (allegedly) agreed on the name and the management of the “Finsen Park”. The 
Folketing’s Privatisation Council received this piece of paper at their meeting on February 2nd, 
and on the recommendation of the Minister of Health, the council members decided to sell the 
Finsen grounds to the Society at the price of DKK 140 million599. The news of the happy ending 
to a week’s worth of drama was well received by the director of Rigshospitalet, Klaus Petersen: 
We will create cohabitation for cancer researchers. We have shaken hands on sharing 
service facilities and on coordinating the research effort. But the different parties are still 
responsible for their own research.600 
But just as the press had broadcasted the news of the sale, the Privatisation Council was 
presented with shocking news that blocked the sale of the Finsen area in the last minute. The 
University representatives had accused Ole Bang – and surprisingly not the other Society 
representatives – of misinterpreting their interest in the proposed Finsen Park once again601. 
According to University representative and basic cancer researcher Elisabeth Bock, the 
negotiating parties did not agree unanimously: 
We only agreed on the basis of the negotiations. Before a sale, it has to be resolved 
whether or not e.g. the State should be co-owner.602 
In essence, the Society was accused of trying to coup their way to the sale of the Finsen area, 
and the story took headlines in the press603. The head of the Finsen Laboratory and basic cancer 
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researcher, Keld Danø, went on national television and demanded that Ole Bang resigned from 
his post as the Society’s director604. It has not been possible to document the motive behind 
Danø’s attack besides his own account that he and the other critical researchers did what they 
could to bring attention to a cancer charity which did not play by the rules605. However, the 
Minister of Health insisted that she had never been misled by Ole Bang, and that the accusations 
made against him and the Society were wrong606. Instead, she told the press that she believed 
that a group of publicly employed cancer researchers were deliberately using the matter to gain 
influence on the private cancer charity607. But whatever the reason for the broadcasted attack 
was; the Society now reacted strongly to it.  
As mentioned above, the Society had exposed itself to various types of attacks on its moral fibre 
going beyond the establishment of the proposed cancer centre. When it pleaded for the use of 
the exemption clause with moral arguments, it effectively made it fair game to discuss the 
Society’s intentions and strategies publicly. The public opinion/press was third party enforcer 
and it affected both the government’s Privatisation Council’s will to sell the Finsen campus to 
the Society and it affected the Society’s image in general. It is not possible to tell if the criticism 
had been kinder had the Society opted to buy the Finsen Campus on market conditions without 
the use of the exemption clause.  
But the criticism of internal organisational dispositions in the private charity would not have 
been fair game in this case, as the Society would then just have made a traditional economical 
and contractually enforced transaction and would be free to do whatever it pleased with its 
acquisition. There would be no moral obligation to build a cancer centre or allow public parties 
from the cancer community to have any more influence than the charity saw fit. The Society’s 
choice to opt for the exemption clause was therefore very costly. The organisation’s next 
reaction to the latest attacks on its director – who embodied the economic capital and business 
logic that was subject to the moral attacks – was thus not surprising according to the theoretical 
framework of this thesis: the Society sought to right a wrong and costly decision that had 
deprived it of bargaining power. 
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At an extraordinary meeting on February 3rd1990, the Society’s Executive Committee decided to 
withdraw its offer to buy the Finsen area. The decision was announced in a press release the 
very same day: 
The offer was meant as a contribution to Danish cancer research, and we still feel that the 
idea is right. But we must, as a matter of fact, accept that there has not been sufficient 
support for the Cancer Society’s initiative.  
A decisive condition for the success of such a large project with so many participants has 
to be the establishment of a trusting collaboration. The debate of the last couple of weeks 
has convinced us that this is not possible right now. The anti-cancer cause is thus better 
served, if the Society’s plan of buying the Finsen area is given up. 608 
In addition, the Society used the press release to state that it would instead spend more money 
directly on cancer research projects, and that Ole Bang still had the full support of the Society. 
For it was indeed Bang who was the target of the press-mediated accusations, not the Executive 
Committee he worked for. There were many reasons for specifically targeting Bang. He was 
more visible in the press than the Executive Committee. Also, he represented a private business 
logic and culture whose interests in asset management, marketing, rational target fulfilment, 
publicity, research administration, and investments simply clashed with those of the research 
community (who did not give high priority to business strategies and lay 
administration/interference of their research activities). And he was therefore an easier target 
than the scientists of the Executive Committee (such as Kjeldgaard and Harvald), who could not 
as easily be accused of not appreciating the values and needs of science.  
As mentioned in chapter 4, the market conditions of the 1980s made the Cancer Society decide 
to make investments in buildings in order to protect its capital from the inflationary pressure, to 
get PR from its research activities, and to remain an autonomous agent in the cancer community. 
The Society’s investment strategy was to protect its financial interests so that it would be able to 
serve the anti-cancer cause for years to come, even if the voluntary contributions should 
suddenly decrease. The way the anti-cancer organisation saw things was that it had a 
responsibility to spend the collected money in the best possible manner and had to act 
accordingly. But in doing so, its business logic and increasing wealth was somehow clashing 
with the modest ideology of a charity organisation, and Ole Bang who embodied this logic was 
criticised by the press for being greedy and acting indecently.  
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5.5 A second round of negotiations 
As expected, the Society’s decision to redraw its bid took leverage from the critics, and the 
public researchers tried to re-start negotiations with a more appeased approach to the matter as 
they were still interested in a centre for the reasons stated in the above and could not do without 
the Society’s purchase of the Finsen campus either. It is interesting that the public researchers 
tried to perpetuate the path of the cancer centre, even when the Society had stated its intention of 
spending the money for the plan on grants-in-aid that could potentially benefit the researchers 
by financing their research. As the distribution of such grants was subjected to peer review 
through the Society’s scientific council, this would have given the researchers some measure of 
influence. But they pushed for “a bigger fish” in the form of a centre. And why? Did they need it 
as leverage to pursue their attack on the Society’s set-up? Did they see it as an ideal tool to 
coordinate Danish cancer research and/or to secure better lab facilities than in their current 
housing? No matter what, gridlock meant that no-one was likely to harvest the gains to be made 
from the transactions girding the matter. The Society was thus re-instated in its position of 
power in the cancer community. Its economic capital was once again symbolic capital and a 
powerful currency. The path of the cancer centre continued.  
Ironically, the cultural differences that eventually led to the deadlocking of the talks were also 
the reason why the negotiation for a Danish cancer centre actually continued with different 
persons at the table. Shortly after the Executive Committee decided not to buy the Finsen area, a 
group of researchers from the Society, Rigshospitalet, the MRC and the University contacted 
Rigshospitalet’s obstetrician Johannes Bock, who was chairman of the Society’s Scientific 
Council. Because he was a clinician and not part of the Society’s management, the researchers 
must have felt that it was easier and more effective to approach him instead of Ole Bang. They 
wanted to let Bock and the Society know that they were very positive towards the idea of 
establishing a cancer centre at the Finsen campus609.  
One of the interested researchers, Keld Danø, proposed a new model for the research centre, in 
which the State did not sell all of the Finsen area in tender, but reserved a small area for a cancer 
research centre610. Designing a “Danø-model” for the research centre – in which the state 
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reserved a small part of the Finsen for a centre – would thus be a clever way of jumpstarting 
discussions. Danø’s initiative was an attempt to level out the unequal power distribution in the 
field by trying to involve the State financially through the reservation of the building stock for 
the centre. This time, though, the initiative grew from the bottom and up based on researchers’ 
discussions rather than on the opinion of administrators. Still, the focus of discussions was on 
form, not content. 
Johannes Bock of the Society consequently met with the Medical Board of Rigshospitalet which 
offered to establish a council consisting of Johannes Bock (the Scientific Council), basic cancer 
researcher Keld Danø (the Finsen Laboratory), basic cancer researcher Elisabeth Bock (the 
Medical Faculty), Mogens Spang Thomsen (Copenhagen University pathologist appointed by 
the dean of the Med. Fac.), and the director of Rigshospitalet Klaus Petersen, Rigshospitalet’s 
oncologist Mikael Rørth, and Rigshospitalet’s professor John Philip611. The council was 
established for the purpose of reviving the Finsen project and preventing the State from selling 
off all of the Finsen area to buyers who could be expected to use the grounds for purposes other 
than cancer research and thereby forever kill the dream of a centre. The new council  had to 
work fast and secretly met on February 8th. In fact, the meeting was so secret and sudden that 
Bock did not have time to inform all the members of his Scientific Council until after the 
meeting. He acted with the approval of the Society’s Chairman, Bent Harvald612.  
At the meeting, the council worked out a rescue plan to create a Finsen Park in which all parties 
had equal ownership. The plan was based on Danø’s model in which the State would reserve 
approximately 20% of the Finsen area for a cancer research centre613. In this way, the proposed 
cancer centre would consist of the Society’s research building as well as the proposed reserved 
(and State-owned) buildings. The following day, the plans were presented to the Minister of 
Health, Ester Larsen, who consequently initiated a discussion of the possibility of establishing a 
“Finsen Park” with the political management of the originally involved planning parties 
(including administrators such as Ole Bang). But although the model proposed by the 
researchers was the reason why the parties even met again, Ester Larsen did not plan to put it 
into practice. In the words of Bent Harvald, who was present at the meeting: 
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During the following negotiations, the Minister declared unequivocally that the 
government could not contribute financially to the centre plans although the plans of 
establishing a cancer research centre had her full sympathy. As a consequence thereof, the 
State did not want to be co-owner of the buildings of such a centre. The Minister of Health 
stressed that her job in relation to the Finsen area was to carry through a property 
transaction for the State at the best possible price.  
On the basis of the Society’s decision to withdraw its offer to buy the entire Finsen area, 
the Minister informed us that she was prepared to recommend further negotiations with 
the Society about buying part of the area, if this would contribute to the establishment of 
the cancer research centre.614 
In addition, the Minister informed the Society that she had met with the other negotiation parties 
to determine their need for laboratory space and their ability to finance it. As it turned out, 
neither of the parties were willing or able to pay rent for their research activities, and they could 
only make small contributions to the modernisation and equipment of the labs. In other words, 
the research centre would only come about if the Society financed the acquisition and 
renovation of the entire building stock and paid the basic expenses for the operation of the 
centre as well. This was far from the model proposed by the researchers as the government was 
not willing to contribute with anything but its sympathy in addition to what was already 
contributed through the core budgets of the universities and hospitals and as grants-in-aid from 
the MRC and the NSRC615. The Society regained leverage, and for a brief moment it was out of 
the firing line, as it could hardly be held morally obliged to establish and finance a cancer centre 
massively influenced by public institutes, when no State or other public organs felt morally 
inclined or able to participate financially.  
It would have been a great political victory for Ester Larsen if she had brought the parties to an 
understanding and made them establish a cancer centre without any additional financial aid from 
the government. However, the power balance between the Cancer Society and the public 
negotiation parties was askew, and the researchers’ attempt to change this by getting the 
Ministry of Health financially involved failed when the minister refused to contribute with 
additional funds. The Ministry of Health had been the only agency able to even out the power 
balance by contributing financially to the centre and be on an equal footing with the Cancer 
Society. However, with the Minister’s decline, the cancer field was still dominated by the 
private cancer organisation and this catalysed a new reaction from the publicly-employed 
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researchers, who had to find new ways of ensuring themselves some measure of influence: the 
management of the centre. 
The Head Board of the Society discussed the Minister’s offer intensely. If the Society agreed to 
the new terms, it meant a significant financial burden and responsibility. And even so, it was not 
known whether or not the other negotiation parties were still interested in a research centre 
owned entirely by the Society, but governed by the type of management agreed on in the 
Rockefeller negotiations back in 1984. There were still considerable differences in what the 
different negotiation parties felt was at the heart of cancer research (clinical vs. basic research 
problems), and as Keld Danø had pointed out in an appendix to the 1984 report on the 
Rockefeller Centre, the nature of the poly-institutional centre management held the implicit risk 
that the involved institutes did not share the same vision for the cancer centre, and that the 
individual visions were incompatible and would prevent the centre from functioning as a unit. 
Would it even function in practise?  
As mentioned in the previous chapters, the University and Rigshospitalet did not see eye to eye 
on research administration, and none of them shared the Society’s need for asset management 
and publicity. However, the members of the Head Board finally agreed to continue negotiations 
with the Ministry of Health about buying the northern part of the Finsen area in spite of this616.  
This is perhaps not surprising given that the Society’s objective had always been to acquire and 
invest in real estate as a way of protecting its capital against inflationary pressure. So in a path 
dependence perspective, it was no surprise why the Society would continue down the path of the 
cancer centre – to practice its investment strategy – nor is it surprising that the financially 
pressed public negotiating parties followed suit. And the fact that it was done with so little 
regard for discussing the content and scientific viability and benefit of the centre model in the 
face of alternatives (as offered by Inge Henningsen and the Kjeldgaard Report in chapter 3) 
implies that the “centre” was a means to other ends than coordinating Copenhagen cancer 
research.  
On February 22nd 1990, the process resulted in a new model for the structure of the centre, and it 
was presented to the other negotiation parties.  The new model was welcomed by all parties. The 
proposed centre was independent of the Society in the sense that its various public and private 
research labs were autonomous and run by different institutes, and that the management and 
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scientific board consisted of representatives of all the involved institutes and researchers, 
respectively617. In essence, the administrative structure of the centre would be just like that of 
the Rockefeller centre, (see chapter 4). Although the Society was the main funding organ, it did 
not demand proportional influence in the management, and this was welcomed by the publicly 
held research groups and institutes. On the condition that the State sold buildings 8, 9, 11, and 
12 at the Finsen area to the Society, the cancer centre would consist of 13.000 m2, see figure 5-
2. At the first stage of the establishment, the centre would house the Society’s Cancer Registry 
and the Fibiger Institute, Rigshospitalet’s Finsen Laboratory and the secretariat of the Danish 
Breast Cancer Group, but the Society planned to offer 6,500 m2 to other interested research 
groups later on618. 
Figure 5-2:  Outline of the relevant northern part of the Finsen grounds (square A) 
 
Note: The upper left square (A) of the drawing is the part of the Finsen campus the Society was offering to 
buy. Building 10 was already owned by the Society and it housed the Fibiger Institute. 
Source: The centre proposal of February 22nd 1990. 
 
The negotiation parties wrote a note about the proposed structure of the cancer research centre, 
and they all signed it on February 22nd 619. Johannes Bock of the Society went to the press with 
the good news: 
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All the meeting participants agree that it is a good solution which will infuse Danish 
cancer research with extra strength and drive. The organisation [the Society] will 
unconditionally pay the State DKK 40-50 million to take over part of the Finsen area. 
Then, it will invest DKK 40-50 million in the fitting-up of research laboratories; and in 
addition, we will pay the rent and yearly operation expenditures, approximately DKK 5-6 
million. The scientists who move into the Finsen Park must be approved by either the 
University, Rigshospitalet, the MRC or the Cancer Society.620 
It seems as though Johannes Bock deliberately tried to underline the democratic structure of the 
new centre, given that the Society had previously been accused of monopolising and dominating 
Danish cancer research. His comment that the University, Rigshospitalet, the MRC or the 
Society was to decide which groups to accommodate was not entirely true, however. It was the 
autonomous centre management with representatives from these institutes who were in charge 
of such decisions, and this worried the head of the Society’s Scientific Department, Erik 
Amdrup, who had not been present at the negotiation table: 
The dream of such a centre included – at least in my opinion – Danish and perhaps 
international research groups of international standard. It worries me that according to the 
meeting minutes, the centre negotiations have been focused on creating a rather 
bureaucratic structure while the means to secure the quality of the centre’s research has 
hardly been mentioned. The project will initially cost a hundreds of millions, and the 
future operation of the centre will cost several millions per year. It is the most costly 
investment/project that the Society has ever financed. I had hoped that applications for 
moving into the centre were to be evaluated by an independent scientific committee (the 
Scientific Council or externally), and that the project would be monitored and 
occasionally evaluated by the ISAC along the way. It is no doubt comfortable for the 
departments in question to move closer to each other, but there is no guarantee that the 
improvement of their research efforts is worth the money spent. In the future, it would be 
prudent to be able to document the success of the project to the donors.621 
Erik Amdrup was right worrying about the lack of scientific planning in the centre and about the 
management models reprecautions for the Society. The constitution of the new centre 
management meant that the representatives of the Danish Cancer Society were outnumbered by 
the representatives of publicly held institutes, and they risked being outvoted on central issues 
such as the scientific profile of the centre. Compared with the Society’s aggressive attitude at 
the January meeting of 1989, this surrender of power seemed a bit odd. Naturally, the Society’s 
strategy to use the media to push for a sale of the Finsen grounds had backfired, and the cancer 
charity could not afford more of the bad publicity it had suffered from the press-mediated 
attacks. But did the Society capitulate and give up influence on the most costly project it had 
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ever embarked on just to restore its reputation? It does not seem likely – but it is certainly 
possible – that the management of the Society was willing to go to great lengths to secure the 
Finsen area to protect the capital of the cancer charity, and that a total dominance of the centre’s 
activities was not as important as actually establishing a cancer research centre and restoring the 
trust of the donors. But did the Society hand over the reins? No! In April 1990, Bent Harvald 
and Ole Bang called on the other negotiation parties to discuss the adding of a supplement to the 
February proposal for the management and structure of the cancer research centre: 
It is hereby announced that in principle the Society adopts the parties’ consensus on the 
described collaborative framework, given that the Society may assume that any decision 
made in the centre management will be made unanimously in order to secure the highest 
quality in the centre research. In reference to the proposal, the Society points to the fact 
that the management decides which new cancer research units to place in the centre, 
which ones to reduce/terminate, and how to allocate the space in the centre. 622  
In the entire history of planning for a Danish cancer centre, unanimous decision-making had 
been a rare sight. The Society’s new condition would probably prevent a centre management 
from deciding anything at all. As mentioned above, the institutes held different and sometimes 
incompatible views on central points (the definition of cancer research, the administration of 
research, and the need for publicity), and this could effectively rule out consensus decisions. So 
after lengthy discussions on May 14th 1990, the negotiation parties concluded that only decisions 
regarding which groups to move into the centre should be unanimous. Also, no institute could 
be financially obliged against its own will because of a majority vote in the management623. The 
parties therefore seemed to agree on the structure and management of the proposed cancer 
research centre, and all that was left was the actual acquisition of the buildings.  
The Ministry of Health and the Folketing’s Privatisation Council wanted to sell the northern part 
of the Finsen area to the Danish Cancer Society for DKK 90 million, whereas the cancer charity 
wanted to pay no more than DKK 60 million. The Society hired a real estate agent to give an 
impartial appraisal of the building stock, and the agent estimated the buildings at a price of DKK 
65 millions. In addition, the agent argued that the price would probably be much lower if the 
Ministry of Health tried to sell the buildings by calling for tenders, as there were certain 
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restraints on what the grounds could be used for624. According to the planning and building 
regulations of the City of Copenhagen, the area could only be used for non-profit activities for 
the common good, and this drastically reduced the number of potential buyers625. The 
Privatisation Council subsequently announced that it was willing to sell the grounds to the 
Society at a price of DKK 75 million, on the condition that the establishment of the cancer 
research centre would be put into practice and governed in the manner in which the negotiation 
parties had agreed on February 22nd 1990626. In this way, the Folketing tried to reinflict the 
Society the moral responsibility of establishing this type of cancer centre, in spite of the fact that 
such a demand could not legally or morally be part of a traditional transaction such as a sale of 
the Finsen if the sale was done in open tendering, even though the result of the tendering process 
could be much lower bids than the asking price.  
In April 1990, the Cancer Society’s Head Board discussed the Privatisation Council’s latest 
move and decided to stand by their initial offer of DKK 60 million, and it informed the Minister 
of Health that the Society would make a public bid on the grounds, if the Privatisation Council 
did not accept the latest offer and decided to put the Finsen grounds up for sale in open 
tendering. This evoked a lot of anger on the part of one prominent member of the Privatisation 
Council, Arne Melchior, who found the Society’s latest offer scandalously low and considered 
cancelling his membership of the cancer charity627. According to the logic behind the the formal 
institutions girding the government’s privatisation-trend and desire to make the public sector 
transact on market conditions, the Society’s actions would absolutely make sense. This was true 
from the perspective of its commission to serve the anti-cancer cause by spending the collected 
funds/contributions responsibly. Why pay overprice? Why not play the market? Melchior’s 
outburst can only be seen as yet another attempt to drag the Society and the sale of the Finsen 
campus out of an arena girded by business logic, market conditions and contractual legal 
enforcement and into an arena of more diffuse subjective morality, increasing the Society’s 
vulnerability.  
In this way, the sociological mechanisms behind these attempts to shift battlefields mirror the 
perception of the Society’s own transition from modest physician dominated charity to a modern 
DJØF-led organisation and the discussions of whether or not such a change was suitable for 
                                                 
624 The Chairman’s report to the Cancer Committee May 20th 1990. Personal papers of Ole Bang, (Copenhagen). p. 
15.  
625 Tolderlund, S. (1990) "Finsen-området næsten rømmet" Berlingske Tidende København 21.07.1990, p. 2.  
626 Ibid.  The supplement to the proposal for the centre’s management and structure was added a month later.  
627 NN. (1990) "Kræftens Bekæmpelse afviser pris på Finsen" Berlingske Tidende 18.03.1990, p. 10.  
 
The Cancer Centre That Never Was 
 
 276 
charity work. The Privatisation Council eventually decided not to accept the Society’s offer and 
put the whole area up for sale in open tendering. The process took time because of bureaucratic 
difficulties and confusion on the decision-making authority of the Ministry of Finance and the 
Ministry of Health in this matter628. Also, the Ministry of Health was interested in changing the 
planning and building regulations for the City of Copenhagen, so that the Finsen grounds could 
be used for purposes other than non-profit activities629. This was of course an attempt to attract 
more buyers and push up the price of the Finsen area, but the Ministry of Health did not have 
the mandate to change the regulations by itself – this was the domain of the City of Copenhagen. 
The Finsen grounds were finally put up for sale in open tendering in October, and potential 
buyers had to make their bid before mid-December. Although the Ministry of Health now 
wanted to sell all areas of the Finsen grounds, and not just the northern part, the Society was still 
interested. It placed a bid for DKK 140 million, and this was the exact same offer it had made 
when it first started planning for a private cancer research centre. Two other bids were made:  
a) DKK 150 million from Kay Wilhelmsen Holding. The firm wanted to build flats at the 
grounds and rent laboratory space to the Danish Cancer Society.  
b) DKK 10 million from a building association that wanted to buy part of the area for 
senior housing630.  
The two competing offers could only be considered if the City of Copenhagen agreed to bend 
the rules for the use of the Finsen area. Given that this process would be of long duration and 
that the operation costs of the Finsen area amounted to almost DKK 2 million a month, the 
Danish Cancer Society held a strong position. On March 22nd 1991, the Society’s offer was 
discussed at a meeting in the Folketing’s Privatisation Council, but the Council never reached an 
agreement on whether or not to sell the Finsen area to the cancer charity. According to 
Chairman Bent Harvald, the Society was informed that the reason for this was that one of the 
council members had requested legal advice on whether a sale would pledge the Society to 
establish a cancer research centre at the Finsen grounds in accordance with the centre proposal 
of February 22nd 1990631. To the management of the Society, only one scenario was 
conceivable: the Society was not obliged to establish a centre. In the words of Bent Harvald: 
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The Head Board’s position on this issue was clearly voiced at our meeting on May 15th 
1990, when it was stated that any promise regarding the Finsen Park would be based on 
the document from February 22nd 1990 only. It was unacceptable to link the described 
collaborative framework – which the Society, along with the other collaboration partners, 
had agreed to in principle – with the conditions of a sale [of the Finsen area]. As 
everybody recalls, this was the decisive condition that made the Society refrain from 
buying the Finsen area from the State without open tendering. By buying in open 
tendering, the question of linkage no longer applies. Otherwise, the requirement to 
establish a cancer research centre should have been entered as a condition in the tender 
material.632 
On April 4th 1991, the Minister of Health issued a note to the Privatisation Council regarding the 
sale of Finsen. She agreed with the Society that a sale of the Finsen area would not obligate the 
cancer charity to build a cancer research centre. Furthermore, the Minister and her legal advisors 
acknowledged that the proposal of February 22nd 1990 was a declaration of intent rather than a 
binding legal document, although signed by Ole Bang and Johannes Bock633. The Minister even 
considered the proposal to be a party truce after lengthy political posturing in the media634. 
According to the Minister, the situation had changed since the proposal was first written. Back 
then, the Society was planning to buy only part of the Finsen area at an affordable price that 
would allow the cancer charity to finance most of the proposed centre as well. Nevertheless, the 
situation changed considerably when the State sold the entire Finsen area in open tendering with 
no special cancer research centre clauses and at a much higher price. In conclusion, the Minister 
informed the Privatisation Council that the Society was not bound by the proposal or the 
establishment of any kind of cancer centre. It was thus free to do whatever it wanted with the 
Finsen buildings for business purposes – be that the establishing of a cancer research centre, the 
renting of some of the buildings to other businesses etc. The Society could pursue whatever 
means to serve the anti-cancer cause in the sense that it would optimise the Society’s income 
and make its investment profitable for the sake of continued survival.  
The Society had succeeded in buying the Finsen campus without the constraints of any “moral 
clause”. However, the continued success of the organisation’s investment strategy depended on 
– yet again – a positive media and public perception  of whether or not the organisation lived up 
to its objective of serving the anti-cancer cause responsibly. Because even though the cancer 
charity had succeeded in separating an economical transaction from political (moral) agendas, 
the organisation still suffered the consequences of once having let itself be dragged into a battle 
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on moral fibre in the beginning of the negotiations. The can of worms had not yet been resealed, 
and the public researchers and other critical voices could still revive the media debate against 
the Society if they felt deprived of influence over the centre, or if the Society tried to defect 
from the centre plans yet again. 
5.6 The drawbacks of corporate charity 
Even if the Society enjoyed temporary political support from the government, it was attacked 
once more by cancer researchers through the press. Along with an alleged number of 320 cancer 
researchers, Dr Jørgen Rygaard from the Copenhagen Municipal Hospital established a 
competing cancer charity in April 1991. According to Rygaard, the reason for doing so was a 
growing discontent with the Society, which had become all too commercial and no longer lived 
up to the humble ideology of a humanitarian organisation635. In a series of newspaper articles 
e.g. “Researchers rebel against the Cancer Society” and “The Society is too commercial”, 
Rygaard informed readers about the new cancer organisation, which in contrast to the Society 
would not sit on its coffers and invest to amass a “huge pile of money” – quite the contrary. The 
new organisation would function as a foundation and channel all its collected money directly 
into cancer research, not administration. And according to Rygaard, the new initiative was 
backed by what appeared to be the entire cancer community in the form of 320 cancer 
researchers:  
We feel that the Cancer Society has become too commercial. We saw it during the 
negotiations for the cancer research centre at Finsen where the atmosphere was 
characterised more by business considerations than by the positive and optimistic tone one 
could have expected from negotiations about a research centre. (…). We want to form a 
supplemental association, and we will make sure that donations are channelled into 
research without unnecessary delay. The Cancer Society spends money on many other 
things, and researchers have reservations about the construction of a large empire such as 
the Finsen as it has not been possible to obtain clear agreements about the management 
structure.636 
The name of the new organisation was “The Danish Cancer Research Foundation” (DCRF), 
which was backed by the Danish Medical Oncology Society and the Danish Cancer Research 
Association. If the DCRF was in fact formed and supported by 320 cancer researchers, it would 
mean that almost all cancer researchers in the country were opposed to the Danish Cancer 
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Society, and this was indeed a powerful message to the Folketing’s Privatisation Council which 
was to decide whether or not to accept the Society’s bid on the Finsen area.  The 320 cancer 
researchers were in fact equal to the exact number of members in the two professional 
associations, the Danish Oncology Society and the Danish Cancer Research Association, but it 
is far from certain that they were all for the initiative. It has not been possible to document 
whether the decision to back the new foundation was unanimous or based on a majority vote. 
The cancer researchers of the Danish Cancer Society were also members of one or both of the 
associations, but they are not likely to have supported the idea of a competing cancer charity. It 
was later claimed by the Society that only a small percentage of the members of the professional 
association actually agreed to the new initiative637. If this was true it meant that Rygaard had 
used the name of the two associations to boost the credibility of the new foundation.  
The newspaper articles did not reflect such nuances, however, maintaining as they did a 
juxtaposition between the Society and all Danish cancer researchers, and this was the message 
that came across to the average reader. Danish politicians were affected as well, and even 
though the Minister of Health had no reservations about selling the Finsen area to the Society, 
some of her colleagues did. The Folketing’s Finance Committee wanted to postpone the sale of 
the Finsen area yet again as it worried that the Society would fail to keep the centre agreement 
of February 1990, and end up building a private centre on which the State and other public 
organs would have no influence at all638. This in spite of the fact that a centre and the Finsen 
sale were in no way linked legally, and the Privatisation Council therefore had no mandate to 
dictate the use of a lot bought in open tender with no “centre-clause” in the tendering material. 
The matter caused a great deal of commotion and outrage in the press, and this surprised the 
chairman of the Society: 
The odd thing about this matter is that we are not buying the Finsen area for any other 
reason than the establishment of a research centre. We merely wish that the purchase 
should be separated from the collaborative agreement that does not legally bind us to 
anything. 639 
Still, the image of the Society was tainted by the press and the critical cancer researchers, and a 
series of unrelated accusations against the private cancer charity was suddenly morally linked 
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with the sale of the Finsen area640. The establishment of the alternative cancer research 
foundation had made people question what the Society was in fact spending all its money on. 
Research? Administration? Strategic investments? While Ole Bang and his colleagues had used 
the promise to establish a cancer research centre as leverage to acquire the Finsen grounds, a 
small group of critical researchers (Danø, Elisabeth Bock) and politician Arne Melchior used the 
sale of the Finsen grounds as leverage against the Society in order to pressure the organisation 
into establishing a cancer research centre with a scientific management that would give 
substantial influence to the publicly employed researchers. This had successfully been done 
when the Society opted to force the Privatisation Council to use the exemption clause of selling 
the Finsen campus at a potentially lower price to a worthy cause, but this time the bid was made 
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on equal terms with other bidders and with no such clause. In fact, any politician’s attempt to 
link the sale and the establishment of the centre would be on legally thin ice and should have 
resulted in heavy public criticism. But it did not.  
Proposing such a linkage bore no risk of legal ramifications for the critical researchers, though.  
They were once again using the sale as a tool to restructure the field of power – that is to change 
the power-balance by forcing the Society’s management to their knees. Their actions were 
shaped by this power balance, and since the former Minister of Health had passed on the chance 
to level out this balance by contributing financially to the centre on an equal footing with the 
Society, the researchers had to find other strategies to rally up allies (politicians from the 
Privatisation Council, the public) to secure a scientific management and influence. But now that 
the present Minister of Health, Ester Larsen, had stated that the Society was not obliged to 
establish a cancer research centre if it acquired the Finsen grounds, the researchers had to 
change tactics again, and the press-mediated criticism therefore slowly changed nature: it was 
targeted at the structure and management of the Society itself.  
Heine Høi Hansen had previously pointed out to the Scientific Council that the annual budgets 
were unclear as to how much money the Society actually spent directly on cancer research 
projects, and other critical voices had complained about the non-transparent lines of decision-
making within the Society. And Danø used the press to portray the cancer charity as a 
notoriously secretive and undemocratic empire that almost conducted accounting trickery and 
was no longer being true to its origin as a popular anti-cancer movement641. Danø also attacked 
the consolidation policy of the charity as the bond holdings of the Society amounted to DKK 
623 million, and according to Danø, this was far more than needed to protect the capital against 
inflation and to secure the continuity of cancer research in the country. Furthermore, Danø 
criticised the configuration of the charity’s annual budgets as they were non-transparent, and he 
claimed that the budgets showed that the organisation spent too much on administration 
compared to what was spent on research642.  
If this was true, the Society had misused the donations and trust of the public, as it was 
considered good form to keep administration expenses to a minimum in humanitarian 
organisations. The management of the Society naturally retorted in the press where it appealed 
to the public saying that their money was well spent on research and not on excessive 
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administration, that the design of their budgets was standard, and that Danø had simply made a 
miscalculation when he presented the faulty figures.643 Danø replied by stating that he had been 
an apprentice accountant before he became a researcher, and that he was thus more than capable 
of analysing a budget. The debate went on for a long time, and the cancer organisation was in 
danger of suffering the drawbacks of corporate charity.  
Sociologist Bourdieu favours the use of sports analogies to describe the dynamics of social 
fields. In this context, the Society was constantly forced to play a game in which the court and 
the rules were constantly changing to its disadvantage. Being forced to play tennis with golf 
clubs so to speak. Constantly finding itself at another turf and under different rules than 
presupposed. The Society was forced to play the “moral” game, even though its actions were 
only warranted in an entirely different world and by sets of rules such as law and market that 
was not acknowledged by the Society’s opponents and the third party enforcement. A group of 
cancer researchers were constantly trying to undermine the Society’s image and power, and the 
Achilles heel of the private cancer charity was in fact its image (for an impression of the 
campaign’s effect on the Society’s income, see figure 4.1, chapter 4). If the public did not 
believe their money was spent right by the Society, they would stop donating or go to the 
competing cancer foundation – the DCRF.  
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Newspaper drawing (Politiken, 1992): The Danish Cancer Society is drawn as a crab/cancer sitting on its 
coffers while researchers plead for money for their activities. The lines around the crab’s eyes depict the logo 
of the Society.  
Meanwhile, the tumultuous events affected the Danish Folketing’s Finance Committee as well, 
as the members asked the Minister of Health about her stand on the sale of the Finsen area. She 
assured them that the Society would establish a cancer research centre managed according to the 
proposal of February 22nd 1990644. According to the Minister, the Society’s Chairman had 
affirmed this over the phone on April 19th 1991645. The Finance Committee regarded this 
conversation as an oral agreement to establish a centre and had no further objections to the 
sale646. On May 22nd 1991, the entire Finsen area was sold to the Danish Cancer Society.647The 
fact that the Minister, the Finance Committee, and the Privatisation Council even had such 
discussions and made conclusions regarding the sale of Finsen – even though they could not 
legally make any such demands – bears witness to a widespread attitude towards what a charity 
should be and how it should act from a moral point of view. It is very doubtful that the State 
representatives would have made similar demands of legally groundless moral demands to e.g. a 
private pharmaceutical company bidding on the campus which did not in the same way as a 
charity depend on its image and private contributions. Even though the Cancer Society was 
private and run like a private business, it was certainly not judged or treated by the same set of 
standards as a private business.  
5.7 So close, so far 
The Society had bought 35,300 m2 of building stock, and the organisation could not possibly 
use all of this space for the centre. The Society’s Executive Committee therefore planned to 
reserve 17,700 m2 for the Danish School of Design, which was interested in renting offices in 
the Finsen area648. 4,600 m2 were used for the Society’s Head Office and Advisory Centre, 
while 13,000 m2 were reserved for the actual cancer research centre. The Society had assured 
the extramural researchers that the centre would be governed according to the management 
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model agreed upon in the document of February 22nd 1990, and this had calmed down the 
critical press coverage649. However, the Society’s Scientific Council members were not 
unanimous in their support of the management model. One member worried that the 
collaboration between the proposed Supervisory Board (administration) and the Coordination 
Council (scientific profile) would be impeded, given that the Supervisory Board had the 
mandate to decide which scientific groups to include in the centre650. Or in other words: would 
the New Public Management trend from the hospitals and the business strategies of the Cancer 
Society infiltrate the centre and allow non-scientific and non-medical personnel to make such 
important decisions?  
This was a very important decision that would affect the centre’s scientific profile. Should the 
political and administrative management have such power to affect the scientific activities in the 
centre? The Executive Committee acknowledged the concern and agreed that the principles of 
the February document were very complicated and might not function in practise. 
Unfortunately, they could only be changed and simplified if all of the negotiation parties agreed 
to do so.  
The opportunity to discuss these and other questions regarding the planning for the Finsen Park 
arose when the Society invited the other negotiation parties to a meeting on September 24th 
1991. The purpose of the meeting was to find out which extramural research groups were 
interested in moving into the centre in addition to the Finsen Laboratory and the Secretariat for 
the Danish Breast Cancer Group which were already part of the plans651. But the meeting ended 
in disaster as representatives from the public research organs and institutes walked out of the 
talks early. Because of this, there is no formal record of the meeting signed by all parties; the 
only document available is the Society representatives’ summary to staff. According to this, 
representatives from the State-owned Rigshospitalet, the MRC, the NSRC, and the Research 
Department of the Ministry of Education were not able to list any groups ready to move into the 
Finsen Park. The Medical Faculty of Copenhagen University presented five groups that were 
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only interested if the Finsen Park would provide them with better laboratory facilities and 
equipment than at their current location652.  
As shown in chapter 4, better laboratory facilities was definitely one of the public researchers’ 
incentives to support the establishment of a cancer centre, no matter if – it would seem – the 
centre had a clearly defined scientific profile/content or not. According to the summary, the 
University researchers required expensive new apparatus such as electron microscopy facilities, 
a series of centrifugal separators, and immunohistological facilities in order to even consider 
moving into the centre653. The Natural Science Faculty of the University reported that many of 
its researchers had reservations about the entire project and were not interested in moving their 
activities at all – at least not until the negotiators had appointed members for a suitable board of 
directors. All in all, the summary reflects that it must have been very important for everyone but 
the Society’s representatives to establish a board of directors.  
The Society was represented by Bent Harvald, Ole Bang, and Executive Committee member and 
lawyer Niels Fisch-Thomsen, and the three of them were far from happy with the proposal. To 
them, it did not make sense to establish a board of directors without deciding on the rules and 
regulations for the centre first. According to Bang and Fisch-Thomsen, no other private firm 
would ever establish a board of directors before making rules to define and/or reduce its 
decision-making authority654. Furthermore, they did not find it reasonable to establish a board of 
directors when there were, as of yet, no interested publicly held and financed research groups to 
govern at all.  
In other words, the representatives of the Society wanted to discuss and determine the rules and 
regulations, the scientific content and the profile of the centre before establishing a board, while 
the other negotiators wanted to establish a board of directors before planning which groups to 
place in the centre. Obviously, this represented a clash with the private business logic of the 
Society’s management, which the economist Bang and the lawyer Fisch-Thomsen reflected 
because of their education and job positions, and which physician Bent Harvald respected in his 
capacity as chairman of the Society, the best interests of which he served. Bent Harvald and 
Fisch-Thomsen suggested that an interim council should be established for a period of 2-4 years, 
and that the centre plans should be cancelled if the council could not present clear-cut rules of 
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procedure and a viable scientific profile for the centre within this period of time. The Society 
now owned the large Finsen area and could not be expected to leave the costly buildings vacant 
for years, just because the planning process dragged on due to the indecisiveness of the 
negotiators, when the Society could be renting the space to other (commercial) purposes 
instead655. Given that the parties had now planned for two years and still could not even produce 
a list of research groups interested in moving into the centre, Bang and his colleagues found that 
their proposal for an interim council was more than reasonable. And yet, the parties never came 
to an understanding on the issue, and the State representatives became agitated and left the 
meeting in anger. The meeting thus reflected the difficulties which the management of the 
proposed centre might encounter. And even worse; the Washington planning conference on 
cancer centres (chapter 3) may have been right to recommend that a planning process should 
follow a certain series of steps faithfully in order to prevent problems like the ones experienced 
at the Danish meeting and to avoid ending up with a cancer centre without content. An empty 
shell.  
The Society wrote to the other negotiators the very same day with their account of the meeting, 
and in a press release the cancer charity announced that the plans for the Finsen Park had come 
to an abrupt halt because no extramural research groups were interested in the Society’s 
“generous gift”.656 The Society’s representatives were under the impression that the other 
negotiators had a hidden agenda, as the Chairman informed the Head Board on a later occasion: 
Given that our negotiation parties were rather impervious for these points of view and 
dismissed the idea of a council and passionately maintained their demand for the 
establishment of an actual and permanent board then and there, this demand gave rise to 
our increasing fear that there is more behind the collaborative partners’ violent demand for 
establishing the board. On our part, we had to ask ourselves if there were completely 
different and far-reaching intentions behind such claim. This concern was underlined 
during the events of the meeting, and made it pivotal for the Society’s representatives to 
emphasise to our collaboration partners that the working basis and competence of the 
board of directors had to be fully defined before the board could be established. Anything 
else seemed completely irresponsible to us.657 
According to the Society’s representatives, the agenda of the other negotiators was to use the 
board to achieve influence on the Finsen Park and thus also on a great deal of funds from the 
                                                 
655 Ibid. p. 7.  
656 Press release from the Society, September 26th 1991.  
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of Keld Danø, (Copenhagen). p. 1.  
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Society658. The representatives from the publicly-owned institutes, however, were of a different 
opinion. They refused to recognise the Society representatives’ account of events of the meeting. 
In a letter to the Society’s management, they stated that they had in fact presented many 
interested groups, and that all the participants at the meeting agreed to establish a board of 
directors in accordance with the document of February 22nd 1990659. The discrepancies between 
the accounts of the Society’s representatives and the other negotiators were displayed by the 
press in a series of articles which cannot have contributed positively to the Society’s public 
image660. The Society arranged for a press conference in order to explain the situation, but the 
press and the critics did not take warmly to it: 
The feature was not very informative, with the exception that the Society did not feel 
obligated to establish a common board of directors with the State partners for the new 
centre. The Society’s director, Ole Bang, pointed out that the Society’s proposal for a 
common research centre was only a proposal in principle. The Society’s chairman, Bent 
Harvald, felt that a comprehensibility gap had emerged.661 
According to the press, the Vice-Chairman of the Society, Niels Fisch-Thomsen, tried to explain 
the collapse of the meeting between the negotiators in the following manner:  
Our collaboration partners were passionate about establishing a board. As a lawyer, this 
made me suspect that they might have had other intentions than to establish a research 
centre. In my opinion this may be a struggle for power or money, rather than a matter of 
establishing a research centre. There is no basis for the establishment of a board until it is 
likely that there is anything to be in charge of. This is why I suggested the establishing of 
a council instead.662 
Fisch-Thomsen and the rest of the Executive Committee thus seemed to believe that the idea of 
a research centre had become a power-prop. The idea of the centre was used to achieve 
influence on the Society’s growing fortune, and in the opinion of the committee members the 
fact that the publicly-employed researchers were so keen on establishing a board of directors 
before giving any thought to the centre’s scientific activities only supported this view. Talks 
about what the centre was really supposed to be about – cancer research – had receded into the 
background. Furthermore, the attacks on the Society did not focus on the organisation’s role in 
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661 Pedersen-Bjergaard, J. (1991) "En kamp om magt og penge" Politiken København 10.10.1991, p. 8.  
662 Lundbeck, S. and T. Bagge (1991) "Vi er ikke bedragere" B.T. 04.10.1991, p. 22.  
 
The Cancer Centre That Never Was 
 
 288 
the planning of the centre. On the contrary, a wide array of researchers and politicians launched 
a broad attack on anything from the cancer charity’s fortune and structure to Ole Bang’s 
character. As will be elaborated later on, the problematic establishment of the cancer centre was 
transformed into either a most welcome occasion for the Society’s critics to criticise the Society 
or a means to promote one’s own interests.  
One of the fiercest political critics was Arne Melchior from the Folketing’s Privatisation 
Council. When the sale of the Finsen grounds was final, he had lost his leverage against the 
Society as a member of the Privatisation Council – that is to delay the sale until the Society 
agreed to establish a centre with a scientific management – and he thus employed an alternative 
strategy to bring across his message. He publicly cancelled his membership of the Cancer 
Society because he believed the members of its management to be “liars and frauds” who used 
“indecent methods to hoodwink the government into selling the Finsen grounds without a 
resulting cancer centre”663. Melchior urged the other 400,000 members of the Society to cancel 
their memberships as well, as this would probably be the only effective way to call the cancer 
charity to order. Melchior not only objected to the Society’s latest aversion against establishing 
a permanent board of directors that would assure (public) researchers influence on the as of yet 
non-existing cancer centre, he also criticised the Society’s massive accumulated wealth of over 
DKK 600 million664. He effectively made the case a matter of moral and used the press to drag 
the Society into “the moral arena” and away from its home turf of acting and being judged 
according to business logic. In his own words: 
I have lost my eldest child because of a cancer disease, so nobody feels stronger for the 
good cause than I. Several times I have gladly gone out with the collection box to collect 
money for the Danish Cancer Society, but I would be ashamed to do so now, when they 
are sitting on their coffers. Director Ole Bang seems to have one thought in his head only: 
to build a business empire. It is like a plant that grows by budding, while cancer-patients 
are forgotten. I have enjoyed fantastic support from colleagues, friends and the cancer-
stricken. They agree with my critique and support my action.665 
The colleagues and friends referred to were, amongst others, the State-employed cancer 
researchers Heine Høi Hansen from Rigshospitalet’s Radium Station, Keld Danø from 
Rigshospitalet's Finsen Laboratory, Elisabeth Bock from Copenhagen University’s Protein Lab, 
oncologist Nis I. Nissen from Rigshospitalet’s Haematological-Oncology Department, 
                                                 
663 NN. Ibid.: "Arne Melchior: Uanstændige metoder" p. 23.  
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Rigshospitalet’s cancer physician Jens Pedersen-Bjergaard, Rigshospitalet’s oncologist Mikael 
Rørth, Jørgen Rygaard from Copenhagen Municipal Hospital, and his old friend and former 
Fibiger Institute Director Jørgen Kieler666, who had successfully launched a media campaign to 
discredit the Society (for an impression of the effect on the Society’s income, see figure 4.1 in 
chapter 4). They each had different points of critique that can be summarised as follows and 
which are heavily loaded with their perception of moral standards for a private charity 
organisation and which all disregard the fact that the development could also be seen as the 
legally sound transaction of a private business and its right to act as it pleased: 
1) The Society was not really interested in a cancer centre and had only used the dream of it to 
buy the entire Finsen grounds667. 
2) The political and administrative management of the Society had deceived the government, the 
Privatisation Council, and its scientific negotiation parties. The management should be 
dismissed (especially Ole Bang)668. 
3) The Society conducted property speculation which was not in agreement with the humble 
ideology of a charity organisation669. 
4) The annual budgets of the Society were non-transparent, and the Society lied about how 
much of the donated money was spent on research and administration. In other words, the 
Society was accused of creative accounting670.  
5) The Cancer Society was governed by a management that did not include a single active 
cancer researcher671.  
6) The Society’s unscientific management meddled with the scientific decisions of the Scientific 
Council672. 
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7) The Society was impervious to critique and would punish any researcher who dared to 
question the organisation by withdrawing grants673.  
8) The Society was “sitting on its coffers” and did not spend enough money on cancer research. 
The Society should not have its own research institutions. It should rather spend its money 
directly on cancer research like other foundations for scientific work.674 
In addition to these press-mediated accusations, the group of critical cancer researchers found 
other ways to undermine the management of the Society. According to Odense University 
oncologist Carsten Rose of the Society’s Head Board, a prominent member of the Scientific 
Council had launched a petition in the oncology departments all over the country with the sole 
purpose of having Ole Bang dismissed as director of the Cancer Society675. Also, it was 
rumoured that the Danish Medical Society was preparing a vote of no confidence against the 
Cancer Society’s chairman, Bent Harvald, who was also President of this professional 
association676. Given that Harvald was to retire shortly after, the Head Board considered the 
initiative to be a malicious statement in the campaign against the Society with no other purpose 
than to checkmate the cancer charity in the Finsen conflict and to “gain total control of Danish 
cancer research”677. The Society and its supporters actively tried to refute the criticism made 
against it and explain its actions to the Danish public. Some of the accusations were made 
against the Society’s overall policy/business logic – such as the decision to run its own research 
institutes and the decision to invest money in bonds and bricks for the sake of asset management 
and survival – and they had been advanced and answered many times before.  
However, some of the accusations were more serious and demanded immediate response from 
the Society: the accusation of fraud, creative accounting and alleged financial sanctions against 
critical researchers. According to the Society, these accusations were downright wrong, and it 
tried to refute them in the press again and again678. The financial of the Society explained the 
budget on several occasions, but to little avail as the press was supposedly more interested in 
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repeating the accusations over and over than in the technical explanation of the budget’s 
construction679.  
The situation was worsened when a few members of the Society’s Head Board resigned in 
protest against the actions and non-transparent budgets of the cancer charity680. Most members 
of the Head Board and the Executive Committee agreed that the critique was not just, however. 
It was argued that the criticism was only put forward by a small group of cancer researchers and 
not the entire Danish public, and that the individual counts of criticism could easily be countered 
with facts.681 However according to Erik Amdrup of the Society, the Head Board and the 
Executive Committee were oddly ignored by the press: 
During the continued attack on the Society, predominantly aimed at the director’s 
character, it was odd that the Executive Committee was protected despite the fact that its 
members did not try to hide, and on numerous occasions publicly acknowledged, 
responsibility of the decisions made. This was true for the president, Lars Nordskov 
Nielsen, and the longstanding member, Tove Smidth – persons whom the media were 
otherwise not reluctant to ask for comments – and it was also true for the internationally 
respected board members lawyer Fisch-Thomsen and professor N. O. Kjeldgaard. If one 
read the newspapers or watched TV, one could get the erroneous impression that the board 
members either did not exist or snored to the beat of the director’s baton. If they wanted to 
take part in the debate, they had to write readers’ letters.682 
The Board and the Executive Committee had a hard time getting through to the press and the 
public with their opinions.  Only Ole Bang was in focus, and he could not convincingly 
comment on the critique of his own person.  
In summation, the Society’s management saw the strategies of the Society’s critics as tools to 
gain power over the Cancer Society and to achieve this goal: 
 By demanding a scientific management for the proposed Finsen research centre (with no 
lay representation from the Society). 
                                                 
679 Bjerre, M. (1991) "Keld Danøs tarvelige talmagi" Berlingske Tidende 17.10.1991, p. 11.  
     Kræftens-Bekæmpelse (1991). Årsberetning. København, Kræftens Bekæmpelse, p. 53. 
The Society was later cleared of all charges of creative accounting and misuse of the donated money, when an 
impartial and state-authorised public accountant firm reviewed the Society’s dealings and budgets in the years in 
question. See: KPMG C. Jespersen: “Beretning om gennemgang af administration af udvalgte områder indenfor 
Kræftens Bekæmpelse” (June, 1994). Archives of the Danish Cancer Society, (Copenhagen).  
680 Kassebeer, S. (1991) "Borgmester forlader to hovedbestyrelsesposter" Berlingske Tidende København 
18.10.1991, p. 6.  
681 Supplement to the chairman’s ”Thougths on the Danish Cancer Society”, August 14th 1991. Archives of the 
Danish Cancer Society, (Copenhagen). p. 2. 
682 Amdrup, E. (1998). Som jeg så det - en kirurgs tilbageblik. Danmark, Gyldendal, p. 199.  
 
The Cancer Centre That Never Was 
 
 292 
 By launching a negative press campaign against the Society, so that fewer people would 
support the organisation financially. 
 By creating the illusion in newspaper articles that the conflict in the cancer community 
was between a united front of all the country’s cancer researchers against the Society. 
 By circulating a petition for a vote of misconfidence about Bent Harvald’s presidency of 
the Danish Medical Society (even though his presidency ended soon after, anyway), 
which could only been seen as an attempt to undermine the authority and character of the 
Society’s managers. 




Newspaper drawing (Universitetsavisen, 1991): Only very few (university) papers chose to cast the State as the 
villain in the centre affair, such as this drawing which portrays the Minister of Education as the witch guarding a 
treasure/the public funds in the H.C. Andersen fairy tale “The Tinder-Box”.  
 
Only a few persons from outside the Society tried to defend the cancer charity by stating that the 
management had acted according to the practice of common fundraising, or that the real culprit 
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in the affair was the “State” which did not contribute enough to Danish cancer research683. In 
retrospect, Erik Amdrup described the press’ role in the matter in the following way: 
The media coverage is expected to be critical, but in this case it was biased, and that 
cannot be the purpose of good journalism. It was almost entirely based on information 
from negative sources, and a picture of the Society’s opponents eventually took form. A 
few of them had knowledge of the Society, such as Jørgen Kieler, who had left the 
Society’s Fibiger Institute because of old age and never concealed his discontent with the 
Head Board’s and the Executive Committee’s politics. As one would expect, this old 
freedom fighter concealed neither countenance nor names, and even though I disagree 
with his allegations, I respect him more than the persons who attacked the Society on the 
basis of the little knowledge about the Society one gets when one applies to the Society 
for grants. The same is true with regard to Professor Jørgen Rygaard who before and at the 
beginning of my time in the Society turned in a good performance for the Society. I do not 
know the reason for Rygaard’s subsequent aversion, which was manifested in the 
establishment of the competing “Danish Cancer Research Foundation”.684 
 
5.8 A disinterested approach: centering science 
The Society had a publicity problem and something needed to be done. On October 11th 1991, 
the Head Board decided that the time was ripe for putting the record straight. The Society 
needed to be clearer in its statements to the press about its suspicions that the conflict had little 
to do with the proposed research centre. Also, the Head Board felt that there was a definite need 
for a thorough debate on whether or not there was still sufficient scientific basis for the centre, 
or if there were better ways to support and promote Danish cancer research e.g. by importing 
renowned research groups from abroad685. Fortunately, the Society’s Scientific Council offered 
its assistance on this matter. The new Chairman of this Council, Professor of Clinical 
Epidemiology at the Institute of Preventive Medicine, Thorkild I. A. Sørensen, had followed the 
conflicts from the sideline, and now stated in a newspaper article that he wanted to mediate 
between the Society and the group of critical researchers: 
This has become trench warfare with an almost unbearable mistrust between the involved 
parties – instead of utilisation of this fantastic opportunity for Danish research. I will do 
what I can to re-establish a healthy trust again.686 
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The Society’s Scientific Council consisted of both intra and extramural cancer researchers and 
was the diplomatic agent to bring the parties back to the negotiation table. At the meeting of the 
Head Board, Sørensen presented his solution to the conflicts about the cancer research centre: 
The Scientific Council suggests that interested researchers and research groups should 
have the opportunity to propose a solution to the conflict. The solution must improve the 
conditions of cancer research. The Scientific Council offers to mediate so that the 
researchers will get the opportunity to present research plans and corresponding structures 
that will allow the involved institutes and researchers to collaborate. The Scientific 
Council thus suggests that the next move is preceded by a gathering of all interested 
researchers. 687 
In other words, Sørensen and the rest of the Council wanted to invite every cancer researcher in 
the country to a meeting in which they would be given the chance to express their opinion on the 
need, structure, scientific basis, and feasibility of the cancer centre688. According to Sørensen, it 
was not at all certain that the majority of Danish cancer researchers supported the centre plans, 
as there was now a considerable divergence in this groups’ perception of the need for a 
geographical centralisation and physical coordination of cancer research689. Not all were 
convinced that the centre would yield scientific results that would not otherwise be obtained by 
the research groups in their current locations.  
The Head Board and the Executive Committee of the Society welcomed the initiative to analyse 
the need for a cancer centre, and so did the Danish Oncology Society, who had otherwise been 
very critical of the Danish Cancer Society’s actions in the Finsen affair:  
So far we have monitored the situation with anxiety, as the debate has focused, to an 
alarming degree, on persons and principles rather than content. It is now the intention that 
the Scientific Council mediates contact to a wide segment of Danish cancer researchers 
and even international cancer communities. We have much faith that the Council will 
succeed in closing in on the essence of the matter: an evaluation of how to most 
effectively support the entire Danish cancer research and treatment for the benefit of the 
patients and their loved ones.690  
The large-scale debate meeting was scheduled for January 23rd 1992. The Scientific Council 
needed time to prepare and send out invitations and questionnaires about the need for the cancer 
research centre, so the meeting could not be held right away. Invitations were sent out to 
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researchers who had received grants for cancer relevant projects from the Society, the MRC or 
the NSRC within the last five years691. It was hoped that this group of researchers would fill in 
and return the questionnaires before the meeting, so that the Scientific Council could get an idea 
of the general attitude towards the centre plans. The meeting was to be led by a panel and an 
impartial moderator, and the administrative and political managements of any of the involved 
institutes were denied access to the meeting which was for researchers only. The moderator was 
the chief of the State-owned Danish Research Foundation, Peder Olesen Larsen, who was 
considered an impartial party by all692. Also, a series of speakers were invited to present their 
views on different aspects of the cancer centre problem: 
Niels Ole Kjeldgaard (Aarhus University molecular biologist and author of the Kjeldgaard Report of 
1981):  
“The history of the research centre” 
Elisabeth Bock (Copenhagen University basic cancer researcher, author of the report for the Rockefeller 
Centre 1984): 
 “The idea and strategy of the research centre” 
Keld Danø (Head of the Finsen Laboratory, secretary of the Kjeldgaard Report survey):  
“The management and finance of the research centre” 
Jesper Zeuthen (Researcher at the Fibiger Institute, secretary of the Kjeldgaard Report survey): 
 “Advantages and disadvantages of the research centre” 
Nis Nissen (Rigshospitalet oncologist, author of the Kjeldgaard Report, author of the report for the 
Rockefeller Centre 1984): 
 “The research centre’s relation to clinical cancer research” 
Mikael Rørth (Rigshospitalet oncologist, author of the report for the Rockefeller Centre 1984): 
 “Alternatives to a research centre in the Finsen area” 
Jens Overgaard (Experimental oncologist researcher at the Society’s research unit in Aarhus):  
“Can Danish cancer research be strengthened in other ways?” 
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The selection of these speakers posed a problem in itself, as the line-up could be interpreted as 
the Scientific Council’s view on the conflict of the cancer research centre693. There needed to be 
a balance between those who were in favour of and in opposition to the centre and the different 
management models, otherwise the meeting would be doomed from the start. For this reason, 
one of the invited speakers, the former member of the Society’s Executive Committee, Niels Ole 
Kjeldgaard, was almost shocked to be invited at all. Although he had been one of the authors of 
the Kjeldgaard Report of 1981, he no longer supported the establishment of a physical cancer 
research centre. Since his retirement from the Executive Committee 18 months earlier, he had 
only followed the Finsen affair from the sideline, and he now worried that the Scientific 
Council’s efforts were in vain. He feared that the idea of the centre had become a “white 
elephant” so to speak, and that its history supported this stand. Prior to the meeting, he thus 
warned Thorkild I. A. Sørensen about the discussions to come: 
Of course it is difficult for me to distance myself from something I have spent 10 years on. 
Looking back on the evolution [of the idea], or lack thereof, one might ask if the dream of 
a Danish centre is even realistic today with our quality potential. This will hopefully 
contribute to your understanding of my shock when I read the papers [the invitation]. Has 
the Scientific Council really not contemplated what a centre can and should be? Your 
introductory presentation is a pipedream with no basis. The concept of research quality is 
not even mentioned. The centre will appear as a question with no backdrop, with no 
constructive past.694 
Furthermore, Kjeldgaard did not believe that the financing plan for the centre was tenable. As a 
university professor, he had often planned new research initiatives, and he feared that the 
Society had miscalculated how many research groups it would be able to move into the centre 
and the cost of fitting the buildings for laboratory use695.  In other words, he feared that the 
centre plans had not been created within the confinements of what he called the “art of the 
feasible”. The meeting’s topic of discussion was thus an empty shell, and this led Kjeldgaard 
and most of the other invited speakers to fear that the meeting was in danger of continuing the 
conflict-ridden question of the structure of the centre which would not be appropriate, as the 
purpose of the meeting was merely to find out whether or not there was a scientific basis for 
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694The question of whether or not there was in fact enough scientific potential in Denmark was not touched upon by 
others than Kjeldgaard himself. See:  Letter from N. O. Kjeldaard to T.I.A. Sørensen, December 12th 1991. 
Archives of the Danish Cancer Society, (Copenhagen). p. 2.  
695 Ibid. p. 3.  
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it696. Instead of eliminating the mistrust between the parties, the meeting could very well end up 
as a battleground. For although most agreed that there was a definite need for analysing the need 
for the centre, the small group of critical cancer researchers continued to attack the Society in 
the press, and many feared that the different battling parties were still too far apart to be able to 
debate in a rational manner. The media debate did in fact continue at full speed697. The fiercest 
critic raised the rhetoric and gave the readers of the newspapers the impression that the conflict 
was between the Society and the entire group of cancer researchers in the country698. The battle-
lines were therefore clearly drawn at the opening of the meeting.  
5.9 The debate meeting 
On January 23rd, 250 Danish cancer researchers participated in the debate meeting. Research 
managers from the institutes involved in the negotiation for the centre were excluded from the 
meeting, which was supposed to be a forum for cancer researchers only. For the first time ever, 
                                                 
696 Letter to Peder Olesen Larsen from Thorkild I. A. Sørensen, November 21st 1991. Archives of the Danish 
Cancer Society, (Copenhagen). p. 1.  
Letter from Jens Overgaard to Thorkild I. A. Sørensen, December 18th 1991. Archives of the Danish Cancer 
Society, (Copenhagen), p. 3. 
Letter from Niels Ole Kjeldgaard to Thorkild I. A. Sørensen, December 12th 1991. Archives of the Danish Cancer 
Society, (Copenhagen), p. 3-4.  
697 In particular in Harvald, B. and E. Amdrup (1991). "Kampagnen mod Kræftens Bekæmpelse." Ugeskrift for 
læger 153(49): 3500-3505, Pedersen-Bjergaard, J. (1991). "Svar." Ugeskrift for læger 153(49): 3504, p. 3504, 
Rygaard, J. (1991). "Svar." Ugeskrift for læger 153(49): 3504-3505, p. 3504-05. 
 A media database search on the words “Cancer Society” and  “centre” revealed that at least 30 articles were written 
on the subject around the time of the grand debate meeting (January 1992-April 1992): Sørensen, T. I. A. (1992) 
"Det gik pengene til" Berlingske Tidende København 07.01.1992, Ziebe, H. (1992) "Forskning vigtigere end fejde" 
Berlingske Tidende 22-02-1992, Thomsen, J. (1992) "Intet fælles center for kræftfoskning" Berlingske Tidende 
København 27.02.1992, Thomsen, J. (1992) "To centre for dansk kræftforskning" Berlingske Tidende København 
28.02.1992,Thomsen, J. (1992) "Forskere uenige om kræftcenter" Berlingske Tidende København 
24.01.1992,Simonsen, T. I. A. (1992) "Et skridt fremad" Politiken København 19.02.1992,NN. (1992) "Forsker lige 
i en hvepserede" Politiken 05.03.1992; NN. (1992) "Kræftforskere samles på Rigshospitalet" Politiken 07.03.1992, 
NN. (1992) "Kræftcenter skrinlægges" Politiken 14.02.1992,NN. (1992) "Uenighed om kræftcenter" Politiken 
24.01.1992, Nielsen, S. (1992) "Kræft, trit og retning" Politiken 01-03-1992,Kassebeer, S. (1992) "Stormøde om 
kræftcenter" Berlingske Tidende København 08.01.1992,Dahlin, M. (1992) "Strid blandt kræftforskere" Berlingske 
Tidende 15.02.1992, Andreassen, M., F. Blasi, et al. (1992) "Støtter nyt center for kræftforskning" Berlingske 
tidende 11.03.1992, NN. (1992) "Nej til nyt kræft-ceter" B.T. 14.02.1992, Juul-Madsen, A. (1992) "Politisk røre 
over nej til kræft-center" Berlingske Tidende København 15.02.1992, NN. (1992) "Minister skuffet over Kræftens 
Bekæmpelse" Berlingske Tidende 17.02.1992, NN. (1992) "Kræftskandalen" Ekstra Bladet 19.02.1992, Jørgensen, 
P. S. (1992) "Arne Melchior må undskylde" Politiken København 22.02.1992, NN. (1992) "Kræftens Bekæmpelse 
svindler" Ekstra Bladet 27.02.1992, NN. (1992) "Melodien der blev væk" Berlingske Tidende 01.03.1992, 
Clemmesen, I. (1992) "Vi vil ikke kaldes for andenrangs" Berlingske Tidende 04.03.1992, Melchior, A. (1992) 
"Sløser med betroede midler" Politiken København 06.03.1992, Melchior, A. (1992) "Et dansk 
kræftforskningscenter skal ikke forpurres" Berlingske Tidende København 06.03.1992, Celis, J. E. (1992) "Kaos 
om kræft" Politiken , Bentzen, S. M. (1992) "Kræftforskningsdebatten set fra sidelinjen" Berlingske Tidende 
København 11.03.1992, Bentzen, S. M. (1992) "Forskernes kræftstrid" Politiken København 13.03.1992, 
Christensen, S. (1992) "Planerne om Finsen Parken skrinlagt" Politiken 15.03.1992, Danø, K. (1992) "Sagen om 
kræftforskningscentret var ikke noget spil" Berlingske Tidende 22.03.1992, Sørensen, T. I. A. (1992) "Misvisende 
debat om dansk kræftforskningscenter" Berlingske Tidende København 10.04.1992.  
698 Danø, K. (1991). "Svar." Ugeskrift for læger 153(49): 3502-3504, p. 3502.  
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they were all given the chance to express their opinion on the proposed centre. The press was 
invited too and the entire meeting was recorded on tape so that the Scientific Council could 
analyse the statements later on. The following summary of the events of the meeting is based on 
a print of these recordings.  
Niels Ole Kjeldgaard was the first speaker to present his topic; a brief overview of the history 
and possible future of the idea of a cancer research centre in Denmark. According to Kjeldgaard, 
the situation of the early 1990s was quite different from that of the early 1980s, when he had 
recommended the establishment of comprehensive cancer centres in the Kjeldgaard Report. He 
was no longer convinced that a cancer centre – be that a comprehensive one or the proposed 
cancer research centre – was the best tool to promote and strengthen the quality of Danish 
cancer research. To illustrate and elaborate his point he posed two central questions:  
1) Are there enough internationally renowned cancer research groups in Copenhagen to 
establish a centre with an excellent international reputation? 
2) Will it contribute to the strength and development of Danish cancer research to place 
these groups under the same roof?699 
According to Kjeldgaard, 80% of all cancer research projects in the country were done in the 
relatively small part of Copenhagen called “Østerbro”. This was the area in which both the 
Society’s Finsen buildings, the Finsen Laboratory, the Medical Faculty, and Rigshospitalet were 
located, see appendix E. Kjeldgaard therefore asked “How much money should be spent on 
moving people who are already neighbours?”700 Whereas many cancer researchers and groups 
were pressed for space in the early 1980s when the negotiation parties were planning for the 
Rockefeller centre, this was not the case in the early 1990s. According to Kjeldgaard, the MRC 
no longer needed a centre to place its two research professors in, as Olsson had moved to the US 
and Lars-Inge Larsson had found tenure at the State’s Serum Institute. Also, Kjeldgaard claimed 
that there were not enough renowned and active cancer research groups in the lot to create a 
centre of the desired international standard. This was, of course, a bold statement in a room full 
of Danish cancer researchers, but Kjeldgaard based his claim on bibliographical citations studies 
and continued with a recommendation to the Society: 
                                                 
699 Print I of the recorded debate meeting, January 23rd 1992. Archives of the Danish Cancer Society, (Copenhagen). 
p. 6.  
700 Ibid. p. 7. 
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Forget the centre, unless some excellent international researchers can be found who can be 
the foundation of the future development of a cancer centre with an international 
reputation. But if this is not possible, I think we should establish research scholarships for 
5 or 10 years instead in order to [strengthen] the quality of young Danish researchers, who 
after all already exist.701 
 
The next speaker was Elisabeth Bock from the medical Faculty of Copenhagen University. As 
one of the most active critics of the Society’s dealings in the Finsen affair, her opinion on the 
need for a cancer centre was clear from the beginning. The meeting schedules state that the title 
of her talk was “The idea and strategy of the research centre”, but all in all her talk was a 
continuation of the press-mediated attack on the Society’s aversion against establishing a board 
of directors for the centre702. In other words, she wanted to discuss the structure of the proposed 
centre before discussing its scientific content, as had been anticipated by many of the other 
participants. The next speaker in line, Keld Danø, had been invited to talk about the 
management and finance of the centre, and he therefore continued this line of arguments703. As 
representatives of some of the most aggressive critics in the conflict, Bock and Danø were 
definitely for the Finsen centre. They argued that placing researchers under the same roof would 
result in synergy effects and more quality research, and that the price of establishing the centre 
was very small compared with the potential outcome and the savings on shared apparatus etc.  
To the next speaker, the Society’s basic cancer researcher from the Fibiger Institute, Jesper 
Zeuthen, this synergy effect did not emerge ex nihilo. He presented a sociological study on 
communication between laboratories (which unfortunately was not presented with a title or 
author), in which it was argued that research groups placed within a radius of 10 metres of each 
other communicated often and thus had a sound basis for understanding each other’s work and 
even working together on a shared project704.  However, if the distance between the labs 
exceeded the 10 meters, the frequency of talk and collaboration declined drastically. Quite 
interestingly, Zeuthen argued that the study showed that the frequency remained about the same 
for any distance above 10 metres. In other words, it did not matter if the laboratories were 15 or 
900 metres apart. If the purpose of the centre was more collaboration between the research 
groups than what was already taking place in their current position on Østerbro – in which the 
distances between the research institutes were already short – it would pose a great challenge to 
the architectural design of the research centre.  
                                                 
701 Ibid.  
702 Ibid. p. 9-12. 
703 Ibid. p. 13-17.  
704 Ibid. p. 19-20. 
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The findings were of paramount importance to the topic of next speaker, clinical Oncologist at 
Rigshospitalet Nis I. Nissen. He spoke of the centre’s relation to the clinical cancer research at 
Rigshospitalet, which was situated in another part of Østerbro. In Nissen’s opinion, the Finsen 
centre lacked the clinical research module and patient treatment that had been part of the plans 
for the Rockefeller centre. And on this point, he was backed by the next speaker in line, 
Rigshospitalet’s oncologist Mikael Rørth, who did not strongly support the Finsen model. 
Instead, he contemplated alternatives to the proposed centre by suggesting other locations nearer 
to Rigshospitalet. However, it seemed that none of these locations would be vacant for a long 
time. Although Rørth did not support the Finsen model and could not find any feasible 
alternatives to it, he did not dismiss the idea of a centre altogether as Kjeldgaard had done705. 
The last of the invited speakers, the Society’s exp. oncologist Jens Overgaard, felt differently. 
Under the watchword “Danish cancer research lacks brains not bricks”, Overgaard argued that 
the money for the cancer research centre would be better spent on promoting Danish research 
talent and so-called brick-less collaborations between existing research groups706:  
I am convinced that if collaboration between the different research groups has not already 
been established in Copenhagen – where there is only a 15-minute bike-ride between the 
institutes – well, then it will not be promoted by moving into the same building. 
Completely different conditions apply here, and I think it is naïve to imagine that 
coordination on the Finsen grounds will generate significantly new and better research on 
that basis. On the contrary, this one-way ticket down Blegdamsvej will be the costliest in 
Danish history and it will demand so many resources that the centre can very well end up 
depriving other and more relevant activities of funds, and consequently damage Danish 
cancer research.707 
Overgaard did not recommend the establishment of a cancer centre. Despite the fact that he 
came from Aarhus and not Copenhagen and that his objections could be interpreted as an 
attempt to stop all funds from being channelled into Copenhagen research, there was more to his 
objections than that. According to Overgaard, the discussions of the centre had been focussed on 
the formal structures of a non-existing centre without giving serious thought to the very 
substance and quality of the research about to be done there. Overgaard thus argued that one had 
to answer the following question before deciding on whether or not to establish the centre: “Will 
it improve Danish cancer research?”. And on that note, the debate among the 250 cancer 
researchers began. 
                                                 
705 Ibid. p. 27.  
706 Ibid. p. 29-33.  
707 Ibid. p. 30-31. 
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On an overall level, the meeting reflected that the majority of the 250 cancer researchers were 
far from happy with the Finsen plan, as it lacked the close contact with clinical cancer research 
and patient treatment which had been part of Engelbreth-Holm’s dream in 1945, the 
recommended centres of the Kjeldgaard Report in 1981, and the Rockefeller plans in 1984. The 
proposed centre at the Finsen grounds was not comprehensive! It was a cancer research centre 
without contact to the clinic, and this particularly worried the clinicians who had preferred a 
comprehensive cancer centre like the Rockefeller centre would have been. As mentioned in 
chapter 4, some of the researchers from the Fibiger Institute and the Finsen Institute had 
gathered to discuss what kind of research was to be done in the planned Rockefeller centre, and 
the basic and clinical researchers had agreed that basic cancer research and clinical cancer 
research were deeply dependent on each other. The oncogene paradigm had provided a new 
theoretical foundation for the understanding of cancer. Understanding some of the molecular 
mechanisms behind carcinogenesis was crucial to designing effective diagnostic tools and 
treatments for the cancer diseases and the reports from the clinic on how cancer tumours acted 
in vivo (response to treatment etc.) was invaluable to the basic researchers who used it to adjust 
and expand their theoretical models and/or were inspired to study new problems.  
Since 1985, when the Danish researchers had first discussed the matter, the integration of the 
oncogene theory in cancer research had increased worldwide because it was not revolutionary in 
the sense that it did not exclude the existing theories on cancer causation – it provided a shared 
molecular explanation for them – and it could easily be employed by researchers without 
redefining their projects fundamentally708. In addition, the theory and the use of basic sciences 
in cancer research became popular because of the availability and simplicity of the necessary 
tools and reagents, the technology’s and theory’s applicability on clinical research problems, 
and the fact that oncogene problems provided the advantage of results in relatively short time 
frames which meant more frequent publications.709 The same trend seems to have occurred in 
Denmark; at least this was reflected in the statements of the cancer researchers at the grand 
debate meeting.  
                                                 
708 Helvoort, T. v. (1999). "A Century of Research into the Cause of Cancer: Is the New Oncogene Paradigm 
Revolutionary?" History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences: 293-330, p. 323. 
     Fujimura, J. H. (1988). "The Molecular Bandwagon in Cancer Research: Where Social Worlds Meet." Social 
Problems: 261-283, p. 269. 
709 Fujimura, J. H. (1988). "The Molecular Bandwagon in Cancer Research: Where Social Worlds Meet." Social 
Problems: 261-283, p. 267-269,p. 271, p. 275. 
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As a clinical oncologist, Mikael Rørth argued that he needed to collaborate with the basic 
scientific disciplines, and clinician Nis I. Nissen concurred. The nature of cancer research had 
changed and the nature of the proposed centre had to accommodate this change, and this was not 
possible without contact to the clinic. Whereas early comprehensive cancer centres in other 
countries had placed basic and clinical cancer research under the same roof as cancer treatment 
in order to provide cancer patients with scientifically based and standardised treatment, see 
chapter 2, a portion of the researchers at the grand debate meeting seemed to think that basic 
cancer research was just as dependent on the results of the clinic, and that a cancer research 
centre without a clinic would be somehow anachronistic. Others felt that the expected scientific 
bonus of the centre was not proportionate to its costs, and that the money would be better spent 
on other cancer research initiatives710.  
Also, the majority of the invited researchers were concerned that the proponents of the centre 
seemed to focus on structure rather than content. The proponents on the other hand, argued that 
the focus had been necessary, because a board of directors without Ole Bang and his associates 
was the only thing that could protect the autonomy of science from the control of the 
management of the Society.  
The meeting allowed every cancer researcher to comment on the centre plans in the presence of 
their peers and the press, the latter of which had up until now been dominated by a few active 
critics who on several occasions had claimed to represent the opinion of all Danish cancer 
researchers. Now the researchers had been given a chance to speak for themselves, and the result 
was that while most liked the idea of a cancer centre in general, they doubted the scientific 
outcome of the Finsen centre in particular711. In other words, the centre no longer had an entirely 
loyal clientele, which according to Timothy Lenoir is one of the conditions crucial to successful 
“institutionalisation”, see chapter 1, and the physical manifestation of unity in cancer research 
on a par with scientific disciplines and medical specialities at the universities and hospitals. The 
centre thus also lacked the scientific unity of researchers, their support, and the probable output 
                                                 
710 Jesper Zeuthen of the Fibiger Institute particularly wanted to know what exactly the alleged “synergy effect”/the 
scientific bonus of the centre would be. In his opinion, the three strongest research fields within Danish cancer 
research were: clinical oncology, cancer epidemiology, and molecular oncology. He thus wondered why the plans 
for the centre, which was supposed to attract international researchers because of its high standards, were not 
already based on the talented researchers within these fields. See, print II of the debate meeting January 23rd 1992. 
Archives of the Danish Cancer Society, (Copenhagen, p. 21.  
711 See: print II of the debate meeting January 23rd 1992. Archives of the Danish Cancer Society,(Copenhagen), p. 
1-36.  
     NN. (1992) "Uenighed om kræftcenter" Politiken 24.01.1992, p. 9.  
    Thomsen, J. (1992) "Forskere uenige om kræftcenter" Berlingske Tidende København 24.01.1992, p. 8. 
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needed to persuade any private or public funding body of giving additional financial support, 
which as shown in the previous chapters had been a main strategy in the process of planning a 
centre in the 1980s.   
It is noteworthy that because the proposed Finsen centre lacked contact to the clinic, some of the 
speakers who had previously fought tooth and nail for a scientific management of the centre – 
e.g. Nis I Nissen and Mikael Rørth – at this point seemed less enthusiastic to carry out the plans. 
This could indicate that at some point after the collapse of the Rockefeller plans, the Finsen 
plans and the sale of the Finsen grounds were used only as power-props to ensure publicly-
employed researchers greater influence over the rather monolithic Cancer Society. In other 
words, perhaps the Finsen plans were the occasion but not the actual reason for a group of 
publicly employed researchers attempting to get access to and some means of influence over the 
“fortress” called the Cancer Society, who clearly was the financial force and the major power 
broker of their research field, and without whom only few large-scale initiatives could be carried 
through. But now suggestions were set forth at the meeting to spend the money for a centre on 
different (and as of yet not specified) cancer research support initiatives. To anyone using the 
cancer centre plans as a tool to yield support from the Society – and only to a minor degree to 
facilitate a synergy effect of coordinating the cancer research milieus – a dismissal of the centre 
plans may not have been unfavourable. Of course, it was not yet a choice between money 
through a centre or money through alternative initiatives, as the Society’s direction had not yet 
offered or agreed to such an alternative. But the previously instated legitimacy of battling in the 
moral arena may have offered the most Society-critical, and pro-centre orientated researchers 
hope of continuing a moral debate to seek influence on the Society’s internal process of research 
support. In general, however, the majority of the cancer researchers present at the meeting 
concluded that the comprehensive cancer centre dream was no longer possible from a scientific 
point of view because of location and financing problems, and that at pure research based Finsen 
centre was anachronistic and no longer in tune with the needs and nature of modern cancer 
research. When faced with the question of centre content and output vs. cost of establishment, 
the arguments for being pro the centre faded. The basis of a centre dissolved.    
The majority of the researchers at the grand debate meeting doubted the merits of the proposed 
centre and the Society’s Scientific Council took this to heart, and on February 13th 1992, 11 out 
of 12 members recommended that the Society should NOT establish a cancer centre at Finsen: 
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Under the current condition, the Council finds that there is no basis for recommending the 
establishment of a cancer research centre at Finsen as outlined in the proposal of February 
22nd 1990. The Council places great emphasis on the fact that the debate did not present 
sufficient arguments to motivate the planned investments. The debate pointed to a series 
of possible alternatives which were discussed at the Council’s meeting on February 12th 
1992. The Council recommends that the Cancer Society actively supports a number of 
cancer research lines without committing to actual “brick-centres”. This aims at favouring 
a concentration in connection with certain cancer research areas in a mandatory 
collaboration with the hope of obtaining a synergy effect, which will strengthen cancer 
research with regards to quality and quantity. Such research collaboration will most often 
be characterised by a research centre without “walls” – co-operation across organisational 
boundaries – but with given mandatory collaboration and management structures.712 
The Scientific Council thus recommended that the DKK 45 million set aside by the Society for 
the renovation and fitting of the laboratory space in the Finsen centre for the potential 
extramural research groups should be used on new cancer research projects and “brick-less” 
collaborations instead713. The Society’s management decided to follow the recommendation of 
its Scientific Council. This marked the end of the Society’s attempts to put the almost 50-year-
old dream of a (comprehensive) cancer centre in Denmark into practise.  In conclusion, the 
Society’s management admitted to the organisation’s members that a survey of the researchers’ 
opinions on the centre was long overdue, but that they had not pushed for one in the light of the 
researchers’ (blind) support of the idea of a centre in general714. As mentioned in chapter 3, most 
of the cancer researchers liked the idea of a “cancer centre” in the 1980’s Kjeldgaard survey. 
Because many of them had visited the American Sloan-Kettering cancer centre, the NCI or the 
British Imperial Cancer Research Fund they wanted something similar in Denmark. The dream 
of a cancer centre was generally appealing to Danish researchers even though it did not seem 
possible to carry it out in practice at home. The negotiations for and discussions of the Finsen 
plans had made this clear to most parties, and the Chairman explained the situation to the Head 
Board in the following way: 
When the survey of the need to establish a shared cancer centre shows different results 
today than earlier, it is due to many different factors. The first negotiations took place at a 
time when several Copenhagen cancer research units suffered from unsatisfactory or time 
limited laboratory conditions. This provided a completely different negotiation basis 
compared with that of today when most research groups have satisfactory facilities. In 
                                                 
712 Recommendation from T.I.A. Sørensen and Hans Sjøström, February 13th 1992. Archives of the Danish Cancer 
Society (Copenhagen). p. 1.  
713 Meanwhile, the Society still owned the entire Finsen grounds and was now free to rent the buildings to 
whomever it wanted, accept the ones already occupied by the Fibiger Institute, the Cancer Registry and  
Rigshospitalet’s Finsen Laboratory, of course.  
714 Kræftens-Bekæmpelse (1991). Årsberetning. København, Kræftens Bekæmpelse, p. 3.  
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addition, the potentially interested research units are already placed in the neighbourhood 
and thus have easy access to each other.715 
In a continued effort to explain and legitimate the collapse of the centre plans to its members, 
the Society presented a press clipping in the annual report to describe the press’ new perception 
of the Society’s role in the Finsen conflict: 
If one is to blame the Cancer Society for anything in connection with the purchase of the 
Finsen area, it is hardly that the Society failed to observe the actual purpose of the 
acquisition, but rather that they have kept the illusion of the central research centre alive 
for too long. Much indicates that the Society’s Scientific Council was right to suggest that 
the DKK 45 million planned for the renovation and fitting of new research laboratories is 
better spent directly on research projects now that most cancer researchers are placed 
within a radius of 1 kilometre.716 
But neither the dream of a cancer centre nor the criticism against the Society died this easily. 
5.10: Perspectivating summary 
When the Society chose to defect from the Rockefeller plans of 1984 it did so as part of a new 
tactic to employ business-like strategies for investment, PR and fundraising to achieve its 
objective of supporting the anti-cancer cause. That is, the Society had experienced increasing 
pay-offs from this tactic as set and embodied by the Society’s DJØF director Ole Bang, and this 
let the organisation to doubt that the Rockefeller plans (which restricted the realisation of the 
new approach) would lead to just as good results for the private charity as would a new strategy 
of expanding the framework of constraints that girded the choices and actions of the private 
cancer charity. The Society was transformed from a modest physician-dominated charity (whose 
limited power depended mostly on the scientific reputation and image of its medical/scientific 
researchers: social and cultural capital) to being a modern corporately led organisation with 
considerable wealth (economic capital) due to the financial skills of its new management and 
through the property it owned.   
The Rockefeller plans had entailed several objectives for the multitude of public and private 
planners: coordinating cancer research (clinical and basic), getting the State to finance the 
equipment and modernisation of the Rockefeller building (a much needed improvement of 
facilities for public cancer research), a potential state takeover of the Cancer Society’s research 
units717, and making cancer research a priority to attract more private of public funding by 
                                                 
715 The Chaiman’s report to the Head Board, February 26th 1992. Personal papers of Ole Bang, (Copenhagen). p. 3.  
716 Kræftens-Bekæmpelse (1991). Årsberetning. København, Kræftens Bekæmpelse, p. 5. (original newspaper 
article was brought in Politiken).  
717 The Society’s ”Modest Charity Spear Head Ambition”-strategy of the time. 
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physically “institutionalising” the heterogeneous cancer research field which had not yet found 
independent status at the universities and hospitals.  
However, at some point in the planning process, the Society chose to defect from these plans 
and objectives, it no longer fully shared, as its new organisational strategy gravitated more 
towards other means of maximizing its wealth, survival, and serving of the anti-cancer cause: 
e.g. investing in real estate to protect its capital against the inflationary pressure of the 1980s 
Danish economy, harvesting the PR value of having its own research units instead of handing 
them over to the State, and of buying real estate to ensure continuous room for its physically and 
scientifically expanding research units that would otherwise (in the Rockefeller plans) not have 
been allowed the necessary laboratory space or conditions – or worse – be split up!  
The Society therefore presented the cancer community with plans to establish a cancer centre at 
another location than the Rockefeller Institute. Namely the Finsen campus at which the Society 
already owned one building for its Fibiger Institute. Although the new proposal would mean a 
deterioration of the comprehensive cancer centre dream inasmuch as it entailed no physical 
contact with clinical research, the Society favoured this model as it allowed the organisation to 
pursue its new fruitful strategy (investment, PR, keeping its research units together) and give the 
organisation full control of the financing – and consequently also the management – of the 
privately funded cancer centre that would also invite public research groups in as tenants.  
As mentioned in chapter 4, the decision to defect from the Rockefeller plans did not have 
immediate negative effects for the Society in terms of decreased positive feedback or declining 
member counts or voluntary contributions. In contrast to a contractually based economic 
transaction, there was no legal or direct economical punishment for defecting from the 
Rockefeller plans. It was not a legal deal and there was no third party enforcement. But the 
informal institutions surrounding the transaction – such as code of conducts and the taste and 
preferences of the public giving donations to the Society – could still result in negative 
consequences for the cancer charity if its choices did not make sense to the broader public or 
somehow raised doubts about the charity’s moral incentives to support the anti-cancer cause in a 
proper manner. In other words, the mindset (or professional logic) guiding the Society’s choice 
of defection had to make sense to more than just the Society itself.  
Because the Society’s director Ole Bang and the strategy he introduced were strongly guided by 
a professional “business logic” (associated with economically trained professional groups) that 
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traditionally clashed with the “scientific“ and “medical” logics of the cancer community’s 
researchers, who were already fearing the introduction of such business mentality at the 
hospitals, it was surprising that these professional groups did not at first oppose or voice their 
dissatisfaction with the defection to an extent that would affect the public opinion (and the 
informal institutions) and punish the Society. Instead, they did not dismiss the Finsen plan at 
first, although the lack of clinical contact would make the plans scientifically inferior to the 
original comprehensive cancer centre dream, and although the Society would be expected to 
finance and therefore control the entire thing.  
The lack of immediate negative response thus indicated that, 
a) the cancer community accepted the Society’s economical wealth (economic capital) as 
the predominant form of power currency (symbolic capital) of the social field of cancer 
research; 
b) the lack of debate of a potential Finsen centre’s scientific program/content (lack of 
clinical contact) was not as important as possibly improving the researchers’ situation 
through modernised labs and the hope of extra (private) discretionary funds associated 
with the establishment of the centre; 
c) the centre became a means to “follow the money” rather than an end in times of state 
cutbacks for research in general; 
d) the centre could – possibly – provide the physical settings for a symbolic 
“institutionalisation” of the cancer research field on a par with the academic disciplines it 
sprang from. It would satisfy the need for a united identity. This incidentally seems to be 
a need closely linked to negative conjunctual change, formal institutions favouring 
applied research, unsatisfactory laboratory facilities, and a strategy to appeal for 
additional funding in the form of a cancer centre. A need that in the history of the cancer 
centre has not been as visible in times of  science push funding practices and high 
conjuncture. 
In summation, the lack of more outspoken and damaging critique of the Society’s defection may 
have owed less to the research community’s potential acceptance of the Society’s business logic 
reasons for defections and more to the hope that the proposal of a centre – any centre – could be 
the means to improve the standing and the conditions of the public research groups, which may 
be the reason why the discussions of both the Rockefeller and the Finsen plans focused on form 
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rather than content. The Finsen plan was a tool to utilise the existing institutional matrix that had 
meant reduced state support and increased wealth and research support from the private Society. 
And this may be why an intense appeal to the public (the public opinion) as a type of third party 
enforcement in moral matters was not yet called upon by these public researchers. But the lack 
of negative feedback may have led the Society to believe that its business logic and economic 
capital were in fact the most powerful in the social field, and that it could therefore act 
accordingly. 
If the Society were to achieve its objectives, it needed to acquire the Finsen campus which as 
part of a government privatisation trend was put up for sale in open tender. The Society would 
have to place a bid for the property in direct competition with other interested private 
companies. A legal exemption clause could theoretically allow the government’s Privatisation 
Council to sell the lot directly to one interested party without putting the area up for sale in open 
tender, provided that this party had a special worthy cause for buying and using the property. In 
this way, the Privatisation Council could support a worthy cause by removing the competitive 
element and a potential bidding war from the sale. A sale could thus go through at a potentially 
lower price than if it were made through open tender. On the other hand, government policy of 
the time was to make the public sector act according to market conditions, and a sale of the 
Finsen lot at the highest possible price through open tender was politically favourable.  
As a cancer charity, the Society used the press to push for a use of the exemption clause, as the 
charity argued that there was hardly (morally) worthier causes than the anti-cancer cause and a 
cancer centre. To the Society, the use of the press was necessary because of the Privatisation 
Council’s initial reluctance to use the clause and sell at a potentially lower price. However, the 
choice to opt for the use of the clause opened up an unexpected can of worms for the cancer 
charity, as the concept of a morally “worthy” cause changed the rules, currency and arena that 
made up the dynamic social field of the cancer community. A sale was suddenly morally linked 
by the press and the Privatisation Council to the establishment of not only a cancer centre, but a 
cancer centre that all public and private negotiation parties could agree on in unison. A linkage 
that the Society could have avoided completely, had it bought the Finsen campus in open tender 
as a standard contractually negotiated transaction with only legal third party enforcement.  
The Society “got it wrong” with the choice of opting for the exemption clause. In a Northian 
perspective, this choice can easily be explained though. As mentioned in chapter 1, North does 
not believe in the universal existence of perfect markets where all transacting organisations 
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either make sufficiently informed and therefore correct and efficient choices or suffer negative 
feedbacks that will correct any poor choice. Instead, he advocates the existence of imperfect 
markets in which transacting organisations do not always know enough about each other, the 
transaction, and the potentially unstable conditions and circumstances of the trade to be made. In 
this way, it is quite possible to make erroneous choices and suffer very high transaction costs 
that cannot easily be corrected given that these conditions can be contingent on sociological 
processes and mindsets that can be hard to dissect and understand for the individual transacting 
organisation. In other words, it can be hard to know what went wrong and how to correct it. The 
unstable conditions could typically be the informal institutions girding the transaction’s (moral) 
code of conducts, taste and preferences of the public etc.  
In case of the Society opting to use the exemption clause, the organisation cannot have taken the 
unstable conditions of the transaction into account: The fact that its status and bargaining power 
could change if its economic capital was not the preferred currency in the murky waste-land that 
was the Privatisation Council members’ subjective perception of what exactly a “worthy cause” 
was. The organisation unwittingly dropped the ball by admitting the opposing transaction party 
this power. A moral linkage was created between the Finsen sale and a privately financed cancer 
centre in which the public institutes were much more than just tenants worked against the 
Society’s logic and desire to control a completely Society-financed cancer centre.  
The Society had initially opted for the clause in order to make the best possible (and cheapest) 
purchase as a direct consequence of its management’s business logic that may have been 
effective in the field of the cancer community but not in the field of politics, in which the 
decisions of the Privatization Council took place. The moral linkage between sale and centre 
became a Trojan horse for  the critical public cancer researchers and the Privatisation Council to 
gain influence on the management and structuring of an otherwise privately financed initiative. 
The Society may not have been aware of the power of this (informal) linkage, as such a thing 
did not translate well into the sets of mental models/business logic of its direction, and through 
which the organisation filtered the information regarding the impending transaction of the 
Finsen campus.  
Moreover, the Society may have been overly confident in its own strength to – in a Bourdieuan 
perspective – rely on its business logic and economic capital as the predominant (symbolic) 
capital of the social field. When consensus on a balance between public and private influence on 
the management and name of the proposed Finsen centre could not be reached, it became 
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evident that the Society’s primary form of capital was not the only powerful currency. As the 
wealthiest funding body in the cancer community, the Society had had the upper hand and 
power in the field, but the exemption clause had subjected this social arena to a change of rules, 
values and capital. The field of the cancer community was suddenly no longer a closed scientific 
society, it was made accessible to the public and politicians through media covered political 
debates and decisions, opening the field to interaction with other social fields and their 
respective symbolic capitals, actors and alliances. It was now a moral arena with the public 
opinion as third party enforcer and in which economic capital could easily be trumphed by the 
social and cultural capital of researchers and politicians in the form of their ability to network, 
form strategic alliances, their social and scientific authority etc.  
A small group of public researchers allied themselves with the politicians of the government’s 
Privatisation Council in order to hold the Society to its moral alleged moral (not legal!) 
obligation to create a suitable cancer centre that all other public and private parties could agree 
on. The Society’s choice to opt for the exemption clause and play the morality card against the 
Privatisation Council had thus backfired, as it was now considered fair game to attack the 
private organisation on the issue of the centre and its internal administration of the voluntary 
contributions for the anti-cancer cause. For was the Society in fact worthy? A line of critical 
questioning that would have previously been hindered by doxa made if the Society had opted to 
buy the Finsen campus in open tendering at a potentially higher price on a par with other 
interested bidders and subject to the terms of any other contractual business transaction.  
In essence, the Society had used the press and moral arguments to expand the institutional 
matrix in favour of a cheaper sale of the Finsen grounds, and this had levelled the playing field 
of the cancer community inasmuch as many disgruntled negotiation parties now saw an 
opportunity to use these weapons against the Society to gain more influence and reach their 
objectives and improve their standing in the field. A media campaign against the Society was 
the direct result. The Society was vulnerable to negative feedback from the public: its members 
and source of potential contributors. And as the public opinion could affect the government’s 
Privatisation Council’s will to sell the Finsen grounds using the clause, the negative feedback 
became powerfull leverage against the cancer charity: it could not live out its new strategy  
without purchasing the Finsen campus, and it also could not afford to suffer long-term negative 
returns in a broader societal sense. Nor could it, however, allow external parties (critical 
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researchers and politicians) to dictate its use of funds and the management and operation of an 
entirely privately financed cancer centre. 
As a result the Society withdrew its bid on the Finsen campus. In Northian terms, this was a 
gridlock situation in which none of the involved planning parties or politicians were likely to 
realise the potential gains of the sale. Even though the Society was suffering the full brunt of the 
media campaign, the group of critical public researchers extended an olive branch in order to 
start bilateral negotiations with parts of the Society in order to find a suitable model, as they 
themselves had strong interests in the centre and could not do without the participation of the 
Society. Power fluctuated back to the cancer charity.  
Due to new polity, the Society could now only buy the property in open tendering without any 
clauses or legal obligations to establish cancer centres. Still, the government’s Privatisation 
Council went against all legal practice and imposed such an informal moral obligation on the 
charity through the press. In this sense, the private charity was not being held to the same sets of 
standards as would ordinary businesses bidding on the campus. It seems that the Society’s 
transition from a physician-dominated, modest charity to a DJØF-led modern corporate charity 
had been costly, as not all agreed with the Society’s management that a non-profit organisation 
should speculate financially or act according to business logic in order to support the anti-cancer 
cause. The criticism made against the organisation was multifaceted, ranging from its moral 
obligation to establish a cancer centre at Finsen, its internal decisions regarding scientific 
planning and support, to the moral fibre of its director.  
Eventually, the Society planned a grand debate meeting at which the Danish cancer researchers 
were all invited to discuss the Finsen plans, and in this way make the debate about disinterested 
science rather than about the moral disposition of the Society. The outcome of the meeting was 
that a majority of the many researchers felt that: 
a) the Finsen plans were inferior to the Rockefeller plans, as they lacked clinical activities; 
b) they dealt with form rather than content; 
c) there was no evidence that mutual housing would improve Danish cancer research 
through increased collaboration; 
d) the money was better spent on “brains than on bricks”; 
e) the plans were anachronistic as the nature of cancer research had changed. 
 
The Cancer Centre That Never Was 
 
 312 
The lack of content for the cancer centre was now displaying its consequences. As predicted at 
the 1970s Washington conference on planning for cancer centres (chapter 3), a clearly defined 
research program was the first and most important step in planning a cancer centre if it were to 
have any chance of succeeding. The plans had now been proven to be an empty shell; a tool for 
other agendas than that of coordinating Danish cancer research. 
So why did the majority of researchers dismiss the plans now and not much earlier on? Contrary 
to the picture from the press, the majority of cancer researchers had been silent during the media 
campaign and not chosen sides. The few but loud critics may have had personal agendas and 
political motives for wanting a centre, which went beyond the majority’s wish to coordinate 
cancer research and improve the (often) poor state of cancer labs. But as the years went by, and 
the labs were modernised through slowly increasing public expenditures for the universities and 
hospitals (and not through funds for cancer research in specific), the majority’s need for better 
housing was diminished.  
Also, the idea of increased social and scientific interaction as the result of shared housing was 
deflated by new sociological findings, and the notion that the research milieus were already 
closely situated geographically. Other means of collaborating and networking than a shared 
coffee machine was used in everyday laboratory life. In conclusion, the collapse of the Finsen 
plans happened that day at the grand debate meeting at the mercy of those who should have had 
the most central position in the negotiation in the first place, but the deterioration of the centre 
path had been on its way for many years.  
But if it is true that the centre was essentially a means rather than the end in the opinion of the 
battling parties, what did the collapse mean to those who tried to keep the idea alive for reasons 
other than coordinating cancer research?  
The Society: The organisation essentially got what it wanted: real estate to invest in, the 
publicity of its research units, buildings that allowed for scientific growth of these units. This 
was all part of its new strategy. Of course, it came at a high price, as the media debate would 
continue and take its toll on the Society’s image and the level of private contributions for its 
anti-cancer cause.  
The critical public and private researchers: This group may not have gotten a cancer centre, but 
they did manage to affect the monolithic Cancer Society whose power position in the cancer 
field was no longer cemented. The Society made many organisational changes and admissions 
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to this group of researchers regarding the practices of supporting research and budget 
transparency. Also, one of the grand debate meeting recommendations of spending the money 
for the cancer centre on different research initiatives was noted by the Society, and although this 
did not mean a guaranteed influx of money for their lines of work, the group of critical 
researchers had managed to push the funding practice in the direction they favoured (less 
strategic programs decided on by management, more through the Scientific Council). This 
recommendation even opened new possibilities to continue the media campaign against the 
Society post-Finsen collapse, as the moral attacks could surely apply to the question of  which 
worthy initiatives the Society would spend the “centre-money”. In other words, they still had 
leverage.  
The group did not get to coordinate Copenhagen cancer research or physically “institutionalise” 
it for a shared identity and a united front to make cancer research a priority of the state. As 
mentioned in the previous chapters, the use of the centre plans as means to get state or private 
funding  rather than as a scientific objective in itself  and the rhetoric used in the cancer research 
surveys and centre plans seem to indicate a need for a shared professional identity for the 
practitioners of the heterogeneous cancer research activities that ranged from bed to bedside and 
included many different and logically inconvergent professional groups (basic science vs. 
physicians) – that could not easily be fitted into one category guided by one logic as the overall 
norms and goals that unify and identify the group from others. And although the different areas 
of the umbrella-like field of cancer research were increasingly interdependent in their practices, 
a shared identity could not easily be brought about in the traditional academic sense of scientific 
disciplines and medical specialities. A physical building for cancer research could have mirrored 
a process of institutionalisation and professional identity outside academia. Even though it was, 
for a short while, possible to portray such unity to the press and to lay politicians in order to try 
to secure support for the centre (in addition to what was already channelled to the disciplines at 
the hospital and university), the lack of centre content eventually revealed the heterogeneity of 
the field, and the plans were dropped.  
In a path dependence perspective, the dream of a cancer centre took on different forms from the 
early 1980s to 1992. The Rockefeller plan resembled the original Engelbreth-Holm vision of 
1945 and the recommendations of the Kjeldgaard Report of 1981, however it was construed 
with no respect for the unfavourable formal institutions set by government in the form of a strict 
financial policy to control the growth of public expenditures, which was in direct conflict with 
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the Rockefeller plan’s implicit demand for additional state funding for modernising and 
equipping the Rockefeller building.  
The Society’s defection from these plans happened due to incremental institutional change (a 
change in the taste and preferences regarding the government’s policy) which allowed the 
Society and its new management to capitalise on the public’s will to support the anti-cancer 
cause, which the State did not give priority in times of restraints on the growth of the hospital 
sector. This development led to the Society’s strategy to fundraise aggressively, utilise its PR 
potential, and to invest in real estate as a way of protecting its capital against the inflationary 
pressure of 1980’s Danish economy. This was made possible by the minor incremental changes 
of informal institutions – that is within the existing overall sets of constraints guiding the 
Society’s actions. The Finsen plans were a way to continue utilising this institutional framework 
to the Society’s advantage, and the path of the cancer centre was therefore continued albeit with 
a deteriorating content that no longer resembled the original comprehensive dream. This did not 
seem to matter to the negotiation parties for quite a while, as the plans had become a tool rather 
than the objective in the constant battling for symbolic capital and wealth maximisation in the 
dynamic social field of the cancer community.  
Nevertheless, the deteriorating content eventually revealed itself to be devastating to the plans, 
as the Finsen proposal was dismissed at the grand debate meeting in 1992. It was concluded that 
the centre was not scientifically viable; in fact it was quite anachronistic, because the nature of 
cancer research had changed. And on a more metaphorical level, the centre was no longer 
essential as a tool and as leverage for the negotiation parties to achieve their objectives  that had 
very little to do with the original plans to coordinate cancer research. Some of these objectives 
were achieved: the Society carried out its strategy, the public critics had managed to set an arena 
for battling the Society in which its economic form of capital was only equal or even inferior to 
theirs, and public critics thereby gained leverage to ensure continued influence on the Society 
regardless of the establishment of a centre.  
However, some objectives were not achieved with the collapse of the plans: the unarticulated 
strive for shared identity and symbolic institutionalisation as the means to increase state support 
for cancer research in times of minimal state support and increased focus on the applicability of 
science. But as long as the Society reserved the centre money for other cancer research 
initiatives, the state support may not have been as important. 
 
The Cancer Centre That Never Was 
 
 315 
In conclusion, the path of the cancer centre dissolved beneath the feet of the negotiation parties. 
Not because of choices of a political or economic nature that provided real tangible alternatives 
– new paths. The path simply dissolved. Had the idea of the cancer centre outlived itself? Was it 
finally buried or could a change of circumstances revive it as a comfortable tool – a content-less 
ghostly and illusive idea – whenever leverage and financial conditions in the cancer field 




The Cancer Centre That Never Was 
 
 316 
Table 5.1: Gallery of key persons in chapter 5 











Summarised actions in this chapter: 







- Chairman of the 
Scientific Council 
(1981-1988) 





- X The Aarhus professor adopted the aims and value of the private business the Cancer Society, as he 
entered its Scientific Department. He never liked the idea of a cancer centre to begin with – because 
he did not believe it to be the right organisational tool to coordinate and strengthen Danish cancer 
research – but he appreciated the Society’s financial and publicity benefits of acquiring the Finsen 
grounds and investing in real estate and the cancer research centre. In this way, Amdrup adopted the 
aims of the Society and remained loyal to the Society’s management. He was against the proposal 
for a management of the Finsen centre as set forward by the researchers involved in the “all-
researcher-negotiations” in 1990. He thought it would deprive the Society of influence and veto-
right on important issues. Did not want to establish a management for a centre, before the scientific 




Director of the 
Fibiger Institute 
until 1989 (retired) 
- (X) 
unclear 
unclear When he retired in 1989, he wanted to preserve the traditional hierarchical administrative structure 
at his institute because he argued that the Institute’s fruitful research milieu was a direct result 
thereof. He was thus against the Society management’s plans to implement more democratic 
structures at the Fibiger. In 1990-91, Kieler joined his friend and politician Arne Melchior (of the 
government’s Privatisation Council) and the Society-critical and publicly-employed researchers 
Heine Høi Hansen, Keld Danø, Elisabeth Bock, Nis I. Nissen, Jens Pedersen-Bjergaard, Mikael 
Rørth, and Jørgen Rygaard in their contributions to the negative press coverage of the Society’s 
management, dealings, structure, budget etc.  He thus took part in the strategy to delay the sale of 
the Finsen grounds until a scientific management was established (e.g. by making Arne Melchior 
aware of the situation regarding the management discussions). It is not clear what Kieler’s position 
on the actual  Finsen centre was. The retired cancer researcher had nothing to gain by the 
establishment for the centre, but he may have regarded the debate about the centre’s management as 
a chance to comment on the Society’s politics in general. He was still discontent with Ole Bang and 
his colleagues for the way they had treated him and his Institute (budget reforms etc., see chapter 4). 
He had never concealed his discontent with the politics of the Executive Committee and the Head 
Board, and he thus used the negative press coverage of the Society as the means to continue making 
his discontent heard. At the grand debate meeting in January 1992, he supported the establishment 
of the Finsen centre, although he did not prefer this cancer research centre to the failed 
comprehensive Rockefeller cancer centre. It seems that he supported the plans – not from a scientific 
point of view – but for the sake of pushing through a scientific management with minimal lay 
representation from the Society – a management that would deprive the Society’s management of 
power and influence over the cancer research field. 
 

















X X (from 
Feb.13th 
1992) 
Clinical researcher from Odense who adopted the aims and values of the Society when he became 
chairman in 1988. As Bang, he used the press against the Minister of Health (Elsebeth Kock 
Petersen) so that she would sell the Finsen grounds directly to the Society via the exemption clause 
(and not in open tendering). In this way, Harvald and his management protected the Society against 
too high a price on the real estate they wanted to invest in, but made it vulnerable to moral based 
scrutiny in the public eye. On one occasion in 1990 he and the rest of management issued a press 
release stating that all public and private negotiation parties agreed on a management for the Finsen 
centre – even though this was not the case – and sent it to the Minister of Health (now Ester Larsen) 
and the Minster of Education (Bertel Haarder). This action almost pushed through a sale of the 
Finsen grounds. It would seem that the management of the Society used the promise to establish a 
cancer centre as leverage to acquire the Finsen grounds (although they did want to establish a cancer 
research centre, just not on any terms). He did not want to give in to the demands of establishing a 
(scientific) management for the Finsen centre before its scientific content had even been discussed. 
The priority of the Society in the purchase of the Finsen grounds was as follows: 
1) Making a sound financial investment. 
2) Getting a place to coordinate the Society’s own research groups. 
3) Establishing a cancer research centre for both private and state-held research groups and 
institutes, (although the intent to establish the centre was sincere enough, the centre was an 





X - Participated in talks about the Society’s plans for a cancer research centre at the Finsen area on 




-Professor in Cell 











X - Participated in the initial negotiation meeting about the Finsen centre plans on January 11th 1989. 
She worried about the terms and the measure of influence the publicly-employed researchers would 
be given in an entirely Society-owned research centre. From 1990, she participated in the media 
campaign against the Society in order to pressure the organisation into establishing a scientific 
management for the Finsen centre that would allow for more external influence over the monolithic 
Cancer Society. To Bock, the establishment of a scientific management with minimal lay 
representation from the Society was crucial for her decision to move into the proposed and 
otherwise Society-dominated centre. To Bock, the Finsen plans were not as ideal as the failed 
Rockefeller plans had been, as the new centre would move her further away from the 
clinic/Rigshospitalet, but she would probably get better laboratory facilities in the new centre. By 
using the press to affect the government’s Privatisation Council to delay the sale of the Finsen and 
by contributing to a negative press coverage of the Society’s politics and organisation, Bock and her 
Society-critical colleagues applied pressure on the Society to establish a scientific management that 
would deprive the cancer charity of a great deal of power. Bock and her colleagues put the Society 
in a difficult position. It could either: 
a) give in to the demands and lose power 
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b) or abort the plans of buying the Finsen altogether, at the risk of being portrayed in the press 
as the party responsible for the cancer centre not being established which would damage 




- Dep. For 
Anatomy, Aarhus 
University. 
- MRC member 
(1984-1992) 
 -(chairman of the 
MRC 1987-1989) 
State/MRC X - Represented the MRC at the negotiations for the Finsen centre on January 11th 1989. He worried 
about a centre owned entirely by the Society, because it would leave the “State” without real 
influence. Wanted an equal State-Society collaboration. 
Mads 
Bjerre 
Chief of economy, 
the Cancer Society. 
Cancer 
Society 
x X (from 
Feb.13th 
1992) 
Participated in the initial negotiations with the public research institutes. He wanted the centre to be 
called “The Danish Cancer Society’s Research Centre” for publicity purposes. He also insisted that 
the centre should be owned entirely by the Society. He thus acted according the financial and PR 
interests of the Society. Did not want to give in to the demands of establishing a (scientific) 





- The Pathology 






State/MRC neutral neutral Represented the MRC at the initial negotiations about the Finsen centre plans on January 11th 1989. 
Stated that he found it unrealistic to believe that the “State” would finance a new cancer centre, and 
that it was therefore understandable that the Society (who would pay for the proposed Finsen centre) 
wanted to name and control the centre. As a former member of the Society’s Information 
Department in the 1970s, he clearly appreciated the Society’s need of publicity through the centre. 
Rygaard was neutral towards the Finsen plans and the establishment of a centre, but he did use the 
commotion and Society-critical press coverage that emerged from the centre-negotiations as a 
chance to establish a competing cancer charity – because he was discontent with the way the Society 














(X) - Represented Rigshospitalet in the initial negotiations about the Finsen centre on January 11th 1989. 
At this early point, he argued that the essential element in the negotiations ought to be the scientific 
content of the centre rather than the management mode and ownership of it. However, he later stated 
(as vice-chairman of the MRC) that the conflict over management was due to the fact that the 
State/Ministries of Health and Education did not contribute to the centre on an equal footing with 
the Cancer Society. At the grand debate meeting, he revealed that he did not like the proposed 
Finsen centre, as it lacked contact to the clinic. He argued that he, as a clinical oncologist, depended 
on the results of basic cancer research and vice versa. He had preferred the comprehensive cancer 
centre proposed at the Rockefeller in 1984 but did not find the new Finsen plans ideal albeit they 
were better than nothing.  For a while he criticised the Society, but it seems that his criticism did not 
really concern the negotiations for the Finsen centre as it was rather targeted at the Society’s clumsy 
withdrawal from the Rockefeller project and its dominance in the cancer community. As a member 
of the MRC, he may have preferred the cancer research field to be influenced by this public research 
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council rather than by the wealthy private Cancer Society. He did not think it was ideal for a private 
charity like the Cancer Society to run its own research units either. This research political concern is 















State/MRC X - Represented the MRC in the disastrous negotiation about the Finsen centre on January 11th 1989. 
Argued that the “State” (meaning the Ministry of Health and/or the Ministry of Education) should 











-Member of the 
Society’s Head 
Board (1982-1990). 










X - Stated to the press that he worried that the Society had grown too powerful for the good of Danish 
cancer research: it monopolised the field. Advised the government’s Privatisation Council not to sell 
the Finsen grounds to the Society, because if the Council did so, the centre would never get an 
independent, professional, scientific management that would allow researchers outside the Society 
to get influence on the centre, and he thus insisted that a management (the centre’s adm. structure) 
had to be established before one could discuss the centre’s scientific content. Høi Hansen thus acted 
against the politics and aims of the Society’s Head Board which he had been a member of until 
1990. Høi Hansen used his status in the cancer community to delay the sale of the Finsen grounds 
until a satisfactory mode of management was established. Pressured the Society, and used the press 
to direct an attack on the lack of transparency of the Society’s budgets and undemocratic 
organisation. By using the press to affect the government’s Privatisation Council to delay the sale of 
the Finsen and by contributing to a negative press coverage of the Society’s politics and 
organisation, Heine Høi Hansen and his Society-critical colleagues applied pressure on the Society 
to establish a scientific management that would deprive the cancer charity of a great deal of power. 
Heine Høi Hansen and his peers put the Society in a difficult position. It could either: 
 
 give in to the demands and lose power 
or 
 abort the plans of buying the Finsen altogether, at the risk of being portrayed in the press as 
the party responsible for the cancer centre not being established, which would damage the 




Minister of Health 
(from June 3rd 1988- 
December 7th 1989) 
Ministry of 
Health 
X - She was interested in the Society’s offer to establish a new centre for cancer research, for which her 
ministry did not have to contribute with much. However, she wanted to sell the Finsen grounds in 
open tendering because that would ensure the State a higher price on the grounds compared to the 
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(V) one she would get by selling it directly to the Cancer Society. This financial strategy backfired as 
the Society’s management went to the press with the story arguing that the Minister was hindering 
the establishing of a cancer research centre by not allowing the Society to buy the Finsen grounds 





-Head of the 
Society’s “Diet & 
Cancer”-program 





- - Lend voice to growing criticism of the Society in the 1990 newspaper article that marked the 
beginning of a period with much negative press coverage of the Society’s actions. Thorling was 
concerned about the fact that Ole Bang aside from being director of the Society, also functioned as 
secretary of its Scientific Council. 
Ester 
Larsen 
Minister of Health 





X - Stated that Ole Bang and the Society had not misled the Ministry of Health regarding the sale of the 
Finsen grounds, and that the discrepancies between the MRC and the Society was due to mere 
misunderstandings. She had to mediate in the matter of the sale of the Finsen and in the conflict over 
the management of the proposed Finsen cancer research centre. She was interested in the Society’s 







- Obstetric Clinic, 
Rigshospitalet. 
 







X - As chairman of the Scientific Council, he initiated new talks on the management of the Finsen 
centre after the Society’s management had withdrawn its offer to buy the Finsen grounds and the 
official negotiations had deadlocked in 1990. Bock took this initiative on his own without the 
approval of Bang and the rest of the management, and he did so because he really believed the 
centre would do the Danish cancer research field good. 
Dr. MD, 
Keld Danø 





X - Since the clinical units of the Finsen Institute had been moved to Rigshospitalet, Danø and his 
Finsen Laboratory were somewhat isolated at the Finsen area. The new centre would bring more 
groups to the area. Danø wanted a scientific management for the Finsen centre, so that the publicly-
employed researchers could gain more influence in the completely Society-owned centre – perhaps 
even a post for himself – and saw Ole Bang’s business methods/agenda and insistence on Society 
dominance of the centre as an obstacle to achieving this goal. In other words, he wanted to 
restructure the field of power. In 1990, he went on national television and demanded that Ole Bang 
resigned as Director for the Society. Danø contributed to the negative press coverage (of the 
Society’s dealings in the purchase of the Finsen grounds, its management and politics) and used the 
sale of the Finsen grounds as leverage to pressure the Society into accepting and establishing a 
scientific management.  
By using the press to affect the government’s Privatisation Council to delay the sale of the Finsen 
and by contributing to a negative press coverage of the Society’s politics and organisation, Danø 
 
The Cancer Centre That Never Was 
 
 321 
and his Society-critical colleagues applied pressure on the Society to establish a scientific 
management that would deprive the cancer charity of a great deal of power. Danø and his peers put 
the Society in a difficult position. It could either: 
 give in to the demands and lose power 
or  
 abort the plans of buying the Finsen altogether, at the risk of being portrayed in the press as 
the party responsible for the cancer centre not being established, which would damage the 
Society’s reputation and perhaps even result in the management having to leave. 
 
When the Society counteracted by withdrawing its offer to buy the grounds, Danø initiated new 
negotiations by contacting the Chairman of Society’s Scientific Council, Johannes Bock. Whereas 
Bang and the Society used the proposed cancer centre as leverage to get the Finsen grounds, Danø 
and a few colleagues used the sale of the Finsen and a negative press campaign as leverage to 
establish a management for the Finsen centre that would allow for more influence: he thus strongly 
demanded that a management (the centre’s adm. structure) had to be established before one could 













X - Participated in the negotiations (between the researchers only) about the Finsen centre management 
along with Danø, Johannes Bock, Klaus Petersen, Mikael Rørth, Elisabeth Bock, and John Philip. 
His interests and strategies are not explicit in this chapter, but in the transcripts the grand debate 
meeting, he clearly states his support for the centre. He wanted to establish a scientific management 
for the Finsen centre before discussing its scientific content, as this was the only way publicly-
employed researchers could be persuaded to move into an entirely Society-owned research institute.  
Klaus 
Petersen 































(X) X Represented the Society in the negotiations for the centre. Wanted to establish the centre at first as 
part of the Executive Committee’s strategy to invest in real estate, but later on saw the press-
mediated attacks made against the Society as the attempts of a small group of researchers to gain 
control of the Society’s funds. For this reason he actively negotiated against the establishment of a 
scientific management of the Finsen that would facilitate such a coup (e.g.: they withdrew the offer 
to buy the Finsen grounds, added clauses to the statutes of the proposed centre management). He 
thought that the conflict between the Society and the small group of publicly-employed researchers 
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was about power and money rather than the desire to build an actual research centre. He wanted to 
defend the autonomy of the Cancer Society, and he did definitely not want to give in to the demands 
of establishing a (scientific) management for the Finsen centre before its scientific content had even 








State - - Neutral mediator at the grand debate meeting. 
Arne 
Melchior 





State X - As a member of the Privatisation Council, he used the sale of the Finsen grounds to pressure the 
Society into establishing a cancer research centre with a suitable management that would allow 
public researchers some influence on the centre and reduce the Society’s autocratic power in the 
cancer community. He often used the press to communicate his discontent with the Society’s 
dealings, and when the sale of the Finsen was final in 1991 (and he thus lost his leverage) he 
intensified his use of the press to get his message through and thereby pressure the Society with bad 
publicity. He publicly cancelled his membership of the Society and urged the other 400000 
members to do the same. He called the Society’s management for “liars and frauds” who used 
indecent methods to hoodwink the government into selling the Finsen grounds to the Society 
without a resulting cancer research centre. He also teamed up with the group of Society-critical 
publicly-employed researchers (Heine Høi Hansen, Keld Danø, Elisabeth Bock, Nis I. Nissen, Jens 
Pedersen Bjergaard, Mikael Rørth, Jørgen Rygaard and his retired friend Jørgen Kieler) to form a 









- Member of the 
Society’s Head 







In 1991, he informed the other members of the Head Board that a petition was being circulated at 
the country’s oncology departments to have Ole Bang fired as director and Bent Harvald fired as 
president of the Danish Medical Association.  

















 X He doubted the value of the Finsen plans, and thought that the money about to be invested in the 
Finsen centre could be better spent on other cancer research initiatives. He did not think the centre-
idea was necessarily the best way of strengthening Danish cancer research. As chairman of the 
Society’s Scientific Council, he initiated and organised the grand debate meeting, so that every 
cancer researcher in the country could express their views on the plans, and so that the Scientific 
Council could decide whether or not to establish the centre on the basis of these views. 
 











-Former member of 
the Society’s 
Executive Council 
(until 31st December 
1990). 
- Temporary head of 
the Fibiger Institute 
1990.  
Society - X As the author of the Kjeldgaard Report and the report on the Rockefeller cancer centre, he was 
invited to speak about the history of the cancer centre at the grand debate meeting in January 1992. 
He no longer supported the idea of a cancer centre, as he thought the situation had changed 
considerably since the collapse of the Rockefeller plans. According to Kjeldgaard, the need to 
coordinate the cancer research groups in Copenhagen had now been reduced to a minimum, as 80 % 
of them were already situated under 2 km from each other at Østerbro, and none of the groups were 
no longer in grave need of better housing and facilities: e.g. research professor Lennart Olsson had 
gone to the U.S, and research professor Lars Inge-Larsson had got tenure at the State’s Serum 
Institute He feared that the centre had become a “white elephant”, and that there were better ways of 
strengthening Danish cancer research (e.g. by importing international and talented research groups, 
as the Society was already planning to do). In this way, Kjeldgaard supported the Society’s interests. 
The organisation had already acquired the Finsen grounds and now wanted to establish a centre for 
their own research groups.  
Major 
consultant, 















(X) (X) He was unhappy with the Society’s proposed Finsen centre, as he thought that it did not allow 
publicly-employed researchers to get much influence – he thus went against the politics of the 
Society’s Head Board, which he had been a member of until 1990. He contributed to the negative 
press coverage of the Society’s dealings in the purchase of the Finsen grounds and actively 
negotiated for a scientific management of the proposed Finsen centre, and he thus insisted that a 
management (the centre’s adm. structure) had to be established before one could discuss the centre’s 
scientific content. At the grand debate meeting, however, he stated that he did not like the Finsen 
model as it lacked contact with the clinic. Being a clinician himself, he had preferred the Rockefeller 
model. In this respect his involvement in the criticism of the Society mirrors that of Mikael Rørth, 
(see above: supporting the Finsen plans, although he did not like them from a scientific point of 
view, in order to establish a centre with a scientific management that would give state-employed 






at the Society’s 
research laboratory 




- X Speaker at the grand debate meeting, January 1992. He did not want to establish the Finsen centre, 
as he did not believe it was the best tool to strengthen Danish cancer research. He stated that this 
field needed “brains not bricks”. As Kjeldgaard, he argued that the situation in the cancer 
community had changed since 1981, when the idea of a cancer centre was first pitched. There were 
no longer “homeless” cancer researchers in need of laboratory space, e.g. research professor Lennart 
Olsson had gone to the U.S, and research professor Lars Inge-Larsson had got tenure at the State’s 
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Hospital) Serum Institute 
Overgaard may, in addition to this, have feared that a large cancer research centre in Copenhagen 
would deprive the provincial cancer research groups (such as his own) of funds. 
Jesper 
Zeuthen 








Speaker at the grand debate meeting in January 1992. He stated that unless the research groups of 
the centre were placed 10 metres or less apart, the synergy effect of placing group under the same 
roof would be lost. According to a sociological study he had got hold of, the effect was gone if the 
distance was over 10 metres, and in this case collaboration partners could might as well be 2 
kilometres apart. Given the fact that 80% of the research groups were already situated within 2 km 
of each other at Østerbro, Zeuthen’s statement may have been a comment on the coordination need 
(or lack of such) of the Copenhagen cancer research groups. Did not want to give in to the demands 
of establishing a (scientific) management for the Finsen centre before its scientific content had even 
been discussed. 











He and his management used the promise to establish a cancer research centre as leverage to acquire 
the Finsen grounds. Much like the other members of management, he wanted the Finsen centre to be 
called “The Danish Cancer Society’s Research Centre” for publicity purposes. He misinterpreted the 
results of negotiations with the other public partners or deliberately misinformed the Society’s 
Scientific Council and the Minister of Health (Kock-Petersen) that the state-owned negotiation 
parties and the Society had agreed on a management for the Finsen centre in order to persuade the 
government’s Privatisation Council to sell the Finsen grounds to the Society and also in order to 
persuade the Society’s own Scientific Council to approve the purchase of the Finsen grounds for a 
cancer centre. Used the press to pressure the Minister of Health (Kock-Petersen) into selling the 
Finsen grounds directly to the Society and not in open tendering. He and his management did so by 
arguing that the Minister would be hindering the establishment of a cancer research centre if she did 
not sell the grounds to the Society at a reasonable price. Indicating that the minister was “against” 
the anti-cancer cause was an effective strategy to protect the Society’s interests. He acted according 
to his habitus as an economist and according to the norms and goals of the Society as a private 
business. It would seem that the management of the Society used the promise to establish a cancer 
centre as leverage to acquire the Finsen grounds. (although they did want to establish a cancer 
research centre, just not on any terms). Did not want to give in to the demands of establishing a 
(scientific) management for the Finsen centre before its scientific content had even been discussed. 
The priority of the Society in the purchase of the Finsen was as follows: 
 Making a sound financial investment. 
 Getting a place to coordinate the Society’s own research groups. 
Establishing a cancer research centre for both private and state-held research groups and institutions. 
(Although the intent to establish the centre was sincere enough, the centre was an additional bonus 
to the two items). 
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Chapter 6 The aftermath 
 
When the Finsen plans were dropped, it marked the dissolution of the path of the cancer centre. 
This chapter gives a brief summary of the aftermath of the failed Finsen project and some the 
different research political initiatives that emerged from it.  
The Society’s decision to follow the recommendation of the majority of the Danish cancer 
researchers to abandon the Finsen project provoked the small group of publicly-employed 
researchers who had struggled to establish a centre this time around. In particular Keld Danø 
was disappointed by the failed attempts to establish a shared centre, as he feared there would 
now be two smaller competing centres718. Danø believed that Rigshospitalet would move his 
own Finsen Laboratory from the Finsen grounds to the state hospital’s premises, and that this 
would create a cluster of public cancer research groups at Blegdamsvej (Rigshospitalet and the 
University) and a private grouping at the Society’s Finsen campus719.  
The head of Copenhagen University, Ove Nathan, worried that the failed centre plans split the 
Copenhagen cancer research community in two and hoped that the researchers would learn to 
collaborate in spite of the unhappy circumstances720. If Nathan was right about the division of 
the cancer community, it meant that the dream of a national cancer centre had the exact opposite 
effect of what Engelbreth-Holm and the authors of the Kjeldgaard Report had hoped for: 
coordination! But contrary to popular belief, the division had not emerged as a result of the 
Society’s latest decision alone – it had been coming for many years. In fact, the split seems to 
have been an inevitable facet of the dream of the centre itself, as long as the participants did not 
agree on the very content of it and on the way it should be managed, and that was made clear at 
the grand debate meeting where a majority of the country’s cancer researchers had dismissed the 
Finsen plans and suggested that the money be spent on something else. This had resonated well 
with the chairman of the Society’s Scientific Council who stated that the decision to abandon the 
centre plans was in fact good for Danish cancer research, as there was now room to find better 
ways to strengthen the field721.  
                                                 
718NN. (1992) "Kræftcenter skrinlægges" Politiken 14.02.1992, p. 5.  
719 Ibid. 
720 Dahlin, M. (1992) "Strid blandt kræftforskere" Berlingske Tidende 15.02.1992, p. 5.  
721 Simonsen, T. I. A. (1992) "Et skridt fremad" Politiken København 19.02.1992, p. 5.  
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As mentioned in the previous chapter, a small group of Society critical researchers (and their 
allied politicians) supported the Finsen plans despite the opinion of the majority of researchers, 
and their success of changing the rules and turf of the press-mediated conflict with the cancer 
charity had allowed them to direct attacks on the charity’s morality and fulfilment of its anti-
cancer cause even after their scientific colleagues had rejected the idea of the cancer centre at 
Finsen. This time however, the attacks were closely associated with the question of how the 
cancer charity would spend the money set aside for the Finsen centre. The critics had managed 
to attract the public eye to this matter, and in this way the continued critical press coverage can 
be seen as a continuance of the moral linkage between the Society and the “worthy cause” from 
the Privatisation Council’s exemption clause, which had once before forced the Society into a 
“moral arena” in which its economical capital, business logic and right to act in the way it found 
most proper were put under severe pressure. By continously attacking through such a “moral 
arena”, the small group of critical researchers and politicians practiced some measure of 
influence on the image-sensitive charity’s internal funding practices, although they legally had 
no right to do so. A cancer centre was no longer necessary for this influence to be practiced.  
The grand debate meeting’s recommendation of spending the money for the centre on as of yet 
unidentified initiatives to strengthen cancer research was negotiated within the Society’s 
Executive Committee and the critics’ attack of the Society – and in particular its business logic 
embodied by the charity’s direction – was related to a parallel development in the hospital 
sector. The government’s 1980s policy of controlling the growth of public hospital expenditures 
and making the hospitals more efficient through the introduction of New Public Management 
and privatisation efforts gained strength in the early 1990s. And in the opinion of the medical 
profession, this had shifted the hospitals’ focus from patient treatments to economy and 
budgets722. A first wave of prioritising between expenses for different hospital activities and 
services within a fixed budget was now replaced by a second wave of privatisation of hospital 
services (such as the sanitary area) and in 1992, the Danish Folketing decided to introduce a new 
tool to control public sector growth: the citizen’s right to choose what hospital to be treated at. 
The money now followed the patient rather than the hospital, and this forced the public hospitals 
to compete on price and quality as seen in the private sector723.  
                                                 
722 Jacobsen, K. and K. Larsen (2007). Ve og Velfærd - Læger, sundhed og samfund gennem 200 år. København, 
Lindhardt og Ringhof, p. 481.  
723 Ibid., p. 486-487. 
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In this way, market conditions rather than medical experts dictated the price of health care. To 
the medical profession, this development made it impossible for the hospitals to develop, plan 
ahead or invest in new treatments and apparatus724. In other words, external financing such as 
funding from the Cancer Society was becoming increasingly important for cancer research 
activities at the hospitals, and as explained later on, the university researchers were experiencing 
similar problems. The fact that the Society’s non-medical Executive Committee would probably 
have the last say in the matter of allocating the money reserved for the now collapsed Finsen 
centre plan must have been ominous to the group of critical public researchers in the light of the 
developments at their respective organisations, and this may be part of the reason why they 
continued their attacks in the “moral arena”. They fought for better conditions for public cancer 
research.  
In retrospect, the juxtaposition between these researchers on the one side and the Society’s 
administration (and in parallel also the hospital administration) on the other was a clash of 
professional logics and ethical standings. Medical deontological ethics focused on the medical 
profession’s obligation and calling to treat all patients equally and in the best possible manner as 
opposed to the financial prioritising and utilitarian ethics of administrators trying to spend the 
scarce funds on what would provide the most value for most people. It was thus not a matter of 
one party being ethically superior to another (and unethical) party; it was a matter of different 
ethical foundations leading to different lines of actions that could not easily be united in 
compromise. And quite similar to many ethically based debates, the media attack on the Society 
that happened after the collapse of the Finsen plan all came down to who had the loudest and 
most compelling arguments in the public opinion.  
The Society’s fiercest critics voiced their arguments in yet another wave of often very critical 
press coverage of the Society’s actions725. The group of critical publicly-employed researchers 
                                                 
724 Ibid., p. 487. 
725 Dahlin, M. (1992) "Strid blandt kræftforskere" Berlingske Tidende 15.02.1992, Juul-Madsen, A. (1992) 
"Politisk røre over nej til kræft-center" Berlingske Tidende København 15.02.1992, Jørgensen, P. S. (1992) "Arne 
Melchior må undskylde" Politiken København 22.02.1992, NN. (1992) "Kræftcenter skrinlægges" Politiken 
14.02.1992, NN. (1992) "Nej til nyt kræft-ceter" B.T. 14.02.1992, NN. (1992) "Minister skuffet over Kræftens 
Bekæmpelse" Berlingske Tidende 17.02.1992, NN. (1992) "Kræftskandalen" Ekstra Bladet 19.02.1992, NN. (1992) 
"Kræftens Bekæmpelse svindler" Ekstra Bladet 27.02.1992, Simonsen, T. I. A. (1992) "Et skridt fremad" Politiken 
København 19.02.1992, Ziebe, H. (1992) "Forskning er vigtigere end fejder" Berlingske Tidende København 
22.02.1992, Thomsen, J. (1992) "Forskere uenige om kræftcenter" Berlingske Tidende København 24.01.1992, 
Bentzen, S. M. (1992) "Kræftforskningsdebatten set fra sidelinjen" Berlingske Tidende København 11.03.1992, 
Bentzen, S. M. (1992) "Forskernes kræftstrid" Politiken København 13.03.1992, Celis, J. E. (1992) "Kaos om 
kræft" Politiken , Christensen, S. (1992) "Planerne om Finsen Parken skrinlagt" Politiken 15.03.1992, Clemmesen, 
I. (1992) "Vi vil ikke kaldes for andenrangs" Berlingske Tidende 04.03.1992, Danø, K. (1992) "Sagen om 
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and the politician Arne Melchior led this attack that lasted several years until the management of 
the Society resigned as a result of too much damaging publicity. This conflict will not be further 
elaborated on in this thesis, however, as it emerged from – but did not specifically concern – the 
plans for cancer centre. As stated in the previous chapters, the centre plans had become a tool 
and an occasion for debating the moral fibre of the Cancer Society and to gain some means of 
influence on the charity’s funding practices. And although most cancer researchers in the 
country had discarded the idea of the cancer centre at the grand debate meeting, the concept in 
itself still held political leverage for the public researchers in the perpetual hunt for better 
funding and facilities.  
The following sections briefly describe the different initiatives to establish “cancer centres” in 
the wake of the aborted Finsen plans. 
6.1 The Copenhagen Comprehensive Cancer Centre 
Immediately after the breakdown of the Finsen plans, the MRC attempted to establish a cancer 
centre without the Danish Cancer Society726. More than 10 years of planning had taught the 
MRC that is was not easy to find vacant research buildings for a coordinated cancer research 
effort, and the new centre was therefore planned to be a so-called “brick-less” co-operation 
between already existing research groups at Rigshospitalet and the University. If the Finsen 
Laboratory was moved to Rigshospitalet, the publicly-employed cancer research groups would 
be placed relatively close together. According to Keld Danø: 
The move means that clinical and experimental cancer research will be connected once 
again. They have been apart ever since the patients were moved from the Finsen Institute, 
and we have felt the impact of that.727 
The centre was called the Copenhagen Comprehensive Cancer Centre728, although this type of 
centre was not an autonomous physical unit and lacked epidemiological research to a 
considerable extent. But if the centre was in fact established it would be one of the largest in 
Northern Europe729. It was planned to consist of more than 1300 staff members from 14 
                                                                                                                                                            
kræftforskningscentret var ikke noget spil" Berlingske Tidende 22.03.1992, Melchior, A. (1992) "Sløser med 
betroede midler" Politiken København 06.03.1992, Melchior, A. (1992) "Et dansk kræftforskningscenter skal ikke 
forpurres" Berlingske Tidende København 06.03.1992, Nielsen, S. (1992) "Kræft, trit og retning" Politiken 01-03-
1992, Sørensen, T. I. A. (1992) "Misvisende debat om dansk kræftforskningscenter" Berlingske Tidende 
København 10.04.1992.  
726 Thomsen, J. (1992) "To centre for dansk kræftforskning" Berlingske Tidende København 28.02.1992, p. 4.  
727 NN. (1992) "Kræftforskere samles på Rigshospitalet" Politiken 07.03.1992, p. 3.  
728 Sehested, M. (1993). Copenhagen Comprehensive Cancer Center 1(1): 1-8. p. 1.  
729NN. (1992) "Kræftcenter sætter nålen i Europakortet" Politiken 02.06.1992, p. 2.  
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departments at Rigshospitalet, the University, Herlev County Hospital, and Bispebjerg 
Hospital730.The centre was thus the result of a new collaboration between all of these institutes 
and the MRC, and it was expected to have a budget of DKK 0, 5 - 1 billion731. It was to be 
financed through the channels that already funded the research groups and departments 
involved, but in addition to this, the management hoped to be able to attract additional funding 
from the Danish Basic Research Foundation, the Society, and the EU732. The centre received 
wide support from the publicly-employed researchers who actively tried to make the place an 
international centre of excellence within such areas as e.g. clinical trial, cancer treatment, and 
colon, lung, and breast cancer research733.  
According to one of the staunchest supporters of the project, Dr. Mikael Rørth of Rigshospitalet, 
the new centre plan was the best possible solution to the problem of coordinating cancer 
research in Copenhagen734. The centre was scientifically weightier than the failed Finsen centre 
would have been because it encompassed clinical research and patient care, and according to 
Rørth this also made the new centre better than the Society’s current gathering of its basic 
research units at the Finsen area735. Rørth was already in dialogue with the Danish cancer 
researcher (and grandson of Nobel Laureate Niels Bohr) Wilhelm Bohr, who currently worked 
as head of a department at the prestigious NCI in the US. Rørth and the other researchers hoped 
that the new centre would be able to appeal to him and other prominent researchers736.  
The Society’s Fibiger Institute and Cancer Registry remained at the Finsen grounds, however, 
and publicly-employed researchers such as Elisabeth Bock anticipated that the new centre would 
only be able to collaborate with these units if the Society’s management was dismissed or 
changed its attitude737. In this way, scientific coordination and political power play were mixed 
in the press as a prop against the Society’s management. Nevertheless, the old opponents 
momentarily buried the hatchet in June 1992 when the new brick-less centre was established. 
Ole Bang welcomed the initiative, to which the cancer charity’s Scientific Council already 
                                                 
730Ibid.  (303 physicians, 105 lab assistants, and 686 patient care personnel). 
731 Ibid. 
732 Thomsen, J. (1992) "Planer om nyt kræftcenter" Berlingske Tidende København 28.03.1992, p. 10.  
733 Andreassen, M., F. Blasi, et al. (1992) "Støtter nyt center for kræftforskning" Berlingske tidende 11.03.1992, p. 
8. 
Amongst the supporters and active negotiators were Mikael Rørth, Elisabeth Bock, Keld Danø, Heine Høi Hansen, 
Nis I. Nissen, Jens Pedersen Bjergaard, J.J. Pindborg, Jørgen Rygaard, and former Society researcher Jørgen Kieler.  
734 Thomsen, J. (1992) "Planer om nyt kræftcenter" Berlingske Tidende København 28.03.1992, p. 10. 
735 Ibid. 
736 Ibid. 
737 Thomsen, J. (1992) "To centre for dansk kræftforskning" Berlingske Tidende København 28.02.1992, p. 4. 
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contributed DKK 30 million in the form of project-oriented grants-in-aid for the participating 
researchers738. And at the inauguration of the centre, the Director of Rigshospitalet Christian 
Nissen stated that: 
The Society was partly right to fear that there would not be enough researchers interested 
in the Finsen Park, because the very important clinical part of the work would not be 
possible there. But we must conclude that private and public organisations have different 
goals, so even though the china has been chipped a bit in the process, we all agree that we 
have reached the best solution.739 
The following year, the Society’s management even asked to have the Fibiger Institute and the 
Cancer Registry accepted as members of the brick-less collaboration network740. This was 
welcomed by Mikael Rørth who wanted to work with the Society’s researchers, and it was his 
and many other people’s firm belief that Denmark was not large enough for private cancer 
research of the extent done at the Society, and that the State (i.e. the hospitals and universities) 
ideally ought to undertake all of the country’s research within this field741. According to Rørth, 
the political discrepancies between the Society’s management and the public research organs 
had separated the country’s only two autonomous cancer research institutes from university 
research and the clinic. This was very damaging to the entire field, and Rørth and his colleagues 
appear to have been convinced that such a thing would not have happened if the private research 
units had been integrated in Copenhagen University much as the Radium Stations had been 
made part of the State’s hospital system in the 1960s. But until the Society decided to hand over 
the reins of the Fibiger Institute and the Cancer Registry to the State, their membership of the 
new “brick-less” collaboration would have to do.  
Unfortunately, it was not possible to create a sufficient financial foundation for the centre right 
away. The “brick-less” centre did not have its own funds and thus could not be described as 
autonomous and separate from the organisations that had created it742. The management of the 
new centre aimed at raising the necessary level of funding for the centre before long, but in 
October 1994 it became clear that the brick-less project was overrun and outpaced by yet 
another initiative for Danish cancer research: a research centre in the University’s Teilum 
Building.  
                                                 
738 Thomsen, J. (1992) "København får center for kræftforskning" Berlingske Tidende København 02.06.1992, p. 6. 
739NN. (1992) "Kræft-balladen er glemt" Politiken 02.06.1992, p. 1. 
740 Skovmand, K. (1993) "Kræftcenter tegner til succes" Ibid.: København 04.11.1993, p. 7.  
741 Skovmand, K. (1994) "Sprækker i murene" Politiken København 13.10.1994, p. 9.  
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6.2 From Teilum to BRIC 
From 1993-1995, the University’s Medical Faculty, Science Faculty and Rigshospitalet 
discussed a coordination of their cancer research efforts in an entirely publicly-owned cancer 
centre743. In contrast to the Copenhagen Comprehensive Cancer Centre, the new centre was to 
be made of actual bricks and mortar. A special state allocation (favourable formal institutions) to 
the University had suddenly made it possible to plan for a centre for basic cancer research in the 
Teilum Building, which was situated at Rigshospitalet744. The building was vacant due to a 
sudden exchange of buildings between the University and the hospital, and it was planned to 
house the University’s Protein Laboratory, its Department for Pathological Anatomy and the 
hospital’s Finsen Laboratory745. The Head of University assured the press that if the Society’s 
research units wanted to participate as well, this could easily be arranged746. Apart from the 
basic cancer research centre, the 40,000 m2 large building was supposed to give room to some 
of the University’s biomed-departments and several auditoriums and class rooms. The 
University desperately needed the space, given that the number of students was increasing 
rapidly, and it thus pushed for a speedy takeover. But the State’s Building Directorate was not in 
a hurry to invest over DKK 250 million in the fitting of new facilities that were already present 
in the University’s old buildings747.  
The exchange of buildings and the establishment of a basic research centre therefore proved 
more difficult than the university had anticipated, and negotiations dragged on. The planning for 
the Teilum centre was eventually integrated as part of yet another set of plans, when it became 
clear that the cancer research groups of the planned cancer centre could be placed within an 
even larger centre for biotechnology – The Biotech Research and Innovation Centre (BRIC) – 
which embodied the State’s attempt to establish an international centre of excellence in 
molecular biology and biotechnology748. A new socialist government in 1993 made biotech 
research a special priority, and just as the minority model of the MRC‘s Rockefeller Report in 
1984, the planners of the BRIC saw this and tried to utilise this change of formal institutions that 
favoured one line of research (biotech) to include cancer research as well.  
                                                 
743 NF, SF, et al. (1995). Forskningscenter for bioteknologi. København, Københavns Universitet 
Hovedstadens Sygehusfællesskab: 55.c, p. 23. 
744 Skovmand, K. (1994) "Sprækker i murene" Politiken København 13.10.1994, p. 9.  
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5.  
748 Helin, K. (2004). "Bricks and Mortar." Naturejobs 428(238). 
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The BRIC was the result of several factors. First of all, a plan for Copenhagen University’s 
future development was not received well by the Confederation of Danish Industry which 
believed that the University’s plan did not offer enough potential for co-operation in areas such 
as biotechnology749. In other words, the industries argued that the University was no longer able 
to provide them with the biotechnological expertise needed to develop new products and 
technology. This was in part due to the fact that new and tightened requirements for safety and 
working environment had outdated many of the laboratories at the University’s Science Faculty, 
so that the National Working Environment Authorities could no longer accept them. If the 
Faculty could not improve the condition of the labs in time, they would be shut down and be 
unable to deliver results. Secondly, the University decided to make biotechnology one out of 
three special research and development areas, as many of its researchers worked within this field 
– and not coincidentally – it was also a priority of the government750. Other European 
universities had pointed to biotechnology as the most important R&D field, and the Danish 
university thus followed suit by suggesting a biotechnological centre. The new centre would 
offer the University labs better working facilities and help strengthening the public 
biotechnology efforts. Along with Rigshospitalet, the University thus started collaborating on 
establishing a centre at Tagensvej 18, see Appendix F. 
The two organisations applied for support from the State and legitimated its initiative by 
referring to its possible benefits for Danish agriculture, health system and industries751. In their 
BRIC report, representatives of the University and Rigshospitalet described the centre in the 
following manner: 
The establishment of a biotechnological centre at Tagensvej 18 is expected to greatly 
strengthen the Oresund region’s research potential to benefit the local industries. 
Furthermore, it is in complete accordance with the objectives of Danish research policy 
and the wishes of the organisations of the labour market. The proposed centre will be 
visible and powerful in the European biotechnology research community and it will 
represent innovative thinking that is not embedded in the traditional distinction between 
different institutes, and thus create one great and physically coordinated research milieu 
with the advantages it entails. At the same time, a longtime wish to establish a cancer 
research centre will come true.752 
 
                                                 
749 NF, SF, et al. (1995). Forskningscenter for bioteknologi. København, Københavns Universitet 
Hovedstadens Sygehusfællesskab: 55., p. 21.  
750 Ibid., p. 20.  
751 Ibid., p. 3.  
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In connection with the establishment of such a [biotechnology] centre, it was desired to 
establish a cancer research centre across the organisational boundaries. The main 
component of a biotechnology centre would be the Molecular Biology Department of the 
Science Faculty. In addition, one wished to place the Department for Pathology, Protein 
Lab (Medical Faculty), and the Finsen Laboratory of the Rigshospitalet there as well. 
These three units were meant to focus particularly on cancer research with the application 
of biotechnological methods in mind.753 
Elisabeth Bock, Jørgen Rygaard and Thorkild I. A. Sørensen were involved in the planning for 
the new centre, just as they had been in the failed attempts to establish the respective cancer 
centres at the Rockefeller and the Finsen grounds. Although the new initiative was not a cancer 
centre per se, but a much broader biotechnology centre, the three representatives found that the 
solution was magnificent754. The centre’s scientific profile was planned to reflect expertise in 
molecular biology, cell biology, and combinatorial chemistry. And the representatives 
considered this to be a very fruitful environment to place a cancer centre in755. Also, the centre 
would have sub-surface tunnels to the Medical Faculty (Panum) and Rigshospitalet, and it 
would therefore be in relatively close contact with the patient wards as well756.  
But in contrast to the two failed cancer centres, the new biotechnology centre would be an 
entirely public venture. The establishment of the 33,000 m2 large centre amounted to 
approximately DKK 664 million, and the yearly operating costs were estimated at DKK 23 
million757. This was, perhaps, a very low estimate considering that the centre was planned to 
employ 200 researchers, 200 graduate and PhD students, and 160 technical and administrative 
staff members758. It was hoped that the centre would be financed mainly through the national 
budget and the association of Copenhagen area hospitals759.  
Despite the fact that the BRIC enjoyed political support and that the new government wanted to 
use the centre as a tool to make Denmark one of the world’s leading biotech-nations, it was 
difficult to procure the necessary financial support. According to an article in a local 
biotechnology magazine, legal wrangling and fiscal negotiations with the State meant that the 
                                                 
753 Ibid., p. 22.  
754 Interview with Elisabeth Bock on February 2nd 2005. 
755 NF, SF, et al. (1995). Forskningscenter for bioteknologi. København, Københavns Universitet 
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Universitet: 112., p. 18.  
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construction of the BRIC centre was delayed again and again for many years, and the economic 
basis for the largest research project in Danish biomedical history was still not in place by 
2003760. The constant delays frustrated researchers, research administrators, and the heads of 
Danish medical industries761. Even though Denmark was a member of the EU, and the 
government had signed the so-called Barcelona covenant pledging Denmark to spend at least 
3% of its gross national product on research and development, the actual combined private and 
public expenses for this field amounted to only 2.1 % (with less than 1% contributed by the 
State), and to most researchers, this financial restraint was not compatible with the government’s 
ambition of putting Denmark on the biotech map762.  
It was argued that Denmark simply did not move fast enough to jump onboard the biotech-
bandwagon and was thus in danger of being passed by763. In comparison, the small country of 
Singapore decided to invest heavily in biotechnological R & D in 2001, and only two years later 
it managed to establish seven skyscrapers to house a total of 1,800 researchers764. Denmark, on 
the other hand, had been planning the much smaller BRIC since 1995, and the first stone for it 
was laid in 2004 (!)765. The delay of the establishment appears to be very similar to that of the 
failed Rockefeller and Finsen centres. But in contrast to these two cases, the BRIC was backed 
by the powerful Confederation of Danish Industry which would benefit from the work done at 
the centre and whose interests could not easily be ignored by the government766.  
In 2003 the BRIC was put on the State Budget with a yearly core budget of DKK 25 million, 
and in addition to this it depended on peer reviewed grants-in-aid from private foundations such 
as the Lundbeck Foundation, the Novo Foundation and the Cancer Society767. The centre was 
finally established in 2003 by the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation with the 
purpose of forming an elite centre in biomedicine and as part of the Copenhagen University with 
its own board of directors. The focus of the centre was basic biological research into the basic 
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mechanisms of disease aetiology, disease causing genes, and diagnostic genetic markers for 
diseases such as cancer and ailments of the central nervous system768. From the very start, the 
centre’s model was to conduct basic research, publish and patent results and use the profits to 
pursue commercialisation of the results in the form of new drugs769.  In this way, the basic 
science centre was strongly linked to the Danish biotech industry which was also part of the 
centre’s board of directors. In its first years of existence, the BRIC was moved around to 
different research institutes but in 2006 it was permanently housed at the top of a new 
Copenhagen Biocenter that provided the BRIC with 29,300 m2 of top modern laboratory 
facilities770.  
According to Bock and Danø the BRIC was the final realisation of the dream of a national 
cancer centre in Denmark771. But was it really so? If the dream was about a comprehensive 
cancer centre like the one proposed by Engelbreth-Holm in 1945 and the Kjeldgaard Report in 
1981, the BRIC was not the conclusion of 60 years of efforts. Firstly, the BRIC lacks 
epidemiological and clinical cancer research and training in order to be “comprehensive”. At 
least, cancer epidemiology is not part of the centre’s scientific profile according to its 
homepage. Secondly, the centre is not a co-operation between the Danish Cancer Society and 
public institutes, as Engelbreth-Holm had hoped for, and it has not succeeded in coordinating 
the entire field of cancer research in the Copenhagen area as had been the purpose of the centre 
proposed by the Kjeldgaard Report. In its current form, the research units of the Society are still 
located at the Finsen grounds. But the centre is certainly a successful result of the utilisation of 
formal institutions (in the form of governmental priority of biotech research) to allocate more 
funds into research and to get new and better facilities for basic bio-research, as had been part of 
the purpose of establishing the cancer research centres since the Kjeldgaard Report, and which 
in a likeliness was the real appeal of the centre in the first place for the group of critical 
researchers. 
6.3 The Danish Cancer Society’s Research Centre 
When the Society decided to abandon the plans for a Finsen Park for both private and public 
cancer research groups in 1992, they instead established an internationally orientated cancer 
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centre for their own research and cancer education activities772. As mentioned in the above, the 
Society wanted to use some of the money set aside for the abandoned Finsen Park project to 
strengthen Danish cancer research. To this end, the cancer charity made a bold move by 
importing two entire research groups from Russia and the former Eastern Germany in order to 
bring much-needed molecular biological expertise and international standard to the Fibiger 
Laboratory773.  
The decision to import the research groups was made long before and independently of the 
collapse of the Finsen Park plans, however774. The newcomers conducted research within the 
fields of tumour biology, metastasis, and cell growths regulation and this fitted the profile of the 
Fibiger Institute perfectly775. The inclusion of the two research groups was part of a political 
strategy to increase the scientific quality of the Institute, and the management of the Society 
provided the two groups with ample funds so that they would not have to apply for more for 
several years to come. According to chairman Bent Harvald, the decision was the result of a 
daring science policy: 
At the moment there is much talk of science policy. The described process is in reality an 
example of bold science policy; a massive financial and staff-wise gamble. It is this 
gamble (with expenditures amounting to DKK 30-40 million) that is now paying off. A 
gamble; that would hardly have been risked by the public authorities, but was risked by a 
private organisation like the Cancer Society. It is of course too early to predict the long-
term consequences of the scientific progress that has already been made, but it is hoped 
that the research effort will rub off on and raise the bar for Danish cancer research in 
general.776 
The idea of importing the two research groups was criticised at the time, perhaps mostly because 
the distribution of Society funds from the collapsed Finsen plans was therefore not allowed to be 
influenced by the massive media campaign against the charity. But today, all of the cancer 
researchers interviewed for this thesis agree that the international groups actually helped 
strengthening Danish cancer research. Their research resulted in important findings and 
prestigious publications and helped place the Fibiger Institute on the map again by attracting 
more international visiting fellows. So despite the fact that the Society’s own cancer centre was 
                                                 
772 Press release from The Danish Cancer Society, February 26th 1992. Personal papers of Ole Bang, (Copenhagen).  
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no more comprehensive than the public Copenhagen Comprehensive Cancer Centre and the 
BRIC – and that the recommendation of the Kjeldgaard Report and the 50 year old dream of a 
comprehensive cancer centre was not realised to the letter – the BRIC and the private centre did 
strengthen Danish cancer research, and this was in fact one of the objectives of the Kjeldgaard 
Report of 1981.  The development proved to the cancer community that there were other ways 
of promoting and fortifying Danish cancer research than through the physical coordination in a 
single, joint State-private comprehensive cancer centre. As demonstrated throughout the 
previous chapters, some of the actors had tended to promote the centre as the only attractive 
organisational tool.  
Such alternatives were explored by the Society’s Scientific Council from 1996-1998. The 
Council wanted to chart the ways in which the charity could further strengthen Danish cancer 
research in the years to come. In particular, the Council wanted to find out if organisational 
changes would help the Society bridge the gap between basic and clinical cancer research. Ever 
since the oncology departments were moved from the Finsen area, the Society’s research units 
had been isolated from the clinical research departments and patient wards at the hospitals, and 
the Scientific Council now wanted to know how this could be changed777. Although 17 years 
had passed since the publication of the Kjeldgaard Report and its survey of Danish cancer 
research, some of its findings were still considered valid. For one, the Report had stated that the 
research performed at the Society’s research units was not as good as the research performed at 
the hospitals and universities, and ISAC-reports from the 1980s and 1990s confirmed that this 
was still true for the Society’s Fibiger Institute778. The import of the two Eastern European 
research groups was a successful strategy to overcome this problem, and by 1998 the Fibiger 
Institute delivered results of international standard. However, the Scientific Council wanted to 
make sure that the quality would be maintained in the future as well, and this demanded 
organisational changes.  
But although at least one of the problems identified by the Kjeldgaard Report was still relevant, 
its idea of the comprehensive cancer centre as a way of coordinating and strengthening Danish 
cancer research was not. At least, the Scientific Council now felt that this solution had been 
depleted by many years of conflicts over failed centre plans. For this reason, the centre concept 
was not even listed as an option in the Council’s final report in 1998. Instead, the Council 
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wanted to investigate alternative solutions and focused particularly on the question of whether or 
not the private Cancer Society should run its own research units in the future.  
As mentioned in the previous chapters, the Society had initially not wanted to operate its own 
research institutes as this was a costly thing to do, and because it clashed with the organisation’s 
ambition to spearhead Danish cancer research through grants-in-aid and pilot projects and to 
lobby for the public authorities to assume a greater financial responsibility for all cancer 
research activities in the country. But in the early 1980s, Ole Bang and the rest of the Society’s 
management became aware of the publicity value of running the units and making sure that the 
only fully cancer-orientated research institutes in the country were maintained which was 
necessary given that the State/National Board of Health did not seem eager to take over the 
institutes at the time. Still, advantages could only be derived from this if the research units 
continued to deliver quality work and avoided scientific isolation.  
According to the Scientific Council this could only be done if the units engaged themselves in 
improved and more intensive collaborations with the extramural publicly financed research 
groups at the universities and the hospitals779.  So if the comprehensive cancer centre was no 
longer an option to accommodate such a co-operation, what was? After lengthy discussions, the 
Council recommended that the Society’s units should be integrated at the universities. This had 
been suggested ever since Engelbreth-Holm and the Society placed the newly established 
Fibiger Laboratory at Copenhagen University, and the Kjeldgaard Report had repeated the 
recommendation as a precondition for the establishment of a comprehensive cancer centre. Due 
to what the Society regarded as financial inertia on the side of the Board of Health in the 1980s 
and early 1990s (the Ministry’s attempt to follow the governments plan of reducing the national 
debt by not engaging in costly projects that could be financed by others), nothing had been done 
about the matter. But with the new University Act of 1997, it was made possible for a private 
organisation to sponsor or finance an entire department or professorship at the universities780.  
In this way, the cancer charity would be relieved of expenses for costly apparatus, and at the 
same time it would be able to channel its funds directly into research projects. Furthermore, the 
new act made it possible for the Society’s financial engagement in the operation of the units to 
be gradually reduced or phased out within a trial period of 5-10 years781. It was even possible to 
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give the department a specific name such as The Cancer Society’s Research Department at 
Copenhagen University, so that the Society would be able to place its research units in the 
organisational framework of the University and still enjoy the publicity value of them. The 
Council also believed that a university-takeover of the units would make future collaborations 
between the country’s cancer researchers easier, as a majority of the groups and institutes would 
thus have an academic management. It had clearly not been forgotten that the issue of 
management had been the bone of contention in previous attempts to facilitate private-State 
collaborations, and it was hoped that the proposed managerial uniformity would make such 
disputes a thing of the past782. In fact, the Society’s Cancer Registry and the different units of 
the scattered Cancer Research Institute in Aarhus had already been taken over by the State and 
in some cases physically integrated in universities and hospitals after 1997783. All that was left 
was the Fibiger Institute, and the Council strongly recommended the management of the Society 
to hand over the reins of this institute as well. 
 However, it seems that only the integrations in Aarhus were successful, given that the State’s 
operation and research of the Cancer Registry was since greatly criticised by cancer researchers 
and the Danish Cancer Society - even in recent years. Perhaps this is not surprising, as the 
National Board of Health’s reluctant takeover of the important health institute had been on its 
way for more than 25 years, and that legal wrangling and restrictive financial policies made the 
Society fear that it could not hand over the reins to the State without drastically impairing the 
working conditions and research quality of the registry784.  
In a 2006 newspaper article, a group of cancer researchers expressed their fear that the quality 
and data of the Cancer Registry have been impaired since the institute was taken over by the 
National Board of Health in 1997785. At that time, the State agreed to finance 90% of the 
operating cost of the Registry and to implement a new electronic registration system which 
could coordinate all mortality, patient, and personal records in the country and thereby improve 
the epidemiological knowledge about cancer causation.  However, finding and implementing a 
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new system that was as reliable as the manual registration proved more difficult than expected, 
and as a result more than 165,000 unprocessed death certificates and reports of cancer 
incidences are now piled up in the National Board of Health with the result that the Cancer 
Registry is no longer up to date786.  
So 10 years after the State took over the Registry, cancer researchers now claimed that the 
constant delays of the electronic registration system rendered the epidemiological data from the 
highly esteemed cancer registry inaccurate, and that this has left Danish researchers without 
usable reference frames in their daily work. Several research projects (in e.g. the preventive 
effects of mammography, and an evaluation of the treatment modalities used against lung 
cancer) were put on hold because of the lack of accurate epidemiological data, as none of the 
researchers wanted to publish results based on “uncertain estimates”787.   
According to physician Mark Krasnik of the Danish Lung Cancer Group, the development was 
“a scandal, because the Registry is the basis of all that we can do. As early as 1997, we stated 
that it would be wrong to move the Registry, and all of our worst fears have become real since 
then. Political scientists in the National Board of Health do not understand what cancer is.”788 
The head of research of the Cancer Society, Jørgen Olsen, worried that the Board of Health 
would never be able to maintain the quality of the cancer registry, as it simply did not consider 
the lack of updates to be critical:  
The National Board of Health is used to making statistics that show the number of people 
inflicted with certain diseases, their age, gender, geographical distribution, and the need 
for treatment modalities in different regions. One can tolerate registries that are not totally 
accurate in this kind of statistics. But when one is investigating the cause of cancer in the 
individual patient, the different stages of disease, prognosis and more; the data must be 
precise. I am not sure that the National Board of Health is as fierce about this as we are, 
because they do not have that kind of research there.789 
In response to these allegations, the Board of Health’s Head of Office, Morten Hjulsager, stated 
that the board initiated several new registers each year, and that there was no reason to believe 
that the cancer field should be worse off than any of those; but while this was probably true and 
while it was understandable that the Board had to consider the needs of all medical fields, the 






The Cancer Centre That Never Was 
 
 341 
researchers claimed that they were witnessing the battleship of Danish cancer research turn over 
and sink790. 
Today, the Society still owns and operates the Fibiger Institute by itself. Although it is not 
within the scope of this thesis to describe and analyse the events and dealings regarding the 
State’s planned takeover of the research units or the Society’s current strategy for them, it can be 
concluded that the Scientific Council’s recommendation of giving the Society’s research units 
an academic management marked an important break with any possible reminiscence of the “die 
hard” idea of a private-public comprehensive cancer centre as the only organisational tool for 




“Such small things cannot cost big money” 
Cartoon in Naturens Verden791 
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6.4 Summary  
In a Bourdieuan/sociological perspective, the aftermath of the dissolved cancer centre path 
indicated the following relations: 
The critique made against the Society in the press was a result of a small group of public 
researchers’ and politicians’ successful efforts to undermine the economic capital and business 
logic of the private cancer charity by dragging it into a battle arena that made moral arguments 
and accusations fair game and provided the critics with a fierce tool to hit the charity where it 
was most vulnerable: its image.  
With this move, the critics used their cultural and social capital to secure influence on matters 
that went beyond the cancer charity’s dealings in the matter of the Finsen centre: the 
introduction of the loose concept of morality in the pursuit of the worthy anti-cancer cause made 
it fair game to question not only the Society’s moral obligation to establish a cancer centre at 
Finsen but also to debate the manner in which the organisation chose to spend its collected 
money in the war on cancer. Especially the money that should otherwise have been spent on the 
collapsed Finsen plans and was now free to be used on other (worthy) initiatives to strengthen 
Danish cancer research.  
But what was such an initiative, and who could decide whether or not it was worthy and thus 
reflected responsible behaviour on the part of the Cancer Society? The moral arena would make 
the dealings of the private charity a public matter, as the Society had a responsibility to the 
voluntary donors that provided the financial foundation of its war on cancer. And naturally, the 
small group of critical public researchers had an interest in influencing what initiatives to be 
supported, and influence was sought through the previously successful method of voicing their 
moral outrage in the press against the private organisation, its management and alleged cynical 
and improper business logic that guided its dealings in the war on cancer. In this way, the critics 
had secured leverage in the form of powerful social capital that went beyond the actual 
establishment of the centre which functioned merely as a tool in, an occasion for, or a symbol of 
the battle on capital going on the dynamic social field of the cancer community.  
Eventually the public’s third party enforcement in this battle reached a level that caused the 
Society’s director Ole Bang to resign from his post, because he and the private business logics 
he embodied was the prime target of the press-mediated criticism that resulted in financially 
damaging publicity for the Society (decrease in memberships, donations etc.). The critics had 
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won the battle, but as it turned out they had not won the war. The Society chose to spend the 
reserved money from the Finsen plans on importing two internationally renowned international 
research groups in order to strengthen cancer research at the Society’s own Fibiger Institute, and 
the private Society thus did not succumb to the pressure to allow others to dictate the how the 
money was to be spent. And with the money spent, the critics’ leverage against the Society was 
depleted of power. 
But even though the path of the comprehensive cancer centre had dissolved at the grand debate 
meeting in 1992, the idea as a tool to gain influence and wealth maximization (e.g. in the form 
of increased funding or improved lab facilities) had not completely died. It took on many 
different forms that bore very little resemblance to the original path during the 1990s and early 
2000s. New formal institutions in the form of governmental and industrial focus on applicable 
biotech research and new strict laboratory requirements for university research allowed public 
researchers and administrators to plan for a basic biotech centre (BRIC), which after years of 
political and legal wrangling and delays was established in 2003 and eventually provided the 
pressured public university researchers with better laboratory facilities and funding.  
Even though the BRIC was in no way comprehensive (it lacked clinical contact and 
epidemiological research), it was portrayed in the press as a realisation of the cancer centre, 
which the cancer community had been at each other’s throats about. And even though the BRIC 
was called a biotech centre, it may have contributed to a physical coordination and Lundgrenian 
“institutionalisation” of at least parts of the cancer research field – the basic university 
researchers – in the name of biotech. In any case, it provided them with better state funding and 
facilities which had been a purpose of the proposed cancer centres since the Kjeldgaard Report 
in 1981, and which had until now been impossible due to unfavourable formal institutions, no 
matter how hard the different plans and surveys’ rhetorical portrayal of unity (identity, 
collaboration etc.) in the cancer field had pressed for making cancer research in general a 
priority of the state.  
And the field of cancer research could hardly be scientifically described as unified or 
homogenous, as new insight in the biology of cancer seemed to give rise to more and more 
research vistas every day. There was no one or simple way to attack the very complex cancer 
problem in the laboratory. And by this logic there would be no one or simple science policy 
model – like the NASA model or the idea of the comprehensive cancer centre – to organise the 
attack by. A change in relative prices in the form of scientific progress had made the centre idea 
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obsolete. There could be no golden and comprehensive bullet. In stead, different set ups for 
different research strategies had emerged.  
In a path dependency perspective, the BRIC and the Society’s new research groups – both 
scientifically successes that have strengthened Danish cancer research in each their way – 
cannot be regarded as continuance of the cancer centre path begun by Engelbreth-Holm and 
Hartvig Frisch back in 1949. In other words, this path simply dissolved in 1992 at the grand 
debate meeting and through the hiring of the international research groups, as this depleted the 
centre concept of power as leverage against the Society, and the aftermath was not a logical 
continuance or diverting forks of the path.  The different private and public research initiatives 
were rather products of independent developments such as the Society’s long planned initiative 
to import research groups to the Fibiger Institute, or a new government’s financial priority of the 
biotech field. Other parallel paths, if you will. 
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Table 6.1: Gallery of key persons in chapter 6:  
Name: Institutional affiliation:  Summary of actions in chapter 6: 
Prof. MD Keld Danø Head of the Finsen Laboratory Was disappointed that the Finsen plans failed. Participated in 
the negotiation for a brick-less centre for the public cancer 
research groups in Copenhagen – the Copenhagen 
Comprehensive Cancer Centre. 
Prof. MD Mikael 
Rørth 
-The Oncology Department 5074, Rigshospitalet. 
 
-MRC member (1987-1991, chairman 1992-1994) 
Participated in the negotiation for a brick-less centre for the 
public cancer research groups in Copenhagen – the Copenhagen 
Comprehensive Cancer Centre. Stated that this plan was better 
than the Finsen plans as it included patient care and was owned 
and operated by State-held institutions. 
Arne Melchior Politician, (CD). Was critical of the Society’s management, contributed to 
negative press coverage until 1994. 
Ole Bang Director of the Cancer Society (1981-1994) - 
Prof MD Heine Høi 
Hansen 
-The Radium Station of Rigshospitalet 
- Member of the Society’s Scientific Council (1992/1993). 
-Chairman of the Danish Cancer Research Association 
Negotiator in the planning of the Copenhagen Comprehensive 
Cancer Centre 
Nis I. Nissen Rigshospitalet Negotiator in the planning of the Copenhagen Comprehensive 
Cancer Centre 
Major Consultant, 
MD, Jens Pedersen- 
Bjergaard 
-The Haematology-oncological chromosome laboratory Rigshospitalet. 
- Member of the Society’s Scientific Council (1989-1995). 

















Negotiator in the planning of the Copenhagen Comprehensive 
Cancer Centre 
Professor MD Jørgen 
Rygaard 
-The Bartholin Institute, Copenhagen Municipal Hospital. 
-Member of the Society’s Scientific Council (1997/98) 
Negotiator in the planning of the Copenhagen Comprehensive 
Cancer Centre and the BRIC. 
Dr. Jørgen Kieler Retired. Former Director of the Fibiger Institute, The Cancer Society.  Negotiator in the planning of the Copenhagen Comprehensive 
Cancer Centre 
Professor Thorkild I. 
A. Sørensen 
- MRC professor of clinical epidemiology, Danish Research Council, 
Copenhagen Health Services. (From 1991 at the Institute of Preventive 
Medicine. From 1993: Director of the institute) 
- Member of the Society’s Scientific Council (1991/1992) 
Negotiator in the planning of the BRIC 
Professor MD Lars 
Bolund 
-Geneticist, Aarhus University 
- Member of the Society’s Executive Committee 
- Member of the Society’s Head Board (from 1993). 
- Author of the Bolund Report on the organisation of the 
Society’s intramural research efforts (1998).  
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Mark Krasnik Danish Lung Cancer Group 2006: Critical of the way in which the National Board of Health 
operated the Danish Cancer Research (since the State takeover 
in 1997). 
Jørgen Olsen Head of Research, the Cancer Society.  2006: Critical of the way in which the National Board of Health 
operated the Danish Cancer Research (since the State takeover 
in 1997). 
Morten Hjulsager Head of Office in the National Board of Health 2006: Dismissed critique against the Board of Health inasmuch 
as the Board supported many research fields, and that nothing 
indicated that cancer research was particularly worse off than 
the other fields. 
Elisabeth Bock -Professor in Cell biology, The Protein laboratory, The Medical Faculty, 
Copenhagen University. 
- Member of the Society’s Scientific Council (1984-1991) 
 
Negotiator in the planning of the Copenhagen Comprehensive 
Cancer Centre and the BRIC. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusions and perspectives 
 
 
She always waited for me, a little piece away, and let on to be resting and 
greatly fatigued; which was a lie, but I believed it, for I still thought her 
honest long after I ought to have begun to doubt her, suspecting that this 
was no way for a high-minded bird to be acting. I followed, and followed, 
and followed, making my periodical rushes, and getting up and brushing 
the dust off, and resuming the voyage with patient confidence; indeed, with 
a confidence which grew, for I could see by the change of climate and 
vegetation that we were getting up into the high latitudes, and as she always 
looked a little more tired and a little more discouraged after each rush, I 
judged that I was safe to win, in the end, the competition being purely a 
matter of staying power and the advantage lying with me from the start 
because she was lame.792 
 
(Mark Twain: “Hunting the Deceitful Turkey”) 
 
This thesis has focused on how an idea of a public-private comprehensive cancer centre was 
central to the organisation of Danish cancer research for 43 years without ever amounting to an 
actual centre establishment. Consequently, the focus has been the demise of an idea rather than 
the realisation of one. This is condensed into three main questions: 
1) Why was the goal of building a public-private comprehensive cancer centre never 
reached? 
2) Why did 43 years pass before the idea of the centre was abandoned? 
3) And is it possible to answer these questions by merely seeing the matter as a succession 
of historical events, or should it be seen in the perspective of path dependence? 
Question 3 has to do with the theoretical frame of this thesis, and it has to be answered first as 
the answer will affect the answers to questions 1 and 2. 
In the introduction to this thesis, the conceptual frameworks of Douglass C. North and Pierre 
Bourdieu were presented as a possible approach to explaining the seemingly irrational 43 year 
long history of the idea of a Danish comprehensive cancer centre, which took a central stage in 
several decades of organising Danish cancer research; even though the idea had never paid off in 
the form of an actual, established centre and even though no evidence to the benefits of the 
centre was ever presented. A conceptual framework which, by looking at the history as a series 
                                                 
792 Twain, M. (1957). "Hunting The Deceitful Turkey". The Complete Short Stories of Mark Twain. C. Neider. 
New York, Doubleday & Company, Inc.. 
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of imperfect economic and social transactions guided by different sets of logics, capitals and 
restrictions (institutions), might lend more rational explanations to the 43 years of Danish 
dedication to an elusive idea of a comprehensive cancer centre – in the face of alternatives with 
better proof of concept – than would a traditional historical description of a straight forward 
succession of events and haphazard and seemingly irrational decisions. In other words, did path 
dependence occur and lend rationality to the history of the cancer centre that never was?   
The answer is yes; the development does indicate the occurrence of path dependence. And how? 
As mentioned in the introduction (chapter 1), economist Douglass C. North criticises neo-
classical economic theory for assuming the existence of perfect markets in which zero-cost 
transaction is carried through by bargaining parties fully informed about each other, the 
transaction and its possible implications. North does not subscribe to the theory of such perfect 
and self-correcting markets in which it is possible to always have sufficient information about 
the transaction and therefore make correct decisions or suffer negative feedbacks (in the form of 
high transaction costs) and thus logically correct a wrong choice. Instead, North subscribes to 
the existence of imperfect markets and insufficiently informed choices that lend explanation to 
why some economies, individuals or organisations continue to “get it wrong” and – in contrast 
to the zero-transaction-cost-model – lock in on a series of bad choices and persistently poorly 
performing strategies: path dependence.  
However, according to North, path dependence can only occur if such choices are made in the 
face of (better) alternatives. A path dependent development is thus not an inevitable result of 
historical progress or determinism, but one as the result of actors making deliberate choices 
between alternative solutions under the influence of complex institutional matrices. The story of 
the cancer centre that never was presents such alternatives at each step on the path, and the 
combined theoretical concepts of economist North and sociologist Pierre Bourdieu offers 
explanations to the constraints and logics that not only made dependence of a poorly performing 
path possible – but also rational – to the different groups of actors in this historical 
development. The following will illustrate and summarise the nature of this path and its demise 
in order to lay the foundation for answering the other two main questions of this thesis.  
When the actors of the history of the cancer centre that never was on the surface seemed to 
continue to “get it wrong” and go down an irrational path planning for a cancer centre that never 
came to be, it is actually because the story is not really about the cancer centre as the objective 
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of and means to strengthen Danish cancer research. No, it gradually turns into a story of the 
cancer centre as the means to obtain other non-centre related objectives that differed in nature 
for the many actors. That is, the story is about the concept’s transition from being a natural 
objective to being the means to an end: a tool.  
The concept was transformed from being a concrete plan for a cancer centre, as set forth loosely 
by Engelbreth-Holm in 1945 and established as a path through the setting of favourable formal 
institutions by Minister of Education Hartvig Frisch in 1949, to being a tool in the struggle for 
material or symbolic resources in the social field of the cancer community during the 1980s and 
1990s. So, although the path did never in the 43 years of its existence yield  pay offs in the form 
of an actual, established cancer centre and the desired coordination of Danish cancer research, 
the lock in on the path made sense as it paid off in other ways when the concept of the cancer 
centre was turned into a tool to obtain other objectives than an actual cancer centre: such as a 
group of researchers’ influence on the distribution of more State and/or private discretionary 
funds for (their) cancer research, making cancer research a priority of the State, a way of 
opposing the trend of New Public Management in the public hospital sector, and a cancer 
charity’s pursuit of a new investment strategy to secure wealth maximization and continued 
support of the anti-cancer cause. The fact that the idea of the cancer centre was only 
aggressively promoted in times of unfavourable formal institutions – and not in the era of unique 
State supported expansion of science, medicine and their respective organisations from the mid 
1950s to the early 1970s – supports this theory.  
Planning for different cancer centres for so many years in spite of the lack of success made 
sense for the actors inasmuch as the pay offs from staying on the path took on many other forms 
relating to the actors’ individual objectives and agendas. That is not, however, the same as 
saying that the path was successful, because the choices to continue planning for cancer centres 
rather than pursuing other alternatives with better proof of concept turned out to be rather costly 
for some of the actors – in the form of e.g. bad PR, dented reputations, decreasing charital 
contributions, a higner prize on the Finsen lot, and disappearing incentives for cross-
organisational collaboration. The alternatives presented along the path may have been less costly 
in time and money and would incidentally have been able to better serve the official objective of 
strengthening Danish cancer research. The following presents a short overview of the different 
steps along the way of the cancer centre path, the alternatives presented to the steps, and the 
transition of the cancer centre concept from an end to a means. 
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The cancer centre as the primary objective of the planning process: 
The inauguration of the Fibiger Lab 1949:  
Cancer researcher Engelbreth-Holm presented a scientifically motivated “comprehensive cancer 
centre” model inspired by American cancer centres in order to strengthen Danish cancer 
research and the anti-cancer cause in 1945. At this time, the complexity of the cancer problem 
was not fully understood, and a unified attack in the form of a comprehensive cancer centre 
must have made scientific sense. Formal institutions in favour of this proposal were set by 
Minister of Education Hartvig Frisch in 1949, as he made an unprecedented move of agreeing to 
a part State, part privately financed cancer institute with the potential to eventually expand into a 
comprehensive centre as proposed by Engelbreth-Holm.  
The move was unprecedented as the government’s financial policy at the time did not gravitate 
toward the support of science, but Frisch managed to carry through the motion because the 
establishment of a part privately financed strategic research institute with potential socio-
economic outputs in the form of better cancer treatment fitted the governmental policy 
(institutional matrix) through e.g. the promise of reduced public expenditures for treatment of 
cancer patients.  
However, the agreement was not observed due to different factors as e.g. the death of Frisch, 
and a consequently entirely privately financed realisation of the plan was continuously delayed 
or made impossible over the next 30 years due to building restrictions preventing the 
establishment of fitting buildings, and the move of the Finsen hospitals clinical departments. 
One may argue that such obstacles would hardly be insurmountable for the determined mind. If 
a cancer centre was really believed to promote better cancer research and treatment than the 
existing setup, one would be tempted to think that such an important societal contribution would 
not be stopped by the death of one man or by building restrictions. So perhaps the belief in and 
the drive behind a centre – unifying all aspects of the cancer fight – was not as comprehensive 
as its scientific scope. And why is that?  
In the 1950s, a new government and favourable economic conjunctures kick-started an era of 
excessive state investment in science, medicine and the establishment of hospitals and scientific 
institutes, that made a predominantly privately financed centre more superfluous inasmuch as 
both the public and the private research groups and clinics for such a centre were given good 
facilities at their respective institutes. That is, cancer researchers were given good facilities 
within the “mother” disciplines and specialities such as e.g. physiology and biochemistry. There 
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was no need to advocate for special terms and funds for the cross-disciplinary, un-
institutionalised, and umbrella-like cancer research. There was no need to change the formal 
institutions that had suddenly favoured scientific expansion from the 1950s and forth. The centre 
itself had served as a tool to change once unfavourable institutions for science in general back in 
the 1940s. In an institutional perspective, the path was created by the scientific vision of 
professor Engelbreth-Holm and the unprecedented move in 1949 by Minister Hartvig Frisch to 
co-support a private cancer charity in the establishment of a cancer centre in times of lacking 
governmental support for science. In other words, a cancer centre became a tool to change 
formal institutions.  
Cancer research was specifically favoured by this arrangement, not the traditional university-
based disciplines and specialities it springs from. In essence, this institutional change favoured a 
strategic scientific focus on cancer research, and on an organisational level this favoured the 
Danish Cancer Society and Copenhagen University who lend money and room, respectively, to 
the new organisation.  But shortly after the inauguration, Frisch passed away and took the State 
support with him as his government had never fully supported his initiative. That is, the formal 
institutions for a specific cancer centre changed and the expansion of the first instalment of the 
original plans stagnated.  
Shortly after, a new government created new formal institutions in favour of science in general – 
not cancer activities specifically – by investing heavily in new facilities for science and 
education as part of a strategy to boost Danish economy and competitive position. Inspired 
perhaps by post-war research policy trends from the US, the investments were not targeted at 
research most likely to yield industrially or medically applicable results, whereas the now 
stagnated cancer centre initiative had been promoted for its expected societal value of research 
based cancer treatments in times of strict governmental financial policy. During the 1950-1970-
period of newfound wealth in Danish science, the institutional matrix did not favour 
specialisation in cancer research, neither through the establishment of a cancer centre, nor 
through the “institutionalisation” of cancer activities as an independent university discipline or 
medical speciality, because the practitioners of cancer fighting activities were given good 
facilities and funding possibilities through their current disciplinary and organisational 
affiliation.  
There were no incitements to change this arrangement by promoting a cancer centre, even 
though it would have very well been the best time in the history of Danish science to ask for 
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public support for such a thing! And this is an important point. The formal institutions may have 
favoured a specialisation had the need for one been promoted, but it was not. At least not whole-
heartedly by others than the Cancer Society. The university and hospital researchers working on 
cancer problems apparently did not exhibit the need to invoke a special “cancer research” 
identity. One can thus argue that it was the informal institutions that were not in favour of the 
establishment. Still, the Danish Cancer Society upheld its ambition of creating a cancer centre 
through decades of different types of obstacles, as one might expect from an organisation 
dedicated to the anti-cancer cause and whose survival and powers were closely linked to public 
and private awareness of cancer research as an individual entity and the perpetuation of the now 
outdated formal institutions for State collaboration once created by Hartvig Frisch.  
Nevertheless, this institutional mis-match lend very little promise of success for the Society’s 
attempts to actualise the original vision of a comprehensive cancer centre, and when the Society 
finally equipped labs at the Finsen grounds in the 1970s, the small Finsen hospital and its 
clinical wards were moved to Rigshospitalet, and a comprehensive centre was no longer 
possible. The Society ended up with a research unit and bricks and mortar which was not in 
accord with the charity’s spearhead ambition to primarily support the anti-cancer cause through 
grants-in-aid.  
In the terminology of North, the Cancer Society employed an erroneous strategy to perpetuate 
the institutional matrix that had once been favourable towards its strategic aim and purpose, and 
it devoted resources to prevent any alteration that threatened its survival through this strategy. 
However, the Society’s aim to keep the centre dream alive (as it embodied the favourable 
institutions and State-collaboration the charity fought for) by financing it until the State would 
yet again support the original arrangement was a very risky and costly strategy for a modest 
charity whose only income consisted in voluntary contributions from the man on the street. A 
later lack of support from the cancer researchers thwarted the Society’s efforts to utilize the 
institutional matrix surrounding the state financed scientific expansion in 1950-1970, as the 
researchers’ tastes and preferences did not gravitate towards a specific cancer centre at the time.  
In this respect, the Cancer Society was the one to stay on the path of the cancer centre during the 
era of expansion. The one party that did not correct its erroneous strategy in the face of 
institutional mismatch. The reason for this was that while a centre was never established, the 
Society linked the plans with positive PR for the organisation. One can only speculate if the PR 
gains to be made financially outweighed the costs of pursuing the centre dream and operating 
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research units as part thereof. Had the charity been a business in a competitive market, its 
strategy may have been changed faster. But it was a foundation depending on voluntary 
contributions from the public (mostly oblivious to the strategic elements of cancer research 
organisation) and not on traditional trading. It was not corrected by the market or its 
contributors. 
Alternative:  
1. The Society could have chosen to strengthen cancer research through support of 
the research at the private Fibiger lab at its intermediate location in Lyngby, 
which was favoured over the prospects of a cancer centre at the Finsen grounds 
by the charity’s own researchers. 
2. The Society could have chosen to channel its funding into the existing cancer 
related research environnements at the universities and the hospitals and thereby 
act in concert with the State-dictated formal institutions (the science push model 
as promoted by Vannevar Bush) and informal institutions by public scientists and 
medical researchers, who either intendedly or unintendly supported this basic 
science approach to problem solving (including the cancer problem) in times of 
superfluous State support and scientific expansion.  
 
The cancer centre concept as a tool to obtain other objectives: 
a) The Kjeldgaard Report of 1981: The era of almost unlimited State support for science 
and medicine came to an end in the early 1970s and a subsequent financial recession 
resulted in restrictive national financial policy with the purpose of zero-growth of public 
expenditures in the Danish hospital sector. In other words, unfavourable formal 
institutions for both science and medicine in general and for cancer research and the 
centre dream. Nevertheless, a survey report on cancer research initiated by the State’s 
Natural Science Research Council revived the idea of a cancer centre by recommending 
that a series of comprehensive cancer centres be set up in connection with the country’s 
medical faculties.  
The recommendation was one out of many that all had the purpose of making cancer 
research a (special) priority of the State and thus secure better funding, new facilities and 
subsequently status for the field. It is important to note that although “cancer research” is 
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an umbrella-like name for a very heterogeneous range of basic and clinical research 
activities with often little common ground, the Report used the undiversified rhetoric to 
signal unity and thus the potential of fruitful cross-collaboration which could bring about 
the supposed socio-economic benefits from bridging the gap between bench and bedside: 
applied research = better cancer treatments = less public expenditures. This line of 
arguments was used as selling points to the politicians in order to secure better State 
funding for cancer research. And this is a markedly different research policy than the 
science-push model of the era of scientific expansion. Targeted research to solve societal 
problems like the cancer scourge.  
A recommendation of a public-private comprehensive cancer centre was made despite 
the fact that the Report’s statistical material concluded that peer-reviewed and grants-in-
aid funded research at public research institutes (not primarily dedicated to cancer 
research in specific) delivered better research than that at the private research units of the 
Cancer Society, and that channeling funds into a physical centre would not necessarily 
be the right way to strengthen Danish cancer research (chapter 3). However, this point 
was never made in the Report and it was ignored by both public researchers and the 
Danish Cancer Society who supported the official recommendations of a centre in order 
to secure better funding for cancer research, better public lab facilities, and a State 
takeover of the Society’s research units (because the operation of research units was not 
then considered an optimal use of the Society’s scarce funds).  
In an institutional perspective, this was the Society acting in accordance with its 
organisational need to re-actualise the formal institutions set by Hartvig Frisch in 1949 
for state-collaboration on the anti-cancer cause. A perpetuation of the institutional matrix 
that was in sync with the Society’s strategic research policy and spearhead ambition to 
hand off its initiatives to the State. Again, it seems that the end of an era of State 
supported scientific expansion had left Danish researchers without as favourable terms 
(formal institutions) as before. The notion of promoting special terms for the umbrella-
like “cancer research field” emerges in this context in the form of a recommendation of a 
new organisational setup and new funding needs in addition to the existing research 
environments and funding thereof.  
The Report proposed a centralising comprehensive cancer centre which had not received 
overwhelmingly enthustiastic backing during the time of scientific expansion and which 
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was now in the 1980s not supported by statistical evidence of its virtue. It seems that the 
need for unifying and centralising the very heterogenous cancer fighting efforts – 
physically, institutionally and terminologically – is a phenomenon closely linked to 
times of scarce funding and unfavourable formal institutions towards a broader science 
push policy. That is, the centre and a unified front for the broad scope of cancer fighting 
activities (that assumably held great value for society in the fight against cancer) became 
a strategy to appeal for public support and State funding for something “worthy” and 
“additional” to the existing system. A strategy that possibly held more potential than 
appealing for more funding for the existing setup of non cancer specific university 
disciplines and medical specialities that may not have held special public appeal or 
societal promise.  
In an institutional perspective, the Report embodied a reaction to the State-dictated 
change of formal institutions in the form of restrictive financial policies, altered research 
policy and dramatic cutbacks in science funding. It embodied a change in the informal 
institutions created by the organisations (universities, hospitals etc.) and the affiliated 
researchers inasmuch as rhetorics of a unified cancer field was suddenly emphasised and 
plans for a cancer centre were proposed. With this change, the organisations and their 
individual stakeholders (the public researchers working on cancer problems) were 
suddenly working in institutional accord with the Danish Cancer Society who, as 
mentioned in the above, had worked for a centre during the scientific expansion even in 
the face of the unfavourable informal institutions created by the former group. The path 
of the cancer centre suddenly received wide support from the cancer community for 
different reasons and was re-actualised through the creation of common informal 
institutions to challenge the new State-dictated formal institutions. It was a matter of 
actors regrouping to counteract the institutional changes that could threathen their 
continued existence.  
Alternative: The Report’s own data implied that Danish cancer research could be 
strengthened through increased public and private grants-in-aid to peer-reviewed 
research. This piece of statistical data was ignored by the authors and most recipients of 
the Report, which favoured the idea of a comprehensive cancer centre. An idea that was 
supported by the researchers’ subjective opinions rather than actual statistical data. The 
path was thus re-actualised.  
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b) The Rockefeller Centre (1984-1986):  
The centre-recommendation of the Kjeldgaard Report was continued in a MRC-led 
planning group of representatives from the public and private organisations in the cancer 
community, which was given a mandate by the Minister of Education to plan for a 
cancer centre at the Rockefeller building at Rigshospitalet. The green light for planning 
was given, however, on the one condition that no additional funding would be needed for 
the establishment of the centre. This condition was in accordance with the government’s 
policy of keeping the growth of public expenditures at a minimum, which meant that 
investments in new centres, hospitals. were not top priority. Not withstanding this policy, 
the MRC planning group proposed a comprehensive cancer centre to which the State had 
to contribute funds for the modernisation and equipment of new laboratory facilities in 
the Rockefeller building: a blatant attempt to secure additional State support for better 
lab facilities which most public cancer researchers were in need of as their current labs 
were getting worn-down and needed new and expensive apparatus to keep up with the 
developments of cancer research. And this could not easily be obtained through the basic 
budgets of the hospitals or the universities.  
The planning continued without any security of this additional State support – which the 
Minister had not yet approved and which the formal institutions worked against. A 
centre would most likely have to be established for the funds already allocated to cancer 
research through the public basic budgets of Rigshospitalet and the University, the basic 
budgets of the private Cancer Society’s research units, and through grants-in-aid from 
the State’s research councils and the Society’s Scientific Council. A zero-sum game. In 
other words, only if the MRC-led planning group managed to do what the Kjeldgaard 
Report had not been able to and change the formal institutions to make cancer research 
and a cancer centre special financial priorities of the State, would the centre hold any 
value for the planning parties as a means to secure additional State funding to the field.  
The centre supposedly held scientific value if, in fact, there was proof of concept that a 
comprehensive cancer centre was a good way of coordinating Danish cancer research 
and bridging the gap between the heterogeneous lines of cancer research. But although 
the final MRC report on the Rockefeller model used the same simplified rhetoric of unity 
in the field as the Kjeldgaard Report had done, the MRC report did not focus on 
identifying a specific unifying research program to bring about these outputs that would 
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justify the establishment of a centre in the first place. The lack of focus on content 
reflected how difficult it would actually be to prioritise between the many lines of 
research through the identification of a common program, as this move would inevitably 
lead to the exclusion of some aspects and research groups. A potential conflict was 
brewing.  
The planning parties preferred to discuss a potential centre’s managerial model rather 
than its content. The international (American) experiences with planning for cancer 
centres in the 1970s had otherwise been to firstly identify content and secondly form in 
order to lay the foundation of a viable and successful centre. The lack of focus on the 
content of the proposed Rockefeller centre indicates that a coordinating comprehensive 
cancer centre was not so much planned for its scientific virtues as it was planned as a 
tool to try to make cancer research a priority of the State by the means of increased State 
funding and through a State takeover of the Cancer Society’s research units – however 
unlikely this would seem under the current formal institutions.  
Meanwhile, an economist entered the private Cancer Society as its director, and due to 
his business logic, skills and the public dissatisfaction with the government’s strict 
financial prioritising within the health care sector (informal institutions in the form of the 
taste and preferences of the public), the private cancer charity managed to increase its 
income through aggressive fundraising, increased number of memberships and private 
donations, and through a series of new business-inspired strategies to protect the 
charity’s capital against the inflationary pressure of the 1980s economy. The private 
Cancer Society underwent a transformation from being a modest charity with limited 
funds and power to support the anti-cancer cause (and therefore being dependent on the 
Rockefeller centre as a tool to try to change the formal institutions towards more State 
involvement in the cause) into being a modern corporate charity with substantial funds 
(economic capital) which made it very powerful as the major funding body of the cancer 
community.  
The economic capital became symbolic capital of the social field of the cancer 
community. And with the transformation, the Society’s strategy and goals changed as 
well. The institutional matrix (governmental strict financial policy, the goodwill of the 
public) thus did not point to the Rockefeller centre as the tool to best serve the anti-
cancer cause. The matrix had already rewarded the Society for sticking to another 
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business inspired strategy in the form of increasing returns: public goodwill and 
donations. Instead of aiming at an unlikely State takeover of the Society’s research units 
during times of recession, the Society learned that its research units held PR value that 
could increase the success of its fundraising activities. Also, the investment in bricks and 
mortar that the Society had previously regarded as unfavourable to the anti-cancer cause 
(as it tied up money that could otherwise have been used directly on research through 
grants-in-aid) was now seen as a safe way of protecting the Society’s capital against 
unstable economic conditions so that the anti-cancer cause would continuously have 
funds for the years to come, even though the voluntary contributions should suddenly 
come to an end. This had also been the case in the 1970s but now the organisation had 
the professional management to execute such a strategy correctly. The institutional 
matrix therefore pointed to a continuance of the Society’s investment strategy and to a 
defection from the Rockefeller plans, and the Society defected with the official 
explanation that the scientific expansion of its research units could not be accommodated 
by the Rockefeller plans. With the Society’s defection, the plans were not pursued.  
In an institutional perspective, the concept of a cancer centre became the turning point of 
a multilevel interaction between different layers of institutions. It became the never-
intended-to-materialize means to promote change instead of the natural end of the 
efforts. On a global level, a financial crisis influenced the national level at which the 
Danish government strived to formulate strict financial policy and research policies that 
changed the formal institutions towards less favourable conditions for actors on the 
organisational level. Here, different organisations either changed informal institutions in 
the form of strategies that would help them secure funding for their research 
areas/organisations (the University, the hospitals) by challenging the formal institutions 
that threathen their existence, or they simply maintained slightly out of sync-strategies 
from before (the Danish Cancer Society). At the time of the Kjeldgaard Report, these 
strategies were momentarily united in the plans for a cancer centre using unifying 
rhetorics about scientific scope and value of cancer research and the research groups 
across the different organisations in the field. A rhetorical trick used by early molecular 
biologists (like the author of the Kjeldgaard Report) from the 1930s and onwards in 
order to make molecular biology an independent scientific discipline with independent 
 
The Cancer Centre That Never Was 
 
 359 
budgets at universities world wide793. However the common front to use the idea of a 
centre reflected many different strategies, agendas and scientific scopes: an internal 
mismatch of informal institutions that would make the centre plans difficult to begin 
with. As new actors on the individual level brought with them new competences and 
tastes and preferences, this level influenced the organisational level as well (e.g. Ole 
Bang’s managerial style and the Society’s subsequent shift of strategy to utilise existing 
national and global level institutions).  
Alternative: The minority model of the MRC-report, which suggested a patent-financed 
biotech centre in accord with the formal institutions of the time. A centre that, by 
choosing to focus on biotech, may have had a much broader scientific scope and which 
discarded the idea of a comprehensive cancer centre, but which would have been more 
likely to bring about State-funding for at least some cancer research groups through 
already existing State biotech programs, as biotech was already a financial priority of the 
State, e.g. the formal institutions supported this model. “Biotech” is a unifying term, but 
unlike “cancer” it is somehow wider in scientific scope, as researchers can work on 
many different themes and diseases. Although cancer is a common term for over 200 
diseases, each with their natural history, “biotech” is still wider as it refers to a 
technological and methodological approach rather than a diasease-specific and lends 
more freedom to its researchers as it does not come with the same inherent public 
expectation of the researchers benefitting from each other and having direct synergy as 
with “cancer research”. The biotech alternative was not considered interesting by the 
majority of the planning group, though, and the path for a cancer centre was perpetuated 
despite the lack of proof for the plan’s benefits for cancer research as neither a scientific 
centre nor a tool to secure more State funding. 
c) The sale of the Finsen campus and the proposal of a Finsen centre (1986-1992) 
When the Society defected from the Rockefeller plans in 1986, the decision evoked 
anger amongst the immediate planning parties, but it did not result in a broader public 
critique of the private cancer charity. The charity’s participation in the Rockefeller centre 
would have been costly, as the charity’s research units would have to be moved from 
their current locations and into new and fitted laboratories. In this way, the plans 
                                                 
793 Nielsen, A. K. and M. L. Thomsen (2006a). "I det biokemiske og molekylærbiologiske spændingsfelt". Viden 
uden grænser 1920-1970. H. Nielsen and K. H. Nielsen. Aarhus, Aarhus Universitetsforlag: 183-200 
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equalled a financial transaction for the charity. But this transaction was never legally and 
contractually enforced in the sense of neo-classic economy, and there was thus nothing 
to hinder the Society’s defection. That is, except for the social aspects of the transaction.  
The charity was widely dependent on its image in the public eye, and the defection 
would only be costless if the Society’s image remained squeaky clean, and the public 
believed the charity to serve the best interest of the anti-cancer cause with the defection. 
The fact that the disgruntled planning parties did not question this matter publicly after 
the defection indicates that the Society’s wealth equalled symbolic capital and power in 
the cancer community. The Society’s plans to carry out its new investment strategy by 
buying the Finsen campus and establishing a privately led and financed cancer centre 
there – with public research groups as tenants only – led to the proposal of what was 
later called the Finsen centre. A centre that was not comprehensive as it was removed 
from the clinical hospital department and the medical faculty at the Rockefeller location. 
A centre that, for this reason, could not coordinate all clinical and basic aspects of cancer 
research as had been the original sales-pitch argument to the State in the Kjeldgaard 
Report and the MRC-report. Still, the original planning parties from the Rockefeller 
plans continued negotiating for a Finsen centre despite its lack of clinical content and 
ability to coordinate Copenhagen cancer research in general.  
And yet again, the negotiations were on form (management models) rather than on 
scientific content, and this supports the thesis that the centre was not in itself the primary 
objective to all of the planners, it was a tool to 1) realise the Society’s investment 
strategy, or 2) to ensure additional funding and better lab facilities for some public 
research groups. Seeing that the Society was now the major funding body and power 
broker of the cancer community compared with the State’s research councils (see figure 
4.1 and 4.2 of chapter 4), the tool was now used against the Society and not the State in 
order to follow the money.  
In an institutional perspective, the Society’s strategy was now somewhat out of sync 
with the informal institutions created by the organisational and individual levels of the 
planning parties, but it was not hindered by the formal institutions set by the 
government’s economical policy and research policy or the opportunities created by the 
1980s economy. However, the establishment of the centre and the realisation of the 
Society’s investment strategy depended on a State sale of the Finsen campus to the 
 
The Cancer Centre That Never Was 
 
 361 
cancer charity, and the State was therefore still an active player in the story of the cancer 
centre.  In its attempts to purchase the Finsen property at the lowest possible price, the 
Society used the press to voice moral arguments (informal institutions in the form of 
public taste and preferences) to make the government use a special exemption clause that 
allowed the government to sell the lot to a single party with a special worthy cause for 
buying. That is, a clause that could prevent the Society from having to bid for the lot in 
open tender in direct competition with other interested parties and buy it at a presumable 
much higher price, which would otherwise have been in the interest of the government 
who’s policy was to privatise the public sector or to make it act in accordance with 
market principles to ensure efficient operation and competition.  
The Society’s use of moral arguments to push for a sale via the exemption clause proved 
to be a can of worms for the private charity, as it irreversibly linked a purchase of the 
Finsen campus with a moral obligation to establish a cancer centre. And not just any 
cancer centre the private charity could think of. No, it had to be a privately financed 
cancer centre in which public researchers were given equal influence. This was not in the 
interest of the Society that stood to lose influence of its tool and funds, and the public 
planning parties jumped at the chance to use this linkage as leverage against the charity 
to ensure such influence.  
And this time around these public planning parties used the press and the public as third 
party enforcement to pressure the Society to establish a centre. After lengthy press-
covered debates on the matter, the Society eventually opted to buy the property without 
the use of the exemption clause (and thus no legal obligation to establish a centre), but 
by that time the moral linkage between sale and centre was so firmly established in the 
minds of the public through the critical press coverage and the actions of a small group 
of public researchers and politicians that any attempt to justify the Society’s choices (as 
guided by business logic of the DJØF professional group) was drowned by the voices, 
medical & scientific logic, and deontological moral arguments of its critics. In other 
words; informal instutions as rationalities worked against the Society. The economic 
capital of the Society was undermined in the social field of the cancer community, in 
which the social and cultural capital of the public researchers was now instated as 
predominant currency by the public opinion (in the form of decreasing donations, figure 
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4.1, chapter 4), and the centre plans were now used as tools to discuss the morality of the 
Society in general and influence its funding practices.  
In a final attempt to dismantle the moral debates and bring focus on what should have 
been the real crux of the matter – cancer research in a proposed centre – a grand debate 
meeting between all Danish cancer researchers was set up by the Society in early 1992. 
Here a majority of all Danish cancer researchers rejected the Finsen plans, as attention 
was finally brought to the matter of its inferior/lacking scientific content. The content-
less set-up of the centre proposal was considered anachronistic to modern Danish cancer 
research that, as years had passed, was no longer as financially pressed as in the early 
1980s with regards to housing and facilities, and which no longer naturally subscribed to 
shared housing as the only means of coordination and cross-collaboration. Also, it was 
argued that scientific breakthroughs of uncovering the oncogene paradigm (a change of 
relative prices) and increasing computational power had changed the nature of cross-
disciplinary collaboration making a centre of bricks and mortar an outdated facilitator of 
this type of collaboration.  The majority agreed that the money allocated for the proposed 
centre could be used to strengthen Danish cancer research in other – as of yet 
unidentified – ways. The 6 year old plan was therefore revealed as a content-less power 
prop, and the path of the cancer centre dissolved with no identified alternative paths to 
follow.  
In an institutional perspective, the Cancer Society was skilled in utilizing the 
possibilities for economic growth made possible by the institutional matrix where the 
State’s cutbacks on health services and research (formal institutions) gave rise to a 
change in the public’s taste and preferences favouring the private cancer charity’s 
worthy activities (informal institutions). But when it pushed the envelope to far, the 
informal institutions were affected by orchestrated media campaigns and backfired for 
the cancer charity. Finally, the debate meeting buried the centre plans with a reference to 
the fact that all relevant inhabitants of a centre now had better facilities than they did at 
the start of the planning process in the 1980s. Again, the need for a unifying centre and 
rhetorics was subdued in the face of other funding possibilities. The only purpose the 
centre-concept could now have for the public researchers, who had worked to turn the 
public attention towards the supposedly shady dealings of the Cancer Society, would be 
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a means to get some moral influence on the use of the Society money reserved for the 
centre.  
d) The aftermath (1992-): The use of the money reserved for a Finsen centre became a bone 
of contention between the private cancer charity and its publicly employed critics. 
Again, these critics used the press to voice their points of view, and this hurt the image 
and earnings of the charity (see figure 4.1, chapter 4) during and after the negotiations 
for the Finsen centre. A logical use of the money could have been what the Kjeldgaard 
Report’s statistics had (unwillingly) pointed to in 1981, namely peer-reviewed grants-in-
aid that seemed to yield research with the most international impact (see figure 3.2, 
chapter 3). Instead, the Society chose to continue its longstanding plan of improving the 
research quality at its own research unit, the Fibiger Institute, by importing and financing 
two eastern European research groups of great international standing in order to 
strengthen its own strategy and research based war on cancer (better private research, 
better publicity).  
In this perspective, a cancer centre was no longer needed as a pretext or a tool to carry 
out the Society’s strategies to serve the anti-cancer cause optimally. As for the charity’s 
public critics, the centre was no longer a necessary tool or occasion for them either, as 
their success in setting new rules and securing power in the social field (the moral arena) 
had allowed them to attack the Society’s internal funding practices and the moral fibre of 
it director through the press even without the centre as focal point.  
But although this strategy hit the Society financially and image wise, the charity did not 
succumb to the pressure in the matter of the use of the reserved money. The leverage of 
the tool thus lost value against the Society, although it did result in the resignation of the 
Society’s director who had been the main target of the press-mediated criticism.  
The centre concept resurfaced in two public initiatives, though they bore no resemblance 
with the original dream or path other than by name and press-rhetorics: the Copenhagen 
Comprehensive Cancer Centre and the Biotech Research Innovation Centre (BRIC). 
These initiatives were marketed as realisations of the original centre dream in spite of a 
lack of definition correlation between these and the original cancer centre dream (there 
was nothing comprehensive about the two). The concept and history of the cancer centre 
path was used as a way to make the State secure better facilities and funding for cancer 
 
The Cancer Centre That Never Was 
 
 364 
research in times of – yet again – unfavourable institutional constraints, as new and 
restricted work environment legislation had suddenly made many public research labs 
unable to be up to code. While the former network-based initiative never managed to 
secure State funding, the latter (BRIC) enjoyed more favourable institutions in the form 
of a governmental priority of the biotech field, which allowed the centre to be planned 
although financing arrived only much later in 2003.  
It was a centre that bore remarkable resemblance with the basic idea of the 1984 MRC-
report’s minority model of a biotech centre, inasmuch as the BRIC prioritised content 
(basic biotech focus on cancer and diseases of the central nervous system) and employed 
a patent-based financing model and established strong links to the Danish biotech 
industry. Through the BRIC, many cancer researchers have obtained better facilities as 
was one of the objectives of establishing a cancer centre in the 1980s and 1990s. 
However, this was achieved only under a headline with more political power and 
attraction and less conflicting scientific content than “comprehensive cancer research”, 
namely “basic biotech”.  
In conclusion, the history of the cancer centre that never was can be explained more nuancedly 
than just a succession of historical events through the perspective of path dependence. As has 
been shown in the previous chapters, the development fits the path dependence criteria as set 
forth by Douglass C. North, as there were real and perhaps better alternatives to the path along 
the way. The reason why these alternatives were not followed would at first sight seem 
irrational, but by using the theoretical concepts of North and Bourdieu, it has been revealed in 
the previous five chapters how the centre plans were never just about establishing a centre; the 
plans were tools to obtain different and sometimes opposing objectives of the planning parties.  
North has provided economical concepts to show how a pursuit of these objectives was made 
possible or impossible by different constraints (institutional matrices) and has thus provided 
some measure of “meaning” or rationality of the actors’ choices in terms of what they gained 
from following an otherwise irrational path with no payoffs in the form of an actual centre. 
Bourdieu’s concepts of dynamic social fields, forms of capital and professional logics fits well 
with North’s institutional perspective and offers an explanation to how a small group of public 
researchers could possibly undermine the Society – a major power broker in the cancer 
community – by dragging it into a moral arena. That is, how the “human factor” of insufficiently 
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informed transactions led to power struggles affecting the sometimes unpredictable informal 
institutions and thus the actors’ pursuit of conflicting objectives. Or in other words; how the 
story of the cancer centre was not a single level problem with a single level explanation (e.g. 
State-dictated formal institutions in the form of lack of funding undermined the centre), but on 
the contrary it would seem that everchanging informal institutions played a much bigger role in 
the the matter across the boundaries between different organisations and individuals.  
Together, the conceptual frameworks of these theoreticians have revealed the cancer centre 
concept as a tool rather than a primary objective; as a power prop depleted of scientific content, 
which is the reason why the alternatives to the path were not followed and which is why the path 
eventually dissolved when the prop was stripped of its power.  
Up until the sale of the Finsen grounds, the path was perpetuated by the Danish Cancer Society. 
And why?: 
a) From the 1949 – 1981: The Society was an oldfashioned physician-operated fund, whose 
spearhead ambition of supporting initiatives and making them a state responsibility was 
awarded with the unprecedented State co-support for the Fibiger Lab in 1949. Even 
though this support did not survive the death of its creator, Minister Hartvig Frisch, the 
Cancer Society kept the idea alive, even though the formal institutions no longer 
favoured it. It employed an erroneous strategy out of sync with the institutional matrix 
even during the scientific expansion 1950-1970, where it was not the formal but the 
informal constraints (in the form of lack of researchers backing the centre plans) that 
hindered the organisation in realising a quite costly dream for modest charity to carry 
through on its own. According to neo-classical economical theory, the decision to 
continue down the path inspite of unfavourable institutions should have resulted in a 
market punishment and correction of the action. It did not. The path continued. Perhaps 
because a charity in itself depended more on informal institutions (the publics 
contributions and goodwill) than on formal ones and market efficiency. At least, this 
may have been true back then.  
b) 1981-1986: The proposed Rockefeller centre would serve the Society’s cause and 
strategy for handing over its research units to the State. 
c) 1986-1992: The Society gained power, wealth and new business competences and 
shifted strategy regarding its research units and capital protection and wanted to use the 
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centre concept as a pretext to acquiring the Finsen grounds to fulfil the strategies. 
Therefore, it stayed on the path. Parallelly to this, public researchers used the now 
scientifically deployed centre plans as leverage against the Society to gain influence on 
the use of its funds. For this reason, they stayed on the path though none of the paties 
find the centre plan’s scientific content favourable for the official purpose of it all: 
coordinating the Copenhagen area cancer research. Once the Society had bought the 
Finsen campus, it had no further use for the dream of the cancer centre as a power prop 
and could benefit from bringing attention to its lack of content through the grand debate 
meeting at which the centre dreams were laid to rest. This fitted the Society’s strategy 
well, as it wanted off the path of the cancer centre. 
In essence, the centre became a tool to fulfil changing and often conflicting agendas that had 
very little to do with the centre concept itself. A path was perpetuated, and even when the 
Cancer Society no longer needed the tool (1991/92), others picked it up and momentarily 
prevented the Society from getting off the path even though it wanted to, until the cancer charity 
put a stop to all leverage against it by using its funds to import two Eastern European research 
teams, thereby stripping the prop of its power as leverage. And although the power prop was 
aired again, the aftermath of the history did not provide a continuance of the dissolved path, as it 
was now used against the State to appeal for funds, not against the Society who was no longer 
vulnerable to it.  Also, the proposed centres were not form or content-wise in accordance with 
the original definition of a comprehensive cancer centre.  
Only one of the centres was established, as a biotech centre, because it played into favourable 
formal institutions that prioritised the biotech field, rather than using the battered concept of a 
cancer centre to change formal institutions and make cancer research a State priority. Perhaps it 
was easier to create a centre research program under wider scientific scope of the term 
“biotechnology” which denominates a shared set of methodological approaches to very 
heterogenous research objects, than in the failed cancer centres. In a BRIC centre, the matter of 
“content” would therefore not be as controversial, and a match of formal and informal 
institutions favouring the establishment was more likely from the beginning.   
And this leads us to the answering of the two other main questions of this thesis: 
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1) Why was the goal of building a public-private comprehensive cancer centre never 
reached? 
The short answer is that if the centre ever had a chance, it was in 1949 when the idea managed 
to change formal institutions in the form of unprecedented State support from Minister of 
Education Hartvig Frisch – inspite of a restrictive research support policy in his government. 
However, the centre was not completed for various reasons following this event: initial 
unfavourable formal institutions after the death of Minister of Education Hartvig Frisch, a lack 
of aggressive promotion of the centre in the 1950-1970 era that provided formal institutions for 
unprecedented medical and scientific expansion at the public universities and hospitals (which 
therefore reduced the public need of private funds from the Society and a private-public centre 
solely dedicated to cancer), building restrictions and a move of the Finsen hospital in the 1970s 
which impeded the Cancer Society’s attempts to establish a centre on its own.  
In the era of sufficient support for basic research in all its variety (a science push policy), there 
was no need amongst the researchers dealing with cancer problems to unite and plee for special 
terms, as they were given satisfying workings conditions in the non-cancer specific departments, 
disciplines and specialities to which they were affiliated. The transaction costs for orchestrating 
cancer research as a unified field with a seperat budget and physical frames on a par with the 
university disciplines and medical specialities it springs from may have been too high 
considering the potential difficulties agreeing on a common scientific scope of such an 
arrangement for the extremely heterogenous cancer field. Informal institutions in the form of the 
researchers’ tastes and preferences therefore worked against the centre. When funding once 
again became a major issue after the first and the second oil crisis (and corresponding 
unfavourable formal institutions in the form of strict State research funding policies), the need to 
promote cancer research as a unified and especially deserving field arose. A rhetoric that seems 
to be heavily dependent on the flux of the nation’s financial- and research policies. 
 However, the attempt of different individuals and organisations in the cancer field to change 
formal institutions backfired, as the united front in reality consisted of conflicting agendas, 
rationalities/logics and scientific scopes. It was an internal institutional mismatch with little 
promise of success, and the centre plan became a tool to serve conflicting agendas of the 
planning parties rather than a shared objective embodying scientific coordination in the cancer 
field. When the Society finally dismantled the tool, the concept of a cancer centre had lost both 
relevance and power, and the path dissolved.   
 
The Cancer Centre That Never Was 
 
 368 
2) Why did 43 years have to pass before the idea of the centre was abandoned? 
From the theoretical perspective of this thesis, the answer to this question is as follows: The path 
of the cancer centre may, on the surface, seem irrational because it never paid off in the form of 
an actual cancer centre. However, by employing the concepts of North and Bourdieu it seems 
that the path paid off in different ways and on different levels than through the establishment of 
an actual centre, because the involved actors had other objectives and reasons for supporting a 
cancer centre than what was formally presented as the primary objective: the scientific 
coordination of cancer research in Copenhagen. And as these objectives were either reached or 
finally given up due to (institutional) change in the original premises for promoting a centre, the 
centre concept had outplayed its role, use and value to all. The fact that the battle to obtain these 
different and often conflicting objectives were played out in a moral arena kept the actors 
locked-in on the path for a very long time, as they each displayed different logics and types of 
ethical arguments that could not easily lead to compromises.  
So in short, unfavourable institutions in the form of an unobserved agreement between the State 
and the Society in the 1950s, a lack of active promotion and interest from relevant researchers 
who enjoyed sufficient funding elsewhere (informal institutions/taste and preferences of 
researchers) , financial and architectural constraints in the 1960s, and a move of the Finsen 
hospital in the 1970s had prevented the plans from being carried out when the centre was still 
about coordinating cancer research. When the idea was revisited and converted into a power 
prop in the 1980s, it was used by the Cancer Society to serve its own strategy for survival in 
times of public scrutiny and by public researchers to re-negotiate the distribution of the cancer 
charity’s funds and power. The leverage depletion of the prop took approximately 10 years.  
Outro: perspectives on the cancer centre model 
In the previous chapter, various initiatives in the wake of the Finsen collapse have been 
presented. None of these initiatives resemble the original concept of a comprehensive cancer 
centre unifying bench and bedside in the war on cancer. Still, these initiatives have contributed 
greatly to Danish cancer research and made their marks internationally as well. These initiatives 
vary in their set ups, their research profiles, their association to the pharmaceutical industry etc. 
They represent very different approaches to the cancer problem both scientifically and 
organisationally. All things considered, it would seem that there is no single model for 
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organising cancer research. In fact, the idea of a targeted approach in the form of a 
comprehensive centre might actually have complicated the war on cancer greatly in Denmark.  
The idea of the centre was inspired by targeted projects such as the Manhattan Project and 
NASA’s efforts to put a man on the moon, and the idea of the cancer centre have ben alluring to 
many political stakeholders in the world: If you can split the atom and put a man on the moon, 
surely we can find a cure to cancer...? But whereas the Manhattan Project and the Moon Mission 
was, roughly speaking, a matter of translating well-developed scientific theories into 
“hardware”, the matter of finding a cure for cancer has revealed itself to be a bit more complex. 
For one thing, the theoretical framework for understanding cancer was not at all in place when 
the idea of a cancer centre was presented, and scientific progress in the field has since revealed 
an increasing complexity in the problem of human cancers. All things taken into account, there 
may be as many types of cancers as there are cancer patients, as recent discoveries indicate that 
the patient’s unique physiological constitution greatly influences the development and possible 
treatment of a cancer.  And previous targeted efforts to find a cure – a golden bullet – for cancer 
now seems a little naive.  
And so does the organisational tool behind these efforts, the comprehensive cancer centre. 
Perhaps the umbrella-like concept of cancer is not explored optimally if you limit yourself by 
applying stiff notions on what is appropriate and comprehensive research. On what the balance 
should be between e.g. bench, bedside, and pharmaceutical companies. Or between private and 
public research. Or on how this research should best be housed, financed and coordinated with 
other lines of research. The idea of a short time targeted effort in a set environment (a centre) is 
understandably politically alluring, but it may in fact be the death of the scientific diversity that 
is assumably necessary for solving the many problems of human cancers. And as current 
research opens our eyes to the increasing complexity of cancers, we must appreciate the many 
different approaches to the multifaceted problem. In this light, it seems only natural to abort the 
simplified science policy tools of the past, as they are in danger of over-simplifying the war on 
cancer in the hunt for deceitful turkeys, golden bullets, political paroles and money. Fortunately, 
this was done in the cancer community after a lengthy walk down the path of the cancer centre.  
Nevertheless, the idea of using the targeted approach of NASA and the Manhattan Project on 
societal problems is still in vogue amongst political stakeholders in Denmark today with respect 
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to such complex issues as the innovation of the public health care sector794.  One can only hope 
that they have sufficiently considered the theoretical maturity and complexity of this field before 









































                                                 
794 Horn, U. (2012) "Regeringen vil rydde op i innovationspuljer" Børsen  
 
The Cancer Centre That Never Was 
 
 371 
Sources and literature: 
 
Archival collections and papers: 
 
Archives of the Danish Cancer Society, Copenhagen. 
Personal papers of Ole Bang, Copenhagen. 
Personal papers of Keld Danø, Copenhagen. 
Personal papers of Jes Forchhammer, Bagsværd. 
Personal papers of Niels Ole Kjeldgaard, Aarhus. 
 
Published literature: 
Adams, L. W. (1972). "Cancer Centers and the American People." Cancer 29: 821-823 
Ahm, L. (1994) "Riget skifter image" Politiken København 18.12.1994 
Amdrup, E. (1998). Som jeg så det - en kirurgs tilbageblik. Danmark, Gyldendal 
Andersen, C. (1989) "Millioner ruller til kræftforskningen" Politiken København 19.03.1989 
Andersen, N. Å. (2008). Partnerships: Machines of Possibility. Bristol, Policy Press 
Andersen, P. N. (1981) "USA har sat en pris på hans hovede" Weekendavisen 28.08.1981 
Andreassen, M., F. Blasi, et al. (1992) "Støtter nyt center for kræftforskning" Berlingske tidende 
11.03.1992 
Arthur, W. B. (1988). "Self-Reinforcing Mechanisms in Economics". The Economy as an 
Evolving Complex System. P. W. Anderson, K. J. arrow and D. Pines. Reading, MA, Addison-
Wesley 
Arthur, W. B. (1989). "Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical 
Events." Economic Journal 99: 116-31 
Austoker, J. (1988). A History of the Imperial Cancer Research Fund 1902-1986. Oxford, 
Oxford University Press 
Autrup, H. (1991) "Marionetterne" Berlingske Tidende 23.10.1991 
Bang, O. (1991) "Arne Melchior tager fejl" Berlingske Tidende 17.10.1991 
Bang, O. (2004). En personlig beretning om Kræftens Bekæmpelse 1981-1994, Narayana Press 
Bentzen, S. M. (1992) "Forskernes kræftstrid" Politiken København 13.03.1992 
Bentzen, S. M. (1992) "Kræftforskningsdebatten set fra sidelinjen" Berlingske Tidende 
København 11.03.1992 
Bjerg, T. (2001) "Ti år for bio-fremskridt" Berlingske Tidende 26.05.2001 
Bjerre, M. (1991) "Keld Danøs tarvelige talmagi" Berlingske Tidende 17.10.1991 
Bladel, N. (1949) "Videnskaben er skuffet over Hartvig Frisch" Berlingske Tidende 27.01.1949 
Blasi, F., E. Bock, et al. (1990) "Kræftforskerne kan samarbejde" Politiken 01.02.1990 
Bock, E. (1991) "Sandheden om en sandhed" Politiken København 18.10.1991 
Bock, E. (1991) "Sandheden tak!" Berlingske Tidende København 11.10.1991 
Bourdieu, P. (1977). Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
Bourdieu, P. (1979). "The specificity of the scientific field and the social conditions of the 
progress of reason." Soc. sci. inform. 14(6): 19-47 
Bourdieu, P. (1980). The Logic of Practice. Stanford, Stanford University Press 
Bourdieu, P. (1996). Homo Academicus. stockholm, Det Lilla Förlaget 
 
The Cancer Centre That Never Was 
 
 372 
Bourdieu, P. and L. J. D. Wacquant (1992). An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology. Chicago, 
Chicago University Press 
Bourdieu, P. and L. J. D. Wacquant (2004). Refleksiv Sociologi. København, Hans Reitzels 
Forlag 
Breslow, L. and W. G. Cumberland (1988). "Progress and Objectives in Cancer Control." 
JAMA 259: 1690-1694 
Breslow, L., D. Wilner, et al. (1977). A History of Cancer Control in the United States, with 
Emphasis on the Period 1946-1971. Bethesda, Division for Cancer Control and Rehabilitation, 
National Cancer Institute 
Brincker, H. (1991) "Dyre ord" Politiken 17.11.1991 
Burns, T. R. and E. Roszkowska (2005). "Generalised Game Theory: Assumptions, principles 
and elaborators grounded in social theory." studies in Logic,Grammar and Rhetorics 21(8): 7-40 
Bush, V. (1945). Science - The Endless Frontier, The United States' Government Printing Office 
Bühring, O., T. Øyan, et al., Eds. (2003). 75 år med kræftsagen - Kræftens Bekæmpelse, 
Kræftens Bekæmpelse 
Cairns, J. (1978). Cancer: Science and SOciety, W.H. Freeman and Company 
Cancerkomite, D. A. D. L. (1907). Beretning om Den Alm. Danske Lægeforenings 
Cancerkomite's Virksomhed 1905-1907, Aktieselsk. Nationaltrykkeriet 
Cantor, D. (1989). "The MRC's Support for Experimental Radiology during Inter-war Years". 
Historical Perspectives on the Role of the MRC: Essays in the History of the Medical Research 
Councilof the United  Kingdomand Its Predecessor, the Medical Research Committee, 1913-
1953. J. Austoker and L. Bryder. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 181-204 
Cantor, D. (1993). "Cancer". Companion Encyclepedia of the History of Medicine. W. F. 
Bynum and R. Porter. London, Routledge: 537-61 
Cantor, D. (2007). "Introduction: Cancer Control and Prevention in the Twentieth Century." 
Bulletin of the History of Medicine 81: 1-38 
Carter, K. C. (1991). "The Development of Pasteur's concept of disease causation and the 
emergence of specific causes in nineteenth-century medicine." Bulletin of the History of 
Medicine: 528-48 
Celis, J. E. (1992) "Kaos om kræft" Politiken  
Chadarevian, S. d. (1997). "Using Interviews to Write the History of Science". The 
Historiography of Contemporary Science and Technology. T. Söderqvist. Amsterdam, Harwood 
Acacademic Publishers: 51-71 
Christensen, S. (1992) "Planerne om Finsen Parken skrinlagt" Politiken 15.03.1992 
Christiansen, J. (1982). "Cancerforskning i Danmark." Ugeskrift for Læger 144: 815-816 
Christiansen, N. F. (1993). Hartvig Frisch - Mennesket og Politikeren. København, Christian 
Ejlers' Forlag 
Clark, R. L. (1972). "Administrative and Fiscal Aspect." Cancer 29: 846-851 
Clark, R. L. (1977). "Comprehensive Cancer Centers." Comprehensive Therapy 3: 9-14 
Clemmesen, I. (1992) "Vi vil ikke kaldes for andenrangs" Berlingske Tidende 04.03.1992 
Clemmesen, J., T. Busk, et al. (1952). "The topographical distribution of leukemia and 
Hodgkin's disease in Denmark 1942-46." ACTA RADIOLOGICA 37(3-4): 223-230 
Clemmesen, J. and A. Nielsen (1951). "The social distribution of cancer in Copenhagen, 1943-
1947." British Journal of Cancer 5(2): 159-171 
Clemmesen, J., T.Busk, et al. (1948). "The age distribution of malignant diseases in Denmark." 
ACTA RADIOLOGICA 30: 9-16 
Cohen, S. s. (1971). "Cancer Research and the Scientific Community." Science 172: 1212-1214 
Dahler-Larsen, P. and N. Ejersbo (2003). Djøficering - myte eller realitet? Århus 
Dahlin, M. (1992) "Strid blandt kræftforskere" Berlingske Tidende 15.02.1992 
 
The Cancer Centre That Never Was 
 
 373 
Dall, O. (1982) "Kræft er ingen dødsdom" Fyens Stiftidende 27.11.1982 
Danø, K. (1991) "Kun en femtedel til kræftcenter" Berlingske Tidende København 05.12.1991 
Danø, K. (1991) "Mindst 47 millioner til administration" Berlingske Tidende København 
22.05.1991 
Danø, K. (1991) "Regnskabsudlægningen i Kræftens Bekæmpelse er kreativ" Berlingske 
Tidende København 13.10.1991 
Danø, K. (1991). "Svar." Ugeskrift for læger 153(49): 3502-3504 
Danø, K. (1991) "Sådan bør Kræftens Bekæmpelse reorganiseres" Berlingske Tidende 
København 24.10.1991 
Danø, K. (1992) "Sagen om kræftforskningscentret var ikke noget spil" Berlingske Tidende 
22.03.1992 
David, P. (1985). "Clio and the Economics of QWERTY." American Economic Review 75: 
322-37 
Durant, J. R. (1972). "Planning for Cancer Centers - Workshop III Summary." Cancer 29: 909-
913 
DVU (1969). Kræftforskningens vilkår i Danmark. København, Landsforeingen til Kræftens 
Bekæmpelse 
DVU (1982). Mødereferat fra det Videnskabelige Udvalg 03.03.1982. Bagsværd, Personal 
Papers of Jes Forchhammer. 
DVU (1982). Mødereferat fra Det Videnskabelige Udvalg 23.09.1982. Bagsværd, Personal 
Papers of Jes Forchhammer. 
Døllner, T. (1991) "Store penge koster penge" Politiken 25.10.1991 
Edwards, M. H. (1972). "Role of the Cancer Center in Training." Cancer 29(4): 889-891 
Ellerman and Bang (1908). "Experimentel Leukæmi hos Høns I." Oversigt over Det Kgl. 
Danske Videnskabernes Selskabs Forhandlinger 
Engelbreth-Holm, J. (1946) "Dansk Kræftforskning" Berlingske Aftenavis København 
21.02.1946 
Engelbreth-Holm, J. (1946) "Kræftforskningen i Fremtiden" Berlingske Aftenavis København 
11.01.1946 
Erdey (1995). Armor of Patience: The National Cancer Institute and The Development of 
Medical Research Policy In the United States, Case Western Univesity. 
Es. (1961) "Dansk kræftforsker død paa vej til London" Berlingske Tidende 18.01.1961 
Espersen, B. T. and A.-L. Roager (2008). Det vidunderlige stof, Aarhus Universitetsforlag 
Fibiger-Institute (1986). Annual Report 1986. Copenhagen, The Danish Cancer Society 
Fibiger-Institute (1987). Annual Report 1987. Copenhagen, The Danish Cancer Society 
Fibiger-Institute (1988). Annual Report 1988. Copenhagen, The Danish Cancer Society 
Fibiger-Institute (1989). Annual Report 1989. Copenhagen, The Danish Cancer Society 
Fischer, A. (1946) "Dansk Kræftforskning" Berlingske Aftensavis København 21.01.1946 
Forskningsråd, S. N., S. L. Forskningsråd, et al. (1979). Danmark og Det Europæiske 
Molekylærbiologiske Laboratorium. København, SNF, SLF, SJVF: 43. 
Forskningsråd, U. f. b. c. n. a. S. n. (1981). Cancerforskning i Danmark, SNF. 
Frisch, H. (1949). "Forskeren og Samfundet (tale d. 12. februar 1949 ved uddelingen af 
Ekstrabladets videnskabspris)". Store og små kulturproblemer. H. Frisch. København, Forlager 
Fremad: 105-115 
Fujimura, J. H. (1988). "The Molecular Bandwagon in Cancer Research: Where Social Worlds 
Meet." Social Problems: 261-283 
Garb, S. (1968). Cure for Cancer: A National Goal. New York, Springer Publishing Company, 
INC 
 
The Cancer Centre That Never Was 
 
 374 
Gardel, U. (1991) "Strid om salget af Finsen blusser op" Berlingske Tidende København 
21.10.1991 
Granshaw, L. (1989). "Fame and fortune by means of bricks and mortar: the medical profession 
and specialist hospitals in Britain 1800-1948." The Hospital in History. L. Granshaw and R. 
Porter. New York, Routledge: 199-220 
Hagerup, A. (1990) "Spillfugle bruges i kræftbekæmpelse" Berlingske Tidende København 
11.03.1990 
Hansen, H. F. (2002). "Hvilken slags politik er forskningspolitik?" Økonomi og Politik 75: 41-
56 
Harvald, B. (1995) "Kræftens Bekæmpelse satsede på forskning og vandt" Berlingske Tidende 
06.07.1995 
Harvald, B. and E. Amdrup (1991). "Kampagnen mod Kræftens Bekæmpelse." Ugeskrift for 
læger 153(49): 3500-3505 
Hayter, C. R. (1997). "Medicalizing Malignancy: The Uneasy Origins of Ontario's Cancer 
Program, 1929-1934." Canadian Bulletin of Medical History 14: 195-213 
Hayter, C. R. (2005). An Element of Hope: Radium and the Response to Cancer in Canada. 
Montreal, McGill-Queen's University Press 
Helin, K. (2004). "Bricks and Mortar." Naturejobs 428(238) 
Helvoort, T. v. (1999). "A Century of Research into the Cause of Cancer: Is the New Oncogene 
Paradigm Revolutionary?" History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences: 293-330 
Henningsen, I. (1982). "Flere spørgsmål end svar." Naturkampen: 20-23 
Henningsen, N. (1979). "Efter et kræftår." Ugeskrift for læger 141(3): 181-184 
Hilton, G. (1990) "Bofællesskab for kræftforskere" Berlingske Tidende København 02.02.1990 
Hilton, G. (1990) "Finsen-salg på ny udskudt" Berlingske Tidende København 03.02.1990 
Hilton, G. (1990) "Finsen-uro pludselig slut" Berlingske Tidende København 02.02.1990 
Hilton, G. (1990) "Forslag om to direktører" Berlingske Tidende København 02.02.1990 
Hilton, G. (1990) "Kræft-direktør i modvind" Berlingske Tidende København 31.01.1990 
Hilton, G. (1990) "Ministre vil mægle om Finsen" Berlingske Tidende København 01.02.1990 
Hilton, G. (1990) "Ole Bang: Dreven og dygtig" Berlingske Tidende Kbenhavn 04.02.1990 
Hirsch, P. m. and J. J. Gillespie (2001). "Unpacking Path Dependence: Differential Valuations 
accorded History Across Disciplines". Path Dependence and Creation. R. Garud and P. Karnøe. 
Mahwa, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. : 69-90 
Holst, H. L. (1994) "Kræftforskningcenter vil bytte sig til plads" Berlingske Tidende København 
27.12.1994 
Horn, U. (2012) "Regeringen vil rydde op i innovationspuljer" Børsen  
Haagerup, U., T. Larsen, et al. (1990a) "Kræft-mastodonten" Jyllands Posten 21.01.1990 
Haagerup, U., T. Larsen, et al. (1990b) "Kræft-mastodonten" Jyllands-Posten 21-01-1990 
Haave, P. (2006). "The Hospital Sector - a four county comparison of organisational and 
political development". The Nordic Model of Welfare. N. F. Christiansen, K. Petersen, N. 
Edling and P. Haave. Copenhagen, Museum Tusculanum Press: 215-242 
Ilbery, P. (1978). "The Comprehensive Cancer Centre." The Medical Journal of Australia(1): 
573-576 
Jacobsen, K. (2004). Jydsk Telefon - "Verdens bedste telefonselskab". København, Post og Tele 
Museum 
Jacobsen, K. (2005). "Institutional change and path dependence in Danish telecom 
development." Paper presented at the conference "Cross-Connections: Communications, Society 
and change", Science Museum London, 11-13 November 2005.: 1-16. 
Jacobsen, K. and K. Larsen (2007). Ve og Velfærd - Læger, sundhed og samfund gennem 200 
år. København, Lindhardt og Ringhof 
 
The Cancer Centre That Never Was 
 
 375 
Jensen, B. L. (1996). "Dansk forskningspolitik - fra finkulture til national strategi." Økonomi og 
Politik: 30-39 
Jensen, C. O. (1903). "Eksperimentelle undersøgelser over kræft hos mus." Hospitalstidende 11: 
581 
Johnsen, P. P. (2006) "Cand.Polit.'erne forstår ikke, hvad cancer er for noget" Weekendavisen 
København  
Juul-Madsen, A. (1992) "Politisk røre over nej til kræft-center" Berlingske Tidende København 
15.02.1992 
Jørgensen, P. S. (1992) "Arne Melchior må undskylde" Politiken København 22.02.1992 
Kassebeer, S. (1991) "Borgmester forlader to hovedbestyrelsesposter" Berlingske Tidende 
København 18.10.1991 
Kassebeer, S. (1991) "Finsen-drøftelse udskudt" Berlingske Tidende København 07.11.1991 
Kassebeer, S. (1991) "Ny forhandling om Finsen Parken" Berlingske Tidende København 28.09. 
1991 
Kassebeer, S. (1991) "Stadig håb for den ny Finsen-parken" Berlingske Tidende København 
27.09.1991 
Kassebeer, S. (1992) "Stormøde om kræftcenter" Berlingske Tidende København 08.01.1992 
Kay, L. E. (1993). The Molecular Vision of Life 
Caltech, The Rockefeller Foundation and The Rise of the New Biology. New York, Oxford 
University Press 
KB (1967). Byggesagen. Fælles Sag: 3. 
KB (1970). Beretning om Landsforeningens virksomhed. Fælles Sag: 2. 
KB (1973). Indvielsen af Landsforeningens nye forskningsbygning på Finseninstituttet. Fælles 
Sag: 1-3. 
KB (1981). Årsberetning, Kræftens Bekæmpelse 
Kennedy, E., H. Wilson, et al. (1972). "National Cancer Act of 1971." Cancer 29(4): 917-921 
Kiberg, C. (1989) "De gode kræfters spil" Berlingske Tidende 02-10-1982 
Kieler, J. (1989). The Fibiger Institute 1949-1989. Copenhagen, The Danish Cancer Society 
Kieler, J. (1991) "Det er Herman Autrup der manipulerer" Berlingske Tidende 29.10.1991 
Kieler, J. (1991) "Løgn fra sandhedens vogtere" Politiken 25.10.1991 
Kieler, J. (1993). Hvorfor gjorde i det? Personlige erindringer fra besættelsestiden i historisk 
belysning. Haslev, Gyldendal 
Kjeldgaard, N. O. (1982) "Er det kun de gamle der får kræft?" Jyllands Posten København 
16.03.1982 
Kjeldgaard, N. O. (1982) "Hvad skal der ske med kræftforskningen i Danmark?" Jyllands-
Posten 02.03.1982 
Kjeldgaard, N. O. (1982). "Kræftforskning er for spredt og bør styrkes i offentligt regi." 
Forskningen og Samfundet 8(2): 6-7 
Kjeldgaard, N. O. (1993). "Molekylær Biologi i 25 år". 25 år: Institut for Molekylær Biologi. O. 
F. Nielsen. aarhus, Institut for Molekylær Biologi, Aarhus Universitet: 7-14 
Kjærgaard, J. J. (1990) "Internationalt kræft-center" Berlingske Tidende København 24.02.1990 
Klenow, H. (2003). "Some Selected Recollections from a Life with Biochemistry". Selected 
Topics in the History of Biochemistry: Personal Recollections VII. G. Semenza and A. J. 
Turner, Elsevier Science B.V.: 285-317 
Knudsen, H. (2005). Konsensus og konflikt - orgnaiseringen af den tekniske forskning i 
Danmark 1900-1960. The Department for the History of Science. Århus, University of Aarhus: 
401. 
Knudsen, H. (2006). "Politik, Penge og Forskningsvilkår". Viden uden grænser 1920-1970. H. 
Nielsen and K. H. Nielsen. Aarhus, Aarhus Universitetsforlag: 323-346 
 
The Cancer Centre That Never Was 
 
 376 
Kohler, R. (1982). From medical chemistry to biochemistry, Cambridge University Press 
Kohler, R. (1991). Partners in Science  
- Foundations and Natural Scientists 1900-1945. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press 
Koordinationsgruppen (1982). Redegørelse om Rigshospitalets rammer. København, 
Rigshospitalet: 59. 
Kristiansen, M. (1989) "Læger føler sig til grin" Weekendavisen 08-12-1989 
Krog, T. B. (2004) "Nu må vi snart lære at dyrke talentet" Ingeniøren København 21.12.2004 
Kræftens-Bekæmpelse (1980-1994). Årsberetninger 1980-1994. København, Kræftens 
Bekæmpelse 
Kræftens-Bekæmpelse (1981). Årsberetning 1981. Copenhagen, Kræftens Bekæmpelse 
Kræftens-Bekæmpelse (1984). Årsberetning 1984. København, Kræftens Bekæmpelse 
Kræftens-Bekæmpelse (1985). Årsberetning, Kræftens Bekæmpelse 
Kræftens-Bekæmpelse (1991). Årsberetning. København, Kræftens Bekæmpelse 
Københavns-Universitet (1996). Strategi for forskning og undervisning i bioteknologi. 
København, Københavns Universitet: 112. 
Larsen, H. (1991) "Kræftforeningen afviser enhver kritik" Berlingske Tidende 13.10.1991 
Larsen, H. (1991) "Kræftstrid i hårdknude" Berlingske Tidende 04.10.1991 
Larsen, P. O. (1981). Forskningspolitik i et lille land, Forlaget Rhodos 
Larsen, P. O. (2003). Forskningens Verden - Prydhave, Nyttehave, Vildnis, Aarhus 
Universitetsforlag 
Larsen, T. (1990) "Bred tilslutning til plan for nyt kræftforskningscenter" Jyllands Posten 
10.02.1990 
Larsen, T. and H. Thomsen (1990) "Fejden om Finsen" Jyllands Posten 09.02.1990 
Larsen, T. and H. Thomsen (1990) "Finsen brogede historie" Jyllands Posten 09.02.1990 
Larsen, T., H. Thomsen, et al. (1990) "Det store kræftshow" Jyllands Posten 11.03.1990 
Lecker, S. and A. Kjær (1994). Kræftens Bekæmpelse - en organisation i modvind. Institut for 
Organisation og Arbejdssociologi, Copenhagen Business School: 116. 
Lenoir, T. (1997). Instituting Science: The Cultural Production of Scientific Disciplines. 
Stanford, Stanford University Press 
Lerner, B. H. (2001). The Breast Cancer Wars. Fear, Hope and the Pursuit of a cure in the 
Twentieth Century America, Oxford Univerity Press 
Lindboe, O. (1982). "Kræft-forskning under revision." Forskningen og Samfundet 8: 24 
Linderstrøm-Lang, K. (1957). "Albert Fischer". Det Kongelige Videnskabernes Selskab- 
Oversigt over Selskabets Virksomhed 1956-57, Ejnar Munksgaard 
Luhmann, N. (1999). Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft, Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Wissenschaft 
Luhmann, N. (2003). "Beslutningens paradoks". Organiseret Kommunikation. Højlund and 
Knudsen. Frederiksberg, Samfundslitteratur 
Luhmann, N. (2006). Orgaisation und Entscheidung. Wiesbalder, VS Verlag für 
Socialwissenschaften 
Luhmann, N. (2013). Indføring i systemteorien, Unge Pædagoger 
Lundbeck, S. and T. Bagge (1991) "Vi er ikke bedragere" B.T. 04.10.1991 
Lundgren, A. (1999). "Naturvetenskapelig institutionalisering". Vetenskapsbärerne: 
naturvetenskapen i det svenska samhället 1880-1950. S. Widmalm. Hedemora, Gidlunds Forlag 
Luukkonen, T. (1989). "Publish in a visible journal or perish? Assesing citation performance of 
nordic cancer research." Scientometrics 15: 349-367 
Marke, A. W. and P. Raunkjær, Eds. (1939). Den Lille Salmonsen, 9,København, J. H. Schultz 
Marke, A. W. and P. Raunskjær, Eds. (1939). Den Lille Salmonsen, 7,København, J. H. Schultz 
Marke, A. W. and P. Raunskjær, Eds. (1940). Den Lille Salmonsen, 11, J.H. Schultz Forlag 
 
The Cancer Centre That Never Was 
 
 377 
McAuley, J., J. Duberley, et al. (2007). Organization theory - Challenges and Perspectives. 
Harlow, Pearson Education Limited 
Melchior, A. (1991) "Ny ledelse af Kræftens Bekæmpelse" Berlingske Tidende 11.10.1991 
Melchior, A. (1992) "Et dansk kræftforskningscenter skal ikke forpurres" Berlingske Tidende 
København 06.03.1992 
Melchior, A. (1992) "Sløser med betroede midler" Politiken København 06.03.1992 
Meyerheim, M. (1982) "Dansker i verdensformat" Politiken 07.02.1982 
Michael, B. J. (1996). "The discovery of Proto-Oncogenes." FASEB Journal: 362-364 
Moncrieffe, J. (2006). "The Power of Stigma: Encounters with "Street Children" and 
"Restavecs" in Haiti." IDS Bulletin 37(6): 31-46 
Morange, M. (1997). "From the Regulatory Vision of Cancer to the Oncogene Paradigme, 1975-
1985." Journal of the History of Biology 30: 1-29 
Morange, M. (2000). A History of Molecular Biology. Harvard, Harvard Univeristy Press 
Murphy, C. C. S. (1989). "From Friedenheim to Hospice: A century of cancer hospitals". The 
Hospital in History. L. Granshaw and R. Porter. New York, Routledge: 221-241 
Maaløe, O. (1985). "Molekylærbiologien i Danmark." Naturens verden(113): 112-120 
Nelson, R. R. and B. N. Sampat "Making sense of institutions as a factor shaping economic 
performance." Journal of Economic Behavior and Organisation 44: 31-54 
NF, SF, et al. (1995). Forskningscenter for bioteknologi. København, Københavns Universitet 
Hovedstadens Sygehusfællesskab: 55. 
Nielsen, A. K. and M. L. Thomsen (2006a). "I det biokemiske og molekylærbiologiske 
spændingsfelt". Viden uden grænser 1920-1970. H. Nielsen and K. H. Nielsen. Aarhus, Aarhus 
Universitetsforlag: 183-200 
Nielsen, A. K. and M. L. Thomsen (2006b). "I det biokemiske og molekylærbiologiske 
spændingsfelt". Viden uden grænser 1920-1970. H. Nielsen and K. H. Nielsen. Aarhus, Aarhus 
Universitetsforlag: 165-182 
Nielsen, H. (2004). Disse fag må lempes til verden... - Oprettelsen og udbygningen af Det 
Naturvidenskabelige Fakultet ved Aarhus Universitet. Gylling, Aarhus Universitetsforlag 
Nielsen, H. and K. Nielsen (2001). Nabo til Nobel - Historien om tretten danske Nobelpriser. 
Gylling, Aarhus university Press 
Nielsen, H., K. Nielsen, et al. (1998). Til samfundets tarv - Forskningscenter Risøs historie. 
Denmark, Forskningscenter Risø 
Nielsen, H., K. H. Nielsen, et al. (2006). "Videnproduktion som komplekst socialt system". 
Viden uden grænser 1920-1970. H. Nielsen and K. H. Nielsen. Aarhus, Aarhus 
Universitetsforlag 
Nielsen, S. (1992) "Kræft, trit og retning" Politiken 01-03-1992 
NIH (1974). The Cancer Centers Program: The National Cancer Institute. Washington, US 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare 
Public Health Service 
National Institutes of Health. 
NN (1984). "Lennart Olsson: Danskeren, som amerikanerne investerer millioner i." Illustreret 
Videnskab: 66 
NN. (1989) "Kræftens Bekæmpelse fik lov at købe Finsen" Politiken 19.12.1989 
NN. (1990) "Ballade om kræft-center" Midtjyllands Avis 23.01.1990 
NN. (1990) "Der forhandles igen om Finsen-området" Berlingske Tidende 15.02.1990 
NN. (1990) "Forsker: Kræftens Bekæmpelse er ved at miste troværdigheden" Jyllands Posten 
26.01.1990 
NN. (1990) "Kræftens Bekæmpelse afviser pris på Finsen" Berlingske Tidende 18.03.1990 
NN. (1990) "Uenighed om overtagelse af Finsen" Berlingske Tidende 18.03.1990 
 
The Cancer Centre That Never Was 
 
 378 
NN. (1990) "Uenighed om prisen på Finsen" Politiken 02.05.1990 
NN. (1991) "Arne Melchior forlader Kræftens Bekæmpelse i protest" Ritzaus Bureau 
01.10.1991 
NN. (1991) "Arne Melchior: Uanstændige metoder" B.T. 04.10.1991 
NN. (1991) "Klar til at rykke ind på Finsen" Berlingske Tidende 27.05.1991 
NN. (1991) "Kræft-kritik afvises" Berlingske Tidende 14.10.1991 
NN. (1991) "Kræftens Bekæmpelse er for kommerciel" Ekstra Bladet 29.04.1991 
NN. (1991) "Kræftpenge spildt på administration" Berlingske Tidende 13.10.1991 
NN. (1991) "Melchior forlader Kræftens Bekæmpelse" Berlingske Tidende 02.10.1991 
NN. (1991a) "Uro om center på Finsen" Politiken 26.09.1991 
NN. (1991b) "Uro om center på Finsen" Politiken 16.09.1991 
NN. (1992) "Forsker lige i en hvepserede" Politiken 05.03.1992 
NN. (1992) "Kræft-balladen er glemt" Politiken 02.06.1992 
NN. (1992) "Kræftcenter skrinlægges" Politiken 14.02.1992 
NN. (1992) "Kræftcenter sætter nålen i Europakortet" Politiken 02.06.1992 
NN. (1992) "Kræftens Bekæmpelse svindler" Ekstra Bladet 27.02.1992 
NN. (1992) "Kræftforskere samles på Rigshospitalet" Politiken 07.03.1992 
NN. (1992) "Kræftskandalen" Ekstra Bladet 19.02.1992 
NN. (1992) "Melodien der blev væk" Berlingske Tidende 01.03.1992 
NN. (1992) "Minister skuffet over Kræftens Bekæmpelse" Berlingske Tidende 17.02.1992 
NN. (1992) "Nej til nyt kræft-ceter" B.T. 14.02.1992 
NN. (1992) "Uenighed om kræftcenter" Politiken 24.01.1992 
NN. (2001) "Flyttedag for kræftforskning i København" Jyllands Posten 05.02.2001 
NN. (2004) "Nyt forskningscenter skal forbedre kræftforskning" Urban 12.11.2004 
North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change And Economic Performance. New York, 
Cambridge University Press 
North, D. C. (2005). Understanding The Process Of Economic Change. Princeton, Princeton 
University Press 
Olaf-Hansen, E. (1945) "Kræftbekæmpelse efter Atombombe-Princippet" Politiken København 
26.08.1945 
Olsen, S. (1982). "Dansk kræftforskning: Monopol eller samarbejde?" Forskningen og 
Samfundet 8(3) 
Olsen, S. (1982) "Er indsatsen i kræftforskningen tilstrækkelig?" Politiken København 
15.02.1982 
Olsen, S. (1982). Kommentar. Private papers of Jes Forchhammer. 
Olsson, L. and H. Kaplan (1980). "Human-human hybridomas producing monoclonal antibodies 
of predefined antigenic spcificity." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the 
United States of America 77(9): 5429-5431 
Orbison, J. L. (1972). "Review of Proposals." Cancer 29(4): 916 
Orstrom, E. (2005). Understanding institutional diversity. New Jersey (USA), Woodstock (UK), 
Princeton University Press 
Oxenløwe, R. H. (2006). "Bygninger, politik og penge". Lys over landet 1850-1920, Dansk 
Naturvidenskabs Historie bd. 3. P. C. Kjærsgaard. Århus, Aarhus Universitetsforlag: 61-95 
Patterson, J. T. (1987). The Dread Disease: Cancer and Modern American Culture. Cambridge, 
Harvard University Press 
Pedersen-Bjergaard, J. (1991) "En kamp om magt og penge" Politiken København 10.10.1991 
Pedersen-Bjergaard, J. (1991) "Hvem fik de 46 millioner?" Politiken København 21.10.1991 
Pedersen-Bjergaard, J. (1991). "Svar." Ugeskrift for læger 153(49): 3504 
 
The Cancer Centre That Never Was 
 
 379 
Pedersen, F. S. and J. Justesen (1993). "Reguleringsmekanismer gennem 25 år: Fra bakteriers 
magiske pletter til pattedyrs magiske gener". 25 År: Institut for Molekylær Biologi. O. F. 
Nielsen. Århus, Institut for Molekylærbiologi: 14-19 
Petersen, T. (1994). "On the Promise of Game Theory on Sociology." Contemporary Sociology 
23(4): 498-502 
Pinell, P. (1991). "Cancer Policy and the Health System in France: "Big Medicine" Challenges 
the Conception and Organization of Medical Practice." Social History of Science 4(1): 75-101 
Pinell, P. (2002). The Fight against Cancer: France 1890-1940. London, Routledge 
POL (1990) "Kræftens Bekæmpelse" Politiken København 15.12.1990 
Porter, R. (2003). Medicinens Historie. København, Rosinante Paperbacks 
Proctor, R. N. (1999). The Nazi War on Cancer. Princeton, Princeton University Press 
Rasmussen, L. (1982). "Virksomheden på Carlsbergfondets Biologiske Institut i professor Erik 
Zeuthens forstandertid". Årsskrift for Carlsbergfondet 1982. Carlsbergfondet. København, 
Rhodos: 46-51 
Rettig, R. E. (1977). Cancer Crusade. Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press 
Rinde, H. (2004). Kontingens og Kontinuitet: framveksten av stiavhengige 
organisasjonsmønstre i Skandinavisk telefoni, Unipub Forlag 
Roberson, W. M. (1972). "Current National Cancer Institute Center Programs." Cancer 29(4): 
887-888 
Rolfstam, M. (2009). "Public procurement as an innovation policy tool: the role of institutions." 
Science and Public Policy 36(5): 349-360 
Rud, E. (1937). Radiumfondet og Landsforeningen til Kræftens Bekæmpelse 1912-1937. 
København, Egmont H. Petersens Kgl. Hof-Bogtrykkeri 
Rud, E. (1953). Landsforeningen til Kræftens Bekæmpelse 1928-1953. København, Egmont H. 
Petersen Kgl. Hof-bogtrykkeri 
Rygaard, J. (1991). "Svar." Ugeskrift for læger 153(49): 3504-3505 
Rørth, C. (1985) "Staten lader de private betale kampen mod kræften" Weekendavisen 
09.08.1985 
Schwartz, D. (1997). Culture and Power: the Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu. Chicago, University 
of Chicago Press 
Scott, W. G. (1971). "Introduction to the conference on planning for Cancer centers." Cancer 
29(4): 819-820 
Sehested, M. (1993). Copenhagen Comprehensive Cancer Center 1(1): 1-8 
Shingleton, W. W. (1989). "Cancer Centers- Origins and Purpose." Archives of Surgery 124: 
43-45 
Simone, J. V. (2002). "Understanding Cancer Centers." Journal of Clinical Oncology 20(23): 
4503-4507 
Simonsen, T. I. A. (1992) "Et skridt fremad" Politiken København 19.02.1992 
Skovmand, K. (1989) "Frontberetning fra krigen mod kræften" Politiken 26-11-1989 
Skovmand, K. (1993) "Kræftcenter tegner til succes" Politiken København 04.11.1993 
Skovmand, K. (1994) "Sprækker i murene" Politiken København 13.10.1994 
Smyth, H. D. (1945). Atomic Energy for Military Purposes; the Official Report on the 
Development of the Atomic Bomb under the Auspices of the United States Government, 1940-
1945. Princeton, Princeton: Princeton University Press 
Snorrason, E. (1980). "Julius Engelsbreth-Holm". Dansk Biografisk Leksikon, Nordisk Forlag 
A/S 
Snorrason, E. and O. Thomsen (1980). "Albert Fischer". Dansk Biografisk Leksikon. 
København, Nordisk Forlag A/S 
 
The Cancer Centre That Never Was 
 
 380 
Storm, H. H., E. V. Michelsen, et al. (1997). "The Danish Cancer Registry - history, content, 
quality and use." Danish Medical Bulletin 44(5): 535-539 
Stærbo, L. (1991) "Staten er skurken i kræftforskningen" Universitetsavisen 31.10.1991 
Sørbø, K. (1991) "Salg af Finsen nu godkendt" Belingske Tidende København 23.05.1991 
Sørensen, T. I. A. (1991) "Mistilliden må fjernes" Politiken København 10.12.1991 
Sørensen, T. I. A. (1992) "Det gik pengene til" Berlingske Tidende København 07.01.1992 
Sørensen, T. I. A. (1992) "Misvisende debat om dansk kræftforskningscenter" Berlingske 
Tidende København 10.04.1992 
Thompson, P. (2002). "The voice of the past". The Oral History Reader. R. Perks and A. 
Thompson. London, Routledge: 21-28 
Thomsen, H., T. Larsen, et al. (1990) "Diskret storvask, haltende demokrati" Jyllands-Posten 
13-05-1990 
Thomsen, J. (1992) "Forskere uenige om kræftcenter" Berlingske Tidende København 
24.01.1992 
Thomsen, J. (1992) "Intet fælles center for kræftfoskning" Berlingske Tidende København 
27.02.1992 
Thomsen, J. (1992) "København får center for kræftforskning" Berlingske Tidende København 
02.06.1992 
Thomsen, J. (1992) "Planer om nyt kræftcenter" Berlingske Tidende København 28.03.1992 
Thomsen, J. (1992) "To centre for dansk kræftforskning" Berlingske Tidende København 
28.02.1992 
Thomsen, O. (1935). "Mindeord over C.O. Jensen." Oversigt over Det Kgl. Danske 
Videnskabernes Selskabs Virksomhed 1934-1935 
Thorhauge, C. (2003). BRIC's finansiering stadig usikker. Regionens Biotek-Avis. 2: 6-7. 
Thorhauge, C. (2003). Bureaukrati forsinker BRIC. Regionens Biotek-Avis. 2: 7. 
Thorsted, C. K. (2008). "BRIC skal levere forskning i verdensklasse." Pharma 
www.bric.ku/press/in_the_media/2008/pharmadanmark2008.pdf(Oktober): 8-11 
Tolderlund, S. (1990) "Finsen-området næsten rømmet" Berlingske Tidende København 
21.07.1990 
Tolderlund, S. (1991) "Forskere i åbent opgør mod Kræftens Bekæmpelse" Berlingske Tidende 
København 29.04.1991 
Tolderlund, s. (1991) "Kræftens Bekæmpelse står fast på Finsen-aftale" Berlingske Tidende 
København 16.05.1991 
Triolo, V. A. (1964). "Nineteenth Century Foundations of Cancer Research: Origins of 
Experimental Research." Cancer Research 24: 4-27 
Triolo, V. A. and M. B. Shimkin (1969). "The American Cancer Society and Cancer Research - 
Origins and Organization: 1913-1943." Cancer Research 29(9): 1615-1641 
Twain, M. (1957). "Hunting The Deceitful Turkey". The Complete Short Stories of Mark 
Twain. C. Neider. New York, Doubleday & Company, Inc. 
UICC (1976). International Directory of Specialized Cancer Research and Treatment 
Establishments. UICC Technical Report Series vol. 23. Geneva, UICC. 
Ulveman, M. (1990) "Politikere føler sig ført bag lyset i sag om Finsen" Berlingske Tidende 
København 27.01.1990 
Vaeth, J. M. (1975). "The network concept in the cancer center." The American Journal of 
Roentgenology  
Radium Therapy and Nuclear Medicine 123(1): 3-6 
Vallgårda, S. (1992). Sygehuse og sygehuspolitik i Danmark. Denmark, Jurist- og 
Økonomiforbundets Forlag.  
 
The Cancer Centre That Never Was 
 
 381 
Varmus, H. and R. A. Weinberg (1993). Genes and the Biology of Cancer. New York, Scientific 
American Library 
Wallot, J.-P. and N. Fortier (2002). "Archival science and oral sources". The Oral History 
Reader. R. Perks and A. Thompson. London, Routledge: 365-379 
Walter, W. A. (1972). "Planning for Cancer Centers." Cancer 29(4): 891-893 
Westphal, A. (1990) "Ministeren støtter kræftorganisation" Politiken København 04.02.1990 
Westphal, A. (1990) "Politikere skal mægle mellem kræftforskere" Politiken København 
27.01.1990 
Westphal, A. (1990) "Samarbejde om kræftforskning" Politiken København 24.01.1990 
Wood, C. (1995). "The "New Public Management" in the 1980's: variations on a theme." 
Accounting, Organizations and Society 20: 93-109 
Zachariae, F. (1978). "Kræftens Bekæmpelse 50 år." Ugeskrift for læger 140(43): 2666-2667 
Ziebe, H. (1981) "Dansker giver lægevidenskaben et nyt værktøj" Berlingske Tidende 
København 08.03.1981 
Ziebe, H. (1992) "Forskning er vigtigere end fejder" Berlingske Tidende København 22.02.1992 
Ziebe, H. (1992) "Forskning vigtigere end fejde" Berlingske Tidende 22-02-1992 




Appendix A : List of abbreviations 
 
 
ACS: The American Cancer Society 
 
BRIC: The Biotech Research and Innovation Centre (Copenhagen, Denmark) 
 
ISAC: International Scientific Advisory Committee (used by the Danish Cancer Society) 
 
MRC: The Danish Government’s Medical Research Council  
 
NCI: The National Cancer Institute (U.S.A) 
 
NSRC: The Danish Government’s Natural Science Research Council 
 

























Appendix B: List of interviewees1 
 
 
Ole Bang  
 
Elisabeth Bock  
 
Johannes E. Bock 
 










Niels Ole Kjeldgaard 
 
Jørgen Kieler  
 






Tove Smidth (via telephone) 
 














                                                 
1 The Danish minister of Education and Research, Bertel Haarder, was asked to participate as well, but he declined in a 
letter dated 20th January 2006.  
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Professor, MD, Bent Harvald 
Major Consultant, MD, Ole Møller Jensen 
Associate professor, Dr.phil., Bodil Norrild 
Major Consultant, MD, Torsten Landberg 































1989 (pr. 31st December 1988):  
 
Director: Ole Bang 
 
Head Board:  
Professor, MD, Bent Harvald (New Chairman) 
Lawyer Steen Helmer Nielsen (Vice chairman) 
Chief psykologist Jørn Halberg Beckmann 
Mrs. Kirsten Damgaard 
Mrs. Ulla Espersen 
CEO Kurt Fromberg 
Major consultant, MD, Hanne Sand Hansen 
Major Consultant, MD, Heine Høi Hansen 
Secretary Niels-Jørgen Hilstrøm 
Mrs. Alice Jørgensen 
Professor of molecular biology, Niels Ole 
Kjeldgaard 
MD Jan-Helge Larsen 
CEO K.E. Larsen 
Bank cashier Aase Lindestrøm 
Head of department Knud Erik Linius  
CEO Erik Mollerup 
Head Nurse Birgit Maarup 
Head Nurse Kirsten Bork Nielsen 
Major Consultant, MD, Nis I. Nissen 
Professo, MD, Steen Olsen 
County Major Kresten Philipsen 
Mrs. Kristine Rasmussen 
Mrs. Kirsten Blume Schmidt 
Editor secretary Bent Skar 
Journalist Tove Smidth 
Mr. Søren Stauning 
Major Consultant, MD, E.B. Thorling 





















The Executive Committee 
Professor, MD, Bent Harvald (new chairman) 
Lawyer Steen Helmer Nielsen (vice chairman) 
CEO Kurt Fromberg 
Professor Niels Ole Kjeldgaard 
Journalist Tove Smidth  
 
The Scientific Council 
Major consultant, MD, Johannes E. Bock (new 
chairman) 
Associate professor, MD, Reidar Albrechtsen 
Major Consultant, MD, Peter Ebbesen 
Head of department Jes Forschhammer 
Major Consultant, Md, Heine Høi Hansen 
Major Consultant, MD, Ole Møller Jensen 
Major Consultant, MD, Torsten Landberg 
Head of department Staffan Magnusson 
Associate professor, Dr.phil., Bodil Norrild 
Major consultant, MD, Jens Pedersen-Bjergaard 
Assoiate professor, MD, Hans Sjöström 































1990 (pr. 31st December 1989):  
 
Director: Ole Bang 
 
Head Board:  
Professor, MD, Bent Harvald (Chairman) 
Chief psykologist Jørn Halberg Beckmann 
Professor, MD, Mogens Blichert-Toft 
Lawyer Niels Fisch-Thomsen 
CEO Kurt Fromberg 
Major H. Thustrup Hansen 
Major consultant, MD, Hanne Sand Hansen 
Major Consultant, MD, Heine Høi Hansen 
Mrs. Inger Hee 
Secretary Niels-Jørgen Hilstrøm 
Mrs. Alice Jørgensen 
Professor of molecular biology, Niels Ole 
Kjeldgaard 
Department chief, veterinarian, Ib Knudsen 
Nurse Vera Kristensen 
Cashier Bent Lassen 
Professor, MD, Ulrik V. Lassen 
Bank cashier Aase Lindestrøm 
Head of department Knud Erik Linius  
CEO Erik Mollerup 
Former major Agnethe Nielsen 
Head Nurse Kirsten Bork Nielsen 
Major Consultant, MD, Nis I. Nissen 
Professo, MD, Steen Olsen 
County Major Kresten Philipsen 
Mrs. Kristine Rasmussen 
Mrs. Kirsten Blume Schmidt 
Editor secretary Bent Skar 
Journalist Tove Smidth 
Vice major Inger Stad 
Mr. Søren Stauning 





















The Executive Committee 
Professor, MD, Bent Harvald (chairman) 
Lawyer Steen Helmer Nielsen  
Professor, MD, Ulrik V. Lassen 
Professor Niels Ole Kjeldgaard 
Journalist Tove Smidth  
Major H. Thustrup Hansen 
 
The Scientific Council 
Major consultant, MD, Johannes E. Bock 
(chairman) 
Associate professor, MD, Reidar Albrechtsen 
Major consultant, MD, John Christiansen 
Major Consultant, MD, Peter Ebbesen 
Head of department Jes Forschhammer 
Major Consultant, Md, Heine Høi Hansen 
Major consultant, MD, Torsten Landberg 
Head of department Staffan Magnusson 
Associate professor, Dr.phil., Bodil Norrild 
Major consultant, MD, Jens Pedersen-Bjergaard 
Assoiate professor, MD, Hans Sjöström 



























1991 (pr. 31st December 1990):  
 
Director: Ole Bang 
 
Head Board:  
Professor, MD, Bent Harvald (Chairman) 
Professor, MD, Mogens Blichert-Toft 
Professor, MD, Peter Elsass 
Lawyer Niels Fisch-Thomsen 
CEO Kurt Fromberg 
Professor arin Hammer 
Major H. Thustrup Hansen 
Major consultant, MD, Hanne Sand Hansen 
Mrs. Inger Hee 
Secretary Niels-Jørgen Hilstrøm 
Mrs. Alice Jørgensen 
Department chief, veterinarian, Ib Knudsen 
Nurse Vera Kristensen 
Cashier Bent Lassen 
Professor, MD, Ulrik V. Lassen 
Bank cashier Aase Lindestrøm 
Head of department Knud Erik Linius  
CEO Erik Mollerup 
Former major Agnethe Nielsen 
Head Nurse Kirsten Bork Nielsen 
County Major Kresten Philipsen 
Mrs. Kristine Rasmussen 
Mrs. Kirsten Blume Schmidt 
Editor secretary Bent Skar 
Journalist Tove Smidth 
Vice major Inger Stad 
Mr. Søren Stauning 
Major Consultant, MD, E.B. Thorling 
MD Ivar Østergaard 





















The Executive Committee 
Professor, MD, Bent Harvald (chairman) 
Journalist Tove Smidth  
Lawyer Niels Fisch-Thomsen 
Professor, MD, Ulrik V. Lassen 
Vice major Inger Stad 
 
The Scientific Council 
Major consultant, MD, Johannes E. Bock 
(chairman) 
Associate professor, MD, Reidar Albrechtsen 
Major consultant, MD, John Christiansen 
Major Consultant, MD, Peter Ebbesen 
Major Consultant, Md, Heine Høi Hansen 
Major consultant, MD, Torsten Landberg 
Associate professor, Dr.phil., Bodil Norrild 
Major consultant, MD, Jens Pedersen-Bjergaard 
Assoiate professor, MD, Hans Sjöström 
Professor, MD, Thorkild I. A. Sørensen 































1992 (pr. 31st December 1991): 
 
Director: Ole Bang 
 
Head Board:  
Professor, MD, Bent Harvald (Chairman) 
Professor, MD, Mogens Blichert-Toft 
Professor, MD, Peter Elsass 
Lawyer Niels Fisch-Thomsen 
CEO Kurt Fromberg 
Professor Karin Hammer 
Major H. Thustrup Hansen 
Major consultant, MD, Hanne Sand Hansen 
Mrs. Inger Hee 
Secretary Niels-Jørgen Hilstrøm 
Mrs. Alice Jørgensen 
Department chief, veterinarian, Ib Knudsen 
Nurse Vera Kristensen 
Cashier Bent Lassen 
Bank cashier Aase Lindestrøm 
Marianne Mayntz 
Former major Agnethe Nielsen 
Head Nurse Kirsten Bork Nielsen 
Former minister Aase Olesen 
County Major Kresten Philipsen 
Mrs. Kristine Rasmussen 
Major consultant, MD, Carsten Rose 
Mrs. Kirsten Blume Schmidt 
Journalist Tove Smidth 
Vice major Inger Stad 
Christian Stentoft 
Major Consultant, MD, E.B. Thorling 
MD Ivar Østergaard 
























The Executive Committee 
Professor, MD, Bent Harvald (chairman) 
Lawyer Niels Fisch-Thomsen 
Professor, MD, Mogens Blichert-Toft 
Journalist Tove Smidth  
Vice major Inger Stad 
 
The Scientific Council 
Professor, MD, Thorkild I. A. Sørensen (NEW 
chairman) 
Associate professor, MD, Reidar Albrechtsen 
Professor Julio E. Celis 
Major consultant, MD, John Christiansen 
Major Consultant, MD, Bo van Deurs 
Major Consultant, MD, Peter Ebbesen 
Major consultant, MD, Torsten Landberg 
Major consultant, MD, Jens Pedersen-Bjergaard 
Professor, MD, John Philip 
Assoiate professor, MD, Hans Sjöström 





























1993 (from 31st December 1992):  
 
Director: Ole Bang 
 
Head Board:  
Professor, MD, Bent Harvald (Chairman) 
Lawyer Niels Fisch-Thomsen 
Karen Baungard 
Engineer John Bill 
Professor, MD, Mogens Blichert-Toft 
Professor, MD, Lars Bolund 
CEO John Christensen 
Professor, MD, Peter Elsass 
Kirsten Fredsted 
Mrs. Inger Hee 
Secretary Niels-Jørgen Hilstrøm 
Mrs. Alice Jørgensen 
Department chief, veterinarian, Ib Knudsen 
Nurse Vera Kristensen 
Cashier Bent Lassen 
Bank cashier Aase Lindestrøm 
Marianne Mayntz 
Former major Agnethe Nielsen 
Head Nurse Kirsten Bork Nielsen 
Former minister Aase Olesen 
Major consultant, MD, Carsten Rose 
Mrs. Kirsten Blume Schmidt 
Journalist Tove Smidth 
Vice major Inger Stad 
Connie Steenberg 
Christian Stentoft 
Major Consultant, MD, E.B. Thorling 
Major consultant, MD, Jørgen Ørnsholt 
























The Executive Committee 
Professor, MD, Bent Harvald (chairman) 
Lawyer Niels Fisch-Thomsen 
Professor, MD, Mogens Blichert-Toft 
Journalist Tove Smidth  
Vice major Inger Stad 
 
The Scientific Council 
Professor, MD, John Philip(new chairman) 
Professor Julio E. Celis 
Associate professor, MD, Reidar Albrechtsen 
Major consultant, MD, John Christiansen 
Major Consultant, MD, Bo van Deurs 
Professor, MD, Heine Høi Hansen 
Major Consultant, MD, Peter Ebbesen 
Major consultant, MD, Torsten Landberg 
Major consultant, MD, Jens Pedersen-Bjergaard 






























1994 (pr. 31st December 1993): 
 
Director: Ole Bang 
 
Head Board:  
Professor, MD, Jens Kr. Gøtrik (new chairman) 
CEO John Christensen 
Karen Baungaard 
Assistant senior researcher Søren M. Bentzen 
Engineer John Bill 
Professor, MD, Lars Bolund 
Professor, MD, Peter Elsass 
Kirsten Fredsted 
Lawyer Niels Fisch-Thomsen 
Kirsten Fredsted 
Svend Erik Haase 
Kurt Hansen 
Professor, MD, Bent Harvald 
Mrs. Inger Hee 
Secretary Niels-Jørgen Hilstrøm 
Department chief, veterinarian, Ib Knudsen 
Nurse Vera Kristensen 
Cashier Bent Lassen 
Bank cashier Aase Lindestrøm 
Marianne Mayntz 
Major consultant, MD, Knud Aage Møller 
Former major Agnethe Nielsen 
Former minister Aase Olesen 
Major consultant, MD, Torben Palshof 
Major consultant, MD, Carsten Rose 
Mrs. Kirsten Blume Schmidt 
Lona Skjørbæk 
Vice major Inger Stad 
Connie Steenberg 
Christian Stentoft 
Major Consultant, MD, E.B. Thorling 
Major consultant, MD, Jørgen Ørnsholt 
























The Executive Committee 
Professor, MD, Jens Kr. Gøtrik (new chairman) 
CEO John Christensen 
Professor, MD, Lars Bolund 
Former minister Aase Olesen 
Vice major Inger Stad 
 
The Scientific Council 
Professor, MD, John Philip(chairman) 
Professor Julio E. Celis 
Associate professor, MD, Reidar Albrechtsen 
Major consultant, MD, John Christiansen 
Major Consultant, MD, Bo van Deurs 
Professor Timo Hakulinen 
Major consultant, MD, Peter Hokland 
Major consultant, MD, Torsten Landberg 
Professor, MD, Hans von der Maase 
Major consultant, MD, Jens Pedersen-Bjergaard 
Major Consultant, MD, Jens Vuust 

























1995 ( pr. 1st april 1995):  
 
 
Director: Nina Würtzen 
 
Head Board:  
Professor, MD, Jens Kr. Gøtrik ( chairman) 
CEO John Christensen 
Karen Baungaard 
Assistant senior researcher Søren M. Bentzen 
Engineer John Bill 
Professor, MD, Lars Bolund 
Hanne Brandt 
Professor, MD, Peter Elsass 
Kirsten Fredsted 
Svend Erik Haase 
CEO Kurt Hansen 
Mrs. Inger Hee 
Anny Borch Jensen 
Lis Truels Jensen 
Head Nurse Jytte Rønnow Jessen 
Department chief, veterinarian, Ib Knudsen 
Nurse Vera Kristensen 
Cashier Bent Lassen 
Marianne Mayntz 
Major consultant, MD, Knud Aage Møller 
Former major Agnethe Nielsen 
Former minister Aase Olesen 
Major consultant, MD, Torben Palshof 
Major consultant, MD, Carsten Rose 
Mrs. Kirsten Blume Schmidt 
Lona Skjørbæk 
Vice major Inger Stad 
Connie Steenberg 
Christian Stentoft 
Major Consultant, MD, E.B. Thorling 
Major consultant, MD, Jørgen Ørnsholt 





















The Executive Committee 
Professor, MD, Jens Kr. Gøtrik ( chairman) 
CEO John Christensen 
Professor, MD, Lars Bolund 
Former minister Aase Olesen 
Vice major Inger Stad 
 
The Scientific Council 
Professor, MD, John Philip(chairman) 
Professor Julio E. Celis 
Associate professor, MD, Reidar Albrechtsen 
Major Consultant, MD, Bo van Deurs 
Professor Timo Hakulinen 
Major consultant, MD, Peter Hokland 
Major consultant, MD, Sverre Heim 
Major consultant, MD, Torsten Landberg 
Research head, Elsebeth Lynge 
Professor, MD, Hans von der Maase 
Major Consultant, MD, Jens Vuust 





























Director: Nina Würtzen 
 
Head Board:  
Professor, MD, Jens Kr. Gøtrik (chairman) 
CEO John Christensen 
Karen Baungaard 
Assistant senior researcher Søren M. Bentzen 
Engineer John Bill 
Professor, MD, Lars Bolund 
Hanne Brandt 
Professor, MD, Peter Elsass 
Kirsten Fredsted 
Svend Erik Haase 
CEO Kurt Hansen 
Marie Hansen 
Anny Borch Jensen 
Lis Truels Jensen 
Head Nurse Jytte Rønnow Jessen 
Nurse Vera Kristensen 
Cashier Bent Lassen 
Marianne Mayntz 
Major consultant, MD, Knud Aage Møller 
Former major Agnethe Nielsen 
Former minister Aase Olesen 
Major consultant, MD, Torben Palshof 
Sonja Poulsen 




Major consultant, MD, Jørgen Ørnsholt 
























The Executive Committee 
Professor, MD, Jens Kr. Gøtrik ( chairman) 
CEO John Christensen 
Professor, MD, Lars Bolund 
Kirsten Fredsted 
CEO Kurt Hansen 
 
The Scientific Council 
Professor, MD, John Philip(chairman) 
Professor Julio E. Celis 
Professor, MD, Hans von der Maase 
Professor Elisabeth Bock 
Major Consultant, MD, Bo van Deurs 
Professor Timo Hakulinen 
Major consultant, MD, Peter Hokland 
Professor, MD, Ole Kronborg 
Major consultant, MD, Torsten Landberg 
Research head, Elsebeth Lynge 
Major Consultant, MD, Jens Vuust 






























Director: Nina Würtzen 
 
Head Board:  
Professor, MD, Jens Kr. Gøtrik (chairman) 




Major consultant, MD, Kamma Bertelsen 




CEO Kurt Hansen 
Marie Hansen 
Bodil Lykke Holm 
Senior Researcher Marja Jättelä 
Anny Borch Jensen 
Mette Jespersen 
Head Nurse Jytte Rønnow Jessen 
Nurse Vera Kristensen 
Cashier Bent Lassen 
Major consultant, MD, Knud Aage Møller 
Finance Officer Jørgen Nørgaard 
Major consultant, MD, Torben Palshof 
Professor, MD, John Philip 
Sonja Poulsen 
Physician secretary Marie Lykke Rasmussen 
MD Inger Sahlholdt 
Connie Steenberg 
IT-assistant Melissa Wieser 
Major consultant, MD, Jørgen Ørnsholt 
























The Executive Committee 
Professor, MD, Jens Kr. Gøtrik ( chairman) 
CEO John Christensen 
Professor, MD, Lars Bolund 
Banker Hanne Brandt 
CEO Kurt Hansen 
 
The Scientific Council 
Professor, MD, Hans von der Maase (new 
chairman) 
Research head, Elsebeth Lynge 
MD, ph.d., Jiri Bartek 
Professor Julio E. Celis 
Professor Elisabeth Bock 
Major consultant, MD, Per Dombernowsky 
Professor Timo Hakulinen 
Professor, MD, Sverre Heim 
Major consultant, MD, Peter Hokland 
Professor, MD, Hans Skovgaard Poulsen 
Professor, MD, Jørgen Rygaard 
Professor, MD, Ole Kronborg 
Lecturer, MSc, Ole Westergaard 






























Associate professor Dr. Hens Henrik Andersen, The 
Physics Department, Aarhus University. 
 
Professor Brian F. C. Clark, The Chemistry 
Department, Aarhus University. 
 
Professor Willi Dansgaard, Geophysical Isoptope 
Laboratory, Copenhagen University. 
 
Professor  Tom Fenchel, Department for Genetics and 
Ecology, Aarhus University. 
 
Professor Peter Johansen, Department for Datalogy, 
Copenhagen University. 
 
Professor Leif Kristensen, Mathematics Department, 
Aarhus University. 
 
MSc Niels Lund, Danish Space Research Institute. 
 
Professor Valdemar Mikkelsen, KVL, Botanical 
Department. 
 
Department head Hans Bjerrum Møller, Research 
Centre Risø. 
 
Professor Kurt Nordström, Department for Molecular 
Biology, Odense University. 
 
Professor Christian Pedersen, Department for Organic 
Chemistry, DTH. 
 
Professor Eigil Præstgaard, Roskilde University 
Centre. 
 
Professor Henning Sørensen (chairman), Department 
for Petrology, Virum. 
 




The MRC:  
Professor Paul Backer, Department for General 
Medicine, Copenhagen University. 
 
Associate professor, Dr. Hans Bndgaard, The Danish 
Pharmaceutical School. 
 
Professor and major consultant MD Viggo Faber, 
Epidemiology Department M, Rigshospitalet. 
 
Professor MD J. Fabricius, Clinical physiological 
Department, Odense University. 
 
Professor Ole Fejerskov, Aarhus Dentistry School. 
 
Associate professor, Svend Juul, Department for social 
medicine, Aarhus University. 
 
Professor MD Poul Kildeberg (chairman), Paediatric 
Department J, Odense University. 
 
Professor Bodil Jerslev Lund. 
 
Professor Frank Lundquist, Biochemical Department 
A, Copenhagen University. 
 
Professor MD Jens F. Rehfeld, Clinical-chemical 
Department CL, Rigshospitalet. 
 
Professor MD Mogens Schou, The Psychiatric 
Hospital, Aarhus. 
 
Professor and major consultant Bent Sørensen, 
Department for Plastic Surgery, Hvidovre Hospital.  
 
Chief Medical Officer Søren K. Sørensen, The 
National Health Board.  
 
Chief psychologist alice Theilgaard, Psychiatric 
Department 0, Rigshospitalet. 
 



















Associate professor Dr. Hens Henrik Andersen 
(chairman), The Physics Department, Aarhus 
University. 
 
Professor Svend Olav Andersen, Department for 
Biological Chemistry A, Copenhagen University. 
 
Professor Brian F. C. Clark, The Chemistry 
Department, Aarhus University. 
 
Professor Willi Dansgaard, Geophysical Isoptope 
Laboratory, Copenhagen University. 
 
Associate professor Lauritz B. Holm-Nielsen, 
Botanical Department, Aarhus University. 
 
Professor Peter Johansen, Department for Datalogy, 
Copenhagen University. 
 
Professor Leif Kristensen, Mathematics Department, 
Aarhus University. 
 
MSc Niels Lund, Danish Space Research Institute. 
 
Professor Valdemar Mikkelsen, KVL, Botanical 
Department. 
 
Vice Director Hans Bjerrum Møller, Research Centre 
Risø. 
 
Professor Christian Pedersen, Department for Organic 
Chemistry, DTH. 
 
Professor Eigil Præstgaard, Roskilde University 
Centre. 
 
Professor Henning Sørensen, Department for 
Petrology, Virum. 
 
Professor Erik W. Thulstrup, Chemical Department, 
DLH. 
 
Professor Roy E. Weber, Biological Department, 




The MRC:  
Professor Paul Backer, Department for General 
Medicine, Copenhagen University. 
 
Professor MD Gunnar Bendixen, Medical Department 
A, Rigshospitalet. 
 
Associate professor, Dr. Hans Bundgaard, The Danish 
Pharmaceutical School. 
 
Professor MD J. Fabricius, Clinical-physiological 
Department, Odense University. 
 
Professor Ole Fejerskov, Aarhus Dentistry School. 
 
Associate professor, Svend Juul, Department for social 
medicine, Aarhus University. 
 
Professor MD Poul Kildeberg (chairman), Paediatric 
Department J, Odense University. 
 
Professor Bodil Jerslev Lund. 
 
Professor Frank Lundquist, Biochemical Department 
A, Copenhagen University. 
 
Professor MD Jens F. Rehfeld, Clinical-chemical 
Department CL, Rigshospitalet. 
 
Professor MD Mogens Schou, The Psychiatric 
Hospital, Aarhus. 
 
Professor MD Morten Simonsen, Department for 
Experimental Immunology, Copenhagen University. 
 
Professor and major consultant Bent Sørensen, 
Department for Plastic Surgery, Hvidovre Hospital.  
 
Chief psychologist Alice Theilgaard, Psychiatric 
Department 0, Rigshospitalet. 
 

















The NSRC:  
 
Associate professor Dr. Hens Henrik Andersen 
(chairman), The Physics Laboratory II, Copehagen 
University. 
 
Professor Svend Olav Andersen, Department for 
Biological Chemistry A, Copenhagen University. 
 
Professor Brian F. C. Clark, The Chemistry 
Department, Aarhus University. 
 
Professor Willi Dansgaard, Geophysical Isoptope 
Laboratory, Copenhagen University. 
 
Associate professor Lauritz B. Holm-Nielsen, 
Botanical Department, Aarhus University. 
 
Professor Niels Haarløv, Department for Zoology, 
KVL. 
 
Professor Peter Johansen, Department for Datalogy, 
Copenhagen University. 
 
Professor Leif Kristensen, Mathematics Department, 
Aarhus University. 
 
MSc Niels Lund, Danish Space Research Institute. 
 
Vice Director Hans Bjerrum Møller, Research Centre 
Risø. 
 
Professor Christian Pedersen, Department for Organic 
Chemistry, DTH. 
 
Professor Eigil Præstgaard, Roskilde University 
Centre. 
 
Professor Henning Sørensen, Department for 
Petrology, Virum. 
 
Professor Erik W. Thulstrup, Chemical Department, 
DLH. 
 
Professor Roy E. Weber, Biological Department, 




The MRC:  
Professor Paul Backer, Department for General 
Medicine, Copenhagen University. 
 
Professor MD Gunnar Bendixen, Medical Department 
A, Rigshospitalet. 
Professor MD Lars Bolund, Department for Human 
Genetics, Aarhus University. 
 
Associate professor, Dr. Hans Bundgaard, The 
Chemistry Department AD, Danish Pharmaceutical 
School. 
 
Professor MD J. Fabricius, Clinical-physiological 
Department, Odense University. 
 
Professor Ole Fejerskov, Aarhus Dentistry School. 
 
Major consultant MD Rasmus Fog, Psychiatric 
Department E, Skt. Hans Hospital. 
 
Professor MD Poul Kildeberg (chairman), Paediatric 
Department J, Odense University. 
 
Professor Bodil Jerslev Lund, Danish Pharmaceutical 
School. 
 
Major consultant MD Nis I. Nissen, Medical 
Department, The Finsen Institute. 
 
Professor MD Morten Simonsen, Department for 
Experimental Immunology, Copenhagen University. 
 
Professor and major consultant Bent Sørensen, 
Department for Plastic Surgery, Hvidovre Hospital.  
 
Chief psychologist Alice Theilgaard, Psychiatric 
Department 0, Rigshospitalet. 
 
Head of Department, MD, Jens Otto Wieth, 
Department for Biophysics, Copenhagen University.  
 

















The NSRC:  
 
Associate professor Dr. Hens Henrik Andersen 
(chairman), The Physics Laboratory II, Copenhagen 
University. 
 
Professor Svend Olav Andersen, Department for 
Biological Chemistry A, Copenhagen University. 
 
Professor Brian F. C. Clark, The Chemistry 
Department, Aarhus University. 
 
Professor Willi Dansgaard, Geophysical Isoptope 
Laboratory, Copenhagen University. 
 
Associate professor Lauritz B. Holm-Nielsen, 
Botanical Department, Aarhus University. 
 
Professor Niels Haarløv, Department for Zoology, 
KVL. 
 
Associate professor Hans Peter Jensen, Chemical 
Laboratory A, DTH. 
 
Section leader Jørgen K. Kjems, Physics Department, 
Research Station Risø. 
 
Professor Leif Kristensen, Mathematics Department, 
Aarhus University. 
 
Professor Gunnar Larsen, Geological Department, 
Aarhus University. 
 
MSc Niels Lund, Danish Space Research Institute. 
 
Associate professor Mogens Nielsen, Datalogical 
Department, Aarhus Unievrsity. 
 
Professor Eigil Præstgaard, Roskilde University 
Centre. 
 
Professor Henning Sørensen, Department for 
Petrology, Virum. 
 
Professor Roy E. Weber, Biological Department, 
Odense University.  
 
Suppleant for Roy E. Weber: Professor Axel 
Michelsen, Biological Department, Odense University. 
 
 
The MRC:  
 
Professor Daniel Andersen, Surgical Department K, 
Odense Hospital. 
 
Professor Paul Backer, Department for General 
Medicine, Copenhagen University. 
 
Professor MD Gunnar Bendixen (chairman), Medical 
Department A, Rigshospitalet. 
 
Associate professor, MD, Elisabeth Bock, The Protein 
Laboratory, Copenhagen University.  
 
Professor MD Lars Bolund, Department for Human 
Genetics, Aarhus University. 
 
Associate professor, Dr. Hans Bundgaard, The 
Chemistry Department AD, Danish Pharmaceutical 
School. 
 
Professor MD  J. Fabricius, Clinical-physiological 
Department, Odense University. 
 
Major consultant MD Rasmus Fog, Psychiatric 
Department E, Skt. Hans Hospital. 
 
Professor Bodil Jerslev Lund, Danish Pharmaceutical 
School. 
 
Major consultant MD Nis I. Nissen, Medical 
Department, The Finsen Institute. 
 
Professor J. J. Pindborg, Department for Pathology and 
Medicine, Copenhagen University.  
 
Professor MD Morten Simonsen, Department for 
Experimental Immunology, Copenhagen University. 
 
Chief psychologist Alice Theilgaard, Psychiatric 
Department 0, Rigshospitalet. 
 
Associate professor OveNorén, Biochemical 














The NSRC:  
 
Professor Torkild Andersen, Physics Department, 
Aarhus University. 
 
Professor Christian Berg, Department for Mathematics, 
Copenhagen University. 
 
Professor Brian F. C. Clark, The Chemistry 
Department, Aarhus University. 
 
Professor Willi Dansgaard, Geophysical Isoptope 
Laboratory, Copenhagen University. 
 
Associate professor Lauritz B. Holm-
Nielsen,(chairman), Botanical Department, Aarhus 
University. 
 
Dean and professor  Hans Peter Jensen, 
Administration, DTH. 
 
Section leader Jørgen K. Kjems, Physics Department, 
Research Station Risø. 
 
Professor Gunnar Larsen, Geological Department, 
Aarhus University. 
 
MSc Niels Lund, Danish Space Research Institute. 
 
Professor Agnete Munch-Petersen, Department for 
Biological Chemistry B, Copenhagen University. 
 
Associate professor Mogens Nielsen, Datalogical 
Department, Aarhus Unievrsity. 
 
Associate Professor Jytte R. Nilsson, Department for 
Cell Biology and Anatomy, Copenhagen University. 
 
Professor Eigil Præstgaard, Roskilde University 
Centre. 
 
Professor MD Erik Skadhauge, Department for 
Veterinary Physiology and Biochemistry, KVL. 
 
Professor Roy E. Weber, Biological Department, 
Odense University.  
 
The MRC:  
 
Professor Daniel Andersen, Surgical Department K, 
Odense Hospital. 
 
Professor Paul Backer, Department for General 
Medicine, Copenhagen University. 
 
Associate professor, MD, Elisabeth Bock, The Protein 
Laboratory, Copenhagen University.  
 
Professor MD Lars Bolund, Department for Human 
Genetics, Aarhus University. 
 
Director MD Claus Bræstrup, NOVO Industri A/S. 
 
Associate professor, Dr. Hans Bundgaard, The 
Chemistry Department AD, Danish Pharmaceutical 
School. 
 
Major consultant MD Rasmus Fog, Psychiatric 
Department E, Skt. Hans Hospital. 
 
Major consultant MD Jørn Giese, Clinical-
physiological Department, KAS. 
 
Professor Bodil Jerslev Lund, Danish Pharmaceutical 
School. 
 
Professor Arvid Maunsbach, Anatomical Department 
A, Aarhus University. 
 
Major consultant MD Nis I. Nissen, Medical 
Department, The Finsen Institute. 
 
Professor J. J. Pindborg (chairman), Department for 
Pathology and Medicine, Copenhagen University.  
 
Professor Jørn Olsen, Social Medicine Department, 
Aarhus University. 
 
Professor MD Morten Simonsen, Department for 
Experimental Immunology, Copenhagen University. 
 
Associate professor Ove Norén, Biochemical 















The NSRC:  
 
Professor Torkild Andersen, Physics Department, 
Aarhus University. 
 
Professor Christian Berg, Department for Mathematics, 
Copenhagen University. 
 
Professor Willi Dansgaard, Geophysical Isoptope 
Laboratory, Copenhagen University. 
 
Associate professor Lauritz B. Holm-Nielsen, The 
Researcher Academy, Aarhus. 
 
Dean and professor  Hans Peter Jensen, 
Administration, DTH. 
 
Section leader Jørgen K. Kjems, Physics Department, 
Research Station Risø. 
 
Professor Gunnar Larsen, Geological Department, 
Aarhus University. 
 
MSc Niels Lund, Danish Space Research Institute. 
 
Professor Kjeld Marcker, Department for Molecular 
Biology and Plant Physiology, Aarhus University. 
 
Professor Agnete Munch-Petersen, Department for 
Biological Chemistry B, Copenhagen University. 
 
Associate professor Mogens Nielsen, Datalogical 
Department, Aarhus Unievrsity. 
 
Associate Professor Jytte R. Nilsson, Department for 
Cell Biology and Anatomy, Copenhagen University. 
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Appendix D: Central institutions 
 
 
The Danish Cancer Registry: Founded by Johannes Clemmesen and the Danish Cancer Society in 
1942. It is an institution with the purpose of producing cancer statistics and epidemiological 
research based on the reported caner incidences and cancer related deaths in the country.  
 
The Danish Cancer Society: A private cancer charity founded in 1928. Its main activities are 
cancer research, cancer education, and counselling of cancer patients and their families. The charity 
finances more than 50 % of all cancer research in the country. Its head offices are located in 
Copenhagen, but it has smaller regional departments all over the country. 
 
The Copenhagen University: Founded in 1479. It accommodates more than 30 000 students and 
7000 scientific and technical/administrative personnel. With over 100 different types of educations, 
it is the largest educational institute in the country.  
 
The Fibiger Laboratory/Institute: The Fibiger Laboratory was founded in 1949 by the Danish 
Cancer Society and the Copenhagen University and it was located at the university. In 1965, it was 
made an independent institute and it was later moved to the Finsen area. It is a cancer research 
institution and it is owned and operated by the private cancer society.  
 
The Finsen Institute and the Finsen Laboratory: Originally a self-owning institution founded in 
1896 with the purpose of continuing the Nobel laureate Niels Finsen’s radiation treatment of skin 
diseases (incl. cancers). In cooperation with the Danish Cancer Society, the institute was converted 
into a small hospital specialising in cancer treatment. In 1981, the institute was officially fused with 
the Rigshospitalet, to which the small private hospital’s patients and oncology wards were finally 
moved in 1990. The Finsen Laboratory, a lab for experimental cancer research, was left behind at 
the Finsen premises, and the remaining buildings were eventually occupied by the Danish Cancer 
Society and its research units (the Society had already bought one the buildings for its Fibiger 
Institute that neighboured the Finsen Lab). 
 
The Rigshospitalet: The State-owned hospital was founded in 1910 and located at Blegdamsvej in 
Copenhagen. The hospital was restructured and expanded from the 1960’s onwards until it became 
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